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CISPES AND FBI COUNTER-
TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF EEPEESENTATIYES

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JUNE 13 AND SEPTEMBER 16, 1988

Serial No. 122

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
92-568 WASHINGTON : 1989

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

PETER W. RODINO, Jr.,
JACK BROOKS, Texas
ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, Wisconsin
DON EDWARDS, California
JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
ROMANO L. MAZZOLI, Kentucky
WILLIAM J. HUGHES, New Jersey
MIKE SYNAR, Oklahoma
PATRICIA SCHROEDER, Colorado
DAN GLICKMAN, Kansas
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
GEO. W. CROCKETT, Jr., Michigan
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
BRUCE A. MORRISON, Connecticut
EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio
LAWRENCE J. SMITH, Florida
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
HARLEY O. STAGGERS, Jr., West Virginia
JOHN BRYANT, Texas
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland

M. Elaine Mielke
Arthur P. Endres,
Alan F. Coffey, Jr.

New Jersey, Chairman
HAMILTON FISH, Jr., New York
CARLOS J. MOORHEAD, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
DAN LUNGREN, California
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,

Wisconsin
BILL McCOLLUM, Florida
E. CLAY SHAW, Jr., Florida
GEORGE W. GEKAS, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL DeWINE, Ohio
WILLIAM E. DANNEMEYER, California
PATRICK L. SWINDALL, Georgia
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
D. FRENCH SLAUGHTER, Jr., Virginia
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

General Counsel
Jr., Staff Director
Associate Counsel

Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights

DON EDWARDS, California, Chairman
ROBERT W. KASTENMEIER, Wisconsin F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,

JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan Wisconsin
PATRICIA SCHROEDER, Colorado MICHAEL DeWINE, Ohio

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York WILLIAM E. DANNEMEYER, California

Catherine A. LeRoy, Counsel
Ivy L. Davis, Assistant Counsel
Stuart J. Ishimaru, Assistant Counsel
James X. Dempsey, Assistant Counsel
Alan Slobodin, Associate Counsel

(ID

CONTENTS

HEARINGS HELD Page

June 13, 1988 1

September 16, 1988 113

WITNESSES

Bass, Kenneth C, III, Venable, Baetjer & Howard, McLean, VA 47

Prepared statement 50

Finn, John, professor, Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT 70

Prepared statement 73

Halperin, Morton H., director, Washington office, American Civil Liberties

Union, Washington, DC 2

Prepared statement 5

Richard, Eric L., Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Washington, DC 56

Prepared statement 59

Sessions, Hon. William S., Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Wash-
ington, DC 116

Prepared statement 128

Stern, Gary M., Center for National Security Studies, Washington, DC 2

Prepared statement 5

Toohey, D. Caroll, Deputy Assistant Director, Inspection Division, Federal

Bureau of Investigation, Washington, DC 116

APPENDIXES

Appendix 1. — Letter dated July 15, 1988, from Chairman Don Edwards to

Director William S. Sessions 195

Appendix 2. — Letter dated October 4, 1988, from Chairman Don Edwards to

Director William S. Sessions 197

Appendix 3. — Letter dated September 16, 1988, from Russell B. Christensen,

staff attorney, Ayuda, Inc 199

Appendix 4. — Selected FBI documents released under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act 201

(in)

CISPES AND FBI COUNTERTERRORISM
INVESTIGATIONS

MONDAY, JUNE 13, 1988

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights,

Committee on the Judiciary,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:30 p.m., in room
2237, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Don Edwards
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Members present: Representatives Edwards, Schroeder, Kasten-
meier, and Conyers.

Staff present: James X. Dempsey, assistant counsel; Alan M. Slo-
bodin, associate minority counsel; and Catherine A. LeRoy, counsel.

The subcommittee will come to order.

Mrs. Schroeder. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Edwards. The gentlewoman from Colorado.

Mrs. Schroeder. I ask unanimous consent the subcommittee
permit coverage in whole or in part by television broadcast, radio
broadcast or still photography in accordance with rule 5.

Mr. Edwards. Without objection, so ordered.

This afternoon the subcommittee examines an issue of longstand-
ing concern: the constitutional and other limits that should apply
to the FBI's investigations of domestic groups that oppose this gov-
ernment's foreign policy. Such cases raise issues of predication,
scope and duration.

By predication, we refer to what information the FBI had at the
time it opened the case. I have always said that there must be
some latitude given to the FBI in deciding when to open an investi-
gation, and the guidelines on domestic terrorism reflect this. Espe-
cially for a preliminary inquiry, the threshold is very low.

By scope, we refer to the focus of an investigation: who or what
is under scrutiny and how broadly the FBI may extend its inquiry.
To say that the predication for opening an investigation was ade-
quate says nothing about the scope of the case.

The most reliable protection as to scope is the criminal standard.
If the FBI is investigating criminal activity and seeking evidence
on which to base a prosecution, then the criminal statutes serve to
define the scope of the investigation.

However, many Americans would be surprised to learn that the
FBI does not have to focus on criminal activity when it is dealing
with international terrorism. If a domestic group is alleged to be
supportive of a foreign group that has been labeled terrorist, then

(l)

the domestic group is subject to investigation on that basis alone.
The lack of a criminal standard can leave agents wondering what
they can monitor and what is off limits.

This past January, the release under the Freedom of Information
Act of FBI documents regarding the CISPES case brought renewed
attention to these issues. The Director of the FBI has on his desk
an internal audit of the CISPES case and he will be testifying
before us when he has completed his review.

To aid us in outlining the issues and setting the stage for the Di-
rector's report, we have called on four witnesses with expertise in
these matters, and we look forward to their testimony.

[The witnesses were sworn.]

Mr. Edwards. Our first witness is Morton Halperin, Director of
the ACLU's Washington office. He is accompanied by Gary Stern of
the Center for National Security Studies. I believe I will introduce
each witness as they testify.

TESTIMONY OF MORTON HALPERIN, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON
OFFICE, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, ACCOMPANIED
BY GARY M. STERN, CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
STUDIES

Mr. Edwards. Mr. Halperin, do you want to proceed, please?

Mr. Halperin. Thank you very much. We very much appreciate
this opportunity to appear here. I want to take this opportunity to
once again express our appreciation for your leadership not only on
this issue, but civil liberties issues in general.

Mr. Edwards. Mr. Halperin, forgive me. Does the gentlewoman
from Colorado have a statement?

Mrs. Schroeder. That is fine, Mr. Chairman. I want to compli-
ment you for having these hearings and staying on this issue.

Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Mrs. Schroeder.

Mr. Halperin. We believe that the FBI's CISPES investigation
clearly demonstrates the inadequacies of the FBI's guidelines for
conducting international terrorism investigations directed against
Americans. The CISPES investigation demonstrates that the cur-
rent FBI guidelines have failed to protect Americans from improp-
er government surveillance. For 27 months, the FBI conducted sur-
veillance of a nationwide political organization on a scale not seen
since the 1960s and early 1970s, when civil rights and antiwar or-
ganizations were targets of FBI domestic spying.

In looking through these files one could not help but be remind-
ed of at least some aspects of those past investigations, the kinds of
investigations that we thought were behind us, and that we
thought the Bureau had repudiated some time ago.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, there were proposals from the
Church Committee and the House Intelligence Committee to enact
legislative charters for the FBI and for intelligence agencies in gen-
eral, and that simply was not done, and therefore, we have been
forced to rely on guidelines that were issued by a series of Attor-
neys General that were meant to avoid the abuses of the past.

I think it is now clear, as we and many others argued at the
time, that guidelines could not be sufficient. They could not be suf-
ficient because inevitably they would be drawn in a way that would

leave loopholes and because they could be changed. As you recall,
they were at the beginning of this Administration, to give more
latitude to the Bureau in conducting such investigations.

We believe the record shows, and as you know, we have now
done a careful report of the record, that there was a wide-ranging,
undefined, and in many ways, improperly supervised investigation,
which infringed on constitutional rights. We have looked, as you
suggested, both at the initiation of the investigation and at the con-
duct of the investigation.

As far as the initiation is concerned, I think our conclusion,
while tentative, given that the Bureau has still not released the
critical documents which specify the information they had at this
point, our conclusion is that the start of the investigation may not
have violated the FBI's guidelines, but from that we conclude not
that the initiation was proper, but that the guidelines are not
proper, because we think it is inappropriate for the Bureau to have
the authority to launch a wide-ranging investigation of this kind of
a political organization on the evidence, even treating it in the best
light favorable to the Bureau, that it had at the time. That, in our
view, strengthens the case for a legislative predicate and one which
is tighter than the existing guidelines.

When you come to the investigation itself, the report which we
released today, prepared by Mr. Stern, I think demonstrates very
clearly that the guidelines were, in fact, violated, that the Bureau
engaged in a wide-ranging investigation of a domestic political or-
ganization, and that it gathered information about the lawful polit-
ical activity of that organization, and that it did so without really
paying attention to the question of what it was learning and
whether what it was learning related at all to what it was investi-
gating.

I think we need to keep in mind that the purpose of the investi-
gation ostensibly was to find out whether CISPES was providing
support for international terrorism in El Salvador, and presumably
secondarily, whether at the direction of some political group in El
Salvador was engaging in terrorist activity in the United States.

But if you look through the pages and pages of the files, there
just is no information gathered on that subject. Rather, what the
Bureau agents did was to go to public meetings as if CISPES was
being used as a cover for terrorism, somebody would stand up in a
public meeting, to which anyone could go, and detail the terrorist
activities that the organization was planning to engage in, or the
illegal support that they were giving to a terrorist group in El Sal-
vador.

Clearly if something like that was going on, it could not have
been discovered by attending public meetings and listening to
public speeches, nor was there any purpose related to that in re-
cording attendance at the public meetings, or listing the other or-
ganizations that were associated with CISPES at various meetings.
Yet, all of that information is in fact in the record.

Our view is the same as it was when we testified before this com-
mittee and other committees at the time when these issues first de-
veloped, and again at the beginning of the Reagan Administra-
tion — that there needs to be a legislative charter and a comprehen-
sive legislative charter, for the FBI and the intelligence agencies.

We would urge you to consider in the interim, since that project
will take some time, and inevitably will take the cooperation of the
Justice Department — which I doubt you will have in the next eight
months at least — that you consider enacting a more limited stat-
ute, one that focuses on the specific question of the predication for
and the conduct of investigations involving groups that are en-
gaged in lawful political activity and which may also be engaged in
terrorist activities.

We suggest in more detail in our testimony, and I would ask the
full statement, as well as our report, be made part of the record.

Mr. Edwards. Without objection, the full statement and report
will be made part of the record.

Mr. Halperin. What we suggest is the distinction between an
international terrorist organization and a domestic terrorist organi-
zation is not helpful for these purposes, and that the Congress
ought to enact a single standard for investigating organizations op-
erating in the United States, whether they are believed to be con-
trolled from abroad or not, and that that standard require a crimi-
nal predicate, the belief that the organization is engaged in crimi-
nal activity, and then that the investigation be supervised in a way
that ensures that there will not again be the gathering of this kind
of information.

I think one does have to say that some things have improved. I
don't want to end before acknowledging that as far as we know,
there was no attempt to manipulate political activity, that this in-
vestigation, at least in the documents that have been released so
far, shows that the Bureau limited itself to gathering information
rather than seeking to disrupt the organization. If that turns out to
be true, that is certainly a major step forward from the sixties.

Secondly, that there was at least from time to time review of this
by the Justice Department and the investigation was again appar-
ently terminated as a result of the internal Justice Department in-
vestigation. That is again a step forward.

But we think those few steps are very modest as compared to the
serious implications for the First Amendment of these kinds of in-
vestigations.

I want to once again commend you for holding these hearings
and urge you to move forward with legislation in this area.
Thank you.

[The statement of Mr. Halperin and the report of the Center for
National Security Studies follow:]

PREPARED TESTIMONY
AND

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
OF

MORTON H. HALPERIN
DIRECTOR

WASHINGTON OFFICE, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

AND

GARY M. STERN
RESEARCH ASSOCIATE
CENTER FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES

THE FBI'S CISPES INVESTIGATION
BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

OF THE

HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
JUNE 13, 1988

Mr. Chairman,

We very much appreciate this opportunity to testify on
behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union on the FBI's
investigation of the Committee in Solidarity with the People of
El Salvador (CISPES) . The ACLU is a non-partisan organization of
over 250,000 members dedicated to the defense and enhancement of
civil liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.

The FBI ' s CISPES investigation vividly demonstrates the
inadequacy of the FBI's guidelines for conducting international
terrorism investigations directed at Americans. The CISPES
investigation demonstrates that the current FBI guidelines have
failed to protect Americans from improper government
surveillance. For twenty-seven months, the FBI conducted
surveillance of a nationwide political organization on a scale
not seen since the 1960's and early 1970 's, when civil rights and
anti-war organizations were targets of FBI domestic spying.

The files released through the Freedom of Information Act
show that the FBI investigation was reminiscent in some respects
of earlier FBI activities that had been exposed and repudiated
more than a decade ago. The post-Watergate investigation by the
Church Committee in 1976 revealed the extensive damage done to
individuals and political groups by the FBI's political
intelligence and counterintelligence (COINTELPRO) activities. The
committee conclusion bears repeating:

Too many people have been spied upon by too many

government agencies and too much information has been
collected. The Government has often undertaken the
secret surveillance of citizens on the basis of their
political beliefs, even when those beliefs posed no
threat of violence or illegal acts on behalf of a
hostile foreign power. . . . Groups and individuals
have been harassed and disrupted because of their
political views and their lifestyles.

The subsequent legislative efforts to reform and control FBI
conduct based on the Church Committee's 1976 recommendations,
however, were not successful. That failure left the door open
for a return to past practices that should have been, and should
now be, permanently prohibited.

Though legislative reforms were not enacted at that time,
the Attorney General has issued guidelines to ensure that it did
not repeat the abuses associated with past investigations. Those
guidelines were clearly not sufficient to achieve their stated
goals. They failed to keep the Bureau's investigation of CISPES
within prescribed bounds. The FBI involved itself in monitoring
on a nationwide scale the "political activities involving First
Amendment Rights" of a political organization comprised of dozens
of chapters and thousands of members. As an investigation that
targeted a domestic political activist organization under the
international terrorism guidelines for well over two years, the
record shows that it was relatively wide-ranging, undefined,

unsupervised, and infringed on constitutionally protected rights.

The CISPES files indicate that the FBI never squared its
goals with its methods. Even presuming the facts at the time most
favorable to the Bureau, widescale monitoring of public events
served no apparent purpose toward achieving the FBI ' s stated
objective under the FCI investigation, which was to determine
whether CISPES was "knowingly aiding and abetting terrorists in
the conduct of international terroristic activities" by operating
as a front group to hide its alleged covert activities. A front
organization, it is worth noting, is not going to reveal its
hidden agenda in its public activities. If the FBI's goal was to
determine whether or not the alleged clandestine support existed,
the investigation should have been narrow and precise, focused
exclusively on those persons actually suspected of illegal
activity.

Today the ACLU is releasing a Report, prepared by Gary Stern
of its Center for National Security Studies, that analyzes the
CISPES investigation based on the publicly released information.
This report first considers whether the FBI had sufficient
justification to initiate an investigation of CISPES as an
international terrorist organization. An analysis of the CISPES
files suggests that the basis (or "predicate") for doing so was
extremely weak. However, because the FBI's operating guidelines
allow investigations to proceed upon extremely vague foundations,
the FBI may have had sufficient basis to conduct an initial,
limited investigation under its own guidelines. If that is the

case, it indicates that the guidelines do not confine the FBI
within constitutionally appropriate restraints.

The Report then focusses on the conduct and scope of the
investigation once it got under way. It examines the
instructions from FBI headquarters to its field offices and
evaluate the agency's decision to continue a "broad"
investigation even though it found no evidence of links to
terrorist activities. It also reviews the limited supervision of
the field investigation by headquarters, which gave lip service
to the need to respect the First Amendment but did not rein in
various field offices who reported activities that appeared to
violate its instructions.

The preliminary analysis reveals that some of the worst
excesses of the past have been avoided in this case: for
instance, at least according to the documents released thus far,
no preventive or disruptive action was taken against CISPES
(although some may have been contemplat ) . The investigators
appear to have limited their efforts to collecting information
and monitoring political activity. Furthermore, the new procedure
requiring annual review by the Justice Department, as delayed as
it was, did finally result in the investigation's termination.
Without such a review, CISPES could conceivably still be under

■1/ For example, one memo from the New Orleans field office
reads: "It is imperative at this time to formulate some plan of
attack against CISPES and specifically, against individuals,
[names are deleted] who defiantly display their contempt for the
U.S. government by making speeches and propagandizing their cause
while asking for political asylum." CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-128X
(Nov. 10, 1983).

surveillance. Nonetheless, now, as in the earlier incidents,
purely political activity became the subject of an extensive
investigation by the FBI.

Finally, this report offers proposals for legislative reform
to curtail the use of intelligence or terrorism investigations
against political organizations. The ACLU believes that all
investigations of political organizations should be based on
public, codified guidelines and should include frequent review to
ensure that they stay within the prescribed bounds. The ACLU also
believes that the present guidelines for intelligence and
terrorism investigations should be incorporated into a
comprehensive FBI charter.

Even without a comprehensive charter, the ACLU believes that
one publicly enunciated standard should apply for all criminal
intelligence investigations that may involve the collection of
information about the exercise of First Amendment rights relating
to acts occurring or originating in the United States, including
terrorism. 2/ As the CISPES case demonstrates, separate standards
allow the FBI to investigate all the activities of U.S. political
groups when just a small number of members are only suspected of
illegal action. The indication of a foreign connection should
not diminish the rights and protection normally afforded to
Americans who are suspected of politically motivated criminal

2/ The exception is for groups whose sole purpose is
criminal activity, such as the Mafia, regardless of what it
called itself. The FBI acknowledged, however, that CISPES was
for the most part engaged in legitimate First Amendment activity.

activity.

The mere collection of publicly available information can
have a significant adverse effect — a "chilling effect" — on
people's exercise of their constitutional rights. The fear of
possible government surveillance can chill people from
participating in certain activities. It is impossible to know
how, or even if, the information collected may come back to haunt
someone who has done absolutely nothing wrong. But experience
has shown, as documented by the Church Committee, that in cases
involving the intelligence surveillance of political
organizations, the potential for abuse tends to outweigh the
benefit of the information.

The CISPES investigation demonstrates a failure to ensure
that this balance does not fall against the private individual or
group. Yet, as the Church Committee experienced, it is very
difficult to "draw the fine line between legitimate
investigations of conduct and illegitimate investigations of
advocacy and association." But given the Bureau's history of
pursuing its investigative objectives with minimal efforts to
protect the constitutional rights of the people it is
investigating, we urge Congress to insist on stronger measures to
protect against improper and unnecessary investigations.

through activities that involve force or violence and a violation
of the federal criminal law. These investigations must be
conducted according to public guidelines that should apply even
when the persons are suspected to be agents of a foreign power or
involved in "international terrorism."

These investigations must be reviewed every ninety days to
ensure that there is a continuing basis for investigation and
that procedures for minimizing the intrusiveness of techniques
employed and information collected are effective and being
followed by agents conducting the investigation. This provision
ensures continued Attorney General participation and supervision
over all sensitive investigations.

Additionally, although this does not appear to have occurred
in the CISPES investigation, the FBI should not be able to
infiltrate someone into a leadership or decision making capacity
without disclosing that person's identity to the appropriate
official of the organization. Such infiltration invariably
distorts and undermines the political objectives of the groups
under investigation. The FBI should not be directing any person
in such a position to continue to act on the Bureau's behalf.

The CISPES investigation has exposed a serious deficiency in
the FBI's investigative authority. The current FBI guidelines
accommodate the demands of law enforcement without fully
protecting the lawful exercise of our constitutional rights.
Left to its own devices, the FBI, like any other investigative
agency, frequently tends to focus singlemindedly on its own

narrow goals while forsaking the protected liberties of its
targets. As the Church Committee Report commented: "The natural
tendency of Government is toward abuse of power. Men entrusted
with power, even those aware of its dangers, tend, particularly
when pressured, to slight liberty." Given this tendency and the
dangerous cost of its fulfillment, it is essential that Congress
enact legislation to secure, to the highest degree possible, our
rights and liberties against the threat of government abuse of
power.

The Center for
National Security Studies

THE FBI'S MISGUIDED PROBE

OF CISPES

by Gary M. Stern

CNSS Report No. ill
June 1988

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER 1 Was the FBI Justified in

Targeting CISPES as a Terrorist Group? 5

A. The First Investigation: Foreign Agency 5

B. The Second Investigation: Terrorism 6

C. Was the FBI's "Terrorism" Investigation Justified? 8

D. The FBI Targeted Dissent Not Terrorism 8

CHAPTER 2 Should the FBI's Investigation of CISPES

Have Been So Broad? 13

CHAPTER 3 The Failure of Headquarters' Supervision 17

A. The First Example: October 28, 1983 18

B. The Second Example: July 27, 1984 18

C. The Third Example: October 17, 1984 19

D. The Fourth Example: November 17, 1984 22

CHAPTER 4 Congress Should Enact an FBI Charter 25

A. The Current FBI Guidelines 25

B. The Need for a Charter 28

C. Proposed New Standards for Intelligence Investigations 30

D. Conclusion 34

Introduction

The FBI officially began its counterterrorism investigation of the Committee in

Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) on March 30, 1983.^ On that day,

the FBI Headquarters in Washington authorized eleven field offices to begin probing

the involvement of individuals and the CISPES organization in
international terrorism as it affects the El Salvadoran government,
and [authorized] the collection of foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence information as it relates to the international
terrorism aspects of this investigation.^

For the next twenty-seven months, the FBI conducted surveillance of this
nationwide political organization on a scale not seen since the 1960's and early 1970's,
when civil rights and anti-war organizations were targets of FBI domestic spying.

The full extent of the investigation began to come to light in January 1988 when
the FBI released portions of its files on the case in response to a Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights on behalf
of CISPES. Prior to that time, evidence of the probe had surfaced in a suit for back pay
by the FBI's key CISPES informant and in a congressional hearing. The files released
through the FOIA show that the FBI investigation was reminiscent in some respects of
earlier FBI activities that had been exposed and repudiated more than a decade ago.3/

The post-Watergate investigation by the Church Committee in 1976 revealed the
extensive damage done to individuals and political groups by the FBI's political

1. There had been an earlier criminal investigation under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. See infra

p.4.

2. FBI Headquarters File, CISPES, File Number 199-8848-1 (March 30, 1983), at p.6 [hereinafter CISPES-
HQ, # (date)].

3. These public documents constitute barely one-third of the total Headquarters file and are riddled with
many deletions (known in the trade as "redactions"). Consequently, this report pieces together information from
other FBI sources- public statements, testimony, and reports by FBI officials-in order to assemble the most
complete picture of the investigation possible from public sources.

2 The FBI's Misguided Probe of CISPES

intelligence and counterintelligence (COINTELPRO) activities. The committee concluded
that:

Too many people have been spied upon by too many government
agencies and too much information has been collected. The
Government has often undertaken the secret surveillance of citizens
on the basis of their political beliefs, even when those beliefs posed
no threat of violence or illegal acts on behalf of a hostile foreign
power. . . . Groups and individuals have been harassed and
disrupted because of their political views and their lifestyles.^

The subsequent legislative efforts to reform and control FBI conduct based on the
Church Committee's 1976 recommendations, however, were not successful. That failure
left the door open for a return to past practices that should have been, and should now
be, permanently prohibited.

Though legislative reforms were not enacted at that time, the FBI has adopted
guidelines to ensure that it did not repeat the abuses associated with past investigations.
Were those guidelines sufficient to achieve their stated goals? Did they succeed in this
case in keeping the CISPES investigation within prescribed bounds? The balance of this
report seeks to answer these questions.

Our preliminary analysis reveals that some of the worst excesses of the past have
been avoided in this case: for instance, no preventive or disruptive action was taken
against CISPES (although some may have been contemplated^/). The investigators appear
to have limited their efforts to collecting information and monitoring political activity.
Furthermore, the new procedure requiring annual review by the Justice Department, as
delayed as it was, did finally result in the investigation's termination. Without such a
review, CISPES could conceivably still be under surveillance. Nonetheless, now, as in the
earlier incidents, purely political activity became the subject of an extensive investigation
by the FBI.

This report focusses on two distinct questions arising from the CISPES
investigation. Chapter 1 asks whether the FBI had sufficient justification to initiate an

4. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate,
"Book II, Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans" (94th Cong., 2d Sess , Rep No <M-7SS), at S
[hereinafter Church Committee Report, Book II).

5. For example, one memo from the New Orleans field office reads: "It is imperative at this time to
formulate some plan of attack against CISPES and specifically, against individuals [names are deleted] who
defiantly display their contempt for the U.S. government by making speeches and propagandizing their cause
while asking for political asylum." CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-128X (Nov. 10, 1983).

INTRODUCTION 3

investigation of CISPES as an international terrorist organization. An analysis of the
CISPES files suggests that the basis (or "predicate") for doing so was extremely weak.
However, because the FBI's operating guidelines allow investigations to proceed upon
extremely vague foundations, the FBI may have had sufficient basis to conduct an initial,
limited investigation under its own guidelines. If that is the case, it indicates that the
guidelines do not confine the FBI within constitutionally appropriate restraints. (For a
discussion of the need for more stringent guidelines or a charter for the FBI, see
chapter 4.)

The second question concerns the conduct and scope of the investigation once it
got under way. Chapter 2 examines the instructions from FBI headquarters to its field
offices and evaluates the agency's decision to continue a "broad" investigation even
though it found no link to terrorist activities. Chapter 3 reviews the limited supervision
of the field investigation by headquarters, which gave lip service to the need to respect
the First Amendment but did not rein in various field offices who reported activities that
appeared to violate its instructions.

Finally, this report offers proposals for legislative reform (chapter 4) to curtail the
use of intelligence or terrorism investigations against political organizations. The ACLU
believes that all investigations of political organizations should be based on public,
codified guidelines and should include frequent review to ensure that they stay within
the prescribed bounds. The ACLU also believes that the present guidelines for
intelligence and terrorism investigations should be replaced with a general FBI charter.

CHAPTER 1

Was the FBI Justified in
Targeting CISPES as a Terrorist Group?

By its own admission, CISPES is an organization that "supports" the "opposition
movement in El Salvador [the Democratic Revolutionary Front {FDR} and the Farabundo
Marti Front for National Liberation {FMLN}] . . . [and] attempts to educate the U.S.
public regarding the situation in El Salvador, particularly the legitimacy of the broad
opposition movement represented by the FDR."^ These activities placed CISPES in
direct opposition to the Reagan Administration, which had made El Salvador the focus of
its Central America policy to prevent the success of any "communist" revolutionary
movements. The Administration also determined that the FMLN, which CISPES
"supported," was a terrorist organization. Throughout the FBI files in this case there are
indications that the FBI continued to target CISPES because of its legitimate exercise of
free speech in opposition to the policies of the Reagan Administration.

A. The First Investigation: Foreign Agency

In September 1981, the FBI opened a criminal investigation at the request of the
Department of Justice to determine whether CISPES was violating the Foreign Agents
Registration Act (FARA) by failing to register as an agent of a foreign entity-the
FMLN. After a six-month investigation, from September 3, 1981, to February 23, 1982,
the FBI concluded that "there was no specific evidence indicating CISPES was acting on
behalf of, or at the direction of a foreign power or group." Consequently, the FBI
officially ended its investigation of CISPES. However, the Bureau also noted that if a

6. CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-1, at 2.

6 The FBI's Misguided Probe of CISPES

formal link between the FMLN and CISPES could be determined in the future, it would
reopen the investigation.^

B. The Second Investigation: Terrorism

Thirteen months after ending the FARA investigation, on March 30, 1983, the FBI
began its international counterterrorism investigation of CISPES. The type of
investigation is important because each is covered by a different set of guidelines. The
so-called Smith Guidelines, which control all domestic security investigations, allow the
FBI to target only those persons who it reasonably suspects are actually involved in
criminal activity. The Foreign Counterintelligence Investigation (FCI) Guidelines, which
control all investigations of foreign origin, allow the Bureau to target whole groups even
if it suspects only a few of its members.^ Furthermore, the FCI Guidelines as a whole,
by raising the specter of "national security," have a looser predicate standard for
initiating investigations.

The initial foundation for labelling CISPES a "terrorist" group was a statement in
one of CISPES's own publications that it "provides international support for the
opposition movement in El Salvador." 9 ^ On top of this shaky, ambiguous base, the
bureau placed its next building blocks-two source reports. The first came from an FBI
informant, Frank Varelli, whose veracity the FBI has subsequently sought to challenge
and discredit.^ Varelli reported that CISPES's self-proclaimed "support" for the FMLN
included not only money, food, clothing, medical and school supplies to Salvadoran war

7. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, "An Interim Public Report on the
Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES)" (FBI, Criminal Investigative Division,
Counterterrorism Section, February 22, 1988), at 4 [hereinafter "Interim Report"].

8. For a fuller discussion of the FBI guidelines, see infra p.25.

9. CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-1, at 3 (emphasis added).

10. Executive Assistant FBI Director Oliver B. Revell conceded in testimony before a joint hearing of the
Senate Intelligence and Judiciary committees that Varelli provided "misinformation and disinformation . . . that
had misdirected the investigation." Washington Times. Feb. 24, 1988, at A4. Revell testified further that while
"[sjome of his information was found to be correct, some was found to be blatantly false, and some of it he
concocted in his own mind" which resulted "in the investigation being misled in some material aspects." Id.

TARGETING CISPES

victims but also covert funding of military aid, "forwarded through Mexico for ultimate
use by the guerrilla forces in El Salvador."-^

The second source, who has not been identified (and could be either an FBI agent
used for a counterintelligence investigation into the FMLN or a CIA source in El
Salvador^/), supplied information linking the FDR and FMLN to alleged terrorist
activities in the U.S. As the FBI stated in a report:

In 1983, a source reported that individuals in contact with the FDR
and FMLN were planning to establish clandestine cells in the US for
political, ideological, and military support, as well as for intelligence
activities. The military cells allegedly would commit killings,
sabotage, and other illegal acts such as bank robberies. In addition,
this source indicated that one proposed cell, to which the source
was to belong was to coordinate its activity with already established

Though this source had not linked the alleged FDR and FMLN "clandestine cells" to
CISPES, the FBI coupled this information with the information received from Varelli and

Therefore, the acknowledgement of CISPES in their literature that
they were acting in support of the FDR, an organization reported to
be in the process of establishing a network of clandestine cells, was
significant when evaluated in the light of the CISPES connection to
the FMLN and FDR. 14'

Based on these two reports, the FBI was able to formulate its predicate for opening

its counterterrorism investigation into CISPES:

This investigation was predicated primarily upon information
furnished by Mr. Varelli that the activities of CISPES were being
directed by the FDR and FMLN, giving reason to believe that
certain members of CISPES were or may have been engaged in
international terrorism, or activities in preparation for terrorism, or

11. Interim Report, supra note 7. at 3.

12. The issue of third agency involvement (CIA, NSC, State Department) in the CISPES investigation is
still unclear. The Interim Report stated that "[a] review of the FBI Headquarters CISPES file, as well as
contact with appropriate supervisory personnel, revealed that there were no indications of direction, instructions,
or inquiries received or solicited from the White House concerning this investigation." But that does not absolve
the CIA and the State Department. Source information from El Salvador and other areas of Central America
would likely have come from the CIA. Philip Mabray, a former CIA contract agent and member of Oliver North's
private Contra aid network, asserted that North "directed [him and other members] to investigate opponents of
Reagan administration Central American policies. . . . 'OUie told me that if the FBI received letters from five

or six unrelated sources all requesting an investigation of the same groups, that would give the Bureau a
mandate to go ahead and investigate.'" R. Gelbspan, "Texan Says North Set FBI on Foes of Administration,"
Boston Globe. Feb. 29, 1988, at 3.

13. Interim Report, supra note 7, at 3.

cells.!3/

concluded:

14. Id.

8 The FBI's Misguided Probe of CISPES

knowingly aiding or abetting those engaging in terrorist activities,
specifically the FMLN.l^

C. Was the FBI's "Terrorism" Investigation Justified?

The allegation that CISPES covertly supplied military aid to a foreign political group
should normally have been investigated as a criminal violation of the neutrality laws. But
since the recipient of the alleged aid~the FMLN-was deemed to be a "terrorist"
organization, the FCI Guidelines became the applicable standard. Under those guidelines,
the FBI claims it has broad latitude to initiate an investigation into alleged "terrorist"
activities.

Even under the current FCI standards, though, the ACLU believes that no basis
existed for investigating CISPES as a terrorist organization. All that the FBI had were
allegations of an indirect link between CISPES and those persons suspected of terrorist
activity. The FBI appears to have had no information indicating that any individuals
within CISPES might be engaged in terrorist activities. Its only basis for implicating
CISPES or any of its members in terrorist activities that were to be carried out by the
clandestine cells is the claim that CISPES was supporting the FMLN. Yet, the FBI, in its
earlier investigation under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, was unable to show that
CISPES was acting as an agent or under the direction or control of the FMLN.l^/

D. The FBI Targeted Dissent Not Terrorism

The FBI was fully aware, from the moment it began its investigation, that the great
majority of those members were "unaware of and d[id] not support violence or criminal

15. Id. at 4.

16. Perhaps, as Varelli publicly claims, while the FARA investigation was closed, other investigative activity
against CISPES continued. In a telephone interview with a Boston Globe reporter, Varelli asserts that his "case

agent, Daniel Flanagen . . . and others told him the investigation would continue to operate, but with a lower
visibility," notwithstanding the fact that Flanagen "showed him a teletype from Headquarters indicating that the

Justice Department had ordered the [FARA] investigation closed." R. Gelbspan, "Informer denies deceiving FBI
during 5-year probe of CISPES," Boston Globe. March 4, 1988, at A7.

TARGETING CISPES 9

violations."-!^ But interspersed throughout the CISPES files one finds FBI officials
portraying CISPES's lawful political activities in a frame of disloyalty and anti-
Americanism. Unable to affix any specific instances of misconduct to CISPES or its
members, the field reports that were sent back to Headquarters, when they did more
than report the absence of anything suspicious, relied on distortion and guilt by
association in order to justify the effort of the investigation.

These documents reveal how these field offices considered CISPES to be a
completely illegitimate organization (even though Headquarters instructions said
otherwise), thus making anything CISPES did immediately suspicious. The FBI is
certainly not the only government agency to interpret any hesitation or refusal to
cooperate as an indication of possible misconduct and a basis for further investigation.
But in an intelligence investigation of political activity, it is all too easy, and much too
dangerous, to attribute greater meaning to such behavior.

The Bureau's history in this kind of practice alone makes many persons who oppose
government policy suspicious and on their guard to possible investigation. This creates a
vicious cycle effect when the Bureau treats such suspicion, in conjunction with one's
opposition or minority views, as worthy grounds for continued investigation. Thus, while
it may be true that some persons feel that being targeted by a government investigation
is a sign of their political effectiveness against government policy, that fact can serve
no basis for assuming they are engaged in illegal conduct.

Congressman Don Edwards (D-Calif.) chastised the Bureau for this practice, noting

that "not one criminal act was expressly charged to CISPES, yet through innuendo and

guilt by association, CISPES was prosecuted, tried, and found guilty of subversion."^

Edwards cited several examples:

CISPES was alleged to be "involved in the distribution" of a
Soviet-forged document to the media, yet there was no indication-
and when pressed, Mr. Revell could offer none -that CISPES knew
the document was forged

17. CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-543 (October 17, 1984), at 6. See also CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-1 (March 30, 1983)
at 5-6: "It should be noted that many of the members of CISPES and/or its subgroups may not be aware that
their fund-raising activities, the subsequent funds, and other support which tl,:y furnish to CISPES is directed by
CISPES officials to support the terrorist activities of the El Salvadoran leftist terrorists."

18. Congressional Record , H707 (March 3, 1988, daily edition).

10 The FBI's Misguided Probe of CISPES

Guilt by ideological association was stretched to the breaking
point when the FBI suggested a link between CISPES and two
bombings in Washington: one that took place at "about the same
time" a CISPES rally was held in Washington and one that was
actually claimed by another group espousing positions "similar to
those of CISPES"....

The FBI report states that an informant reported that a
CISPES member in Dallas had been tasked to make maps of
government buildings and to time the response times of "public
safety vehicles," which the report stated "may well be consistent
with the activities of terrorists preparing an act of violence."

Another example of guilt by association is found on page 6 of
the FBI report which states that "a CISPES chapter in the Midwest
received communications from the United Freedom Front, a left wing
domestic terrorist organization," again suggesting some sinister
connection without stating whether the communications were
solicited or not and whether the CISPES chapter responded or not.

The Interim Report summed up the Bureau's handling of the investigation as follows:
"It is evident from . . instructions communicated to FBI field offices that the scope of
the investigation was to be limited. Furthermore, instructions enunciated by FBI
Headquarters cautioned that the investigation should avoid infringing upon any person's
Constitutional guarantees."^/ While this statement speaks to a noble purpose, it belies
the actual effect of the FBI's CISPES investigation.

On June 18, 1985, a five-page notice went out from "Director, FBI" to 59 field
offices instructing them to close their investigations of CISPES due to the fact that "on
the basis of information made available to the Department of Justice it appeared that
CISPES was involved in political activities involving First Amendment rights and not
international terrorism."^ It took the FBI twenty-seven months to reach this
conclusion, and then only after previously concluding a six month investigation to the
same effect In the meantime, the FBI involved itself in monitoring on a nationwide
scale the "political activities involving First Amendment rights" of a vast political

19. Interim Report, supra note 7, at 9.

20. Quoted from "Statement for Director William S. Sessions" (press statement dated Feb. 2, 1988) at 3
[hereinafter "Sessions Statement"]. The file document, CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-671 (June 18, 1985), is still largely
classified and is thus heavily redacted.

TARGETING CISPES 11

organization comprised of dozens of chapters and thousands of members. As an
investigation that targeted a domestic political activist organization under the
international terrorism guidelines for well over two years, the record shows it was
relatively wide-ranging, undefined, unsupervised, and infringed on constitutionally
protected rights.

CHAPTER 2

Should the FBI's Investigation of CISPES
Have Been So Broad?

The FBI publicly stresses that the "extent of the FBI investigation was narrow in
focus and was limited to . . . leaders and key members [of CISPES]." 2 -!/ But the
evidence of the files reveals that the field agents pursued a much broader range of
persons.2^ Indeed, Oliver Revell, the FBI official who oversaw the investigation from
Headquarters, conceded this point in a press conference: the investigation, he said, was
"not specific as to individuals but as to the purpose of the organization. ... So it had
to be broad and it narrowed as it proceeded." 2 ^

By admitting that the investigation "had to be broad," Revell in one sentence has
essentially attested to what went wrong with the Bureau's handling of the whole affair.
The investigation became so broad because the predicate was so vague— a mere allegation
of a possibly foreign-influenced group contemplating the "support" of as yet undetermined
criminal activity. A broad investigation meant that the FBI undertook to locate every
CISPES chapter and coalition member in the country and peruse its membership to find
out the leaders and key members. There is simply no way to conduct this kind of
investigation "narrowly." Rather, the investigation went forth on a massive scale.

21. Sessions" statement, supra note 20, at 1 (emphasis added).

22. The initial instructions did, admittedly, warn field agents that "this investigation is not concerned with
the exercise of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution," that "it is incumbent that this investigation
be closely coordinated with FBIHQ," and that "[b]ased on the sensitivity of this investigation, recipients [i.e.
Held offices] should ensure that agents handling this investigation are thoroughly familiar with the Attorney
General guidelines for foreign counterintelligence as they apply to international terrorism investigations."
CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-1 (March 30, 1983) at 7-8. But the investigation then proceded with little, if any,
adherence to any of these concerns by either the field or Headquarters.

23. "Director Sessions' Meeting with National Press Regulars" (February 2, 1988), at 34-35 (statement of
Oliver B. Revell) (emphasis added) [hereinafter "Sessions Press Conference"]. While it may have begun narrowly-
-only eleven field offices received the initial March 30, 1983, instructions-by July 25, 1983, it quickly expanded

to 25 field offices and, on October 28, all 59 field offices were included.

14 The FBI's Misguided Probe of CISPES

A few examples show just how wide a net the FBI was willing to cast:

* Just nine days after the investigation officially began, the San
Juan field office offered to check out all Salvadorans living in
Puerto Rico.24/ While Headquarters responded with a caution that
"[c]ertainly not all Salvadorans are connected with Salvadoran leftist
activities," it allowed that "if San Juan still believes this
investigative avenue should be attempted, [it should] forward a new
request to FBIHQ substantiating the benefits of this endeavor and
the expected results."2§/

* In May 1983, the Los Angeles field office relayed an airtel [FBI
memoranda] to Headquarters and eleven other field offices describing
a CISPES sponsored demonstration 'hat "consisted of approximately
35-50 people and took place with no incidents reported. . . .
[A]mong the various signs and slogans displayed by some of the
participants was one that read 'Victory lo FMLN'."^ Los Angeles
submitted this information "to alert receiving offices of possible
similar activity within their respective di isions." 2 ^

* The Milwaukee field office reported that, "The CISPES office in
Milwaukee is located in the office of the mobilization for survival
(MOBE), which can be characterized as an umbrella group
encompassing a wide angle of 'anti' causes, including anti-nuclear
and so-called 'peace' groups."^ The report continued: "attempts to
contact members were immediately met by requests to 'see a
warrant' or referring the agents to the group's attorneys. In other
words, CISPES anticipated FBI investigation. It is also noted that
the group's attorneys include long time National Lawyer's Guild
member[s]."2§/

By April 1984, the FBI had compiled "information regarding CISPES demonstrations,
picket lines, protests, boycotts, or other similar activities, which number in the
hundreds"^ and a detailed list of all known CISPES chapters and leaders (in 34 of 59
cities surveyed) and all working telephone numbers.

24. CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-10 (April 8, 1983).

25. CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-11 (April 18, 1983). Two weeks later, San Juan responded that it "concurs with
the Bureau's opinion" and that it had no intention of indexing the names of El Salvadorans; it "simply is desirous
of determining the approximately [sic] size of the El Salvadoran community" in order "to provide assistance to
this Division in its efforts to identify, grasp if you will, the extent of El Salvadoran presence in Puerto Rico and

the U.S. Virgin Islands." CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-16 (May 5, 1983). On June 23, San Juan forwarded to headquarters
photographs that were "provided to the Dallas Division for use in captioned investigation." CISPES-HQ, 199-
8848-35 (June 29, 1983).

26. CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-21 (May 24, 1983) at 1-2.

27. Id

28. CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-458 (August , 1988) at 1-2 [dale obscured].

29. Id. at 2-

30. See CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-300X (April 2, 1984) at 17.

THE FBI'S BROAD INVESTIGATION 15

The Bureau also had a "List of groups, organizations connected with CISPES or
mentioned in relation to CISPES activities," with 138 groups named. Though the FBI
claims that it did not expand its investigation to include those other organizations listed
in the CISPES files, 3 -!/ Director Sessions testified that: "CISPES members were in contact
with large numbers of people who were affiliated with numerous organizations. Limited
investigation was conducted to follow-up information that was not complete. The focus
remained on CISPES, not the other organizations, and was to round out, or develop
information on the scope of activities and influence of CISPES."^ Sessions' reference
to "CISPES members," however, suggests that the Bureau targeted more than just the
"leaders and key members." An investigation looking to "round out" information on the
activities and influence of a large, national organization clearly engaged in protected
political activities portends a broad focus beyond the limits of the guidelines.

Having collected all of this information about CISPES's public activities, the FBI
still appears to have had no information showing that CISPES or any of its members
were supplying covert military assistance to the FMLN or engaging in any other type of
terrorist activity. In fact, an ever growing number of field office reports indicated either
no CISPES activity of any kind in the region or no activity that would warrant
continuing any kind of investigation. Yet, the Bureau did not narrow the focus of its
investigation until it was ended much later.

The CISPES files indicate that the FBI never squared its goals with its methods.
Even presuming the facts at the time most favorable to the Bureau, widescale monitoring
of public events served no apparent purpose toward achieving the FBI's stated objective
under the FCI investigation, which was to determine whether CISPES was "knowingly
aiding and abetting terrorists in the conduct of international terroristic activities" by
operating as a front group to hide its alleged covert activities. A front organization, it
is worth noting, is not going to reveal its hidden agenda in its public activities. If the
FBI's goal was to determine whether or not the alleged clandestine support existed, the

31. See "Sessions Statement," supra note 20, at 2-3; Interim Report, supra note 7, at 10-11.

32. "Sessions Statement," supra note 20, at 2-3 (emphasis added).

16 The FBI's Misguided Probe of CISPES

investigation should have been narrow and precise, focused exclusively on those persons
actually suspected of illegal activity.

The FBI's predicate looks even more suspect when one compares the language of the
March 30, 1983, authorizing document with the definitional standard in the FCI
Guidelines. They match up nearly word for word: CISPES was targeted because it is, "or
may be, engaged in international terrorism, activities in preparation therefore, or
knowingly aiding and abetting the terrorists"; the FCI Guidelines require that the target
be someone who "knowingly engages in international terrorism or in activities in
preparation therefor, or knowingly aids or abets any person engaged in such activities."
Little effort appears to have been made to correlate the suspected activity with a
specific element. Given the general vagueness of the guidelines already, it is essential,
especially when investigating political organizations, that they be applied and reviewed
with precision and specificity, precisely in order to avoid an open-ended and uncontrolled
investigation of this type.

CHAPTER 3

The Failure of Headquarters' Supervision

In comments to the press and Congress, FBI Director William Sessions and the agent
who oversaw the investigation, Oliver Revell, asserted that Headquarters supervision had
been sufficient. Sessions, for example, testified that he would have stepped in to bring
the investigation within limits had he been Director when the investigation crossed over
the line into unauthorized activities: "Maybe I would have found at some point that in
my view they were outside [the guidelines]. For instance, I might have found that some
statement, a report coming back in to me showed an obvious lack of understanding about
the nature and scope of the investigation. . . . Then I would have taken, I hope, steps
to try to be sure that that was corrected and did not happen and correct instructions
were given."^

Director Sessions' comments raise the issue of how FBI Headquarters handles the
coordination, guidance, and supervision of intelligence and terrorism investigations. The
Interim Report cites four examples where Headquarters performed its supervisory function
in responding to field reports in much the same fashion as Sessions indicated.^ But a
close reading of those instances, along with numerous other times when there was no
such response, leaves great doubt as to the thoroughness or effectiveness of
Headquarters' actual supervisory role.

33. "Sessions Press Conference," supra note 23, at 32. Revell also admitted that there may have been
"some wavering over that line." Washington Post . February 24, 1988, at A8 (testimony before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence).

34. Interim Report, supra note 7, at 8-9 (digest of Headquarters' guidance and instructions to field offices).

18 The FBI's Misguided Probe of CISPES

A. The First Example: October 28, 1983

The first instance was a Headquarters airtel to all field offices dated October 28,
1983, "which clarified the basis for which the CISPES investigation was opened, and
provided instructions to the offices to concentrate on developing information on the
locations, leadership, and activities of CISPES chapters within each field offices'
jurisdiction."^ It also "[r]eiterated . . . that the purpose of the investigation was not
to investigate the exercise of First Amendment Rights of CISPES members. . . In
fact, however, this was the very memorandum that opened up the investigation to all the
field offices.

Thus, instead of reining in the investigation. Headquarters had let it loose. The
instructions not to infringe on First Amendment rights were simply a recirculated copy
of the original March 30, 1983, authorization memo.^ There is no indication of any
narrowing of the focus of the investigation. Indeed, on November 11, 1983, the Denver
field office's response to the recent Headquarters' clarification was to note "that Bureau
instructions in this matter are to determine location, leadership and activities of chapters
through sources, surveillance and investigation."^

B. The Second Example: July 27, 1984

The second example is perhaps the one time where Headquarters actually offered
constructive guidance. A July 27, 1984, communication reads that, "it is imperative that
these investigations are closely supervised and monitored to ensure our investigations do
not infringe upon the rights of these individuals or groups protected by the
Constitution."^ And further on it states: "Political activities or political lobbying by

35. Interim Report, supra note 7, at 8.

36. Id.

37. CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-105 (October 28, 1983).

38. CISPES-HO, 199-8848-128X2, at 2.

39. CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-436 (July 27, 1984) at 5.

THE FAILURE OF HEADQUARTERS' SUPERVISION 19

CISPES, unless it can be shown as a violation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act,
are not, repeat not, targets of this investigation and should not be monitored."^

Since the rest of this document is redacted, it is impossible to know what other
guidance and instructions were given. But, as corrective as this language may sound, if
the rest of the directive affirms the vague predicate and broad scope of the investigation
and fails to point out specific instances of unacceptable behavior, then this example may
be nothing more than toothless wisdom, from which the field would have been no better
guided than before.

In fact, just two weeks after receiving this directive from Headquarters, which
warned that "political lobbying" is not a target of the investigation and should not be
monitored, the Chicago field office did not seem to have gotten the message. Chicago
sent back an airtel describing CISPES as a group that "organizes campaigns to pressure
legislators to vote against covert and overt intervention in Central America."^ Chicago
has characterized as "pressuring legislators" what is known simply as political lobbying.
Thus, whether in ignorance of, defiance of, or connivance with Headquarters, the Chicago
field office continued to engage in the surveillance of explicitly acknowledged
constitutionally protected activities. Such was the effectiveness of Headquarters' best
effort at internal guidance.

C. The Third Example: October 17, 1984

The next two instances undermine as much, if not more, than they support the
FBI's contention that its investigation was narrowly focused. On October 17, 1984,
Headquarters sent out a memo in response to concerns from the field "as to how much
seemingly legitimate political activity could be monitored."^ Rather than urging
restraint, the text of the response indicates, if anything, a stepping-up of the
investigation. It cites as its goals:

40. Id. at 9.

41. CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-482 (August 10, 1984) at 3 (emphasis added).

42. Interim Report, supra note 7, at 8-9.

20 The FBI's Misguided Probe of CISPES

To identify contacts and communication links between CISPES
leaders or ruling members and the Salvadoran guerrilla-terrorist
organizational structure and leadership [redacted section] to locate
and identify means of transmitting money, military paraphernalia
from the U.S. to the Salvadoran guerrilla-terrorist organization and
means of shipping propaganda into the U.S.; to obtain information
concerning preparation and/or plans for future terrorist activities in
the U.S.; to identify the leaders and/or key members of CISPES who
are in direct contact with representatives of the Salvadoran
guerrilla-terrorist organization; penetration of local, regional and
national levels of CISPES to obtain the best intelligence information
regarding the other goals 0

This states in plain language that nothing less than maximum surveillance of every
level and every contact of the organization will suffice.

The October 17, 1984, document goes on to implicate certain members of CISPES

with a number of recent bombings and bomb threats:

Another CISPES member may have been involved in threatening to
bomb a TACA airlines aircraft. ... It is already noted that several
bombings in the Washington, D.C. area, although probably not
perpetrated or directed by the CIPES [sic], have occurred around
CIPES [sic] meetings and were claimed as support for the Salvadoran
guerrilla-terrorist organization. Investigation has demonstrated some
contacts and/or connections between those responsible for the
bombings and the CISPES.^

A whole series of documents in the files narrate the tale of these bombings and
bomb threats. On April 26, 1983, and then on August 18, 1983, bombs exploded in the
Washington, DC installations of Fort McNair and the U.S. Navy Yard, respectively. Both
were accompanied by statements expressing support for the FMLN and "solidarity" with
various Central American political movements; the first bombing occurred during the same
time that CISPES was holding a rally in Washington.

Numerous documents make reference to these bombings in connection with CISPES.
They were added to the list as further bases for the investigation.^/ But the Interim
Report states explicitly that the Armed Resistance Unit (ARU), "a left-wing domestic

43. CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-543 (October 17, 1984) at 4 (emphasis added).

44. Id. at 5-9.

45. See, e.g. . CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-300X (April 2, 1984); CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-543 (October 17, 1984).

THE FAILURE OF HEADQUARTERS' SUPERVISION 21

terrorist group," claimed responsibility for both bombings.^ To the degree that there
may have been some associations between the ARU and certain CISPES members, the FBI
should have fo!lowed-up on those individuals as part of its domestic terrorism
investigation of the ARU. Ironically, the FBI investigated the ARU, which was directly
connected to violent activity, under the stricter Domestic Security/Terrorism (Smith)
guidelines, while it investigated CISPES, connected to no violent, or even criminal,
activity, under the looser (and still classified) International Terrorism (FCI) guidelines.

The October 17, 1984, communication raises questions about the FBI's handling of
the CISPES investigation in still more ways. It states explicitly that the rhetoric and
propaganda of CISPES (i.e., its political speech) is an important focus of the
investigation: "Certainly the propaganda and political rhetoric of the CISPES is important
to our investigation regarding a possible FARA violation. It is not, however, the main or
only concern of this investigation. The purpose of this investigation is to determine the
extent of the overall international terrorist support threat and international terrorist
action threat CISPES poses to the U.S. government."^ After one and one-half years
the Bureau feels compelled to tell the field that political speech is not the only concern,
while acknowledging that it is still a significant concern.

The most telling aspect of the October 17, 1984, communication is what it does not
say. Given that this document is cited in the Interim Report as responding to the
sensitive issue of monitoring "legitimate political activity in one of only four instances of
guidance and instruction from Headquarters," it is revealing that in no place does it
admonish as to the propriety of the questioned investigative techniques, let alone the
parameters of the investigation as a whole (as was done in the July 26, 1984,
communication). On the contrary, in this ten page memo Headquarters seems to condone

46. Interim Report, supra note 7, at 5-6. Yet the Bureau continues, to insinuate a CISPES connection to
those bombings (the Interim Report was released on February 22, 1988), as well as to other past instances of
violent activity, for which no evidentiary connection has ever been established. For example, on the very same
page of the October 17, 1984, document quoted above, the Bureau notes: "although most of CISPES members or
supporters are unaware of and do not support violence or criminal violations, some of the key leaders and
founders of the CISPES were seriously involved in the Weather Underground and have been supportive of these
types of actions in the past."

However, on May 11, 1988, the FBI obtained the indictments of seven members of the ARU for all of the
bombings it had previously suspected CISPES of doing. See L. Hockstader, "7 Indicted in 1983 Capitol Bombing:
Members of Communist Group Face Charges in 7 Other Explosions," Washington Post, May, 12, 1988, at Al.

47. CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-543 (October 17, 1984) at 10 (emphasis added).

22 The FBI's Misguided Probe of CISPES

a broader based investigation than in any of its previous communications. Rather than
seeking to rein in confused and perhaps overzeaJous field officers, this memo seems to
unleash them.

D. The Fourth Example: November 17, 1984

The last instance cited in the Interim Report, a November 15, 1984, directive to the
Baltimore field office,^ does nothing to redeem Headquarters' supervisory role. That
memo simply affirmed Baltimore's general conduct in investigating an organization that
fit the CISPES profile "to identify members and determine if they were engaged in
terrorist acts or in support of terrorism inside the United States. "42/ in what the
Bureau takes perhaps as a restrictive instruction, the Interim Report noted that "the FBI
Headquarters further directed that should it be determined the group was not engaged in
support of terrorism, the investigation should immediately be closed."^ 0 -/ Essentially,
Headquarters is asking for its agents to prove the negative: i.e., unless they can show
conclusively that there is no indication of terrorist activity, they must continue to
investigate.

This last piece of guidance is, in fact, more vague than the original instruction.
After all, the whole point of the investigation was to determine if CISPES was engaged
in terrorist activity. The function of the field offices was to assemble as much
information as possible, by "penetrating" every level of the organization. It was up to
Headquarters, the coordinating office, or the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review
(OTPR) in the Justice Department, actually to determine whether "investigative
developments are sufficiently strong or compelling to retain the investigation in an active
status."^!/ Of course, field offices had the discretion to devote more or less time to
this investigation depending on the nature of the beast in each division. Where there

48. CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-562 (November 15, 1984).

49. Interim Report, supra note 7, at 9.

50. M.

51. Id. at 9-10. On June 3, 1985, almost wo and one-half years after the investigation began, OIPR
determined that no further investigation was warranted.

THE FAILURE OF HEADQUARTERS' SUPERVISION 23

was no more information to report, field offices could close the investigation, as more
and more such offices did throughout the course of the investigation. But, as long as
the general investigation remained open, there was nothing to stop any field office from
reopening it at the local level.

Interestingly, in one instance where a field office decided to close its investigation,
Headquarters responded that it should not do so, but rather probe deeper. On November
9, 1983, the Phoenix field office sent an airtel to the Director advising that "it does not
appear that further investigation regarding the Tucson Committee For Human Rights in
Latin America is warranted. This case is therefore being closed."52/ On the following
January 6, Headquarters responded: "Based on the information contained in referenced
Phoenix airtel, Phoenix should consider the possibility that the 'Tucson Committee For
Human Rights' (TCHR) may be a front organization for the CISPES. [redactions] Before
closing this investigation, Phoenix will submit information available regarding the TCHR
to Dallas, Houston and San Antonio."53/ Here again is an instance where Headquarters,
instead of reining in the excesses, pushed the investigation to its outer limits.

52. CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-128X (November 9, 1983) at 3.

53. CISPES-HQ, 199-8848-150 (January 6, 1984).

CHAPTER 4

Congress Should Enact an FBI Charter

The CISPES investigation demonstrates once again the need for statutory guidelines
that clearly define the FBI's responsibilities when conducting criminal and terrorism
intelligence investigations, both domestic and international. The internal guidelines and
procedures that govern the FBI have diminished the opportunity for abuse. But the
CISPES investigation indicates that that effort has not gone far enough in preventing
such transgressions. Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) spoke, in introducing the first
FBI charter bill in 1979, of "the inevitable tension which arises when the legitimate
enforcement of the law and the lawful exercise of constitutional rights occupy the same
space."S4/ This same tension was equally in the minds of the Founding Fathers two
hundred years ago when they drafted the Constitution with specific protection against
excessive police action. While some tension will always exist, it is possible and
necessary to ease the tension by enacting statutory guidelines.

A. The Current FBI Guidelines

The FBI currently conducts all of its investigations, intelligence as well as criminal,
under the authority of two sets of guidelines promulgated by the Attorney General. The
first set is "The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
Enterprise and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations" (the Domestic Security
Guidelines), which "provide guidance for all investigations by the FBI of crimes and
crime-related activities."^ The second set is the "Attorney General Guidelines for FBI

54. FBI Charter Act of 1979, S. 1612, Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate (96th Cong., 1st Sess., Serial No. 96-53, Parts 1 & 2), Part 1, at 2 [hereinafter FBI Charter Hearings].

55. The Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Domestic
Security/Terrorism Investigations," at 1 (March 7, 1983) [hereinafter Domestic Security Guidelines].

26 The FBI's Misguided Probe of CISPES

Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence Investigations" (the FCI
Guidelines), which cover "all foreign intelligence, foreign counterintelligence, foreign
intelligence support activities, and intelligence investigations of international terrorism
conducted by the FBI pursuant to Executive Order 12333."^

The standards enumerated by these guidelines govern the predicate for initiating and
the methods for conducting intelligence and terrorism investigations. All investigations
must meet both a standard of proof and a factual threshold before they can begin.
(Unfortunately, the FCI Guidelines remain partially classified, thus making it impossible
to know the complete standards for conducting FCI investigations.) The standard for
initiating domestic security/terrorism investigations is:

when the facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that two or
more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of
furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through
activities that involve force or violence and a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States. The standard of "reasonable
indication" is identical to that governing the initiation of a general
crimes investigation under Part II. In determining whether an
investigation should be conducted, the FBI shall consider all of the
circumstances including: (1) the magnitude of the threatened harm;
(2) the likelihood it will occur; (3) the immediacy of the threat; and
(4) the danger to privacy and free expression posed by an
investigation.^/

"Reasonable indication" is the standard of proof; "engaging in a political enterprise
for the purpose of furthering political or social goals . . . [using] force or violence and a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States" is the factual standard. Thus, a
domestic security/terrorism investigation can be based on a reasonable indication that the
targets' purpose is to engage in political activities which involve violence and violate the
law. While this standard is quite broad, the Domestic Security Guidelines still require

56. "Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence
Investigations," (April 18, 1983) at 1 [hereinafter FCI Guidelines] (emphasis added).

57. Domestic Security Guidelines, at 13-14, sec. III(BXlX a ) (emphasis added). "The standard of 'reasonable
indication' is substantially lower than probable cause. In determining whether there is reasonable indication of a
federal criminal violation, a Special Agent may take into account any facts or circumstances that a prudent
investigator would consider. However, the standard does require specific facts or circumstances indicating a

past, current, or impending violation. There must be an objective, factual basis for initiating the investigation; a
mere hunch is insufficient." Id. at 7, sec. 11(C) (General Crimes). The guidelines further limit the factual
standard by stating: "In the absence of any information indicating planned violence by a group or enterprise,
mere speculation that force or violence might occur during the course of an otherwise peaceable demonstration is
not sufficient grounds for initiation of an investigation under this section." Id. at 14, sec. 111(B)(1)(c).

CONGRESS SHOULD ENACT AN FBI CHAR TER 27

that the FBI establish some kind of criminal nexus to the persons under investigation.
The guidelines also created the "enterprise" standard. This standard allows the FBI to
investigate groups of people engaged in politically motivated violence, but limits the
investigations only to those people who are knowing participants in criminal activities,
known as an "enterprise."

The second set of guidelines—the FCI Guidelines—control all intelligence
investigations that have a foreign connection. Since these investigations are carried out
for "national security" purposes against foreign oriented targets, they tend to put less
emphasis on safeguarding the constitutionally protected rights guaranteed to United
States persons. Indeed, major portions of the FCI Guidelines are classified for national
security reasons. While it is widely believed that those guidelines also use the same
reasonable indication standard found in the Domestic Security Guidelines, as far as is
known, the FCI Guidelines contain none of the limitations specified for domestic
terrorism investigations-e.g., the four circumstances that must be weighed, or the
caution on avoiding "mere speculation."

Unlike the Domestic Security Guidelines, the unclassified sections of the FCI
Guidelines pay no heed to specific First Amendment issues that could arise, and give only
lip service to the Constitution as a whole: "Such collection shall be accomplished by the
least intrusive means that will provide information of the quality, scope and timeliness
required and in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United
States, these guidelines and Executive Orders."^ Indeed, the FCI Guidelines go so far
as to authorize, under certain constraints and only with the approval of the FBI
Director, the infiltration of groups "that will influence rights protected by the First
Amendment, for example through assuming a leadership role in an organization."^

Additionally, unlike the Domestic Security Guidelines, the FCI Guidelines do not use
the "enterprise" standard. Thus, the FBI is able to investigate whole political

58. FCI Guidelines, at S, sec. 111(A)(1). It is hardly imaginable that such language, if it existed, would
remain classified.

59. FCI Guidelines, at 15, sec. IV(a)(2) (Special Techniques: Undisclosed Participation). The Director must
determine that there is "probable cause" and that the "undisclosed participation is essential to establish, enhance,
or maintain cover and the effect on the activities of the organization is incidental." The Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review must also be notified.

28 The FBI's Misguided Probe of CISPES

organizations even when many, if not most, members are not suspected of being involved
in "international terrorism."^/

The FCI Guidelines, then, give the FBI even wider authority to investigate persons
or groups it believes may be preparing for or supporting others in international terrorism
than it has for investigating domestic terrorism. These guidelines in particular allow the
FBI to start an investigation on whole organizations with only the vaguest allegations of
criminal activity in the United States~e.g., "supporting" foreign terrorists. Serious
consequences were bound to follow when the FBI turned to the less restrictive FCI
Guidelines to continue what had already proved a fruitless investigation under the general
crimes section of the Domestic Security Guidelines.^

The problem with having separate and lower standards for international terrorism
investigations under the FCI Guidelines is that it allows the FBI to target United States
persons who may be engaged only in First Amendment activities. The Domestic Security
Guidelines already provide a standard which should be adequate to conduct intelligence
investigations of terrorist type organizations; they allow flexibility while maintaining
some safeguards. The FBI seems fully capable of using the Domestic Security Guidelines
successfully in combatting terrorism in the United States, without having to cross the
line into investigations of protected First Amendment activity. A modified standard for
all criminal investigations, including terrorism, should be codified as part of a
comprehensive FBI legislative charter.

B. The Need for a Charter

The ACLU has long advocated the need for a comprehensive statutory FBI charter
in order to establish a permanent base of authority for the FBI's investigatory, police
training, support, and liaison functions and to prevent the Bureau from operating under

60. The FCI Guidelines define "international terrorist" as "an individual or group that knowingly engages in
international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor, or knowingly aids or abets any person engaged in
such activities." FCI Guidelines, sec. II(O), p. 4 (emphasis added).

61. The standards for the FARA criminal investigation are even more restrictive than even for domestic
terrorism cases: "A general crimes investigation may be initiated by the FBI when facts or circumstances
reasonably indicate that a federal crime has been, is being, or will be committed . Smith Guidelines, at 7, sec.
11(C)(1) (emphasis added).

CONGRESS SHOULD ENACT AN FBI CHARTER 29

the unfettered power of "inherent authority."^ Without such a charter, the FBI is
controlled only by Executive Order and Attorney General guidelines, both of which are
open to indiscriminate change and interpretation by the executive branch. In particular,
legislation allows the executive and the Congress to develop a legislative history to
explain the meaning and application of the standards for conducting investigations-a
consensus of meaning that can be used for purposes of supervision and oversight.

A statutory charter provides a record and a benchmark against which to consider
future changes in the standards and, by requiring those changes to go through the
legislative process, permits the Congress and the public to debate recommendations and
influence the outcome. Indeed, at present major portions of the FCI Guidelines are still
classified and thus not subject to any public scrutiny. Finally, it permits the
establishment of external controls (e.g. criminal liability and civil remedy) to enforce the
standards.

In advocating the need for legislation, the ACLU is not suggesting that all of the
guidelines and procedures governing investigations be enacted into statute, but only basic
standards, restrictions, and controls. The management and control of operations or
investigations should be left to guidelines, with the Congress suggesting broad
requirements it would like to see met (i.e., First Amendment safeguards, frequent review
of operations. Justice Department supervision). The charter would give the FBI the
authority it needs to conduct criminal and terrorism intelligence, as well as foreign
counterespionage, investigations, but would include substantive investigative standards and
authorization procedures to protect civil liberties.

The first effort to enact an FBI charter began more than a decade ago following
the Church Committee's conclusion that "[investigations have been based upon vague
standards whose breadth made excessive collection inevitable."^ Following the Church

62. Indeed, some of the language in this section is taken directly from earlier ACLU reports. See, e.g. .
Prepared Statement, American Civil Liberties Union, in FBI Charter Hearings, Part 1, supra note 54, at 253-70;
Prepared Statement, American Civil Liberties Union, on Need for FBI Charter, in Statutory Charter, Hearings
before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., on FBI Statutory Charter (Part 1, Apr.
20 & 25, 1978) at 117-37 [hereinafter FBI Preliminary Hearings]; "A I .aw to Control the FBI," sponsored by The
Committee for Public Justice, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Center for National Security Studies;
The Lessons of ABSCAM, A Public Policy Report by the American Civil Liberties Union (Oct. 10. 1982, by Jerry
Berman).

63. Church Committee Report, Book II, supra note 4, at 5 (emphasis added).

30 The FBI's Misguided Probe of CISPES

Committee investigation, and after a round of preliminary hearings in 1978,^ Senator
Kennedy introduced the FBI Charter Act of 1979 (S. 1612, 96th Congress). That bill
sought to establish a comprehensive authority for all FBI domestic activities.^/ The
bill, however, was never enacted into law.

C. Proposed New Standards for Intelligence Investigations

Even without a comprehensive charter, the ACLU believes that one publicly
enunciated standard should now apply for all criminal intelligence investigations that may
involve the collection of information about the exercise of First Amendment rights
relating to acts occurring or originating in the United States, including terrorism.^ As
the CISPES case demonstrates, separate standards allow the FBI to investigate all the
activities of U.S. political groups when just a small number of members are only
suspected of illegal action. The indication of a foreign connection should not diminish
the rights and protection normally afforded to Americans who are suspected of politically
motivated criminal activity.

The mere collection of publicly available information can have a significant adverse
effect—a "chilling effect"— on people's exercise of their constitutional rights. The fear
of possible government surveillance can chill people from participating in certain
activities. It is impossible to know how, or even if, the information collected may come
back to haunt someone who has done absolutely nothing wrong. But experience has
shown, as documented by the Church Committee, that in cases involving the intelligence
surveillance of political organizations, the potential for abuse tends to outweigh the
benefit of the information.

64. FBI Preliminary Hearings Part 1 (Apr. 20 & 25, 1978), at 117-37 and Part 2 (June 12, 27, July 12, Aug.
10, 15, and Sep. 26, 1978), supra note 62.

65. The purposes of the bill were: "(1) to define the duties and responsibilities of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) except as to foreign intelligence collection and foreign counterintelligence investigations; (2)
to confer upon the FBI and to codify the statutory authority necessary to discharge those duties and
responsibilities; and (3) to establish procedures for the discharge of those duties and responsibilities " S. 1612,
sec. 531 (96th Cong., 1st Sess.), reprinted in FBI Charter Hearings, PL 2, supra note 54, at 429.

66. The exception is for groups whose sole purpose is criminal activity, such as the Mafia, regardless of
what it called itself. The FBI acknowledged, however, that CISPES was for the most part engaged in legitimate
First Amendment activity.

CONGRESS SHOULD ENACT AN FBI CHARTER 31

The Church Committee reported how "the Government has collected, and then used
improperly, huge amounts of information about the private lives, political beliefs and
associations of numerous Americans. . . . That these abuses have adversely affected the
constitutional rights of particular Americans is beyond question. But we believe the
harm extends far beyond the citizens directly affected." 6 ^/ The Report then eloquently
explained the nature of this harm:

Free government depends upon the ability of all its citizens to
speak their minds without fear of official sanction. The ability of
ordinary people to be heard by their leaders means that they must
be free to join in groups in order more effectively to express their
grievances. Constitutional safeguards are needed to protect the
timid as well as the courageous, the weak as well as the strong.
While many Americans have been willing to assert their beliefs in
the face of possible governmental reprisals, no citizen should have
to weigh his or her desire to express an opinion, or join a group,
against the risk of having lawful speech or association used against
him.

Persons most intimidated may well not be those at the
extremes of the political spectrum, but rather those nearer the
middle. Yet voices of moderation are vital to balance public debate
and avoid polarization of our society.^

The CISPES investigation demonstrates a failure to ensure that this balance does
not fall against the private individual or group. Yet, as the Church Committee
experienced, it is very difficult to "draw the fine line between legitimate investigations
of conduct and illegitimate investigations of advocacy and association." 6 ^ But given the
Bureau's history of pursuing its investigative objectives with minimal deference to the
constitutional rights of the people it is investigating, we must adopt stronger measures to
protect against improper and unnecessary investigations.

The ACLU recommends the enactment of a statute that authorizes "criminal
intelligence investigations" only where two or more persons are engaged in a pattern of
activities for the purpose of furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through
activities that involve force or violence and a violation of the federal criminal law.
These investigations must be conducted according to public guidelines incorporating the

67. Church Committee Report, Book II, supra note 4, at 290.

68. Id. at 290-91 (emphasis added).

69. Id. at 321.

32 The FBI's Misguided Probe of CISPES

following standards and procedures. These standards should apply even when the persons
are suspected to be agents of a foreign power or involved in "international terrorism."
The first three requirements proposed by the ACLU are consistent with, if not already a
part of, current practice. The next three proposals are designed to give further
protection to persons and groups engaged in First Amendment activities.

The first requirement is that all such investigations must be based on a written
finding approved by the FBI Director that specific and articulable facts reasonably
indicate that the subjects of investigation have engaged, are engaged, or will engage in a
violation of the laws of the United States. This is the "reasonable suspicion" standard
presently used in the Domestic Security and FCI Guidelines. Codifying this standard will
add greater clarity and specificity to factual requirements needed to open an
investigation.

Second, four circumstances must be weighed-(a) the magnitude of the threatened
harm, (b) the likelihood it will occur, (c) the immediacy of the threat, and (d) the
danger to privacy and free expression posed by an investigation. Again, the Domestic
Security Guidelines currently require that these four circumstances be considered.
However, the FCI Guidelines do not. This requirement would subject all investigations to
this standard.

And third, minimization and supervisory procedures must be employed to ensure that
the least intrusive means are used for collection, retention, and dissemination of
information. Both the Domestic Security and FCI Guidelines also require the use of
minimization procedures, although the provision in the FCI Guidelines allows the
retention of any information "incidentally acquired ... if it relates to FBI
counterintelligence or law enforcement responsibilities or concerns FBI employees or
assets."^ A statutory specification will ensure greater oversight of this procedure both
internally and by Congress.

Fourth, specific Attorney General certification for investigation of any organization
engaged in the exercise of First Amendment rights that such organization is engaged or
15 continuing to be engaged in a violation of the laws of the United States or that

70. FCI Guidelines, Sec. VI(E), at 24 (Minimization of Information Concerning United States Persons).

CONGRESS SHOULD ENACT AN FBI CHARTER 33

specific leaders or members of the organization are engaged in a violation of the laws of
the United States and there is no other less intrusive means available to gather evidence
or necessary information. This provision first requires direct Attorney General
participation and then imposes a much higher threshold than normal criminal intelligence
investigations before investigations can proceed on political organizations. The purpose
of this provision is to ensure that the FBI affords the greatest protection to the political
rights of the groups whom it investigates.

Fifth, the FBI may not infiltrate someone into a leadership or decision making
capacity without disclosing that person's identity to the appropriate official of the
organization. Such infiltration invariably distorts and undermines the political objectives
of the groups under investigation. The FBI should not be directing any person in such a
position to continue to act on the Bureau's behalf.

And sixth, the investigation must be reviewed every ninety days by FBI
Headquarters and every year by the Attorney General (or designee), except that
investigations requiring Attorney General certification (requirement four) must be
reviewed by the Attorney General (or designee) every ninety days, to ensure that there
is a continuing basis for investigation and that procedures for minimizing the
intrusiveness of techniques employed and information collected are effective and being
followed by agents conducting the investigation. This provision ensures continued
Attorney General participation and supervision over all sensitive investigations.

Finally, the ACLU recommends that victims of unauthorized surveillance have a civil
remedy under the Federal Tort Qaims Act. The damage from an unauthorized FBI
investigation can be extremely severe. Yet the only remedy present' available
through Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau Narcotics.^ But Bivens
applies only for violations of constitutional rights, and only against the individual agent;
it does not extend to violations of privacy or the use of certain intrusive techniques, and
it does not impose liability on the U.S. government. Since most agents have a good faith
defense-acting under orders-and minimal assets, they are essentially judgement proof.
A civil remedy against the government will give victims a greater chance of receiving

71. 403 U.S. 288 (1971).

34 The FBI's Misguided Probe of CISPES

both actual and punitive damages. And it puts a greater deterrent on all levels of
government officials from violating the standards.

The ACLU also believes that government officials and agents should face criminal
liability for the willful violation of the statute and guidelines. Criminal penalties serve
two purposes. First, they add an extra deterrent on anyone contemplating an illegal
investigation. Second, they give greater argument to people to resist pressure by the
President or his or her advisors to perform an illegal investigation.

D. Conclusion

The CISPES investigation has exposed a serious deficiency in the FBI's investigative
authority. Senator Kennedy spoke of an "inevitable tension which arises when the
legitimate enforcement of the law and the lawful exercise of constitutional rights occupy
the same space." The current FBI guidelines upset this fragile balance by accommodating
the demands of law enforcement without fully protecting the lawful exercise of our
constitutional rights. Left to its own devices, the FBI, like any other investigative
agency, frequently tends to focus singlemindedly on its own narrow goals while forsaking
the protected liberties of its targets. As the Church Committee Report commented:
"The natural tendency of Government is toward abuse of power. Men entrusted with
power, even those aware of its dangers, tend, particularly when pressured, to slight
liberty."^ Given this tendency and the dangerous cost of its fulfillment, it is essential
that Congress enact strong protection to secure, to the highest degree possible, our
rights and liberties against the threat of government abuse of power.

72. Church Committee Report, Book II, supra note 4, at 291.

Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Halperin.

We will withhold questions until all four members of the panel
have testified.

Our next witness is Kenneth Bass. Mr. Bass is an attorney in pri-
vate practice in Washington, DC. He was formerly Counsel for In-
telligence Policy and Review in the Justice Department, where he
had considerable experience dealing with these issues.

Mr. Bass.

TESTIMONY OF KENNETH C. BASS III, VENABLE, BAETJER &
HOWARD, McLEAN, VA

Mr. Bass. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to
appear before you today to discuss the development of the FBI
guidelines for conducting terrorism investigations and the applica-
tion of those guidelines to the CISPES investigation.

My brief opening statement will address the history and develop-
ment of the guidelines. I will comment generally on the applica-
tions of those guidelines to the CISPES investigation.

My comments will necessarily be brief for two reasons: First, the
applicable guidelines have changed since I left the Justice Depart-
ment in 1981, and because many of the relevant portions are classi-
fied, I have not seen them and I can't comment on them.

Second, while I have reviewed parts of the CISPES file that have
been made available under Freedom of Information Act, I have not
seen the entire file and, therefore, cannot comment on a fully in-
formed basis.

A fair and balanced review of this investigation must begin with
a bit of history on the development of intelligence law. The rele-
vant history begins in 1976 with the Church Committee. It was
that committee and the disclosures that led to the creation of that
committee that provided the impetus for all of the current intelli-
gence law protecting rights of Americans. Indeed, it is possible to
use 1976 as a demarcation point in the development of intelligence
law as many of us know it.

The B.C. period — before Church — was marked by little legal at-
tention to the rights of Americans caught up in intelligence and
counterintelligence investigations. The A.D. period — after disclo-
sure of COINTELPRO, CHAOS, and the Plumbers— has been
marked by a proliferation of regulations drafted by the President
and the Executive Branch and passage of a few significant intelli-
gence laws by the Congress.

Any assessment of the CISPES investigation should begin with
an awareness of the fact that while we may be in the 200th year of
the ratification of our Constitution, we are only in the 12th year
A.D. of the creation of the branch of intelligence law that forms
the backdrop for this hearing.

There are many legitimate questions about the scope, extent, and
duration of the CISPES investigation, but those legitimate ques-
tions should not obscure the fact that none of the serious abuses of
COINTELPRO occurred in this investigation. As I understand the
facts, there was no wiretapping in the CISPES case, there was no
circulation of false, malicious gossip as part of a planned character

assassination, there is no indication of a NSA "watch list" for
CISPES members, and there were no "black bag jobs."

While there was use of an informant and there may have been
limited infiltration of CISPES chapters by FBI employees, the
scope, extent and duration of this investigation was far more limit-
ed than the COINTELPRO activities the FBI guidelines were de-
signed to prevent.

It is also important to note that the CISPES case was a terrorism
investigation, not a law enforcement, intelligence or counterintelli-
gence investigation. The main significance of this fact is that ter-
rorism investigations are more likely than others to go beyond FBI
guidelines for at least two separate reasons:

First, the Counterterrorism Section of the FBI, while located in
the Criminal Division, frequently conducts terrorism investigations
using the intelligence and counterintelligence guidelines that were
drafted primarily for use by the Intelligence Division.

And second, terrorism has become a political buzz word that fre-
quently produces the same kind of external pressures that led the
FBI to the excesses of COINTELPRO.

While the external pressures of the sixties and early seventies
came primarily from the White House, the counterterrorism pres-
sures that can lead to excesses by the FBI today, can come from
the Congress as well as the Executive Branch.

I will not dwell on the impact that congressional pressure may
have had on this case except to note two historical facts:

One, when the Carter Administration sought passage of the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act, it was Congress that was pri-
marily interested in broadening certain provisions of FISA to
insure our ability to target terrorists.

Second, it was the Senate that set up a special subcommittee
from 1981 until 1987 with oversight responsibilities for the FBI's
counterterrorist activities. It is possible that some of the directions
from Headquarters in the CISPES case that are now being criti-
cized were at least in part a result of pressures the FBI feel from
the Hill.

The fact that the Counterterrorism Section operates with a foot
in the worlds of both intelligence and law enforcement is in large
part attributable to the nature of international terrorism. But that
fact necessarily means that the Counterterrorism Section does not
have the same practical experience under the FBI guidelines that
the Intelligence Division has, and therefore, may have more diffi-
culty following the nuances of some of the provisions or the under-
lying principles of the guidelines.

A central question in this case is whether the guidelines worked.
In my view, they did work fairly well in this case, at least based on
the information that is publicly available. We know that the inves-
tigation was reviewed periodically by Justice Department and was
terminated at least in part as a result of that periodic review.

We know that FBI Headquarters did send out instructions to the
field to be sensitive to First Amendment rights, although some of
those instructions may have been ambiguous or couched in the con-
text of other instructions that resulted in an unnecessarily long or
broad inquiry.

And we know that none of the excessively intrusive investigative
techniques of COINTELPRO were employed here.

The guidelines will not prevent all excesses — they were never in-
tended to be an insurance policy against excess. Like all laws, rules
and regulations, they are only guideposts for the men and women
who must work with them. The real protection of our rights and
freedoms lies in the hearts and minds of our public officials, not in
the text of the guidelines.

That process puts too much dependence on the Justice Depart-
ment's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review instead of the
Bureau itself. The guidelines will work best when they have been
internalized by the FBI agents under FBI leadership, not when
they are administered by the Justice Department in a supervisory
posture.

A second lesson of the CISPES investigation is the clear continu-
ing need for charter legislation. I do not believe charter legislation
is essential for the creation of a body of law to protect Americans,
for that body of law has been developing consistently since 1976
and shows little sign of being discarded.

An intelligence charter is essential, however, for attaining a
broad national consensus on what we want the FBI and our other
intelligence agencies to do for us. The Congress is a vital part to
the development of any national consensus.

Congress has sometimes spoken in conflicting terms about intelli-
gence, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism activities. That
confusion can produce harmful excesses as well as induce an unde-
sirable bureaucratic inertia. Passage of charter legislation would go
a long way to setting a common agenda for the FBI and the Ameri-
can people.

Mr. Chairman, I have kept my prepared remarks brief because I
understand your primary interest here today is in engaging in a
dialogue with each of the witnesses. I would be happy to answer
any questions the committee might have.

Thank you.

Mr. Edwards. Thank you very much, Mr. Bass.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bass follows:]

STATEMENT OF KENNETH C. BASS, III
BEFORE THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
ON THE FBI INVESTIGATION OF CISPES
JUNE 13, 1988

Mr. Chairman and Members, I am pleased to appear before
you to discuss the development of the FBI Guidelines for
conducting terrorism investigations and the application of those
guidelines to the investigation of The Committee in Solidarity
with the People of El Salvador (CISPES). My brief opening
statement will address the history and development of the
guidelines. I will comment generally on the application of
those guidelines to the CISPES investigation. My comments will
necessarily be brief for two reasons: First, the applicable
guidelines have changed since I left the Department of Justice
in 1981 and because many of the relevant portions are classified
I have not seen them; and, second, while I have reviewed parts
of the CISPES file that have been made available under FOIA, I
have not seen the entire file and therefore cannot comment on a
fully informed basis.

A fair and balanced review of this investigation must
begin with a bit of history on the development of intelligence
law. The relevant history begins in 1976 with the Church
Committee. It was that Committee and the disclosure of abuses
that created the committee that provided the impetus for all
the current intelligence law protecting the rights of Americans.
Indeed, it is possible to use 1976 as a demarcation point in

the development of intelligence law as many of us know it. The
B.C. period — before Church -- was marked by little legal
attention to the rights of Americans caught up in intelligence
and counterintelligence investigations. The A.D. period
after disclosure of COINTELPRO, CHAOS and the Plumbers — has
been marked by a proliferation of regulations drafted by the
President and the Executive Branch and passage of a few signi-
ficant intelligence laws by the Congress.

Any assessment of the CISPES investigation should begin
with an awareness of the fact that while we may be in the 200th
year of the ratification of the Constitution, we are only in
the 12th year A.D. of the creation of the branch of intelligence
law that forms the backdrop for this hearing.

There are many legitimate questions about the scope,
extent and duration of the CISPES investigation, but those
legitimate questions should not obscure the fact that none of
the serious abuses of COINTELPRO occurred in this investigation.
As I understand the facts, there was no wiretapping in the
CISPES investigation, there was no circulation of false, mali-
cious gossip as part of a planned character assassination, there
is no indication of a NSA "watch list" for CISPES members, and
there were no "black bag jobs". While there was use of an
informant and there may have been limited infiltration of CISPES
chapters by FBI employees, the scope, extent and duration of

- 2 -

this investigation was far more limited than the COINTELPRO
activities the FBI Guidelines were designed to prevent.

It is also important to note that the CISPES case was
a terrorism investigation, not a law enforcement, intelligence
or counterintelligence investigation. The main significance of
this fact is that terrorism investigations are more likely than
others to go beyond FBI Guidelines for two separate reasons:
First, the Counterterrorism Section of the FBI, while located
in the Criminal Division, frequently conducts terrorism inves-
tigations using the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Guide-
lines that were drafted primarily for use by the Intelligence
Division; and Second, terrorism has become a political buzzword
that frequently produces the same kind of external pressures
that led the FBI to the excesses of COINTELPRO. While the
external pressures of the 1960's and early 70's came primarily
from the White House, the counterterrorism pressures that can
lead to excesses by the FBI can come from the Congress as well
as the Executive Branch.

I will not dwell on the impact that Congressional
pressures may have had on this case except to note two
historical facts: One, when the Carter Administration sought
passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, it was
Congress that was primarily interested in broadening certain
provisions of FISA to insure our ability to target terrorists.

- 3 -

Second, it was the Senate that set up t- special subcommittee
from 1981 until 1987 with oversight responsibilities for the
FBI's counterterrorist activities. It is possible that some of
the directions from headquarters in the CISPES case that are
now being criticized were in part a result of pressures the FBI
felt from the Hill.

The fact that the Counterter ror ism Section operates
with a foot in the worlds of both intelligence and law enforce-
ment is in large part attributable to the nature of interna-
tional terrorism. But that fact necessarily means that the
Counterterrorism Section does not have the same practical
experience under the guidelines that the Intelligence Division
has, and therefore may have more difficulty following the
nuances of some of the provisions or the underlying principles
of the guidelines.

A central question in this case is whether the Guide-
lines worked. In my view they did work fairly well in this
case, at least based on the information that is publicly avail-
able. We know that the investigation was reviewed periodically
by the Department of Justice and was terminated at least in
part as a result of that review. We know that FBI Headquarters
did send out instructions to the field to be sensitive to First
Amendment rights, although some of those instructions may have
been ambiguous or couched in the context of other instructions

- 4 -

that resulted in an unnecessarily long or broad inquiry. And
we know that none of the excessively intrusive investigative
techniques of COINTELPRO were employed here.

The Guidelines will not prevent all excesses — they
were never intended to be an insurance policy against excess.
Like all laws, rules and regulations, they are only guideposts
for the men and women who must work with them. The real
protection of our rights and freedoms lies in the hearts and
minds of our public officials, not in the text of the
Guidelines .

This is not to say that the existing guidelines are
perfect. We can and must learn from experience. Perhaps we
have learned in this case that the FBI should itself review
certain cases earlier and at a higher level. As I understand
the facts, this investigation was begun and supervised largely
at the section level without significant continuing review by
the Intelligence Division, the Criminal Division, or the
Director. That process puts too much dependence on the
Department's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review instead
of the Bureau itself. The Guidelines will work best when they
have been internalized by the FBI agents under FBI leadership,
not when they are administered by the Department of Justice in
a supervisory posture.

- 5 -

A second lesson of the CISPES investigation is the
clear continuing need for charter legislation. I do not believe
charter legislation is essential for the creation of a body of
law to protect Americans, for that body of law has been
developing consistently since 1976 and shows little sign of
being discarded. An intelligence charter is essential, however,
for attaining a broad national consensus on what we want the
FBI and our other intelligence agencies to do for us. The
Congress is a vital party to the development of any national
consensus. Congress has sometimes spoken in conflicting terms
about intelligence, counterintelligence and counterterrorism
activities. That confusion can produce harmful excesses as
well as induce an undesirable bureaucratic inertia. Passage of
charter legislation would go a long way to setting a common
agenda for the FBI and the American people.

Mr. Chairman, I have kept my prepared remarks quite
general because I understand your primary interest here today
is in engaging in a dialogue with each of the witnesses. I
would be happy to answer any questions the Committee might have.
Thank you.

- 6 -

Mr. Edwards. Our next witness is Eric Richard, also an attorney
in private practice. Mr. Richard previously served as Counsel to the
Senate Church Committee and from 1977 to 1981 was in the Justice
Department, including two years as the Attorney General's Special
Assistant for Intelligence.

Mr. Richard chaired the ABA Committee that produced a com-
prehensive and very useful analysis of the domestic security/ ter-
rorism guidelines in 1985.

Mr. Richard.

TESTIMONY OF ERIC L. RICHARD, SQUIRE, SANDERS &
DEMPSEY, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Richard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
subcommittee. I, too, greatly appreciate the opportunity to be a
part of today's hearing. I will try to summarize my prepared state-
ment, which I submitted for the record.

I do think this hearing is a continuing step in what is at least a
12 year process, and quite possibly a 41-year process, since the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947, to combine two of the best traditions
we have in this country: one, effective intelligence collection, and
two, the rule of law.

It is useful to keep in mind that only a dozen years ago it was
very controversial whether those two things were indeed compati-
ble concepts. We now have historical experience, particularly about
the domestic security/terrorism guidelines originally promulgated
by Attorney General Levy, which should give us great optimism
that they are compatible. We have historical experience to profit
by because while those guidelines, which are relatively stringent,
have been in effect we have fought terrorism effectively in this
country, and I find that one of the most important things to have
happened in our national political dialogue over the last decade.

A couple of preliminary comments. I think that I would have to
agree with Mort Halperin on his conclusion about the political
predicate in this case. If one looks back on it, it appears the FBI
Headquarters at the time had a report from an informant whom
they had been told was reliable by the Dallas Field Office, to the
effect this group was, in fact, sending military supplies to El Salva-
dor. That is probably about as specific an application that one ever
gets that something might need an investigation.

Similarly, I am not particularly concerned with the FBI's defini-
tion of the insurgent groups in El Salvador as terrorists and it has
nothing to do with whether or not I agree with this country's for-
eign policy in El Salvador. The point is the FBI must defer to
others in making those kinds of determinations, and I would not
like to see the FBI become the author of these kinds of formal
policy questions.

Having said all that, however, I did have a serious concern about
the way this investigation was conducted, because it seemed to me
that there was a statement in the FBI's interim report on it reflect-
ing a surprisingly rigid attitude about how one goes about choosing
which guidelines to proceed under.

There is a statement in the FBI's interim report which basically
says unless you have a group whose activities and membership are

entirely in the United States, you cannot proceed under the domestic
security terrorism guidelines. I think that is wrong. I think what we
had here is what I would refer to as a mixed facts situation.

The original allegation that came in from the informant was
that there was international activity going on but this group was
supplying military goods to El Salvador. As the investigation pro-
ceeded, however, the information actually unearthed by the FBI
agents related much more to domestic activity. Such little nuggets
as there were, and there were relatively few in this rather lengthy
series of documents, are that the FBI had discovered that someone
in CISPES might be reconnoitering in Dallas for terrorist attacks
and there might be efforts to disrupt the Republican Convention in
1984, and some bombings that occurred in Washington that were
not specifically linked to CISPES, but whose timing was suspicious.

These domestic elements indicate to me that at some point this
investigation could well have been treated as a domestic security
investigation. Indeed, it seems like mere happenstance the first al-
legation that came into the FBI happened to be international. The
first ones that came in could have been domestic. If they had been
domestic there is very little doubt that this investigation would
have been treated as a domestic security investigation, and thus,
subjected to the more stringent guidelines.

In fact, in preparing for today's hearing this morning, again I
was reviewing the domestic security terrorism guidelines and I
noted a provision I think is very relevant here. It says, "in the
course of a domestic security investigation information warranting
initiation of an investigation under these guidelines may be ob-
tained which would justify the opening of an international terror-
ism investigation."

It says the reverse as well. In other words, the guidelines specifi-
cally contemplate that in the course of a domestic security investi-
gation in the course of a foreign counterintelligence investigation,
you may need to put on the brakes on one and start the other or go
back and forth.

I certainly know of no legal reason why one could not do that if
one had one of these mixed fact situations. I think the Bureau had
a great deal more discretion here then it acknowledged. It may not
realize it had the discretion, but I think it should realize it, given
the language in the guidelines.

I think the implications of this are if one looks at the facts of
this case and pretends they had been inve.- igated under the do-
mestic security terrorism guidelines, one discovers the investiga-
tion could have been started, such serious allegations as there were
could have been examined thoroughly and the investigation would
have been shut down on a much more timely basis once it was dis-
covered there was a dry hole here.

That means to me that we ought to start taking a very serious
look at abolishing this distinction between international terrorism
investigations under the foreign counterintelligence guidelines and
domestic security investigations under the domestic security/ter-
rorism guidelines on the other hand.

Many of the concepts in the domestic security/terrorism guide-
lines do seem applicable and usable in the foreign counterintelli-

gence context and if that had been done here, as far as I can tell
from the documents I have seen, the government would have lost
nothing of value in terms of information that it was entitled to.

Now, I think there is one issue that is going to have to be exam-
ined very seriously as we look to the possibility of extending the
domestic security/terrorism guidelines to international terrorism
investigations. Under the domestic security/ terrorism guidelines,
one needs to have a link to a crime and that is a useful civil liber-
ties protection. We need to look carefully at the criminal laws to
see how they really do apply to a situation such as the one hypoth-
etized by CISPES, where all the alleged violent activity planning
was directed to happen in a foreign country, not here.

There are neutrality laws in this country, which I am not an
expert on, that may be sufficient to cover this, so you could use the
domestic security/terrorism guidelines as they are and be able to
investigate most situations that we all agree bear looking into. But
that is one thing we need to be careful about as We go ahead. If the
answer turns out to be no, either we need to fiddle with the lan-
guage of the domestic terrorism/ security guidelines as to proceed-
ing in these situations, or make some changes in the criminal laws.

In any event, the Bureau deserves some credit over the recent
years for the effective job it has apparently done in protecting us
all from terrorism, but I think if they had proceeded under the do-
mestic security/terrorism guidelines, the privacy of members of
CISPES would have been protected better, public reliability on the
FBI would be in less question than it is at the moment, and we
would have gone further toward protecting what I view as some-
thing very precious, which is a national consensus on how we
strike a balance between civil liberties, law enforcement, and intel-
ligence.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Richard follows:]

STATEMENT OF
ERIC L. RICHARD

CONCERNING
THE FBI INVESTIGATION OF
THE COMMITTEE IN SOLIDARITY WITH THE
PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR

BEFORE PHE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
JUNE 13, 1988

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me to take part in this important
discussion 1 concerning the FBI's investigation of the Committee
in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), and the
implications of that investigation for the rules of law under
which the FBI should operate. I am appearing today as someone
who has had a number of occasions to think about these issues
over the years, but the views I express are solely my own. A
summary of my relevant professional experiences are attached to
my prepared statement.

I would like to begin by acknowledging a few positive
aspects of the FBI's actions in this and similar cases. The FBI
deserves some general credit for keeping this country relatively
free from terrorist acts in recent years. Notably, however, the
Bureau's success in this field has come at a time when it has
been living under a relatively rigorous set of investigative
rules the Attorney General's Guidelines on Domestic Security/
Terrorism Investigations. Just a few years ago, the very idea
that the rule of law would be applied to domestic intelligence
was controversial. Now we have living proof in the form of

1/ The views I express today are based on a limited review of

the relevant documents released by the FBI. Specifically, my
review of documents has been limited to those culled as
especially relevant by the Subcommittee staff.

historical experience that law and intelligence are compatible.
The success of this noble experiment; is due in no small part to
the FBI's cooperation with it.

Second, it is important to keep in mind that when it
opened the CISPES investigation under the Attorney General's
Foreign Counterintelligence ("FCI") Guidelines, FBI Headquarters
had in its possession a report from an informant explicitly
alleging that CISPES was providing military assistance to
insurgent groups in El Salvador. Apparently, the Dallas field
office of the FBI had represented to headquarters that this
informant was reliable. We now know that this judgment was highly
questionable. As a general proposition, however, FBI
headquarters cannot second-guess the judgments of the field
offices on the reliability of informants developed by those
offices. There are simply too many informants helping the FBI
with its broad array of responsibilities to permit a case-by-case
evaluation of each of them here in Washington.

Third, I do not seriously doubt that the FBI was
entitled to define the insurgent groups in El Salvador as
"terrorist" for purposes of applying the relevant Attorney
General guidelines to its work. The U.S. government regarded El
Salvador's government as legitimate and friendly at the time, and
it is not the FBI's job to make foreign policy. One need not
agree with that foreign policy to accept the FBI's determination
as being with the zone of reasonableness.

- j-

Fourth, the reactions of certain FBI field offices to
the direction they were being given by Washington on the CISPES
investigation also bespeak an FBI whose internal culture is
vastly different from that which existed under J. Edgar Hoover.
While the New Orleans field office in effect asked to be unleash-
ed against CISPES, the Denver office raised questions about the
propriety of the investigation as it related to the exercise of
First Amendment rights. It is difficult to imagine a similar
dissent arriving from a field office just fifteen or twenty years
age. The Denver field office should receive recognition for
raising these issues.

Having said all this, however, I am concerned that the
FBI has expressed, in its interim report looking back on this
matter, a rather rigid view of the applicable guidelines. The
FBI appears to believe that, once an FCI investigation is begun
under the relatively lenient FCI Guidelines, the investigation
must always continue in an FCI "mode." According to the Bureau,
"domestic security/terrorism investigations," which occur under
the stricter Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations, "involve
groups or individuals who are based or operate entirely within
the United States and whose acts are directed at elements of the
U. S. government and population." In other words, in the FBI's
view, a foreign counterintelligence investigation is the only
choice where any trans-border activities are involved.

- 1; -

The CISPES case is living proof, however, that real-life
cases do not always fall clearly into international or domestic
categories. In fact, as the FBI's investigation of CISPES
progressed, its focus and justification seemed to change. While
the original justification was based on alleged furtherance of
terrorist acts in El Salvador, the Bureau increasingly seemed to
focus on the possibility that CISPES was planning violent acts in
the United States. For instance, in the FBI's interim report,
the investigation's continuation is justified by citation to
reports that a CISPES member had beer asked to reconnoiter
various sites, and public safety vehicle response times, in the
Dallas area. Similarly, the Bureau suspected a link between
bombings in Washington, D.C., and CISPES meetings occurring in
the area at the same time. Other items cited in the Bureau's
report include an alleged statement by a CISPES member that he
would be able to knock out an important public utility in a major
midwestern city, and allegations that members of CISPES might be
plotting to assassinate President Reagan and disrupt the
Republican National Convention in 196 4.

In other words, relatively early in its investigation,
the FBI developed information which, if credible, would have
permitted the characterization of this investigation as a domes-
tic security/terrorism investigation, rather than as a foreign
counterintelligence or international terrorism investigation.
Indeed, the fact that the FBI received allegations about inter-

national terrorism before it received allegations about domestic
terrorism seems to be mere happenstance. If the domestic allega-
tions had been received first, certainly this investigation could
have been initiated under the Domestic Secur i ty /Ter ror ism
Guidelines, rather than the FCI Guidelines.

I would suggest that when an investigation, like this
one, contains both domestic and international elements, the FBI
can exercise a great deal of discretion on whether to treat it as
a domestic or an international matter, and thus as to which
guidelines should govern the investigation. Of course, FCI
investigations are run by the FBI's Intelligence Division, while
domestic security/terrorism investigation are run by its Criminal
Division. The former is not used to living under the Domestic
Secur i ty /Ter ror i sm Guidelines, while the latter is not used to
living under the FCI guidelines. This organizational division
may have as much to do as any other factor with why this case
continued to be treated as an FCI matter even after domestic
allegations cam to the fore.

In justifying its use on the FCI Guidelines in this
case, the FBI has relied on a narrow legal reading of the juris-
dictional provisions of the FCI and Domestic Secur i ty /Ter ror i sm
Guidelines. (Interim Report, p. 7). Significantly, the FBI's
interim report does not argue that, as a matter of policy or
practicality, the Bureau could not have conducted the
investigation effectively under the Domestic Security/Terrorism

-6-

Guidelines. Nor is it likely that such an argument would be
credible, given the fact that those Guidelines explicitly permit
the gathering of such information as the members of the terrorist
enterprise and other persons likely to be knowingly acting in
furtherance of its criminal objectives; the finances of the
enterprise; the geographical dimensions of the enterprise; and
past and future activities and goals of the enterprise. The link
to the criminal law created by the reference to "criminal
objectives" should not have been a significant obstacle to an
efficient investigation by the FBI, because any alleged planning
of terrorist acts in the United States would have involved any
number of potential crimes, and the group's alleged international
terrorists links could probably have been examined under the
neutrality laws.

All this assumes, of course, that the Bureau could have
met the threshold standard for conducting a domestic security/
terrorism investigation in the first place. The threshold
standard is that there must be a "reasonable indication" that
"two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose
of furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through
activities that involve force or violence and a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States." Again, if FBI Headquarters
believed in good faith that the Dallas informant was reliable, it
might have been justified in initiating a short-term investiga-
tion. But if FBI or Justice Department officials had been forced

-7-

periodically in the investigative process to consider whether
this standard had been met, I believe they would have concluded
relatively soon thereafter that this investigation should stop.
If this had taken place, the U. S. government would have lost
little or no information of real value, the FBI would have
avoided a major controversy, the privacy of CISPES members would
have been preserved, and none of us would be here today.

These are powerful arguments for investigating whether
we should now eliminate some of the legal distinctions between
domestic and international terrorism for purposes of the Attorney
General's guidelines, and begin instead to apply some of the
concepts in the Domestic Security/Terrorism Guidelines to
international terrorism investigations.

The place of international terrorism investigations in
the FCI Guidelines has always been somewhat anomalous in any
event. When those guidelines were originally drafted, the
primary focus of the drafters was on spies -- people believed to
be gathering information clandestinely on behalf of a foreign
power. The sections of the FCI Guidelines on international
terrorism, by contrast, do not require that the targets of such
investigations be acting for or on behalf of a foreign power.
The target of the investigation need only be engaged in certain
dangerous acts intended to coerce populations or influence
policies, occurring outside the United States or across borders.
The fact that a subject of an international terrorism

-8-

invest igat ion under the FCI Guidelines need not be acting on
behalf of a foreign power reinforces the logic of abolishing the
distinction between domestic and international terrorism. The
Domestic Secur i ty /Terror i sm Guidelines have worked so well in
balancing civil liberties, intelligence, and law enforcement
concerns that it may be time to spread the benefits of these
Guidelines more widely.

In considering whether to extend the Domestic Security/
Terrorism Guidelines to international terrorism, we will need to
take a careful look at the extent to which the existing criminal
laws of the United States already cover activities in the U.S. to
promote terrorist acts abroad. Since the Domestic Security/
Terrorism Guidelines link the standards for investigation to the
criminal laws, any failure of those laws to reach international
terrorist activity would have an adverse impact on the FBI's
investigative authority in the event that the Domestic Security/
Terrorism guidelines were indeed extended. If gaps in the
criminal law are found, then some portions of the Domestic
Security/Terrorism Guidelines would have to be modified in their
application to international terrorist investigations, or new
criminal statutes would have to be adopted to close the gaps.

The Domestic Security/Terrorism Guidelines as modified
by Attorney General William French Smith contain one real
innovation in the regulation of intelligence, which is the use of
the enterprise concept. The FCI Guidelines contemplate the

-9-

invest igat ion of entire organizations, whereas the enterprise
concept used in the Domestic Secur i ty /Terror i sm guidelines is
more flexible in the best sense of that word. Under the Domestic
Secur i ty/Ter ror i sm Guidelines, an enterprise is something that
two or more people engage in "for the purpose of" furthering
certain goals through force or violence. In addition,
investigations using the enterprise concept are to focus on
obtaining such information as identifies the members of the
enterprise and others knowingly acting in furtherance of its
criminal objectives. Thus, unwitting participants in an
enterprise, who may have no knowledge of its covert, illicit
goals, should eventually cease to be the subjects of
investigation under the built-in safeguards of the Domestic
Security/Terrorism Guidelines. No similar safeguards are built
into the FCI Guidelines at present.

Other desirable features of the Domestic Security/
Terrorism Guidelines which seem likely candidates for application
to international terrorism investigations include requirements
that, before investigations are opened, appropriate officials
must consider the magnitude of the threatened harm; the likeli-
hood that it will occur; the immediacy of the threat; and the
danger to privacy and free expression posed by an investigation.
FBI agents are warned that, "[i]n the absence of any information
indicating planned violence by a group or enterprise, mere specu-
lation that force or violence might occur during the course of

-10-

any otherwise peaceable demonstration :s not sufficient grounds
for initiation of an investigation. . . ." If these standards
had been conscientiously applied to the CISPES investigation, it
seems certain that an ongoing intrusion into legitimate political
activity would have ended much sooner.

When the provisions of the FCI Guidelines on interna-
tional terrorism were first drafted, it may not have been fully
realized how frequently the groups that would be the targets of
such investigations would be composed primarily of American
citizens. Certainly, little thought was given to such issues as
whether a mere statement by a group that it "supports" a foreign
faction should serve as a legitimate predicate for an investiga-
tion. In the case of CISPES, I am willing to grant the FBI the
benefit of the doubt that it was misled by a "bad" informant and
perhaps by those within its own organization who had an interest
in promoting the bona r ides of that informant. But the very
conscientiousness of the FBI gives me hope that by improving the
standards pursuant to which its international terrorism
investigations are conducted, we can eliminate much potential for
controversy, protect civil liberties better than we have, and
strengthen the FBI's most important asset: the trust and
confidence of broad segments of the public in its work.

Thank you.

Mr. Edwards. Thank you very much.

Our final witness is John Finn, of Wesleyan University. Profes-
sor Finn has been studying the constitutional limitations on coun-
terterrorism investigations, including the experiences of other na-
tions.

Professor Finn, you are welcome.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN FINN, PROFESSOR, WESLEYAN
UNIVERSITY, MIDDLETOWN, CT

Mr. Finn. Thank you very much.

I would like to thank the rest of the committee as well.

I appreciate the opportunity to speak on this question. I have a
fairly long prepared remarks, but I will try to summarize them
quite briefly. I would actually like to speak to two questions, one of
which hasn't been addressed except implicitly, and I would like to
speak to a second question about what changes, if any, are advisa-
ble in the way the FBI conducts investigations.

The first concerns freedom of expression issues, which are clearly
implicit and somewhat explicit in this investigation. There has
been an awful lot of talk about the scope of the investigation,
which is truly broad. Did it interfere with constitutionally protect-
ed freedom of expression rights?

I think we need to be very careful about the way we talk about
that and I think we need to be very careful about the way we ap-
proach the issue. I have to say, frankly, it is not at all clear under
current constitutional jurisprudence that anything that is publicly
known about the FBI investigation of CISPES actually interfered
with First Amendment rights. Now, before we go too far into that,
I simply want to say I am talking now just about the First Amend-
ment as it is understood by the Supreme Court.

In a series of cases the Court has gone out of its way, as have
lower federal courts, to indicate that merely showing up at public
gatherings, recording license plate numbers, photographing partici-
pants, does not, strictly speaking, constitute a violation of the First
Amendment. There are a number of cases and the FBI has been
involved in more than one.

Perhaps the most important would be Laird v. Tatum, which was
decided in the early seventies. I would urge anybody interested in
this case to read that extensively.

Of course, the FBI will be more than intimately involved with a
recent case called the Alliance to End Repression v. FBI, where the
FBI entered into a consent decree in a federal court in Chicago,
which limits the terms or the application of the domestic security/
terrorism guidelines within the City of Chicago.

That said, I don't want to get into that issue at any great length.
I want to point out I am not suggesting Congress ought to defer to
what is a fairly narrow and fairly technical decision about what
chilling means. I think Congress has a duty to exercise and I would
urge it to exercise its own independent judgment about what the
effects of these types of investigations are on the practice and the
structural role that freedom of expression has to play in a democ-
racy.

It is only when you consider the overall systemic effects of this
sort of behavior that you can adequately woigh the First Amend-
ment cost versus the FBI's legitimate — I think we all concede it is
legitimate — interest in law enforcement and intelligence activities.
If I get a chance, I would like to come back briefly to talk about
the distinction between law enforcement and intelligence gathering
activities, because they are quite critical in this case.

Now that I have said that, let me go to the question of possible
changes in the FBI's charter. I support, as I think almost every-
body does here, some notion of an FBI charter. I also support a
charter that spends a good deal of time talking about internal orga-
nization with the FBI. Much of what happened here is not a failure
of guidelines, but a failure of human error. We can pass new guide-
lines, we can pass charters. We have to recognize that ultimately
none of them are going to do what we really need, which is firm
and sensitive control within the FBI to control the scope of investi-
gations.

I want to point out I also agree with the rest of the witnesses —
the predicate the FBI had for starting its international counterin-
telligence investigation here probably was acceptable under the
current guidelines. It may also have been acceptable under the do-
mestic security/terrorism guidelines as well. That is a slightly
more difficult issue.

I would support then an FBI charter. I would also support revi-
sion of guidelines along ways that some of the other members have
spoken about. In particular, I would urge for an abolishment of the
distinction between domestic security/terrorism and counterintelli-
gence investigations. As we know, they basically proceed on the
same predicate, although our information is limited to the classi-
fied nature.

We also know, however, that the scope of the investigation con-
ducted under the FCI guidelines is more broad than what is per-
mitted under the counterterrorism. I am not sure we can justify
the differences when the activities here occurred entirely on the
basis of American citizens and were entirely domestic. I am at a
complete loss to understand what the purpose was in this case of
having made the distinction between domestic terrorism and inter-
national terrorism, except to get out of the more rigid require-
ments implicit in the counterterrorism. I urge an abolishment of
the distinction.

One other matter, and that goes back on the predicate. There
has been talk here about whether the predicate ought to be more
of a criminal predicate or something substantially lower than that.
I don't think we can successfully answer that question in any intel-
ligent way unless we first decide what the purpose of these sorts of
investigations are.

If the purpose is essentially one of law enforcement, if the pur-
pose is to generate indictments and prosecutions — of which CISPES
gave us none, I might add — then we ought to have a standard that
appears very close, if not identical, to the criminal standard either
of probable cause or alternatively, lower reasonable indication
standard currently in use. That is the approach I favor.

On the other hand, we have to concede that there is a legitimate
social and state interest in law intelligence or criminal intelligence

investigations. The purpose of those investigations is rather differ-
ent. The way these investigations should be conducted is entirely
different and I think they might urge or might require us to go to
a different sort of standard.

I again think the appropriate standard in this case would be the
domestic security reasonable indication standard, as well as the
First Amendment limitations that are implicit in the domestic se-
curity guidelines.

I think I will end there.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Finn follows:]

STATEMENT
OF

JOHN E. FINN
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT
WKSLEYAN UNIVERSITY

BEFORE
THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

June 13, 1988

Finn: Prepared statement of June 13, 1988 2
I Introduction .

Chairman Edwards, I am pleased for the opportunity to appear before this
subcommittee today to discuss the constitutional, and in particular the First
Amendment issues raised by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's two
investigations of the Committee in Support of the People of El Salvador
(CISPES). My understanding is that the first investigation, from June 25,
1981 until February 23, 1982, was conducted at the request of the Department
of Justice to determine if CISPES was in violation of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act (FARA). The Interim Report issued by the FBI earlier this
year indicates that the FBI's FARA investigation concluded "there was no
specific evidence indicating CISPES was acting on behalf of, or at the
direction of a foreign power or group." (IR, p. 4)

The second investigation was initiated on March 30, 1983, not as a
continuing FARA investigation but as a separate and distinct counterterrorism
inquiry. The predicate for this second investigation was essentially
information provided by an informant, Frank Varelli, who claimed that certain
activities by CISPES were directed by the FDR and FMLW, thereby "giving reason
to believe that certain members of CISPES were or may have been engaged in
international terrorism, or activities in preparation for terrorism...." (IR,
p. 4) Hence the initiation and the scope of the second investigation was
governed not by FARA or by the Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic
Security /Terrorism, but rather by the classified foreign counterintelligence
guidelines. I think it important to note that Varelli's information directly
contradicted the conclusion reached by the FBI in its earlier FARA
investigation. (Varelli began as a paid informant in the FBI's Dallas office
in March 1981, fully two months before the FARA investigation was commenced. )

Nevertheless, Varelli's information, if thought authentic, would appear

Finn: Prepared statement of June 13, 1988 3

to provide a sufficient predicate to have initiated an investigation under the

FCI guidelines. Although much of these guidelines are classified, a FCI

investigation is authorized in all cases that cover "foreign intelligence,

foreign counterintelligence, foreign intelligence support activities, and all

intelligence investigations of international terrorism conducted by the FBI

pursuant to Executive Order 12333." ["Attorney General guidelines for FBI

Foreign Intelligence Collection and Foreign Counterintelligence

Investigations," (April 18, 1983)] It is important to note here that the

CISPES investigation did not proceed under the Domestic Security /Terrorism

guidelines, which authorize investigations only

when the facts or circumstances reasonably indicate that
two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the
purpose of furthering political or social goals wholly or
in part through activities that involve force or violence
and a violation of the criminal laws of the United States.
The standai-d of "reasonable indication" is identical to
that governing the initiation of a general crimes
investigation under Part II. In determining whether an
investigation should be conducted, the FBI shall consider
all of the circumstances, including: (1) the magnitude of
the threatened harm; (2) the likelihood it will occur; (3)
the immediacy of the threat; and (4) the danger to privacy
and free expression posed by an investigation, (emphasis added)

None of those qualifications appear in the unclassified parts of the FCI

guidelines. Moreover, unlike the Domestic guidelines, which limit

investigations to individuals suspected of involvement in a criminal

"enterprise," the FCI guidelines do not limit investigations to

individuals but rather authorize investigations of entire groups. These

differences figured prominently in the CISPES investigation. The FBI's

Interim Report defended the use of the FCI guidelines by noting that "The

CISPES investigation was based on facts which gave reason to believe that

certain members of CISPES were or may have been engaged in international

terrorism wherein such activities transcend international boundaries." (IR, p.

Finn: Prepared statement of June 13, 1988 4

Subsequent allegations and information gathered through the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) indicated that during the five year course of its
CISPES investigation, the FBI generated over 3700 pages of information and no
indictments. Agents photographed participants and recorded license tag
numbers at political gatherings in opposition to the Administration's Central
America policy, and clipped offending articles from popular magazines. In
addition, the FOIA materials clearly indicate that the investigation soon
expanded to cover not only CISPES but also a very long list of other
organizations, including several religious groups and unions, all of which
were engaged in legitimate political activities protected by the First
Amendment . In several airtels FBI-HQ repeatedly counseled its agents not to
interfere with protected political expression, but FBI Director Sessions has
since conceded that some agents pursued this investigation too aggressively
arid that some field offices were not properly supervised. The investigation
was terminated when the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review in the
Department of Justice concluded that CISPES was involved only in "political
activities involving First Amendment rights and not international terrorism."

II Constitutional Concerns.

The are several constitutional issues raised by the FBI's conduct in
this case. Some of these issues are specific to possible First Amendment
violations in the CISPES investigation. Others involve questions concerning
constitutional limitations in counter terror ism policies more generally and the
different functions of criminal prosecution and intelligence gathering in a
democratic society. I shall address each in turn.

A. First Amendaent Considerations in the CISPES Investigation.

Finn: Prepared statement of June 13, 1988 5

1. Hie PCI Guidelines.

Director Sessions has repeatedly stated that the FBI's investigation was
"narrow in focus and was limited to... leaders and key members to ascertain...'
if they were involved in illegal activities. Nevertheless, the scope of the
investigation undeniably included individual members completely unaware of the
activity suspected of leaders and those key members, and later included at
least "follow up" investigations of other organizations simply because CISPES
members were also involved or in contact with those organizations in some way.

As a result, the FBI was involved for nearly five years in the
surveillance of perfectly legitimate First Amendment activities of speech and
association on the part of CISPES members who were not individually suspected
of criminal activity. The first question is whether so extensive an
investigation exceeded the FCI guidelines. As noted earlier, the
unclassified sections of those guidelines appear to authorize investigations
of organizations and groups who provide "support" for international terrorism.
The FCI guidelines do not limit such investigations to individuals suspected
of criminal activity, and as a consequence authorize investigations that are
remarkably broad in scope, as was the second CISPES investigation. Moreover,
the guidelines do not define "support" for international terrorism (nor do
they define terrorism), but it is fair to assume that its meaninf ls
substantially more relaxed than the standard applied under FARA. It is also
clear that an FCI investigation can proceed simply on the basis of advocacy.
Therefore, the second investigation could proceed even after the earlier FARA
investigation of CISPES was discontinued. The failure of the FCI guidelines
to duplicate the domestic security cautions on First Amendment activity was
also a significant factor in the initiation and later in the scope of the
second investigation.

Finn: Prepared statement of June 13, 1988 6

2. First Aaencfaent Considerations.

The CISPES investigation clearly encompassed surveillance of First
Amendment activities, but it is less clear that the investigation
unconstitutionally infringed upon freedom of expression. The FBI's
activities, however distressing some may find them, do not appear, strictly
speaking, to have been illegal or to have actually violated the First
Amendment rights of the individuals and groups concerned. Although its
investigation was broad, the FBI collected information that was publicly
available and I am aware of no substantiated evidence that the FBI actually
harassed CTSPES or its individual members. It is true that the FBI's behavior
may be said to have "chilled" political expression in some general sense, but
the collection of publicly available information and the presence of agents at
public gatherings — short of actual and overt interference — has not been held
by the Supreme Court to constitute an unconstitutional "chilling" of First
Amendment rights, whether of speech or association. In Laird v. Tatim 408
U.S. 1 (1971), for example, the Court was asked to enjoin the Army's domestic
intelligence activity conducted under the CONUS program. Although the
precedent is troublesome because of its procedural posture, the Supreme Court
ruled that federal jurisdiction could not be invoked by a claim that a
litigant's First Amendment rights were "chilled" by governmental intelligence
gathering activities, absent some direct injury. It appears, therefore, that
the Court has ruled that First Amendment rights are not infringed by the act
of intelligence gathering alone. (For reasons of space, I do not address in
this testimony the related Privacy Act issues raised by the FBI's collection
of otherwise publicly available information.)

Similarly, in a case of especial relevance given some of the activities

Finn: Prepared statement of June 13, 198« 7

in the CISPES investigation , a federal district court, in Donahue v. Duling
330 F. Supp. 308 (1971), rejected a lawsuit brought by leaders of a
demonstration who claimed that local police officers who had taken pictures at
the demonstration had "chilled" their first amendment rights. See also
Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney General of the United States, 419 U.S.
1314 (1974).

.Also important on this point is the case of Alliance to End Repression
v. City of Chicago (U.S. Dist. Ct., April 18, 1983), in which the plaintiffs
sought an order restraining the FBI from implementing within the city of
Chicago the Domestic Security /Terrorism guidelines. The plaintiffs argued
that those guidelines offended the terms of a consent decree entered in an
earlier case. They argued also, on the strength of Brandenburg v. Hayes
395 U.S. 447 (1969) (per curiam), that the domestic security guidelines
\iolnted the First Amendment proper. Brandenburg held that "the
i onstitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action." It is quite clear
that the domestic security guidelines are considerably more relaxed than the
Brandenburg standard. Nevertheless, those standards are what must be
satisfied to criminalize speech and therefore do not necessarily limit the
government's ability to conduct investigations This latter point was left
open by the district court in the Alliance to End Repression case.

In sum, in our constitutional jurisprudence, the chilling effect of a
governmental investigation, absent some direct injury, does not by itself
amount to a constitutional violation. I am not , however, suggesting that
Congress ought to measure First Amendment concerns solely by reference to
Supreme Court case law. Instead, Congress should exercise its own

Finn: Prepared statement of June 13, 1988 8

constitutional judgment to conclude that investigations of the breadth and
scope of the sort that occurred in the CISPES case are inimical to the
constitutional values of free speech and association essential to democratic
self -governance and so should be restricted. As the Church Committee
argued,

Constitutional safeguards are needed to protect the
timid as well as the courageous, the weak as well as
the strong.... No citizen should have to weigh his
or her desire to express an opinion, or join a group,
against the risk of having lawful speech or association
used against him. [U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, Book II,
"Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans" 94th Cong., 2d sess.,
Rep. No. 94-755, p. 5.]

The "chilling" effect of such surveillance must be considered not only on the
basis of its effect upon the individual, but also on the basis of its long-
term, systemic effect upon freedom of expression as an indispensable
structural component of democracy. It is only when the structural, systemic
effects are considered that they can be properly weighed against the public
interest in law enforcement and intelligence gathering.

B. Possible Changes and Recommendations .

1. Changes in the Attorney General's Guidelines.

There are a number of means by which Congress could ensure greater
respect for constitutional values and do so in a way that acknowledges the
nation's very real and legitimate interests in law enforcement and
counterintelligence. One such change should be to specify that
investigations — whether domestic security/terrorism or foreign
counterintelligence — must be limited to individuals knowingly involved in a
criminal enterprise and not targeted to groups as a whole. (Although the FC1
Guidelines are classified, it is known that they permit the FBI to target

Finn: Prepared statement of June 13, 1988 9

whole groups even when suspicion is limited tc certain members only. )
Likewise, Congress should tighten the FCI predicate requirements so that the>
exclude reliance upon ideology or advocacy alone, perhaps by requiring
reasonable suspicion/indication or, alternatively, probable cause to suspect
criminal activity. (The reasonable indication standard is lower than the
probable cause standard typically associated with criminal law enforcement —
choosing between these standards, as I indicate below, is very much related to
the distinction between law enforcement and intelligence gathering. ) Broad
predicates of the sort now permitted under the FCI almost necessitate
expansive investigations. (Consider Assistant Director Revell's statement to
the National Press Club that the investigation was "not specific as to
individuals but as to the purpose of the organization. ... So it had to be
broad and it narrowed as it proceeded.")

I shall speak to the question of threshold predicates in greater detail
later on, but for now I wish to point out that choosing among them cannot be
done intelligently without first specifying in some detail and with some
clarity what the purpose of investigations like these is, and in my view that
is an unresolved question. Moreover, the use of the phrase "terrorism" in
both sets of guidelines invites expansive investigations because the phrase is
left essentially undefined — as a consequence, the distinction between
terrorism and political dissent is easily blurred, as the CISPES case
demonstrates .

This is especially true under the current FCI guidelines, which contain
none of the First Amendment precautions that appear in the domestic
security/terrorism guidelines. For example, the domestic guidelines require
that the FBI consider the "danger to privacy and free expression posed by an
investigation." No such caution appears in unclassified sections of the FCI

Finn: Prepared statement of June 13, 1988 10

guidelines, and indeed those guidelines permit, in limited cases, infiltration
of groups even where "that will influence rights protected by the First
Amendment, for example through assuming a leadership role in an organization."
In addition, under the domestic guidelines, the FBI must limit its
investigation to individuals who are knowing participants in a criminal
"enterprise." The FC1 guidelines are not so limited and as a consequence, the
FBI may investigate entire groups, even if many or most members are not
individually suspected of supporting international terrorism.

Hence, investigations conducted under the FCI guidelines
pose a more direct threat, to freedom of expression than do investigations
conducted under the Smith guidelines. I must again stress that the FBI's
decision to proceed under the FCI guidelines was premised upon the claim that
CISPES may have been acting "in support of international terrorism." The
vagueness of this phrase is quite troubling, for both the language of
"support" and the concept of "terrorism" can be construed — and in this case
apparently were — to mean mere political advocacy, a conclusion reinforced
by the results of the FBI's own FARA investigation. It is worth noting here
that British efforts to make criminalize "support" for terrorist causes under
the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1976) have led to well -publicized
difficulties concerning what "support" means and how broadly it can be
defined.

Also troublesome is the use of a distinction between domestic terrorism
and international terrorism to support separate investigations that proceed
under different rules governing their initiation and termination, and that
authorize different sorts of investigative techniques and different levels of
intrusiveness, as is now the case. Whether the alleged activity on the part
of CISPES was "in support" of domestic terrorism or international terrorism
seems hardly to matter: In either case the subjects of investigation were

Finn: Prepared statement of June 13, 1988 11

American citizens and the conduct involved occurred domestically. The
rationale for a different set of investigative rules for international as
opposed to domestic terrorism, when in both cases the relevant activity is the
same and occurs within the United States, is not obvious.

If the purpose of such investigations is essentially one of law
enforcement and the development of criminal prosecutions , therefore, there
ought only to be one standard governing both domestic and foreign
counterintelligence investigations. The unde^ i rabili ty of the PCI guidelines
for these purposes is underscored by the absence of indictments, not to say
prosecutions, generated by the C1SPES investigation. Instead, the standard
should either be the reasonable indication standard and criminal enterprise
limitation currently in the Smith guidelines, or a more stringent probable
cause standard (I address this issue in more detail in Section III, infra).
In other words, such investigat ions should be permitted only in cases onb
"where two or more persons are engaged in a pattern of activities for the
purpose of furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through
activities that involve force or violence." In addition, these investigations
should be limited to individuals reasonably suspected of involvement in a
criminal enterprise and should not be extended to entire organizations or
groups as a whole.

2. Changes in the Organizational Structure and Internal Policies
of the FBI.

The experience with CISPES also suggests the need for more
accountability and direct and detailed supervision between FBI-HQ and the
field offices. Indeed, in the long run no set of administrat ive or statutory
guidelines can substitute for sensitive and firm direction from FBI -HQ. To
its credit, at several points in the CISPES investigation FBI-HQ did caution

Finn: Prepared statement of June 13, 1988 12

agents not to intrude on protected speech, but it is clear that some offices
and agents either ignored or misunderstood those cautions', and, in one case, a
field office was directed by FBI-HQ to proceed with an investigation it had
closed to determine if the organization was a "front" for CISPES.

The CISPES investigation underscores the extent of decentralization, and
consequent lack of accountability, that currently exists in the FBI. Much of
the investigation was centered at the Dallas office, and other field offices
varied widely in their approach to the investigation. FOIA documents indicate
that the Pittsburgh office wanted to place an informer in the local CISPES
chapter, and the New Orleans office wrote of the need "to formulate a plan of
attack against against CISPES and specifically against individuals who
defiantly display their contempt for the U.S. Government...." On the other
hand, the Denver office concluded that "in spite of attempts by the bureau to
t larifv guidelines and goals for this investigation , [we] are not sure of how
much seemingly legitimate political activity can be monitored," To this end,
all counterintelligence investigations should be approved by the Director
personally and supported by written findings indicating that the reasonable
indication standard has been applied and satisfied.

Ill Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and Constitutional Liberties.

Public critics of the CISPES investigation have repeatedly noted that
five years of extensive surveillance notwithstanding, the investigation
produced no indictments and no prosecutions. I mentioned earlier that this
failure is intricately related to the question of investigation predicates and
how stringent they should be. Investigations the purpose of which is law
enforcement and criminal prosecution should be initiated only on the strength
of predicates that, are likely to satisfy that purpose. As a consequence,

Finn: Prepared statement of June 13, 1988 Ki

investigations of this sort should be strictly limited to criminal behavior
and initiated only on probable cause to suspect criminal activity. Less
stringent standards permit the collection of information concerning legitimate-
First Amendment activities that cannot of themselves give rise to criminal
prosecutions. This understandably and quite properly engenders public fears
that the FBI is using intrusive surveillance techniques to harass
administration opponents and monitor political dissent.

Still, we ought not confuse law enforcement with investigations whose central
purpose is intelligence gathering and evaluation rather than criminal
prosecution. Assuming the state has an interest in and a need for
surveillance and intelligence gathering that is distinct from its interest in
law enforcement and the prevention of criminal behavior (and I recognize how
controversial that assumption is), the predicate for such investigations
should be somewhat less stringent than for law enforcement investigations.
As Director Webster testified in 1982, "Our domestic security
investigations. . .entail not only determining who committed specific criminal
acts but also how those individuals related to others similarly motivated,
how they are financed and supported logistically , and who their leadership
is." [U.S. Congress, Senate, Domestic Security (Levi) Guidelines, Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d sess., 1982, p. 11.]

How we approach the distinction between these sorts of investigations
also depends upon how we approach the phenomenon of political terrorism and
how we assess its significance. It is commonplace by now to observe that
debates over definitions of terrorism are endless, but the consequences of
definition are very real and of more than mere scholastic importance. I have
argued elsewhere that the tendency to "exceptionalize" terrorism and to speak

Finn: Prepared statement of June 13, 1988 14

of a "war" against it lean's policy makers and academics to conclude that
extraordinary or special measures are needed to respond to terrorism. Surely
some idea of this type is the basic justification for the relatively relaxed
regulations that currently govern FCI investigations.

I have argued also that the preferable approach is to treat terrorism as
simply another form of criminal activity, in part because the accouterments
of terror— burglaries , bombings, murders, kidnapings, and the like — already
violate the criminal laws of every western democracy. Under a criminal
activity approach, terrorism investigations would proceed, as would all
typical law enforcement investigations, under a probable cause standard or
under the general crimes standard in the Smith guidelines. Similarly, there
would be no reason to distinguish, as the current guidelines do, between
foreign counterintelligence and domestic security investigations. And all
investigations would be limited to individuals suspected of criminal
behavior — groups as such would not be investigated simply on the basis of
ideology or advocacy or vague allegations of unspecified "support" for
terrorist organizations. Such a requirement appears to be in force in
Chicago as a result of the consent decree agreed to by the FBI in the
Alliance to End Repression case that I discussed earlier. It is worth noting
here that this standard would preclude use of many of the investigative
techniques used in the CISPES case by in effect adopting the criminal
prosecution standard specified in Brandenburg as the threshold predicate.

Nevertheless, the state does have a legitimate interest in
intelligence gathering and evaluation that is distinct from its law
enforcement interests. Unfortunately, the Constitution is largely silent on
the subject of intelligence gathering. And as Director Webster's testimony
suggested, there are reasons to distinguish terrorism from other

Finn: Prepared statement of June 13, 1988 15

forms of criminal activity, and therefore to apply a different predicate as a
condition for an investigation. This predicate should be less stringent than
the criminal prosecution standard. The reasonable indication predicate
currently in use under the Smith guidelines strikes an appropriate balance
and should be required for all domestic intelligence investigations that
implicate American citizens, whether in support of domestic or international
terrorism. The freedom of expression conditions contained in the Smith
guidelines should likewise be expanded to cover all domestic intelligence
investigations .

Even so, intelligence investigations do create the possibility that the
information collected can be used to harass or intimidate citizens who oppose
administration policies. This is a problem very much complicated by the
concentration of both law enforcement and intelligence functions within a
single organization like the FBI. There are some very real differences
between these two functions and the sort of information needed to perform them
and that they are likely to collect. Criminal investigations have beginning
points and end points and an internal dynamic determined by the goa] of
prosecution. Intelligence investigations are ongoing, fluid, and are
necessarily less structured. Information of great use in an intelligence
investigation may be either irrelevant or simply useless in a criminal
investigation. The differences between these two functions are not as well
understood or as much appreciated as they are in some other countries, such as
Great Britain, where the security service fulfills intelligence functions only
and the police have a monopoly over law enforcement functions. Combining both
functions in a single agency can only increase fears that information gathered
in the pursuit of one function will be improperly used in the other.

As 1 indicated earlier, there are but a very few ways to counteract this

Finn: Prepared statement of June 13, 1988 16

problem. One is simply to deny the need for intelligence investigations that
proceed on a predicate less stringent than the criminal prosecution standard.
For the reasons I identified earlier, this approach is unsatisfactory. A
second approach — the one currently employed — is to enact a set of guidelines
that limit the initiation and determine the scope of such investigations. 1
have suggested how the current guidelines might be improved to better account
for First Amendment concerns, but we must acknowledge that the capacity of
rules to constrain behavior is always limited; intelligence gathering and
evaluation is a discretionary enterprise inherently ill-suited to governance
through specific rules. Faults in the CISPES investigation were as a much a
result of human error as of deficiencies in the guidelines.

That said, the development of such guidelines, and their utility, has
been hampered in the past by questions concerning their authority, their
partial secrecy, and the opportunity they present for abuse. Statutory
guidelines and charters might offset some of those difficulties, as well as
make more public the state and society's legitimate interest in such
information. An FBI Charter in particular, in investigative which guidelines
were codified, would help serve this purpose, but it will not resolve the
other difficulties I have identified. Moreover, efforts to enact a charter or
statutory guidelines will raise troublesome constitutional issues concerning
separation of powers and the inherent powers of the president, issues too
complex to explore in this limited forum.

IV Conclusion .

The CISPES investigation has once again raised concerns about the FBI's
investigation of domestic political organizations and the extent to which such
investigations, even if properly conceived in origination, interfere with

Finn: Prepared statement of June 13, 1988 17

protected and legitimate First Amendment activities. I have argued that those
concerns require a more sophisticated understanding of the distinctions
between law enforcement and intelligence gathering and evaluation, and that
only through an appreciation of the distinction between these two activities,
and how they relate to terrorism, can those concerns be addressed.

I have recommended also that the Smith guidelines be expanded to cover
all domestic intelligence investigations and that the distinction between
domestic terrorism and international terrorism — insofar as it authorizes
different sorts of investigations based on different predicates — be eliminated
and replaced with a single "reasonable indication" standard. Finally, I have
indicated thai a more fruitful long run approach should focus not on the
development of external guidelines but rather on internal FBI organization.

Mr. Edwards. Thank you very much. That is very helpful testi-
mony.

Mr. Kastenmeier, do you have any questions?

Mr. Kastenmeier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to con-
gratulate you on this hearing, although it is a continuation of
something you and this committee have been interested in for some
time.

I think the testimony, brief as it was, by the witnesses is very
much on point and very useful. A discussion of what if any statuto-
ry changes might be appropriate, whether limits ought to be some
of the more stringent, or whether, as the last witness suggested, we
need to first know the purposes of these investigations in the name
of intelligence or in the name of preventing terrorism. And also,
the fact that we are quite far behind in reaching, in developing a
charter for the Bureau.

I don't want to read too much into what some of the witnesses
testified to. I was interested in Mr. Richard suggesting, I thought
at the outset, part of the problem might be whether or not the
Bureau might be influenced by other factors. That is to say, I sup-
pose I may be reading into this, but by the Administration or Jus-
tice Department or by the State Department, or the intelligence
community, in terms of what it thinks are its appropriate — in
terms of expectations or whether it is specifically tasked to do cer-
tain things or whether it believes in concert with the Administra-
tion with certain policies reflected throughout the rest of the Exec-
utive bureaucracies we can expect it to be as neutral in its re-
sponse to the sometime political questions as it might be under an-
other Administration.

Maybe that is too much to ask for. If it is, then the problem may
be worse. That is, it might be cyclical. The early seventies may
return in the mid-eighties and return again in the mid-nineties,
partly because of this sort of political response to expectations,
partly in response to the rest of the bureaucracies, and the political
nature of the Administration.

I don't want to read too much into that, Mr. Richard, but I do
think that is a problem that probably a somewhat more stringent
charter might help resolve. But I suppose we would have to look
for a continuing need for a Congress to exercise oversight to sort of
counter that disposition.

Would you not agree, sir?

Mr. Richard. I do agree with that. I think Ken Bass may have
touched on that at more length than I did, but I will respond to it.

I think there are a combination of answers. One is hearings like
this serve a tremendously valuable purpose in keeping people in
the Executive Branch aware, as much as they may dislike it, that
there is oversight and that one can never tell when one may be
called to account. I think that has a useful deterrent effect in its
best sense.

Secondly, I think some procedural safeguards can be set up, and
indeed have been set up. For instance, I guess about ten years ago
there were guidelines instituted at the Justice Department for dis-
semination of information by the FBI to the White House. My un-
derstanding is those guidelines or some form of them are still in
effect.

I think one useful procedural safeguard is to the maximum
extent possible, make sure when there is contact between the FBI
and the White House on something that mj.y have these political
ramifications it go through responsible officials at the Justice De-
partment so people can't deny they knew what happened.

Mr. Bass. There are a couple of brief comments.

I would agree with your observation of the cyclical nature of the
Bureau's activities. I would point out It is not, in all instances, a
cycle that is tied to either political party or position on the political
spectrum. Many of the pressures that led to Bureau excesses in the
COINTELPRO, Chaos started befor. the Nixon Administration. I
think it is an unfortunate phenomena that has been evident in
both parties. I think the tie to it tends to be with the level of inter-
national tension in the world.

Mr. Kastenmeier. I did not mention political parties. It was not
my intention or my implication.

Mr. Bass. I understand that. I di not read that into your ques-
tion, although I think some comm ntators have said it tends to
fluctuate with political ideology. I ihink if you want to tie it to
something external you can tie it to level of international tension
in the world. When we are successful in the area of foreign rela-
tions in maintaining a relatively ph :id international environment,
the Bureau is called upon less often to get into the matters that it
got into here.

Similarly, when there is a consensus within the United States on
what our foreign objectives are, it tends to provoke less problem for
the FBI.

In both Vietnam and in the case of the El Salvador investigation,
one of the things that I note is that you had this very distinct dif-
ference between public goals and Administration goals, and that is
going to tend to produce the type of criticism I think that we see
here.

The other point that I would raise very preliminarily and touch
on briefly, that I think the committee will need to address when it
looks seriously at charter legislation, is what component of the fed-
eral investigative mechanism we want to do domestic intelligence
work. The FBI is preeminently a law enforcement agency, not an
intelligence agency, although the Intelligence Division of the
Bureau tends to be more like an intelligence agency than a law en-
forcement agency.

The mentality of the two disciplines is quite different. Professor
Finn alluded to this earlier. I think there is a serious debate as to
whether it is better to put domestic foreign intelligence investiga-
tion duties in the CIA, in an intelligence agency, or in the FBI.

In a nutshell, I think the argument tends to be that if you put it
in the FBI, the laudatory law enforcement, constitutional rights,
sensitivity to American values that are inherent in a law enforce-
ment agency will tend to dampen any excesses in the intelligence
field.

The arguments on the other side being that it is not something
the Bureau is that skilled at. It does something that the Bureau
recognizes as a career track and therefore, may not be as effective
or efficient at weeding out the good from the bad in terms of pro-
ductive information versus useless noise.

Mr. Halperin. Could I add one comment to that?

I think part of the problem here again is the absence of legisla-
tive limits. Because when you have limits that are just put in by
the Executive Branch and there is pressure on the Bureau or any
other agency to engage in an activity, then the pressure to accom-
modate the limits or interpret the limits so that the activity can go
forward is, I think, much stronger when the agency can point to
the Congress and say a law was enacted. We are responsible to the
Congress for a budget, and so on. We can't do this so we are going
to get into trouble with Congress.

I think not only with the Bureau but the CIA, and in general
that is much more effective than if they just have to say the rule
you wrote for us we would violate here because the answer always
can be then we will change the rule if you can't conduct investiga-
tions without that.

Mr. Kastenmeier. I think that is a good point. I think it is one
that arose during the Iran-Contra hearings with respect to the CIA,
that there are statutory limits that were finally recognized and fi-
nally tried to blow the whistle in that operation. This was handled
in that way.

Mr. Bass, I think you are correct to suggest that — a couple of
things, but one of them that might be cured by a review of cases
earlier and at a higher level, I am not convinced about that.

The reason I say that, I think is, because I vividly recall within
the last six months the top FBI officials — maybe not necessarily
the new Director or the past Director but the other top people —
vigorously defending the CISPES investigation before the Senate
and in a manner which meant that they were absolutely sanguine
about it personally. I mean, it wasn't a question of merely defend-
ing subordinates, but that they conscientiously felt this was the
right thing to do.

So I wonder whether that is an effective restraint — review at a
higher level so to speak?

Mr. Bass. Congressman, I have two responses to that:

First, I wasn't there, and I am not certain of this, but based on
what I have read and a few conversations I have had with some
people who were there, the after the fact justification at second
levels of the FBI is very different from an on the scene view as it
develops.

It is my understanding that the CISPES annual reviews within
the Bureau never rose above the second level. I could be wrong in
that. But if they weren't reviewed at either the Intelligence Divi-
sion or at the Criminal Division level, and went straight to the De-
partment of Justice, I think you have a breakdown in manage-
ment, not in guidelines.

If you have a situation where it is only after the cat is out of the
bag, so to speak, that the senior bureau people have to come forth,
they are then going to get caught and it really is probably only the
Director in the bureaucracy of the FBI who can come forth and say
something was done wrong.

The second level and certainly the division level people will tend
historically to back up what was done rather than to get out front
with criticism when they don't know where the Director is going to
be.

Mr. Kastenmeier. You are also suggesting thereby that perhaps
to ask the Bureau to investigate itself in this regard is not the best
way we can proceed?

Mr. Bass. Not always, but in some ways it is better than what we
had, because the internal checks and balance mechanisms of
whether there are inspectors general or an Inspection Division
within the Bureau does work, not perfectly, but they are working
better than the Department of Justice review in terms of being a
more reliable test.

The second point that I would make-— again I think it is some-
thing the Bureau needs to work out strategically and organization-
ally, is the uniqueness of these terrorism investigations. Because
when the Terrorism Section begins running a terrorism investiga-
tion under the FCI guidelines as opposed to the domestic security
guidelines, the Terrorism Section's management is really not that
experienced in implementing the FBI guidelines.

I don't think, as I understand the way the Bureau does it, that
they transfer responsibility over to the Intelligence Division at that
point. So you tend to wind up with a senior management that may
not be as experienced as you would like to see them in trying to
administer the guidelines or control the timing and duration of the
investigation.

Mr. Kastenmeier. I think those observations are very useful. As
a member of the Intelligence Committee, as well as this committee,
I am sensitive to what you are saying.

Only one last comment, Mr. Chairman. That is, I think you are
also correct, Mr. Bass, in suggesting that this is not as bad as
COINTELPRO and wiretapping and the watch list. No black bag
jobs. Although we are left with the uncomfortable question of why
all these break-ins throughout this country?

We have looked at it. We don't know the answer. We don't even
seem to be able to get anybody in authority who can suggest an
answer for something that cannot — does not I think to us appear to
be pure chance in various communities, that there is rifling of files,
and churches, and others interested in Central American policy or
CISPES organizations.

Even in recent days, not two or three years ago, we are talking
about, events that are taking place on a continuing basis, and
within the last year or so. We have never been able to learn that.
That is still a very perplexing question of whether these are — to
whom they are attributable.

As far as I know, it is not the Bureau, but on the other hand, it
appears that it must be part of something, and there has never
been an adequate explanation. So we still have to sort of live with
that in terms of evaluating this particular episode.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Kastenmeier.

Mr. Conyers.

Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I was hopeful that somebody would respond to Mr. Kastenmeier's
question, because that is where I start off — with asking you wheth-
er the spirit of J. Edgar Hoover is or is not alive and well in the
FBI. Because frequently the committees in Congress become, in-
stead of oversight agencies, especially on the law enforcement

agencies and intelligence gathering agencies, we become the place
where — they actually use the committee for a place to justify all of
their positions. The reverse relationship builds up.

In other words, I can't help remembering that it was Judge Web-
ster that told me that he didn't see why anybody that didn't have
anything to fear would object to an FBI agent coming on the job or
visiting them — visiting their neighborhoods, homes, to ask a few
questions about them — if you really haven't done anything wrong.

This same subcommittee is wrestling with terrorism inside the
FBI. Donald Rochon has been — here is a classic case that finally
burst out of the violence that goes on with agents who refuse to
make these kinds of discriminatory acts public — here we have the
Hispanic FBI agents in an incredulous class action lawsuit against
the FBI, alleging discrimination.

So I am a little bit nervous about whether we have stepped
beyond the shadow of Hoover and yet they are still working within
that shadow, maybe more than we are aware of. I would just like
for us to examine what kind of an agency is this that we have
where we have been going over and over all that.

The people in Michigan that were in CISPES told some chilling
stories about how they were treated and the kinds of questions and
the nature of the interrogation. It was not all friendly, just doing
my job kind of questions. They were being held up as people to be
suspected of doing something pretty heinous by their fellow citizens
or else the FBI wouldn't be out there. So I would like to get some
discussion going in that direction, Mr. Chairman, if I can.

Mr. Bass. Mr. Chairman, if I could respond to Congressman Con-
yers, I think you put your finger on a very perplexing dilemma in
this whole area of who you are going to have to do what work?

The FBI is a preeminent law enforcement agency. The law en-
forcement mentality, to put it in childhood terms, is cops and rob-
bers, good guys and bad guys. Law enforcement investigations tend
to be confrontational. They tend to be critical. They tend to pro-
ceed from a point of view of suspicion. Presumed guilty. Hard-driv-
ing, fact-driven, specific, intrusive questions, if you will.

The intelligence agency, let's look overseas for a moment in the
field. Intelligence agents' training is to do the opposite, to coy up,
to be subtle, to develop friendships and relationships and trust and
confidence so you don't have to ask questions. The information
comes spontaneously.

And I think one of the conditions of how the investigations are
done today is that by being conducted out of the Criminal Division
instead of the Intelligence Division, they tend to be conducted with
a cops-and-robbers mentality, which is going to tend to produce the
kind of confrontation that the CISPES members in Michigan have
indicated to you.

On the other hand, you get into the problem on the intelligence
side which is without some sort of focus and direction — activity as
opposed to speech — there can be a vacuum-cleaner mentality of the
sophisticated, all-encompassing librarian who wants every bit of in-
formation in the world because information is good whether it is
probative of anything or not, and I am not sure how you balance
the two.

One comment I would make with respect to the discussion we
have had here dealing with the criminal standard, I think we
should note that in the international terrorism investigations
under the FBI guidelines, there is a criminal standard. The defini-
tion of international terrorism in the unclassified portion of the
guidelines is activities that involve violent acts or acts dangerous
to human life, a violation of the criminal laws of the United States
or any State, or that would be criminal violation if committed
within the jurisdiction of the United States or any State.

[The definitions follow:]

International Terrorism

Activities that:

1. Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal vio-
lation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or any States;

2. Appear to be intended: a. to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; b. to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or c. to affect the
conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and

3. Occur totally outside the United States, or transcend national boundaries in
terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear in-
tended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or
seek asylum.

International Terrorist

An individual or group that knowingly engages in international terrorism or ac-
tivities in preparation thereof, or knowingly aids or abets any person engaged in
such activities.

Of all the areas where this is a criminal standard, to the extent
that those words mean anything in terms of limiting investigation,
it is the terrorism activities because terrorism, by definition, en-
tails acts of violence, and the only difference between terrorism
and war, from a legal standard, is that war is terrorism engaged in
by a nation officially acknowledged as such and therefore consid-
ered to be legal under certain concepts of international law, where-
as the other is a private group and therefore illegal under interna-
tional law.

Mr. Halperin. Mr. Conyers, let me make two comments on this,
if I could. First, on the black bag job question, I am interested that
Mr. Bass has said there weren't any black bag jobs. I take it he
means as far as we can tell from the documents that have been re-
leased so far, otherwise I would like to hear it.

But I think it is important to note, as I am sure that you are
aware, is that under the Executive Order the FBI is authorized,
with the approval of the Attorney General, to conduct black bag
jobs in investigations of this kind, so that if there were black bag
jobs, they would not be a violation of the existing guidelines. And
that is something that we have long urged Congress to put a stop
to.

I want to once again urge that the committee and the Intelli-
gence Committee look into this assertion by a succession of Presi-
dents — again, it is a bipartisan matter — of the right to break into
people's houses secretly in the middle of the night or day or their
offices, and steal their papers without warrant or notice upon a
finding of the Attorney General that there is probable cause to be-
lieve that they are agents of a foreign power. That is in the Execu-

tive Order, in the Carter order and in the Ford order. In the view of
the American Civil Liberties Union, it violates the Fourth Amend-
ment, and I think it is long overdue that Congress look into it.

Now, that would not make black bag jobs impossible. But it
would at least make them illegal. And I think they are under the
Constitution but also under the directives, so that I think there
would be substantial less likelihood that they took place.

I have no reason to think any took place here, but it is important
to know that if they did, well, in my view they would have violated
the Constitution. In the view of three Presidents and their Attor-
neys General, they would be legal.

Second, on the question of the predicate as it relates to an intelli-
gence investigation, I think that the failure here in terms of begin-
ning an investigation was, what kind of investigation had been
done?

I certainly think it is appropriate when an informant comes in
and says that an organization or members of an organization are
engaged in illegal activity to investigate that illegal activity. But
that is what you should be investigating.

What should have been triggered, in my view, by the allegations
of the informant here, assuming they were believed and should
have been believed, was a criminal investigation of an alleged
criminal act of violating the Neutrality Act or otherwise supplying
information, and that the standard to authorize an intelligence in-
vestigation of a domestic political organization ought to be much
higher than the predicate to investigate a specific allegation of ille-
gal activity.

Mr. Conyers. Well, would the FBI charter eliminate black bag
jobs or would that have to be taken care of separately?

Mr. Halperin. It could be part of an FBI charter, but it is some-
thing that I don't think should wait for an FBI charter.

Mr. Richard. Congressman, I guess, I think Ken Bass has point-
ed out that the reference to criminal law was very important. It
makes me think that maybe I should take back something I said.

I said that I think maybe the predicate for engaging in an inves-
tigation had been met here. Nowhere in the FBI documents that I
have seen was there a reference to a criminal statute that they
were investigating. I would think that would be part of the predi-
cate that should be clearly spelled out, such as neutrality law.

And secondly, in the spirit of J. Edgar Hoover, I think those have
a habit of lingering for a long time. But on the more cheery side, I
would note that at least now in this case, you had a variety of opin-
ions among the different field officers about what was going on and
some of them feel free to speak up. You had New Orleans say,
"Let's go get these guys, you are not giving us enough room in the
field." But you had Denver saying, "Is this what we ought to be
doing? Is this proper? We are getting close to the First Amendment
here."

I think the Denver office deserves a lot of credit. At least now we
have a couple of flowers, if not a thousand flowers, blooming inside
the FBI.

Finally, part of the problem here is the relative vagueness of
what support for international terrorism means as a criminal

standard. It is completely vague. As it happens, support for terror-
ism might mean mere advocacy.

The other problem is that what terrorism means is itself an open
question. I don't want to get into a mere scholastic debate about
the thousands of definitions about what it means, but I would like
to say you only have two choices. Either you define it as a form of
criminal activity or you define it with some reference to a political
persuasion, and when you do that, as I think the current guidelines
do, you open up problems about the scope of investigation immedi-
ately, particularly when you define support. So it can mean advoca-
cy.

I would urge a more precise definition of terrorism, and I think
there is probably widespread support on this panel for that.

Mr. Conyers. And also for an FBI charter and also for eliminat-
ing the distinction between domestic and foreign terrorism? Is it
fair to say there is a consensus here? Reservations now come for-
ward or forever hold your peace.

Mr. Bass. The only reservation I would have is on the elimina-
tion of distinction between domestic and international terrorism. I
would not want to see NSA and CIA become involved in domestic
terrorist investigations. I do want them involved in international
terrorist investigations.

I think domestic terrorist investigations, properly defined, are
purely a law enforcement and not sharing any of the intelligence
issues.

Mr. Conyers. Is that an acceptable condition to impose, that ev-
eryone else agrees with?

Mr. Finn. If there are a couple more qualifications, if interna-
tional terrorism can be defined as American citizens who act
purely on American soil, only in domestic activities, can be defined
to act in support of international terrorism, I would support it.
There should be no distinction when American citizens are con-
ducting it on American soil.

Mr. Conyers. So I take it there is a difference here.

Mr. Bass. I am not sure. We may be back to closing the circle.

One of the issues litigated in the case had to do with whether the
activities of the JDL wholly within the United States had a foreign
affairs justification for warrantless wiretapping because it would
affect foreign relations, and the holding of the D.C. Circuit was
that was not a sufficient connection to make it international or
bring it with the exception.

I think that is the same distinction that Professor Finn is allud-
ing to. Where there is an extraterritorial involvement, that one I
think you need to bring the Intelligence Community into it rather
than leaving it as a law enforcement matter, but if it is entirely
domestic even though it involves foreign affairs or international
policy, I think it is a law enforcement problem.

Mr. Conyers. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Conyers.

Mr. Richard, it seems to us for a long time that the best safe-
guard that the FBI has that we should continually insist upon is
the criminal standard, that you leave people alone unless there is
some criminal activity about to take place in violation of some Fed-
eral law. And it seems to me that should apply to international ter-

rorism as well as to domestic terrorism. It does apply to domestic
terrorism generally now.

Would it leave any loopholes if we required that standard for
international terrorism?

Mr. Richard. Well, the question that goes through my mind
when I think about the question you have asked me comes from
my experience on the Church Committee. You will remember that
in the Church Committee investigation and the Pike Committee,
too, here in the House, one of the major revelations was that the
CIA had engaged in assassination activities overseas.

I remember that on the staff of the committee, we did some re-
search at the time about whether any statute passed by Congress
made it a crime for Americans to conspire and prepare in the
United States to assassinate a foreign leader. And believe it or not,
the answer that at that time came up was, probably not.

There were some ambiguities in the law there. There is the kind
of activity that I think would be a legitimate subject for investiga-
tion. So there is an example.

I think there should be a criminal standard. There are argu-
ments in favor of that. But we need to look at the laws in that to
make sure there are no gaps. But either that or we will have to
come up with some slightly different language, because there are
some things like foreign assassinations that ought to be subject to
investigation which may fall between the cracks in our criminal
statutes when they happen overseas.

Mr. Edwards. But for suspected or anticipated or feared terror-
ism within the United States, those types of investigations, we
should require the criminal standards?

Mr. Richard. I believe so, yes. I think that is important for a
couple of reasons. Number one, Congress obviously has a role in
passing criminal statutes. There is a process of give and take be-
tween the congressional and executive branches, and what emerges
from that is a consensus on the form of law as to what ought not to
be considered legitimate activity in our society, and that is a safe-
guard for the public consensus in favor of law enforcement investi-
gations that I think must be preserved. I think it is kind of a due
process. It is sort of legislative due process.

Mr. Edwards. Do all of the witnesses agree that that should be
an important part of the FBI charter? Mr. Bass.

Mr. Bass. I think it is an important part, Mr. Chairman, but
there is a role for some agencies in the United States, as Mr. Rich-
ard has indicated, to collect pure intelligence information in sup-
port of foreign activities where there is a foreign-based organiza-
tion engaged in what we would recognize as terrorist activities
overseas.

If you take the Moro kidnaping, which became a cause celeb
among people in the Community, which said that FBI and others
were chilled in assisting in finding the Moro kidnapers, because of
concerns about their proper roles, et cetera, and absence of crimi-
nal predicates.

Mr. Edwards. That would seem to comply with the criminal
standards.

Mr. Bass. It does overseas, but not necessarily if you make it a
violation of U.S. law, and I think that is the — you can call it the

brilliance or the fudge factor. It defines the criminal standard as
being activities that violate our law, or if they were conducted
here, would violate our law. So defined, I don't think there is a
problem with terrorist investigations.

Mr. Edwards. I am sure you know and Mr. Halperin knows that
for many years, we have wished that we could write a charter for
the FBI. We have even written drafts with the help of consultants
from outside. And if you would see the problems we are having
writing a drug bill today in Congress, you realize the hysteria that
overcomes the country and the Congress, and the Constitution
seems to get shredded as we move toward any kind of a charter.

So it really is very difficult, and so what we have had to do is
sort of consider the Constitution our FBI charter whenever the
rights of people come up.

Now, let's get back to the CISPES case for a moment. Apparently
the predicate was information furnished by Mr. Varelli. I presume
that is what one of the witnesses said, that the mysterious bomb-
ing — well, coincidentally there was a CISPES meeting some few
miles away in Washington, DC. And a couple of other things — oh,
Varelli, and he testified under oath in this subcommittee, that
there were plans to interrupt the Republican convention and so
forth.

It seems to me that given the fallibility of Frank Varelli, to
think that he was an employee, getting taxpayers' money for sever-
al years and listened to by the FBI is a strong argument for a pro-
vision in the charter for much better management requirements
and a paper trail. There apparently were very few management re-
quirements in CISPES. They didn't have to file different reports,
and then there wasn't an inspector general or somebody to say,
"That is enough."

You are fooling around with 100 different organizations, none of
which is a criminal organization. You haven't found anybody doing
anything particularly wrong except lawful, political activities or
humanitarian activities. Yet, at the same time, a lot of people got
hurt.

So let's not think that CISPES was as innocent as that. And
there was definite chilling of First Amendment rights in the inves-
tigation.

I think Mr. Conyers pointed out that people were visited in their
homes and in their offices, and the badge was flashed and said, "I
am investigating your employee Joe Smith. Can I talk to him?"
Now, if that is not chilling, I don't know what is, and going to a
parade or a meeting and taking pictures of a parade is chilling, too.
If I take a parade, I don't want somebody to take my picture. I am
protected. And go back to some police file.

I think some of you are presently in a tussle with the FBI send-
ing agents into public libraries and seeing what kind of books cer-
tain people are reading and instructing or asking the librarians to
snitch on them. Now, chilling? Think how important libraries are
to our country, and to think that a police agency is frightening
people by sending agents in to spy on them and see what they are
reading, and then report back.

So what I am getting around to is that if the charter did provide
something about a criminal standard, and I think that Mr. Bass'

100

addition to what I described, would be very valuable, but also pro-
vide management requirements, paper trails so that something
could be done in these cases, that you pass point A and go into
point B and so forth.

Mr. Halperin, what would you think of that?

Mr. Halperin. I think it is essential. The problem — I understand
the problems of passing a charter and I don't mean to minimize
it — the problem with relying on the Constitution is partly that
what we mean by that, of course, is the way the Constitution is in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court, and the current Supreme Court
has not been, in our view, sensitive to First Amendment rights and
the chilling effect of various kinds of actions.

And the second is that it is very hard for the courts to insist
upon procedural safeguards as an element to the Constitution.
Judges, I think, are quite understandably reluctant to intrude
themselves into the management of the FBI, and to say that the
Constitution requires a six-month review of this process or a writ-
ten finding based on reasonable suspicion or whatever.

I think that, if I may say so, what Congress gets paid to do in our
system is precisely to take the political heat and to assume the con-
stitutional responsibility to say that these are the kinds of proce-
dural limits and procedural safeguards which are necessary to im-
plement the intentions and purposes of the Constitution, and par-
ticularly of the First Amendment.

Mr. Edwards. Well, should there not be also something in the
charter that came to light in the CISPES matter to protect Ameri-
cans from file information? When Mr. Revell spoke in defense of
the CISPES investigation before the Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee, he brought out a whole list of previously unreported file infor-
mation. Let me describe them as rumor and gossip and things that
people were said to have said about individuals connected with
CISPES that never in the whole world should have been brought
out to the public. They must have been very damaging to the indi-
viduals and organizations that Mr. Revell described in his testimo-
ny.

I remember once a number of years ago, Judge Webster testified
before this subcommittee and somebody asked him about terrorist
organizations, and he said, "Well, we are investigating so and so,"
and he named three motorcycle gangs. And I asked him, "Judge
Webster, are you sure you should have said that?" And he said,
"No, of course I shouldn't have said that. These organizations, how
do I know they are criminal? If they are, then we will get an in-
dictment and take them to court. But," he said, "I have no business
saying that in public hearings."

And yet this is one of the things that happened in CISPES. Many
people and organizations were badly hurt, and that is something
we don't want to go on.

You might say also that Frank Varelli, although he was terribly
unreliable and switched his story here, but he was gospel to the
Bureau for too long a time, did swear here under oath that the FBI
had engaged in two break-ins of CISPES offices in Dallas, and the
FBI investigated that. We asked them to, and they categorically
denied that the FBI had been involved in two break-ins. But that is
the kind of information that we got.

101

Mr. Kastenmeier, do you have any further questions?

Mr. Kastenmeier. No, other than to observe, Mr. Chairman, I
suppose we should in a sense put this hearing and hearings like it
in the political context.

I am not sure that, this being June 1988, we are going to
produce a statute this year either in terms of reconciling terrorist
investigations and the guidelines and so forth, or whether we can
agree upon a charter this year. But I think these hearings are very
important because, if not realizable in 1988, they should at this
juncture in the political life of our country at least serve as some
interest to both the political parties and their Presidential candi-
dates, and I say both of them, in terms of possibly their platforms
or task forces or whatnot, as being important for the agenda for
1989 and the new administration which will come into power,
whichever it may be.

I think it is in that context particularly that this hearing and
these recommendations to us are important indeed.

Mr. Edwards. Mr. Conyers.

Mr. Conyers. Well, in that connection, I echo my colleague's ob-
servations. These hearings are taking place almost in a vacuum. It
will take almost eight months for the hearings to be printed.

I can't help but wonder where all of our media friends are today.
Here is something that I would really like the American people to
know about, not because I am on the subcommittee but because
this is an incredibly important part of government that rarely gets
its just due. It gets a headline or two when CISPES stories break,
but after that it dribbles off into very small print, if any print at
all.

My feeling is that if there was some way that we could make this
debate more public and more national, we would be able to do what
Mr. Halperin says we are paid to do, and that is to set policy. The
danger about advancing your policy, though, is that other people
also advance their policies. And what we found out, as has been
suggested here, we get into an almost hysterical kind of debate
that is far removed from reality, not reflecting much credit upon
the national legislative body either, as far as I am concerned.

But it seems to me that these kinds of discussions would lead
more Americans to become aware of the validity of the three or
four proposals that I have heard in this short hearing, and that it
would be very important.

I must commend the American Civil Liberties Union, which I
have been working with for many years, for their interest and de-
termination to make these matters public. They worked in a very
important way in bringing this discussion to as many public
forums as possible and to any of the other organizations that have
done the same. I think that is a very important part of this entire
process.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Edwards. I say amen to that. And I am thinking very seri-
ously that perhaps early next year, regardless of who is elected
President, we should take another quick look, with the help of ex-
perts such as this, and write the beginnings of a charter anyway.

Some of the things which I suggested would be a big help even if
they would not be the ultimate. There are some things that we

102

couldn't get by and would get distorted in the legislative process
and we would end up with something we didn't want, which is
much worse, a lot of licensing of activity that should not be li-
censed in a police organization.

Would anyone care to comment on the few things that we have
been talking about?

Mr. Halperin. Let me say a good word for the Bureau, if I
might. I think it is important to remember that the FBI leadership
had endorsed a charter, and that there were very serious discus-
sions, as suggested, that went on during the four-year period prior
to 1981, which almost reached agreement on a charter.

Those discussions terminated, as I understand it, not because the
Bureau had changed its position, but because it was instructed not
to continue those negotiations. I have seen nothing to suggest that
that fundamental view has changed in the Bureau.

I think that it recognizes that a legislative charter gives it pro-
tection against excesses from the White House or the Congress. I
take Ken Bass's point that this is not simply something that comes
from other parts of the Executive Branch, but that there is pres-
sure from parts of the Congress as well.

But I think it is also clear that given congressional suasion, that
a charter does require cooperation between the Executive Branch
and the Legislative Branch, and I would hope that Congress would
seek to persuade the next administration, whichever one it is, that
an FBI charter is in everyone's interest and that we begin to move
again on that process on an urgent basis.

Mr. Dempsey. Going back to the question of who makes the de-
termination as to which foreign groups will be designated as terror-
ist organizations, should that determination — the determination by
an entity other than the FBI that a group is or is not terrorist —
should that have consequences for which domestic groups are in-
vestigated or how they are investigated?

I would pose that question to all the members of the panel.
Should investigative decisions turn on a determination to call one
group or another a terrorist group?

Mr. Richard. I think the concern that is behind that question is
a legitimate one. There shouldn't be investigations to suit the polit-
ical complexion of a particular administration. There is a window
there for that to happen. But in terms of defining, let's face it, it is
very difficult to say who is a terrorist. One man's terrorist is an-
other man's freedom fighter.

When it comes to domestic, purely domestic investigations, I
think it would be not all that difficult to reach a consensus. If you
are setting off bombs, it doesn't matter what your cause is; if you
are doing it for a political purpose, you are not supposed to.

I would hope that the same general attitude would be in the
international arena. I would think that we would not want U.S.
citizens willy-nilly supplying military aid. That is something that is
a government responsibility. So I would hope there would be little
turnover there.

I cannot give you a specific suggestion as to how to protect the
process from political manipulation except that I think that the
overall bias on behalf of everyone in the government should be to

103

regard any military aid by a domestic group to a foreign faction as
highly questionable.

Mr. Bass. I am not much of a believer in labels or pigeonholes. I
don't think it makes much difference which guidelines you apply
or what label you hang on a particular subject of an investigation,
because the world just doesn't divide up, at least for me, into that
quite a set of bright line characteristics. I think you have to be sen-
sitive to the competing interests in these investigations, and make
sure whatever structures you put in place cause responsible people
to think twice before engaging in intrusive techniques.

Let me expand for a bit. There is an assumption I think in much
of what has been said about the CISPES investigation, that had it
been run under the so-called Smith guidelines, the domestic securi-
ty guidelines, it would not have run as far as fast or as widespread.
I am not sure of that.

I have not worked at all under the Smith guidelines, but I did
work under the predecessor guidelines, the Levi guidelines, as
modified by Judge Bell. And there were some fairly long, fruitless,
pointless, in my view, investigations that were run under those
guidelines, including some of which I had responsibility for con-
tinuing the investigation. And what tended to happen was that you
began to get into one of these dialogues where somebody finally
says, "We have done it long enough. It is a dry hole. Stop it." But
there was nothing in the Levi guidelines or the Carter administra-
tion that would have put a break to this investigation any earlier
than came about here.

I just haven't worked with the new guidelines well enough or
seen the full file well enough to know if it had been run under
other guidelines, that it would have been stopped earlier. I think
that is somewhat responsive to the question as to whether the deci-
sion has to do with checking the excesses.

Mr. Finn. It doesn't seem to me that there is any point to a defi-
nition. We need to focus on the activity, whether it is criminal or
not.

The minute you do give it a label called terrorism, you run the
risk that you will get expansive investigations which could not be
called criminal. I am in favor of dropping the word altogether.

Mr. Halperin. I think I am sympathetic to that. In fact, as I un-
derstand the definition, which really comes out of the Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Act, you really are talking about violent
acts which are illegal or would be illegal if conducted in the United
States, conducted for a political purpose.

The reason you want that conjunction that you have in that kind
of a situation, both an illegal act that justifies an investigation and
political activity going along with it, which requires more careful
investigation and more supervision and more techniques than you
have if the surveillance is for purely criminal purposes of extortion
and so on.

So that is why you want more than the simple thing — if people
throw bombs, it is all right to investigate them. You want to say, if
you think people are throwing bombs for political reasons, you are
inevitably going to be looking at the political context and their
military activity as well, and therefore you do need more restric-
tions on how the investigation is conducted.

104

But I think that you also don't want to be in a situation certain-
ly where the administrations of the day or anybody else's view of
the legitimacy of the violence affects whether or not an investiga-
tion is conducted or how it is conducted. We want the same investi-
gation of Americans helping contras, of Americans helping the op-
position groups in El Salvador. And we don't want a debate in the
United States about whether what the IRA is doing in Northern
Ireland is legitimate and to have that determine whether we inves-
tigate activities in the United States to provide bombs to people
throwing those bombs in Iowa.

As far as the investigations which go on in the United States are
concerned, I do think they have to be based on an objective defini-
tion of whether there is violent activity being supported, and I
agree that the use of the word "terrorism" gets in the way of that
since we tend to use terrorists, for those who use violence that we
don't like rather than as a generic term.

Mr. Richard. One further comment. I always hesitate to bring
up a foreign policy point with Halperin in the room because I can't
compete with his expertise, but there might be circumstances
where the U.S. Government was aware that a U.S. group was send-
ing arms to a particular foreign faction and thought it was in the
interest of the United States for that to happen.

There might be cases where they would not want to interfere
with that.

Mr. Conyers. What kind of an example? For example, to me that
is unimaginable. I don't know how you could imagine it.
Mr. Halperin. Try the ANC.

Mr. Conyers. I tried the ANC. The movement, the furthest we
could get there was to introduce a bill, which got nowhere, that de-
scribed them as freedom fighters, and deserving of the support,
which is quite a distance from citizens sending weapons to them di-
rectly.

Mr. Halperin. Let me make a comment, if I may, because I was
too quickly facetious about that.

I think the answer to Eric's question is no, because I think the
provision of aid to groups abroad engaged in violent activity, if it is
done from the United States, ought to be done by the American
government in order to be done pursuant to legislation passed by
the Congress. And the danger with the private groups is that it be-
comes a way to get around congressional restrictions and that is
exactly what we saw in the Iran-Con tra case.

I don't see any way to avoid that as a matter of principle, if we
decide as a nation that we want to help the contras or the FMLN
or the ANC. We ought to, in my view, be open and public about the
decision to support them and ought to require that it be approved
in advance by overt congressional legislation.

I think Mr. Stern wants to make a point.

Mr. Stern. I want to say, I think the one distinction there maybe
between the domestic security guidelines and the FCI guidelines is
the enterprise standard in the sense that in a domestic security in-
vestigation, you are investigating, even if it is a group, it has to be
a group, all of the members have some part and have some knowl-
edge of the illegal activities that are being conducted.

105

Therefore, it would allow the Bureau to investigate a political
group even when it admits, as it did in this case, that most of the
members of CISPES were not involved in illegal activities. I think
that is where it is important to get to not only a criminal standard,
but an enterprise standard so that you only investigate those indi-
viduals involved that are suspected of illegal activity and not the
whole group.

Mr. Richard. I think there is one other way in which the Smith
guidelines would have made a difference here. Under the provision
4(b), it could have been authorized for 180 days and would have
had to be renewed and approved by the director or assistant direc-
tor. So I think the impact would have been a higher level attention
within the FBI as to what was happening here.

Mr. Slobodin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I had a question for either Dr. Halperin or Mr. Stern on your
report here on the CISPES probe. The documents from the FBI file,
was that all the documents, the 1,200 documents that were made
public, or where you consulting the 50 documents that were distrib-
uted by the Center for Constitutional Rights?

Mr. Stern. This report is based on all the documents released
under the Freedom of Information Act, the 1,200 or 1,300 pages.

Mr. Slobodin. You say in your statement that these public docu-
ments constitute one-third of all the headquarter's files. Conse-
quently, this report pieces together information from other FBI
sources, public statements and reports by FBI officials, in order to
assemble the most complete picture possible from public sources.

When you say the other FBI sources, what are you referring to
there?

Mr. Stern. It was testimony by Revell, the press conferences by
Sessions and Revell as well as other quoted statements in the media,
media.

Mr. Slobodin. Would you be willing to make the same kind of
disclaimer that Mr. Bass made where he said parts of the CISPES
file have been available under FOIA and he emphasized he had not
seen the classified part of the file and therefore could not comment
on a fully informed basis?

Mr. Stern. The report makes clear that this, as you just read, all
of this is based only on the publicly available information. And to
that degree, I guess you would say it is tentative to what we know
now, and throughout the report, we say, as appears and from what
we know, based on this information.

Mr. Halperin. If I could add to that, we have been pressing the
Bureau to release what we consider to be the two critical docu-
ments which were the initial memos written at the time of the au-
thorization, and we intend to file an FOIA lawsuit for those docu-
ments because we think they are the critical documents.

They reveal what the Bureau knew before it started the investi-
gation and what it told itself at the time it was starting the investi-
gation was the predicate. It is those documents that we think are
the right basis to decide whether there as a sufficient predicate.
And we hope that the Bureau will release the documents.

Mr. Slobodin. When did the Center decide to release this report
or wait, or why did it decide to finish its report and disclose it now
as opposed to waiting until the FBI completes its internal review,

106

which I understand is at the director level and should be closed
pretty soon — I think in the next couple of weeks.

Mr. Halperin. We did that in part in response to these hearings
and in part in response to a number of questions we have gotten
from our own members, from others as to our assessment of it. We
did give some initial general assessment when the documents came
out, but we thought it was important to look carefully at all the
documents available.

We tried to persuade the Bureau to release the other two docu-
ments. We will do another assessment when, if additional materi-
als come out, and certainly if any of those materials lead us to
change our assessment so that we are either more critical or more
supportive of the Bureau action, we will make that clear.

Mr. Stern. The Bureau had said their report would be out in
May, I think mid to late May. So we are waiting on that for a
while, but after they delayed it another month, we had already
completed the study and felt it was important to get it out as it
stood.

Mr. Slobodin. Okay. Outside of the CISPES probe, has the
Center looked at some of the other antiterrorism cases?

Let me kind of break this down into categories here. There was
an article in the Washington Times shortly after the documents,
the FOIA requests on the CISPES matter were made public. Sever-
al groups that were supporting or aiding the Nicaraguan resistance
were under FBI investigations.

I won't go through the list of the groups, but has the ACLU or
the Center for National Security Studies taken a look at those in-
vestigations to see if they have the same kind of problems as in
CISPES?

Mr. Halperin. To the extent that the documentation is available.
As we understand it, those investigations were conducted as crimi-
nal investigations rather than counterterrorism investigations and
in some cases, of course, apparently may lead to indictments, but
they were conducted as investigations focused on alleged criminal
activity.

Our view is that is the way this investigation should have been
conducted as well.

Mr. Slobodin. Would you say, would you agree with the state-
ment that the Bureau is politically motivated, that the anti-left lib-
eral is justified? In light of the CISPES probe, can you say that?

Mr. Halperin. It certainly raises the question which we raised,
and we would welcome an answer to.

As to why the Nicaraguan investigations were conducted as
criminal investigations, while the CISPES investigation was con-
ducted as a counterterrorism investigation, certainly one possible
explanation is the different attitudes within the administration as
to those two activities. There may be others and we have not
reached any judgment about it. But I think it does raise questions
that one ought to be concerned about.

Mr. Stern. I think it is clear in categorizing the Bureau as politi-
cally motivated, in one way or another, you have to distinguish
among all the different field officers, and I think Mr. Richard
pointed out and it is clear from reading the documents that various
field officers reacted in different ways; from one extreme to some

107

saying "we want to investigate as much as we can in any kind of
activities," but other officers clearly showing restraint, concern and
real cautiousness about this type of thing and coming back to head-
quarters for supervision.

I think part of the problem that we tried to point out in this
report is that some of the supervision was lacking in response to
the field officer's request.

Mr. Slobodin. That is a good point, but I was looking more at
the FBI headquarters since I think those kinds of statements were
referring to that office.

Let me talk about the rest of the antiterrorism program, the
cases that were proceeding under the FCI guidelines. Has the
ACLU and the Center looked at these other cases to see if there
is — I guess what I am getting at is is the CISPES case representa-
tive of the quality of the FBI's work in antiterrorism over the same
time frame?

Mr. Halperin. I don't think it is representative. I think, as far as
we know, it is an aberration.

We have tried to follow these investigations. It is not easy to do
so because in most cases, almost no material is made public. We
have sought material ourselves and urged the committees to do so.

I think the fact is that most of these investigations, as far as we
can tell, have been focused on groups that were actually blowing
up buildings and attempting to physically harm people in violation
of the laws, and the material relating to that is seldom made public
and I think is often properly classified, so it is hard to get much
data about that.

But the Bureau has testified from time to time as to completed
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, terrorism investiga-
tions, and as far as we have been able to tell, in other cases they
have been legitimate investigations which have prevented terrorist
acts within the United States.

So the conclusion we draw is one in which the investigations
always draw, is that the problem is to focus on real threats of vio-
lent activity, and the thing to avoid is the temptation to do what is
much easier to do, go to political rallies and take down information
rather than finding out whether there is a group planning to blow
up a building.

Our view is that, as Bureau directors have testified and attor-
neys general have testified, is that the Bureau does a much better
job when it is not pressured from outside: or from inside to use its
resources in chasing First Amendment activity when it uses its re-
sources to focus on terrorism. Our view has been and remains, not-
withstanding this one episode, that by and large, the Bureau has in
fact in the terrorism area done that.

Mr. Slobodin. Do you think there is a valid distinction in — well,
let me rephrase that.

Would it be valid to distinguish the CISPES case as a terrorism
investigation from other types of terrorism investigations because
of the nature of the organization? Normally when you are looking
at terrorism, you are looking at single-cell organizations or a small
group of individuals, and here we are dealing with, or arguably
dealing with, the FBI is claiming, you are dealing with a large or-
ganization with 80 chapters around the country and that there are

108

some individuals within that organization that are suspected of
aiding terrorism activity outside of the United States.

Isn't that also, what you say, also atypical of other types of anti-
terror investigations? Would anyone else on the panel like to com-
ment on that?

Mr. Halperin. Well, you know there have been some suggestions
of similar allegations relating to groups supporting Puerto Rican
independence, and as far as I can tell, the Bureau in recent years
has focused on terrorist groups, insofar as there are any, rather
than the whole movement for Puerto Rican independence.

But it raises the problem, and that is the kind of problem that
Congress has a responsibility for dealing with. Nobody wants to be
the person to close down an investigation the day before a building
blows up, and that is what is obviously going on here when the hot
potato is being tossed around; nobody wants to be the person that
ordered the investigation closed down just before something terri-
ble happens.

I think in this kind of a situation the problem is harder. It may
be harder to ferret out the terrorist acts, but you would get viola-
tions of people's First Amendment right, which is what happened
here. But that doesn't justify what happened. It underlies the im-
portance of a situation like this where you have a large political
movement and allegations that it is being used as a cover for ter-
rorist activity.

Mr. Slobodin. What would you say the First Amendment viola-
tions were in the CISPES case?

Mr. Halperin. I should explain that I am talking about the
ACLU's view of the First Amendment and not necessarily the Su-
preme Court's view, although the cases are not as bad as were sug-
gested in the beginning. But in our view, the government attending
political meetings and taking down political information — I think
there were clear violations of the Privacy Act. That prohibits the
maintenance of files like that.

But I think, in general, it is our view, and I think there is some
support for it in case law, that investigating lawful political activi-
ties, gathering information about that lawful political activity is in-
compatible with the First Amendment, and I think there were acts
here of that kind.

Mr. Slobodin. Thank you.

Let me just have one last question here on this distinction again,
or eradicating the distinction between international versus domes-
tic terrorism.

The guidelines, I wanted to read just a very brief excerpt from
an opinion dealing with an antiterrorism case from the District
Court in the District of California. It was quoting from another Dis-
trict Court case. It says:

No one can gainsay that obtaining foreign intelligence relating to international
terrorism is a legitimate objective of the Executive's constitutional authority to con-
duct policy. Indeed, to the extent that Article 6 of the Constitution makes treaties
the supreme law of the land, the United States is obligated to combat international
terrorism under the multilateral treaty obligations it assumed as a member of the
Organization of American States and the United Nations.

109

A question to the panel is, wouldn't treaties make a difference?
Should we take that into account before we decide if we want to
eradicate the difference between how to proceed?

Mr. Finn. Your interpretation of Article 6 is unquestionable.

Mr. Slobodin. It is not my interpretation.

Mr. Finn. It is absolutely a correct interpretation, but it seems
fairly clear that it is hard to see how that interpretation matters in
conducting a domestic investigation. Call it international or domes-
tic, what difference does it make? What standards are you going to
use and what standards are you going to use to limit the scope of
an investigation and to decide when it would be terminated?

That is where you have to come up with a plausible reason why
there should be a distinction between domestic terrorism and inter-
national terrorism. It is difficult. But are there any differences that
matter for conducting an investigation in the United States? I can't
see any.

Mr. Slobodin. Let me rephrase the question. Is it your position
that you don't believe from what you know that there are any trea-
ties out there that would impose any additional investigative obli-
gations other than what you have in domestic terrorism situations?

Mr. Finn. Without having researched this, I doubt that that is
the case. I think it is probably not the way I would have put the
question.

The question is, are there any treaties out there that would urge
us that they adopt standards that are less stringent than they
would use for domestic terrorist investigations, and I cannot imag-
ine that that would be the case.

Mr. Bass. This may be a bit repetitive. Let me give you an exam-
ple.

I think under a working definition, the Ku Klux Klan is a terror-
ist organization. Certainly when it has been active, and it is cer-
tainly a legitimate targets for FBI investigation and should be in-
vestigated. And bombings, whether they are persons or properties,
by the Ku Klux Klan should be the subject of prevention and pros-
ecution. But I think it would be a mistake to lump the Ku Klux
Klan in with the Red Guard, because as far as I know, there is no
evidence of Ku Klux Klan direction or control or planning activi-
ties extending transnationally.

I do not want us to make the definitions so one-sided that we
open up to Klan-type investigations all of the resources of the na-
tional Intelligence Community. I think that would take us back to
the days we tried to get away from.

At the same time, in the Red Guard case, or the Armenian ter-
rorists that have been successfully prosecuted in a number of cases,
you have to rely on full national resources and national intelli-
gence sources to conduct the investigation effectively.

Mr. Slobodin. Just one last Monday morning quarterbacking
question.

Anybody want to give an opinion as to when they think the
CISPES investigation — the second one — should have been terminat-
ed?

Mr. Stern. I think it didn't take long for a large number of the
field offices to report back that they are finding nothing in their
files an in their indices checks. That was by early 1984.

110

After the first year — when the FBI conducted and completed the
60 page LHM cataloging every kind of public activity of CISPES,
with all numbers, names, and offices, somebody should have
stepped in and looked at it and said what is this getting us and
what is this doing for a terrorism investigation?

I don't think it got them anything, or had any real apparent pur-
pose in combating terrorism and probably should have been cut off
at least by then, if not before.

Mr. Bass. I will take an even wilder stab, which has nothing to
do with the facts of CISPES, because as I said, I haven't seen them.
From general experience, which in my case was four years, the in-
vestigations that are shut down tend to be shut down one to two
years after — in hindsight — they should have been.

The reason for that is largely bureaucratic inertia. The ones that
I saw that gave me problems — and they are generally domestic se-
curity cases — they would give you problems, and then we talk to
the Bureau liaison agent and he would say, yes, they're giving us
some problems, too, but as Mort suggested earlier, we don't want to
shut it down now because we may be on the verge of doing some-
thing.

So you tend to, at least the first annual review that produces
troubling signs is a blinking yellow light, and the red light doesn't
come under the way it is structured for at least another year.

Mr. Edwards. Isn't that a good reason for a statutory review
process to require steps to be taken?

Mr. Bass. Congressman, I am frankly not sure whether it makes
a difference whether it is statutory or regulatory except for the
consensus point, which I think is important. I think what is more
important is internal higher level reviews, more frequently.

Mr. Edwards. But that depends on the people. The Levi guide-
lines were weakened first by Griffin Bell, and then William French
Smith, and the next Attorney General, whoever he might be, might
wipe them out completely.

Mr. Bass. That is possible, and certainly the permanence of a
charter I endorse as being desirable. But unless that charter puts
in it some type of more frequent higher level internal reviews in
the bureaucracy than the annual reviews, it really isn't going to do
much.

The 180-day reviews of the domestic security guidelines are
better.

Mr. Conyers. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bass' reference to the Klan as
a terrorist organization and how they may be investigated differ-
ently from the Red Guard, raises for me a question that we can't
leave, at least without mentioning this for the record: One of the
most embarrassing parts of the FBI is that the Klan is very, very
poorly investigated, very little investigation.

Most of the success is coming from civil rights groups and civil
libertarian groups, and I am completely at a loss to say that, be-
cause the Red Guard may be international and the Klan is domes-
tic, that we should be satisfied that there would be differences in
the investigation. Here is a problem of historical importance — op-
pression of American citizens, violations of their constitutional
rights ad nauseum.

Ill

Some suggest now that the Skinheads and the Klan are at least
in contact with each other — according to today's New York Times
article on the Skinheads, that now show them in contact with at
least certain leadership within the Klan — again raises to me the
discussion that we began with about whether we are dealing with a
new FBI or the same old FBI.

We could probably hold quite extensive hearings on how we are
doing with international terrorism, beginning with the Klan. Of
course, we know that there are many other organizations out
there. So, I just feel that we should not just hypothetically treat
the Klan and the Red Guard distinction, but somebody like myself
should weigh in on the fact we haven't done much of a job in terms
of investigating and prosecuting the Klan's historically illegal ac-
tivity.

Mr. Edwards. Thank you very much. You have been very help-
ful. We are going to push the resolution of some of these matters
along a good way. We are grateful for your splendid testimony.

[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to recon-
vene subject to the call of the Chair.]

CISPES AND FBI COUNTERTERRORISM
INVESTIGATIONS

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1988

House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights,

Committee on the Judiciary,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:55 a.m., in room
2237, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Don Edwards (chair-
man of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Edwards, Kastenmeier, Conyers, Sen-
senbrenner, and DeWine.

Staff present: James X. Dempsey, assistant counsel; and Alan
Slobodin, associate counsel.

Mr. Edwards. The subcommittee will come to order.

Mr. Sensenbrenner. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent
that the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Committee on Judiciary permit the broadcast and telecast of
this hearing pursuant to committee rules.

Mr. Edwards. Without objection, so ordered.

The subcommittee is pleased to welcome the Director of the FBI,
the Hon. William Sessions, to testify on the FBI CISPES investiga-
tion.

This case has been of longstanding concern to the subcommittee,
going back to 1985. Our current concern was triggered by the re-
lease of documents early this year, which indicated an investiga-
tion of far broader scope than we had been led to believe. Director
Sessions ordered an internal review — the third one, I might note —
and is here today to describe his actions in response to that inter-
nal review.

The FBI can have an effective counterterrorism program that
does not involve any infringement on First Amendment rights.
There is no irreconcilable conflict between law enforcement and
civil liberties. It should be clear to everybody that peaceful dissent
and civil disobedience"are no indication of a propensity to violence.
Peaceful dissent is irrelevant to the FBI's efforts to identify terror-
ists.

The issue is not whether the FBI has the authority to "get there
before the bomb goes off." They do. The question is how the FBI
can best identify the groups or individuals that are planning to
plant the bombs or carry out other acts of violence. The CISPES
case is a perfect example of how not to do it.

(113)

114

The FBI should focus exclusively on criminal activity in its inter-
national terrorism cases. This criminal standard is the only clear,
objective limit on the scope of FBI investigations and the only reli-
able protection for the rights of Americans.

Since 1976, the FBI has operated under the criminal standard in
addressing domestic terrorism, and has been highly successful. In-
vestigating crimes is what the Bureau does best. The CISPES case
suggests that the FBI needs the clarity offered by the criminal
standard in its international terrorism cases as well.

I am pleased that the Director has been so forthcoming in admit-
ting the serious problems in the CISPES case and that he has
adopted some important reforms. As he indicates in his prepared
statement, there are some important issues that remain to be ad-
dressed, and we expect to work closely with the FBI over the next
months on these issues.

Mr. Sensenbrenner.

Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Although there were mistakes in the CISPES investigation, I
think it is important to put the CISPES case into perspective so we
do not damage our successful counterterrorism program. The
CISPES case merely represents only one of about 200 antiterrorism
cases conducted during the same time frame.

In comparing the CISPES investigation with other concurrent in-
vestigations, Mort Halperin of the ACLU admitted at a June hear-
ing on this matter that as far as he knew, the CISPES probe was
"an aberration."

In addition, the following points need to be made. First, there is
no evidence of violation of constitutional rights. Second, there is no
evidence of outside influence. And third, there is no evidence that
the Bureau was going only after foes of the Reagan administration.

Finally, some of the FBI's critics are guilty of the same mistakes
as the Bureau. The basic problem of the CISPES probe was the
FBI's failure to adequately check the background of informant
Frank Varelli.

It should be pointed out that the Center for Constitutional
Rights, the FBI's principal critic in the CISPES probe, swallowed
Frank Varelli hook, line and sinker as a reliable witness when it
served their political purposes.

In February 1987, hearings before the subcommittee, the Center
virtually paraded Frank Varelli as their star witness to buttress
their claim that the FBI was involved in illegal break-ins. It was
only after questioning and documentation provided by this Member
that Varelli's unreliability was publicly revealed.

Indeed, it is ironic that shortly after that hearing, Varelli, ac-
cording to the Washington Post Magazine, became employed by the
International Center for Development Policy — an FBI critic and a
group opposed to Central American policies. It seems that the
Bureau does not have a monopoly on bad judgment in this in-
stance.

It must also be made clear that CISPES is not the Boy Scouts.
According to available information, CISPES was established with
the assistance of the American Communist Party, the U.S. Peace
Council and the Salvadoran Communist Party.

115

According to its own literature, CISPES aims to promote support
to the FMLN, which are the guerrillas attempting to overthrow the
democratically elected government of El Salvador. The FMLN is
composed of several guerrilla groups and has engaged in terrorist
acts of bombings, kidnappings, assaults and assassinations.

The FMLN took credit for the assassination of one of our mili-
tary advisers in San Salvador, Albert Schaufelberger, and has
plans to eliminate other military people in that country.

I fervently hope, Judge Sessions, that the actions you are taking
do not mean that the rules for predication and future investiga-
tions of CISPES or other individuals in CISPES have changed.

The FBI has already given the Institute for Policy Studies blan-
ket immunity from investigation. Just because mistakes were made
does not mean de facto immunity fror/i investigation for future ter-
rorist activity.

[Mrs. Schroeder, a member of the subcommittee, asked that the
following statement be inserted in the record:]

Mrs. Schrokdkr. I wish to thank Director Ses.-ions for joining us today and detail-
ing the results of his investigation into the methods used in the CISPES case. I
would also like to compliment the Director for the difficult steps he has taken to
address problems raised in the CISPES case.

It is important to emphasize in the handling of terrorism and FBI investigations
the difference between investigating criminal activity and investigating political ac-
tivities. Directives to FBI staff up and down the line must be crystal clear on this
point. Gray zones of interpretation should be avoided, gray zones that can be influ-
enced by political winds.

This case suggests that there was a bias in the F'BI — not a conscious one, not one
that came in a directive or telephone call from the White House. However, FBI
agents read the papers and listen to the President's speeches, just as the rest of us
do, and they knew in 1981 that this administration was focusing on specific themes
in its Central American policy.

The fact that some agents so readily reverted to discredited practices and a dis-
credited mindset show that the lessons of the l!)7()s were never institutionalized. An
informant like Varelli cannot lead the FBI arojnd by the nose. He was telling the
FBI things it was predisposed to hear. Nor was this an aberration. Offices all across
the country participated in this case: in the campus surveillance, in monitoring
demonstrations, and so on. The boundaries defining criminal activity were ignored.
The Bureau's critical faculties didn't work in this case because the lessons of the
past were never internalized.

That is your challenge, Director Sessions, to institutionalize and internalize the
principle that dissent is not a crime.

I am troubled that although Headquarters kept sending out memos in the CISPES
case saying "stay away from First Amendment rights," "don't monitor political ac-
tivities;" field offices continued to monitor political activities and to report on them.

Two weeks after Headquarters sent out a memo stating "political activities or po-
litical lobbying are not, repeat not, targets of this investigation, and should not be
monitored, ' the Denver office sent Headquarters a memo stating "in spite of at-
tempts by the Bureau to clarify guidelines and goals for this investigation, the field
is still not sure of how much seemingly legitimate political activity can be moni-
tored."

"Seemingly legitimate political activity"?

Unless agents are told to focus on criminal activity, how will they know what to
do?

Mr. Edwards. The Director has with him at the witness table
Deputy Assistant Director Caroll Toohey of the Inspections Divi-
sion, who directed the team of inspectors who did such an excellent
job of setting out the facts in this matter.

We appreciate all the hard work that went into this and, Direc-
tor Sessions, that extends to the other officials here with you today.
We also welcome them.

116

Mr. Sessions. Thank you.

Mr. Edwards. Judge Sessions, do you solemnly swear or affirm
the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth
and nothing but the truth?

Mr. Sessions. I do.

Mr. Edwards. And, Mr. Toohey, the same?
Mr. Toohey. I do.

Mr. Edwards. Welcome. Glad to have you and you may proceed
with your statement.

TESTIMONY OF HON. WILLIAM SESSIONS, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ACCOMPANIED BY D. CAROLL
TOOHEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, INSPECTION
DIVISION

Mr. Sessions. It is a pleasure to be here and I appreciate the
chairman's recognition of Mr. Toohey who is with me here today,
who handled for me and the Inspection Division the very careful
examination that you referred to.

I would also be very remiss if I didn't tell the Chairman how
grateful I am for the activities of your staff and the helpfulness
they have given to the FBI, and for your willingness to allow us to
testify on this occasion as opposed to an earlier occasion when I
was not yet prepared to testify concerning the full report. So it has
been very helpful to me and I am grateful for that, sir.

I am here today at your invitation to discuss the FBI's investiga-
tion of CISPES, the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El
Salvador.

CISPES, a group headquartered in Washington, DC, with
branches throughout much of the United States, first became the
subject of an FBI investigation in September 1981. At that time,
the Department of Justice asked the Bureau to determine whether
CISPES was in compliance with the provisions of the Foreign
Agents Registration Act. This legislation, as you know, requires
that persons acting in the United States on behalf of foreign gov-
ernments or entities register with the U.S. Government.

Although it was established at that time that CISPES published
literature endorsing the objectives of two organizations known to
be Salvadoran terrorist groups — that is, the Salvadoran Democratic
Revolutionary Front, the FDR, and the Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front, the FMLN — no violation of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act was discovered, and this limited investigation was
completed three months later in December 1981.

Subsequently, in March 1983, based upon information furnished
by the Dallas field office of the FBI, the terrorism section of the
Bureau's Criminal Investigative Division at FBI headquarters in
Washington authorized the opening of a new investigation of
CISPES to determine the extent to which its prior endorsement of
the foreign terrorist organizations had become active financial or
other support. This investigation was also intended to determine
the extent of any control of CISPES by the FDR or the FMLN and
to determine whether CISPES was planning terrorist activities in
the United States.

117

The information furnished by the Dallas field office came from
several sources. Chief among them was a G-ntral American expa-
triate named Frank Varelli. Mr. Varelli had become an FBI asset,
a term meaning intelligence source, in 1981.

As is customary, he was assigned to a special agent in the Dallas
office for monitoring and operating. Varelli alleged that CISPES
was under the direction of the previously mentioned foreign terror-
ist organizations, that CISPES was providing financial support to
those organizations, and that CISPES was preparing for terrorist
activities in the United States.

The information Varelli gave to his case agent in Dallas was in
turn given to that agent's supervisors in Dallas for review. It was
eventually passed along to the operational desk of the terrorism
section in Washington, DC, where the investigation was opened
and from which the investigation was coordinated for all of its 27-
month duration.

Although CISPES was located in the United States, the investi-
gation was classified as an international terrorism investigation be-
cause the question of whether the group supported foreign terrorist
activities, or was in turn supported by foreign terrorists, was the
major focus of the investigation.

For much of 1983 the investigation was narrowly focused. It con-
centrated on CISPES headquarters in Washington, on its Dallas
chapter, and on a handful of other branch chapters. The major
turning point in the investigation came in October 1983, when the
terrorism section of the Criminal Investigative Division at FBI
headquarters sent a teletype seeking additional investigative sup-
port in the CISPES investigation from every field office in the FBI,
thereby effectively making the scope of the investigation nation-
wide.

The then approximately 180 CISPES chapters throughout the
United States thus became subject to investigation, and over the
next 18 months numerous other investigations arising out of the
CISPES investigation, sometimes referred to as spinoff investiga-
tions, were conducted.

The CISPES investigation used many standard investigative
techniques. Among them were checks of public records and sources,
photographic and visual surveillances, undercover attendance at
meetings, reviews of financial records pursuant to the provisions of
the Right to Financial Privacy Act, trash checks, checks of tele-
phone and utility company records, checks of records of license and
credit bureaus, checks of records of law enforcement agencies, and
limited personal interviewing of CISPES memoers.

The investigation continued throughout 1984 and into 1985. As
was and is required by the Attorney General guidelines for foreign
intelligence collection and foreign counterintelligence investiga-
tions — which govern the conduct of international terrorism investi-
gations by the FBI — periodic reports on the CISPES investigation
were filed with the United States Department of Justice. These re-
ports initially set forth the predication for opening the investiga-
tion and thereafter set forth the basis for continuing it.

The first two such reports were approved by the Department of
Justice as satisfying the applicable requirements of the Attorney
General guidelines.

118

Then, in response to the Bureau's report in March 1985, the De-
partment questioned whether sufficient basis existed to continue
the investigation, and on June 3, 1985, the Department advised the
Bureau that the case no longer appeared to satisfy the standards in
the Attorney General guidelines for an international terrorism in-
vestigation. Fifteen days later, the CISPES case was closed. No sub-
stantial link between CISPES and international terrorism activities
was ever established.

Shortly after I became Director of the FBI in November of 1987,
and soon after I became aware of the interest of Congress in this
matter, I ordered the Inspection Division of the FBI to conduct a
full and indepth inquiry into the CISPES investigation.

In particular, I asked to be advised of whether the Bureau had
violated any legal or constitutional provisions, executive orders or
presidential directives, Attorney General guidelines and/or inter-
nal FBI rules, regulations or policies during the CISPES investiga-
tion.

I asked whether any direction had been received from the White
House during the investigation. I also asked whether the discretion
and judgment used in conducting the investigation were appropri-
ate.

The investigation was conducted by experienced inspectors,
whose mandate from me was to leave no stone unturned in assess-
ing the CISPES investigation and in reporting that assessment to
me.

My inspectors reviewed over 375 major files, including all head-
quarters and field office CISPES investigative files, as well as the
case files on individuals and groups that were opened as a result of
CISPES.

They conducted extensive interviews of field and headquarters
supervisory personnel, of the case agents who handled the investi-
gations, and of the agents who were assigned various investigative
responsibilities relating to CISPES.

The inquiry, and an earlier investigation conducted by the Bu-
reau's Office of Professional Responsibility into allegations made
by Frank Varelli, took several months and cost approximately
$800,000, only slightly less than the cost of the entire CISPES in-
vestigation itself.

This was an extensive and thorough inquiry. I am here today to
highlight what my inspectors found and, more importantly, to tell
you what I intend to do about what they found.

Here are the major conclusions of my inquiry.

One, absent the information provided by Frank Varelli, there
would not have been sufficient predication for an international ter-
rorism investigation of CISPES. The case pivoted on the informa-
tion Varelli provided, and there were clear deficiencies, both oper-
ational and supervisory, in the way in which Varelli was handled.

His background and reliability were never investigated adequate-
ly, and during much of the investigation the accuracy of Varelli's
information was not adequately verified. His activities were inad-
equately supervised.

By the time it was realized that Varelli's information was unreli-
able, the investigation had been under way for approximately one

119

year. The investigation would not have developed as it did had
Varelli's reliability been properly scrutinized at the outset.

Two, the original focus and intent of the CISPES investigation
were to determine the extent of monetary and other support by
CISPES for terrorist movements and activities in El Salvador; to
determine the likelihood of CISPES conducting terrorist activities
in the United States; to identify those individuals who knowingly
supported terrorist groups in El Salvador through efforts in the
United States; and to determine the extent of any control over, or
influence on, CISPES by the FDR or the FMLN.

This focus I believe was proper, given the information available
to the Bureau at the commencement of the investigation. At the
beginning the investigation was confined to Washington and 10
other field offices, and personnel were specifically instructed not to
assume that rank-and-file members of CISPES knew anything
about, or were involved with, the funding of terrorist activities in
El Salvador.

They were also specifically instructed that the investigation
would not be directed toward the exercise of rights guaranteed by
the United States Constitution, instructions that were periodically
repeated during the investigation.

Three, the major problem came when the scope of the investiga-
tion was unnecessarily broadened in October of 1983. It remained
unnecessarily broad thereafter. The broadening of the investigation
in October 1983, in essence directed all field offices to regard each
CISPES chapter, wherever located, as a proper subject of the
CISPES investigation.

Based on the documentation available to the FBI by October
1983, there was no reason to believe that all CISPES members na-
tionwide knew of or had any involvement in support of El Salva-
doran or U.S. terrorists. Thus, there was no reason to expand the
investigation so widely. The focus should have been on CISPES na-
tional headquarters in Washington, DC. Indeed, at one point FBI
headquarters told the Washington field office to get ready to
assume principal responsibility for the case, but then failed to issue
the necessary orders to bring this about.

The decision to broaden the investigation unnecessarily was
made at a comparatively low level, and, put -imply, the superviso-
ry personnel at FBI headquarters who shoi 1 have reviewed and
analyzed this decision and appreciated its si t aificance failed to do
so.

Four, after the investigation was expanded in October 1983,
many of the investigative activities that I described to you earlier
could not reasonably have been expected to accomplish the goals of
the investigation. Instead, these activities caused information on
rank-and-file members who had nothing to Jo with international
terrorism to be included in FBI case files.

Five, important aspects of the process by which the CISPES in-
vestigation was managed at certain levels of the FBI headquarters
were flawed. There was no automatic reminder or "tickler" system
in place to ensure timely and appropriate review of incoming infor-
mation.

The field agents collecting information on CISPES could reason-
ably have assumed that the information would be properly re-

120

viewed at FBI headquarters, but in many cases it was not; it was
simply placed in files and left there.

Similarly, some requests for guidance from the field went unan-
swered at FBI headquarters. The personnel responsible for the su-
pervisory system as it then existed at FBI headquarters failed to
ensure that the activities of those conducting the investigation
were properly reviewed.

Six, earlier I spoke of the investigative techniques that were used
in the investigation. It is important to note that certain other tech-
niques, generally more intrusive in nature, were not used — such as
electronic surveillance, consensual telephone monitoring, and
court-authorized searches — although there was one instance in
which information obtained from local authorities based on a local
search warrant resulted in the opening of an investigation that
should not have been opened.

Seven, the Attorney General guidelines were not designed to give
guidance on a major problem faced in the CISPES investigation:
The extent to which leaders and members may be investigated
during an investigation of a group to which they belong. Other as-
pects of the CISPES investigation were also not specifically ad-
dressed by the guidelines.

Eight, there is no evidence that the White House or anyone
acting on behalf of the White House gave instructions, requested
information, or otherwise attempted to influence the CISPES inves-
tigation. The same is true of all other government agencies and
outside private groups. There is no evidence that the CISPES inves-
tigation was politically motivated or directed.

Nine, Varelli's initial case agent, who resigned from the FBI in
1984, gave Varelli classified documents and withheld money that
was to have been paid to Varelli. Other than that, my inspectors
have not identified any illegal acts or violations of constitutional
rights committed by the FBI as part of the CISPES investigation.
They did identify 31 instances of possible violations of the Attorney
General's guidelines, mostly of a minor and technical nature.

Since that time, the Bureau's legal counsel division has opined
that only 15 of those instances were in fact violations, and that of
those violations, 13 warrant being reported to the President's Intel-
ligence Oversight Board.

In a moment I want to discuss what I plan on doing about what
my inquiry discovered. Before I do so, I want to put the CISPES
investigation — and the Bureau's international terrorism program —
into perspective.

First and foremost, contrary to certain allegations, the CISPES
investigation was not a return to the days of COINTELPRO. As ini-
tially conceived, the investigation was a reasonable examination of
a possible terrorist threat. That its execution was flawed reflects
mismanagement. It does not reflect a policy of purposeful interfer-
ence with legitimate political domestic activity.

Terrorism joined white-collar crime, organized crime and foreign
counterintelligence as the Bureau's fourth priority investigative
area back in 1982. It has been and will continue to be the duty of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to do all within its power to
deny support and refuge to international terrorists in the United

121

States and to identify, neutralize and help prosecute individuals en-
gaged in support of international terrorism.

We were directed to do so by executive; order. We are governed in
this task by Attorney General guidelines, and Congress has demon-
strated its own concern by giving us, under certain circumstances,
extraterritorial jurisdiction for terrorist incidents in other coun-
tries.

It should be kept in mind that the CISPES investigation arose
close in time to three bombing incidents in Washington, DC, one of
which, in November 1983, took place in the Capitol itself. It came
not long after a period in which there were sometimes over 100 ter-
rorist incidents annually in this country and Puerto Rico, and at a
time when the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the
Senate Judiciary Committee was urging the Bureau to investigate
groups suspected of terrorist activity and expostulating when the
Bureau did not.

The counterterrorism program designed by the FBI to respond to
these realities has been highly successful. Despite the significant
growth of terrorist acts abroad — often directed against Americans
or American interests — there has not been one terrorist incident
carried out in this country by a member of an international terror-
ist organization since 1983.

Our approach has been to stop incidents before they happen, and
our approach has worked. We have defused plots to bomb a crowd-
ed jetliner, to overthrow established governments, and to assassi-
nate political leaders.

These were arduous accomplishments. They were the product of
diligent investigation and intelligence gathering. A decade ago Con-
gress recognized the need for intelligence gathering when, in pass-
ing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, it noted:

While luckily the United States has heretofore been spared from the worst cases
of international terrorism, a lack of intelligence concerning it may, as other coun-
tries crack down, present the United States as an inviting target.

The Bureau has acted accordingly and has acted effectively.

Does any of this excuse the mistakes that were made in the
CISPES investigation? Of course not. The many successes of the
Bureau's terrorism program do not justify what happened in the
CISPES investigation.

But it is well to remember that when information we have points
toward even a remote possibility of terrorisn on these shores, it is
the Bureau's sworn duty to investigate the matter fully.

In the overwhelming majority of cases, I believe that the Bu-
reau's terrorism investigations have been conducted thoroughly
and capably — properly focused, founded on solid evidence, and con-
cerned only with terrorism.

After a thorough inquiry, I am convinced that the CISPES inves-
tigation was an aberration from this pattern — an unfortunate
aligning of mistakes in judgment at several levels that cumulative-
ly led to an investigation of which the FBI is not proud.

What matters now, of course, is not the past but the future. The
CISPES investigation taught the Bureau, and me, a great many les-
sons, and I would like to share those lessons with you by describing

122

for you now the changes that I have ordered to be made in re-
sponse to the inquiry.

I should first mention that the inquiry report presented to me by
my inspectors made a number of recommendations for changes and
corrective actions. After careful review, I concluded that it was nec-
essary to go beyond what was recommended in this very thorough
report.

Therefore, I have implemented both the actions and changes rec-
ommended in the report, with modifications in some instances to
broaden their effect, and have also implemented a number of my
own policy and procedural changes.

First, a basic conclusion: The Attorney General guidelines appli-
cable to international terrorism investigations were primarily de-
signed to give guidance and sufficient specificity regarding interna-
tional terrorism investigations of groups that are primarily com-
posed of persons in the United States.

For example, the guidelines do not describe the extent to which
leaders and rank-and-file members may be investigated during an
international terrorism investigation of a group to which they
belong. Nor is there specific guidance regarding international ter-
rorism investigations of fairly broadly based groups like CISPES.

For that reason, I have asked the Attorney General to approve
the formation of a Department of Justice/FBI joint working group
tasked with making recommendations to the Attorney General on
modification of the guidelines to address specifically international
terrorism investigations of groups.

I have asked the Attorney General to appoint Mary Lawton,
counsel to the Attorney General for intelligence policy and
review — with whom you are all familiar — to chair this group. My
expectation is that this group will develop for the Attorney Gener-
al additional guideline provisions that will furnish the guidance
necessary for these types of investigations.

It was also apparent that the review and approval processes for
the CISPES investigation were insufficient and were carried out at
too low a level, given the sensitivity of this type of investigation. I
have instituted a number of changes to rectify this problem.

Principally, all international terrorism investigations will now
have to be approved at a higher level. I have instructed that the
approval level for international terrorism investigations of groups
be at the section chief level at FBI headquarters.

At the inception of the CISPES investigation, the approval level
rested at a lower level with the operational supervisor.

This is a significant element of the approval level and brings
each of these cases to the attention of the individual responsible for
the nationwide management of this important investigative pro-
gram.

In addition, I am requiring that the section chief review interna-
tional terrorism investigations of groups every six months and that
the deputy assistant director having oversight of the terrorism pro-
gram review each of these cases annually.

Included in this review must now be an assessment of the inves-
tigative objectives of each case and a determination of whether the
investigation is consistent with and headed toward accomplishment

123

of these objectives. The mission must be cnstal clear and sharply
focused.

As mentioned earlier, I concluded that tl mechanism designed
for review of international terrorism cases, articularly of groups,
including review by the Department of Jut. ice's Office of Intelli-
gence Policy and Review, did not alert reviewing officials to the
fact that particularly sensitive investigative activities were being
undertaken and did not alert them to the ful' scope of an investiga-
tion.

For example, in the CISPiES investigation there were instances
when activities that were essential! political in nature were sur-
veilled. I have further refined the review and approval process to
ensure that higher level officials are aware of such surveillances
and of other sensitive investigative activities, and to ensure that if
these surveillances and activities do cake place, they are fully justi-
fied.

By way of further example, as n nlione.' before, my inspectors
concluded that the October 1983, cc lrnunication to all 59 field of-
fices unnecessarily broadened the s ; -ope of the CISPES investiga-
tion and that it was ordered without sufficient prior review.

Accordingly, I have instructed thrt clear and concise criteria be
developed for judging the appropria 3ness Oi the scope of all inter-
national terrorism investigations and that t v scope of such investi-
gations be regularly reviewed.

I also concluded that during the CISPES investigation there was
no requirement that higher level officials be advised when certain
investigative activities that by their very nature must be scruti-
nized closely were being used. Such activities include surveillances
at public rallies, attendance at meetings, and other similar investi-
gative techniques.

Although I will discuss this topic in greater detail in a moment, I
would like to mention that each time a document is prepared seek-
ing approval or review of these types of investigations, including
domestic security investigations, I will now require inclusion of a
description of the investigative activities that have been undertak-
en to date. If sensitive techniques are to be utilized — and often they
must be utilized — higher level officials will be able to determine,
and required to determine, whether a particular investigation
merits the use of such techniques.

I believe that these and other changes will allow high-level
Bureau officials, as well as the Department of Justice, to assess and
evaluate the focus, the basis, and the scope of these investigations.
These and other changes will thereby help make certain that direc-
tion and guidance are proper and that any sensitive techniques
being used are appropriate and justified.

During the CISPES investigation there were instances when
agents in the field offices asked headquarters for guidance on the
applicability of the guidelines and on the wisdom of continuing cer-
tain aspects of the investigation. It is vital that these types of field
inquiries come to the attention of high-level Bureau officials.

For that reason, I have instructed both of the FBI's investigative
divisions to make certain that tracking and monitoring systems are
in place to ensure that these requests — and particularly requests
for guidance on justification, focus, and the use of sensitive tech-

124

niques — are brought to the attention of higher level Bureau offi-
cials.

I have specifically instructed that Bureau communications forms
be redesigned to make it easy to determine whether a response, for
example, guidance, is required or whether a communication is
merely for informational purposes. This will help make sure that
headquarters provides timely high-level guidance when it is neces-
sary to do so.

Probably the most critical area requiring attention was how to
conduct investigations of groups where legitimate First Amend-
ment activities were being undertaken by rank-and-file members. I
found that, in the CISPES investigation, guidance on dealing with
activities protected by the First Amendment was given to the field
offices in many instances. In spite of this, headquarters received re-
ports on such activities that failed to specify why the reports were
necessary.

What this tells me is that sufficient training in this area is not
being provided to our personnel. For that reason, I have instructed
that additional training on how to deal with activities protected by
the First Amendment be given to all agents, nationwide. This will
include training for new agents, training for managers, and train-
ing for agents working in these types of cases.

I want to do everything I can to remind personnel at all levels
that investigations must not unreasonably infringe on the activities
protected by the First Amendment.

Closely coupled with this will be the development of written
guidance concerning activities protected by the First Amendment
and development of this written guidance concerning the collection
and preservation of printed public source materials.

Further, I have instructed that the Bureau's legal counsel divi-
sion participate from now on in providing instructions in cases
where the potential exists for confronting legitimate First Amend-
ment Activities in the course of the investigation.

As I mentioned before, it is critical that senior managers and the
Department of Justice be fully aware of precisely which investiga-
tive activities have been undertaken in any particular investigation
when they review and/or approve that investigation. The new re-
quirement, mentioned a moment ago, that descriptions be included
in every review and approval document will hasten the solution of
this problem.

My inquiry concluded that a number of deficiencies in the han-
dling and management of Frank Varelli resulted in a failure to in-
vestigate Varelli's background properly and resulted in undue reli-
ance being placed on the information he provided.

Consequently, I have done the following:

First, I have instructed that the Intelligence Division establish a
unit dedicated to managing all foreign counterintelligence and
international terrorism assets in a manner similar to the way in
which all criminal informants are now being managed. I have
taken this action to make certain that our assets receive uniform
and independent oversight, thereby vastly increasing the likelihood
that deficiencies of the type revealed in the Varelli case will be de-
tected by headquarters and acted upon promptly.

125

Second, I have instructed that a number of additional procedural
changes be instituted to ensure that undue reliance will not be
placed on information provided by assets. For example, there were
numerous instances where Varelli provided information to the FBI
that, upon reexamination, was determined not to be firsthand in-
formation but was in fact public source information.

Accordingly, I will now require that information received from
assets and informants be set forth in a manner that will show, to
the greatest extent possible, where the asset or informant obtained
the information. Thus, if there is no indication in a document as to
the original source of an asset's information, that information will
now be judged accordingly.

Third, whenever the FBI begins development and utilization of
an asset, I have instructed that his bona fides be systematically
and thoroughly checked and that any information provided by the
asset be systematically and thoroughly analyzed. This means that
information about an asset and information from an asset will be
subjected to uniform analysis before being characterized as "reli-
able."

The CISPES investigation saw undue reliance placed on informa-
tion that had not been shown to be reliable and on characterization
of an asset as being reliable when, in fact, that had not yet been
established. My changes ought to help prevent this problem from
happening again.

It has also become clear to me that international terrorism inves-
tigations, because of their potential for impacting on civil and con-
stitutional rights, warrant closer examination during the periodic
reviews of field office operations by the Bureau's Inspection Divi-
sion.

Therefore, I have instructed the Bureau's Inspection Division to
develop new audit procedures and to provide more in-depth review
of the asset and informant programs, including review of such mat-
ters as the bona fides and reliability of assets and compliance with
relevant rules and regulations.

I have also instructed that, during each field and headquarters
inspection, all open international terrorism investigations of groups
be reviewed not only for compliance with applicable guidelines,
rules and regulations, but also to determine whether the scope and
focus of these investigations are appropriate and properly docu-
mented. As part of this process, there will be increased training
and specialization for our inspectors and their staffs to ensure the
adequacy of these reviews.

In addition to the need I mentioned earlier for significantly in-
creased training in regard to First Amendment issues, it also
became apparent to me that training in other areas must be en-
hanced. For example, during the CISPES investigation certain su-
pervisors who were entrusted with responsibility for supervision of
various aspects of the investigation clearly did not have sufficient
familiarity with the terrorism program to ensure meaningful case
supervision.

For that reason, I have instructed that new field supervisors and
supervisors new to a particular program receive a comprehensive
briefing on all programs under their responsibility. This will in-
clude making certain that they are familiar with pertinent guide-

126

lines and reference material to help them deal with the types of
issues presented by the CISPES investigation.

In a related matter, to make sure that the FBI learns from and
continues to benefit from the lessons learned in the CISPES case, I
have instructed that the findings of my inquiry be brought to the
attention of all senior managers in the FBI so that they under-
stand what precipitated the need for the changes I have instituted.
I intend to make certain that the deficiencies in the CISPES inves-
tigation and in the operation of Frank Varelli are included in rele-
vant training programs.

I indicated earlier that the names of persons having nothing to
do with international terrorism ended up in FBI case files as a part
of the CISPES investigation. I should mention that most of those
names are not indexed in the central filing system and are, as a
practical matter, irretrievable. Nonetheless, although we are obli-
gated to maintain such files, the Bureau is perfectly willing to con-
sider, on a case-by-case basis, requests from individuals or groups
who wish to have their names expunged.

The primary concern here is not the existence of those names,
but rather what dissemination is made of those names. As a gener-
al proposition, I believe the FBI should take special care in the dis-
semination of information about people whose names ended up in
files merely because they attended CISPES meetings or participat-
ed in CISPES activities.

One routine dissemination of file information comes when other
government agencies request FBI record checks in connection with
employment matters. It would obviously be inappropriate, in re-
sponding to such a request, to make a disclosure that would indi-
cate, directly or by implication, that someone who simply attended
a CISPES rally or had contact with the group in another way was
somehow supporting international terrorist activities.

Consequently, I have ordered senior personnel at the Bureau to
develop criteria for restricting dissemination of information in
CISPES files except in response to Freedom of Information Act and
Privacy Act requests, which will not be affected.

I have also instructed that numerous other policy changes be
made and actions of a less significant nature be taken to assist our
managers in the day-to-day operation of the Bureau. These changes
range from increased examination of indexing processes to reexam-
ination of the usefulness of the FBI file sometimes referred to as
the "Terrorist Photograph Album."

Finally, after careful consideration, I have decided to impose dis-
ciplinary sanctions against six FBI employees at the supervisor,
unit chief, and section chief levels for their performance during the
CISPES investigation. Both field and headquarters personnel are
involved.

In three of these cases, the individuals are being formally cen-
sured, a sanction of considerable gravity within the FBI. In the re-
maining three cases, each of those involved has been censured,
placed on probation, and suspended from duty for 14 calendar days.
A seventh employee, whose performance would in all likelihood
have merited dismissal, has resigned.

Let me make it very clear that I am disciplining these individ-
uals solely because of the managerial or supervisory inadequacies

127

displayed by them during the CISPES investigation. I have seen no
evidence whatsoever that the conduct in question was either illegal
or motivated by any improper purpose.

At the same time, the mistakes in judgment that took place
during the CISPES investigation were serious ones, and I cannot
emphasize too strongly my firm conviction that there is no place
for such mistakes in the work of the FBI. The sanctions I am im-
posing are intended to convey that conviction with clarity and
vigor.

In conclusion, I believe that the changes I have set forth for you
today represent a significant improvement of FBI management pro-
cedures and policies, and I believe that these changes substantially
increase the likelihood that future CISPES cases will not occur.

I will now be happy to try to answer any questions you may have
on what my inquiry found and on what I have done. As I know you
are aware, I cannot discuss classified information in open session,
but I will of course be happy to answer for the classified record any
questions you may have pertaining to such information.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The Director's prepared statement follows:]

128 1

VS. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Office of the Director Wcstunpai DC 20S3S

OPENING STATEMENT
OF

WILLIAM S. SESSIONS
DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SEPTEMBER 16, 1988

129

9/16/88

MR. CHAIRMAN:

I AM HERE TODAY AT YOUR INVITATION TO DISCUSS THE
FBI'S INVESTIGATION OF CISPES — THE COMMITTEE IN SOLIDARITY
WITH THE PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR. CISPES, A GROUP
HEADQUARTERED IN WASHINGTON, D. C, WITH BRANCHES
THROUGHOUT MUCH OF THE UNITED STATES, FIRST BECAME THE
SUBJECT OF AN FBI INVESTIGATION IN SEPTEMBER, 1981. AT
THAT TIME, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ASKED THE BUREAU TO
DETERMINE WHETHER CISPES WAS IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE
PROVISIONS OF THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT. THIS
LEGISLATION REQUIRES THAT PERSONS ACTING IN THE UNITED
STATES ON BEHALF OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS OR ENTITIES
REGISTER WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH IT WAS
ESTABLISHED AT THAT TIME THAT CISPES PUBLISHED LITERATURE
ENDORSING THE OBJECTIVES OF TWO ORGANIZATIONS KNOWN TO BE
SALVADORAN TERRORIST GROUPS—THE SALVADORAN DEMOCRATIC
REVOLUTIONARY FRONT (THE "FDR") AND THE FARABUNDO MARTI
NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (THE "FMLN")— NO VIOLATION OF THE
FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT WAS DISCOVERED, AND THIS
LIMITED INVESTIGATION WAS COMPLETED THREE MONTHS LATER IN
DECEMBER, 1981.

SUBSEQUENTLY, IN MARCH, 1983, BASED UPON INFORMATION
FURNISHED BY THE DALLAS FIELD OFFICE OF THE FBI, THE

130

TERRORISM SECTION OF THE BUREAU'S CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE
DIVISION AT FBI HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON AUTHORIZED THE
OPENING OF A NEW INVESTIGATION OF CISPES TO DETERMINE THE
EXTENT TO WHICH ITS PRIOR ENDORSEMENT OF THE FOREIGN
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS HAD BECOME ACTIVE FINANCIAL OR
OTHER SUPPORT. THIS INVESTIGATION WAS ALSO INTENDED TO
DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF ANY CONTROL OF CISPES BY THE FDR OR
THE FMLN AND TO DETERMINE WHETHER CISPES WAS PLANNING
TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES.

THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY THE DALLAS FIELD OFFICE
CAME FROM SEVERAL SOURCES. CHIEF AMONG THEM WAS A CENTRAL
AMERICAN EXPATRIATE NAMED FRANK VARELLI . VARELLI HAD
BECOME AN FBI ASSET, A TERM MEANING "INTELLIGENCE SOURCE,"
IN 1981. AS IS CUSTOMARY, HE WAS ASSIGNED TO A SPECIAL
AGENT (IN THE DALLAS OFFICE) FOR MONITORING AND OPERATING.
VARELLI ALLEGED THAT CISPES WAS UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE
PREVIOUSLY MENTIONED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, THAT
CISPES WAS PROVIDING FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THOSE
ORGANIZATIONS, AND THAT CISPES WAS PREPARING FOR TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES.

THE INFORMATION VARELLI GAVE TO HIS CASE AGENT IN
DALLAS WAS IN TURN GIVEN TO THAT AGENT'S SUPERVISORS IN
DALLAS FOR REVIEW. IT WAS EVENTUALLY PASSED ALONG TO THE
OPERATIONAL DESK OF THE TERRORISM SECTION IN WASHINGTON,

131

WHERE THE INVESTIGATION WAS OPENED AND FROM WHICH THE
INVESTIGATION WAS COORDINATED FOR ALL OF ITS TWENTY-SEVEN
MONTH DURATION. ALTHOUGH CISPES WAS LOCATED IN THE UNITED
STATES, THE INVESTIGATION WAS CLASSIFIED AS AN
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATION BECAUSE THE QUESTION
OF WHETHER THE GROUP SUPPORTED FOREIGN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
(OR WAS IN TURN SUPPORTED BY FOREIGN TERRORISTS) WAS THE
MAJOR FOCUS OF THE INVESTIGATION.

FOR MUCH OF 1983 THE INVESTIGATION WAS NARROWLY
FOCUSED. IT CONCENTRATED ON CISPES HEADQUARTERS IN
WASHINGTON, ON ITS DALLAS CHAPTER, AND ON A HANDFUL OF ITS
OTHER BRANCH CHAPTERS. THE MAJOR TURNING POINT IN THE
INVESTIGATION CAME IN OCTOBER, 1983, WHEN THE TERRORISM
SECTION OF THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION AT FBI
HEADQUARTERS SENT A TELETYPE SEEKING ADDITIONAL
INVESTIGATIVE SUPPORT IN THE CISPES INVESTIGATION FROM
EVERY FIELD OFFICE IN THE FBI, THEREBY EFFECTIVELY MAKING
THE SCOPE OF THE INVESTIGATION NATIONWIDE. THE THEN
APPROXIMATELY 180 CISPES CHAPTERS THROUGHOUT THE UNITED
STATES THUS BECAME SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION, AND .OVER THE
NEXT 18 MONTHS NUMEROUS OTHER INVESTIGATIONS ARISING OUT OF
THE CISPES INVESTIGATION. SOMETIMES REFERRED TO AS SPINOFF
INVESTIGATIONS, WERE CONDUCTED.

132

THE CISPES INVESTIGATION USED MANY STANDARD
INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES. AMONG THEM WERE CHECKS OF PUBLIC
RECORDS AND SOURCES, PHOTOGRAPHIC AND VISUAL SURVEILLANCES,
UNDERCOVER ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS, REVIEWS OF FINANCIAL
RECORDS PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE RIGHT TO
FINANCIAL PRIVACY ACT, TRASH CHECKS, CHECKS OF TELEPHONE
AND UTILITY COMPANY RECORDS, CHECKS OF RECORDS OF LICENSE
AND CREDIT BUREAUS, CHECKS OF RECORDS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES, AND LIMITED PERSONAL INTERVIEWING OF CISPES
MEMBERS.

THE INVESTIGATION CONTINUED THROUGHOUT 1984 AND INTO
1985. AS WAS AND IS REQUIRED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
GUIDELINES FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND FOREIGN
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS—WHICH GOVERN THE
CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS BY THE
FBI—PERIODIC REPORTS ON THE CISPES INVESTIGATION WERE
FILED WITH THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. THESE
REPORTS INITIALLY SET FORTH THE PREDICATION FOR OPENING
THE INVESTIGATION AND THEREAFTER SET FORTH THE BASIS FOR
CONTINUING IT. THE FIRST TWO SUCH REPORTS WERE APPROVED BY
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AS SATISFYING THE APPLICABLE
REQUIREMENTS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES.

133

THEN, IN RESPONSE TO THE BUREAU'S REPORT IN MARCH,
1985, THE DEPARTMENT QUESTIONED WHETHER SUFFICIENT BASIS
EXISTED TO CONTINUE THE INVESTIGATION, AND ON JUNE 3, 1985,
THE DEPARTMENT ADVISED THE BUREAU THAT THE CASE NO LONGER
APPEARED TO SATISFY THE STANDARDS IN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
GUIDELINES FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATION.
FIFTEEN DAYS LATER, THE CISPES CASE WAS CLOSED. NO
SUBSTANTIAL LINK BETWEEN CISPES AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
ACTIVITIES WAS EVER ESTABLISHED.

SHORTLY AFTER I BECAME DIRECTOR OF THE FBI IN
NOVEMBER, 1987, AND SOON AFTER I BECAME AWARE OF THE
INTEREST OF CONGRESS IN THIS MATTER, I ORDERED THE
INSPECTION DIVISION OF THE FBI TO CONDUCT A FULL AND IN-
DEPTH INQUIRY INTO THE CISPES INVESTIGATION. IN
PARTICULAR, I ASKED TO BE ADVISED OF WHETHER THE BUREAU
HAD VIOLATED ANY LEGAL OR CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
EXECUTIVE ORDERS OR PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES, ATTORNEY
GENERAL GUIDELINES, AND/OR INTERNAL FBI RULES, REGULATIONS
OR POLICIES DURING THE CISPES INVESTIGATION. I ASKED
WHETHER ANY DIRECTION HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE WHITE
HOUSE CONCERNING THE INVESTIGATION. I ALSO ASKED WHETHER
THE DISCRETION AND JUDGMENT USED IN CONDUCTING THE
INVESTIGATION WERE APPROPRIATE.

134

THE INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED BY EXPERIENCED
INSPECTORS, WHOSE MANDATE FROM ME WAS TO LEAVE NO STONE
UNTURNED IN ASSESSING THE CISPES INVESTIGATION AND IN
REPORTING THAT ASSESSMENT TO ME. MY INSPECTORS REVIEWED
OVER 375 MAJOR FILES, INCLUDING ALL HEADQUARTERS AND FIELD
OFFICE CISPES INVESTIGATIVE FILES, AS WELL AS THE CASE
FILES ON INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS THAT WERE OPENED AS A
RESULT OF CISPES. THEY CONDUCTED EXTENSIVE INTERVIEWS OF
FIELD AND HEADQUARTERS SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL, OF THE CASE
AGENTS WHO HANDLED THE INVESTIGATIONS, AND OF THE AGENTS
WHO WERE ASSIGNED VARIOUS INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES
RELATING TO CISPES. THE INQUIRY (AND AN EARLIER
INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE BUREAU'S OFFICE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY INTO ALLEGATIONS MADE BY FRANK
VARELLI) TOOK SEVERAL MONTHS AND COST APPROXIMATELY
$800,000, ONLY SLIGHTLY LESS THAN THE COST OF THE ENTIRE
CISPES INVESTIGATION ITSELF. THIS WAS AN EXTENSIVE AND
THOROUGH INQUIRY. I AM HERE TODAY TO HIGHLIGHT WHAT MY
INSPECTORS FOUND AND—MORE IMPORTANTLY— TO TELL YOU WHAT I
INTEND TO DO ABOUT WHAT THEY FOUND. HERE ARE THE MAJOR
CONCLUSIONS OF MY INQUIRY:

1. ABSENT THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY FRANK VARELLI,
THERE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SUFFICIENT PREDICATION FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATION OF CISPES. THE CASE
PIVOTED ON THE INFORMATION VARELLI PROVIDED, AND THERE WERE

135

CLEAR DEFICIENCIES, BOTH OPERATIONAL AND SUPERVISORY, IN
THE WAY IN WHICH VARELLI WAS HANDLED. HIS BACKGROUND AND
RELIABILITY WERE NEVER INVESTIGATED ADEQUATELY, AND DURING
MUCH OF THE INVESTIGATION THE ACCURACY OF VARELLI' S
INFORMATION WAS NOT ADEQUATELY VERIFIED. HIS ACTIVITIES
WERE INADEQUATELY SUPERVISED. BY THE TIME IT WAS REALIZED
THAT VARELLI' S INFORMATION WAS UNRELIABLE, THE
INVESTIGATION HAD BEEN UNDERWAY FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR.
THE INVESTIGATION WOULD NOT HAVE DEVELOPED AS IT DID HAD
VARELLI ' S RELIABILITY BEEN PROPERLY SCRUTINIZED AT THE
OUTSET.

2. THE ORIGINAL FOCUS AND INTENT OF THE CISPES
INVESTIGATION WERE TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF MONETARY AND
OTHER SUPPORT BY CISPES FOR TERRORIST MOVEMENTS AND
ACTIVITIES IN EL SALVADOR; TO DETERMINE THE LIKELIHOOD OF
CISPES CONDUCTING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED
STATES; TO IDENTIFY THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO KNOWINGLY
SUPPORTED TERRORIST GROUPS IN EL SALVADOR THROUGH EFFORTS
IN THE UNITED STATES; AND TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF ANY
CONTROL OVER, OR INFLUENCE ON, CISPES BY THE FDR OR THE
FMLN. THIS FOCUS WAS PROPER, GIVEN THE INFORMATION
AVAILABLE TO THE BUREAU AT THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE
INVESTIGATION. AT THE BEGINNING, THE INVESTIGATION WAS
CONFINED TO WASHINGTON AND 11 OTHER FIELD OFFICES, AND
PERSONNEL WERE SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED NOT TO ASSUME THAT

136

RANK-AND-FILE MEMBERS OF CISPES KNEW ANYTHING ABOUT, OR
WERE INVOLVED WITH, THE FUNDING OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN
EL SALVADOR. THEY WERE ALSO SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED THAT
THE INVESTIGATION WOULD NOT BE DIRECTED TOWARD THE EXERCISE
OF RIGHTS GUARANTEED BY THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION,
INSTRUCTIONS THAT WERE PERIODICALLY REPEATED DURING THE
INVESTIGATION.

3. THE MAJOR PROBLEM CAME WHEN THE SCOPE OF THE
INVESTIGATION WAS UNNECESSARILY BROADENED IN OCTOBER, 1983.
IT REMAINED UNNECESSARILY BROAD THEREAFTER. THE BROADENING
OF THE INVESTIGATION IN OCTOBER, 1983, IN ESSENCE DIRECTED
ALL FIELD OFFICES TO REGARD EACH CISPES CHAPTER, WHEREVER
LOCATED, AS A PROPER SUBJECT OF THE INVESTIGATION. BASED
ON THE DOCUMENTATION AVAILABLE TO THE FBI BY OCTOBER,
1983, THERE WAS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ALL CISPES
MEMBERS NATIONWIDE KNEW OF OR HAD ANY INVOLVEMENT IN
SUPPORT OF EL SALVADORAN OR U.S. TERRORISTS. THUS, THERE
WAS NO REASON TO EXPAND THE INVESTIGATION SO WIDELY. THE
FOCUS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ON CISPES NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS IN
WASHINGTON, D. C; INDEED, AT ONE POINT FBI HEADQUARTERS
TOLD THE WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE TO GET READY TO ASSUME
PRINCIPAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CASE BUT THEN FAILED TO
ISSUE THE NECESSARY ORDERS TO BRING THIS ABOUT. THE
DECISION TO BROADEN THE INVESTIGATION UNNECESSARILY WAS
MADE AT A COMPARATIVELY LOW LEVEL, AND, PUT SIMPLY, THE

137

SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL AT FBI HEADQUARTERS WHO SHOULD HAVE
REVIEWED AND ANALYZED THIS DECISION AND APPRECIATED ITS
SIGNIFICANCE FAILED TO DO SO.

4. AFTER THE INVESTIGATION WAS EXPANDED IN OCTOBER,
1983, MANY OF THE INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES THAT I DESCRIBED
TO YOU EARLIER COULD NOT REASONABLY HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO
ACCOMPLISH THE GOALS OF THE INVESTIGATION. INSTEAD, THESE
ACTIVITIES CAUSED INFORMATION ON RANK-AND-FILE MEMBERS WHO
HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM TO BE
INCLUDED IN FBI CASE FILES.

5. IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE PROCESS BY WHICH THE
CISPES INVESTIGATION WAS MANAGED AT CERTAIN LEVELS OF FBI
HEADQUARTERS WERE FLAWED. THERE WAS NO AUTOMATIC REMINDER
OR "TICKLER" SYSTEM IN PLACE TO ENSURE TIMELY AND
APPROPRIATE REVIEW OF INCOMING INFORMATION. THE FIELD
AGENTS COLLECTING INFORMATION ON CISPES COULD REASONABLY
HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE INFORMATION WOULD BE PROPERLY
REVIEWED AT FBI HEADQUARTERS, BUT IN MANY CASES IT WAS NOT;
IT WAS SIMPLY PLACED IN FILES AND LEFT THERE. SIMILARLY,
SOME REQUESTS FOR GUIDANCE FROM THE FIELD WENT UNANSWERED
AT FBI HEADQUARTERS. THE PERSONNEL RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
SUPERVISORY SYSTEM AS IT THEN EXISTED AT FBI HEADQUARTERS
FAILED TO ENSURE THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF THOSE CONDUCTING
THE INVESTIGATION WERE PROPERLY REVIEWED.

138

6. EARLIER I SPOKE OF THE INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
THAT WERE USED IN THE INVESTIGATION. IT IS IMPORTANT TO
NOTE THAT CERTAIN OTHER TECHNIQUES, GENERALLY MORE
INTRUSIVE IN NATURE, WERE NOT USED—SUCH AS ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE, CONSENSUAL TELEPHONE MONITORING, AND COURT-
AUTHORIZED SEARCHES— ALTHOUGH THERE WAS ONE INSTANCE IN
WHICH INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM LOCAL AUTHORITIES BASED ON
A LOCAL SEARCH WARRANT RESULTED IN THE OPENING OF AN
INVESTIGATION THAT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN OPENED.

7. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES WERE NOT DESIGNED
TO GIVE GUIDANCE ON A MAJOR PROBLEM FACED IN THE CISPES
INVESTIGATION: THE EXTENT TO WHICH LEADERS AND MEMBERS MAY
BE INVESTIGATED DURING AN INVESTIGATION OF A GROUP TO WHICH
THEY BELONG. OTHER ASPECTS OF THE CISPES INVESTIGATION
WERE ALSO NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED BY THE GUIDELINES.

8. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE WHITE HOUSE OR
ANYONE ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE WHITE HOUSE GAVE
INSTRUCTIONS, REQUESTED INFORMATION, OR OTHERWISE ATTEMPTED
TO INFLUENCE THE CISPES INVESTIGATION. THE SAME IS TRUE OF
ALL OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND OUTSIDE PRIVATE GROUPS.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE CISPES INVESTIGATION WAS
POLITICALLY MOTIVATED OR DIRECTED.

139

9. VARELLI ' S INITIAL CASE AGENT, WHO RESIGNED FROM
THE FBI IN 1984, GAVE VARELLI CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS AND
WITHHELD MONEY THAT WAS TO HAVE BEEN PAID TO VARELLI.
OTHER THAN THAT, MY INSPECTORS HAVE NOT IDENTIFIED ANY
ILLEGAL ACTS OR VIOLATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
COMMITTED BY THE FBI AS PART OF THE CISPES INVESTIGATION.
THEY DID IDENTIFY THIRTY-ONE INSTANCES OF POSSIBLE
VIOLATIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES, MOSTLY OF A
MINOR AND TECHNICAL NATURE. SINCE THAT TIME, THE BUREAU'S
LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION HAS OPINED THAT ONLY FIFTEEN OF
THESE INSTANCES WERE IN FACT VIOLATIONS, AND THAT OF THOSE
VIOLATIONS, THIRTEEN WARRANT BEING REPORTED TO THE
PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD.

IN A MOMENT I WANT TO DISCUSS WHAT I PLAN ON DOING
ABOUT WHAT MY INQUIRY DISCOVERED. BEFORE I DO SO. I WANT
TO PUT THE CISPES INVESTIGATION—AND THE BUREAU'S
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM PROGRAM— INTO PERSPECTIVE. FIRST
AND FOREMOST, CONTRARY TO CERTAIN ALLEGATIONS, THE CISPES
INVESTIGATION WAS NOT A RETURN TO THE DAYS OF COINTELPRO.
AS INITIALLY CONCEIVED, THE INVESTIGATION WAS A REASONABLE
EXAMINATION OF A POSSIBLE TERRORIST THREAT. THAT ITS
EXECUTION WAS FLAWED REFLECTS MISMANAGEMENT. IT DOES NOT
REFLECT A POLICY OF PURPOSEFUL INTERFERENCE WITH LEGITIMATE
DOMESTIC POLITICAL ACTIVITY.

140

TERRORISM JOINED WHITE COLLAR CRIME, ORGANIZED CRIME
AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AS THE BUREAU'S FOURTH
PRIORITY INVESTIGATIVE AREA BACK IN 1982. IT HAS BEEN AND
WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE DUTY OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION TO DO ALL WITHIN ITS POWER TO DENY SUPPORT
AND REFUGE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND TO IDENTIFY, NEUTRALIZE AND HELP PROSECUTE INDIVIDUALS
ENGAGED IN SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. WE WERE
DIRECTED TO DO SO BY EXECUTIVE ORDER; WE ARE GOVERNED IN
THIS TASK BY ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES; AND CONGRESS HAS
DEMONSTRATED ITS OWN CONCERN BY GIVING US, UNDER CERTAIN
CIRCUMSTANCES, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION FOR TERRORIST
INCIDENTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND
THAT THE CISPES INVESTIGATION AROSE CLOSE IN TIME TO THREE
BOMBING INCIDENTS IN WASHINGTON, D.C., ONE OF WHICH (IN
NOVEMBER, 1983) TOOK PLACE IN THE CAPITOL ITSELF. IT CAME
NOT LONG AFTER A PERIOD IN WHICH THERE WERE SOMETIMES OVER
100 TERRORIST INCIDENTS ANNUALLY IN THIS COUNTRY AND PUERTO
RICO AND AT A TIME WHEN THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND
TERRORISM OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE WAS URGING THE
BUREAU TO INVESTIGATE GROUPS SUSPECTED OF TERRORIST
ACTIVITY AND EXPOSTULATING WHEN THE BUREAU DID NOT.

THE COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM DESIGNED BY THE FBI TO
RESPOND TO THESE REALITIES HAS BEEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL.
DESPITE THE SIGNIFICANT GROWTH OF TERRORIST ACTS ABROAD—

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OFTEN DIRECTED AGAINST AMERICANS OR AMERICAN INTERESTS-
THERE HAS NOT BEEN ONE TERRORIST INCIDENT CARRIED OUT IN
THIS COUNTRY BY A MEMBER OF AN INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION SINCE 1983. OUR APPROACH HAS BEEN TO STOP
INCIDENTS BEFORE THEY HAPPEN, AND OUR APPROACH HAS WORKED.
WE HAVE DEFUSED PLOTS TO BOMB A CROWDED JETLINER, TO
OVERTHROW ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENTS, AND TO ASSASSINATE
POLITICAL LEADERS.

THESE WERE ARDUOUS ACCOMPLISHMENTS. THEY WERE THE
PRODUCTS OF DILIGENT INVESTIGATION AND INTELLIGENCE
GATHERING. A DECADE AGO CONGRESS RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING WHEN, IN PASSING THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, IT NOTED:

WHILE LUCKILY THE UNITED STATES HAS HERETOFORE
BEEN SPARED FROM THE WORST CASES OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, A LACK OF
INTELLIGENCECONCERNING IT MAY, AS OTHER
COUNTRIES CRACK DOWN, PRESENT THE UNITED STATES
AS AN INVITING TARGET.
THE BUREAU HAS ACTED ACCORDINGLY AND HAS ACTED EFFECTIVELY.

DOES ANY OF THIS EXCUSE THE MISTAKES THAT WERE MADE
IN THE CISPES INVESTIGATION? OF COURSE NOT. THE MANY

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SUCCESSES OF THE BUREAU'S TERRORISM PROGRAM DO NOT JUSTIFY
WHAT HAPPENED IN THE CISPES INVESTIGATION.

BUT IT IS WELL TO REMEMBER THAT WHEN THE INFORMATION
WE HAVE POINTS TOWARD EVEN A REMOTE POSSIBILITY OF
TERRORISM ON THESE SHORES, IT IS THE BUREAU'S SWORN DUTY
TO INVESTIGATE THE MATTER FULLY. IN THE OVERWHELMING
MAJORITY OF CASES, I BELIEVE THAT THE BUREAU'S TERRORISM
INVESTIGATIONS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED THOROUGHLY AND CAPABLY—
PROPERLY FOCUSED, FOUNDED ON SOLID EVIDENCE, AND CONCERNED
ONLY WITH TERRORISM. AFTER A THOROUGH INQUIRY, I AM
CONVINCED THAT THE CISPES INVESTIGATION WAS AN ABERRATION
FROM THIS PATTERN—AN UNFORTUNATE ALIGNING OF MISTAKES IN
JUDGMENT AT SEVERAL LEVELS THAT CUMULATIVELY LED TO AN
INVESTIGATION OF WHICH THE FBI IS NOT PROUD.

WHAT MATTERS NOW, OF COURSE, IS NOT THE PAST BUT THE
FUTURE. THE CISPES INVESTIGATION TAUGHT THE BUREAU (AND
ME) A GREAT MANY LESSONS, AND I WOULD LIKE TO SHARE THOSE
LESSONS WITH YOU BY DESCRIBING FOR YOU NOW THE CHANGES
THAT I HAVE ORDERED BE MADE IN RESPONSE TO THE INQUIRY.

I SHOULD FIRST MENTION THAT THE INQUIRY REPORT
PRESENTED TO ME BY MY INSPECTORS MADE A NUMBER OF
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGES AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. AFTER
CAREFUL REVIEW, I CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO GO

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BEYOND WHAT WAS RECOMMENDED IN THIS VERY THOROUGH REPORT.
THEREFORE, I HAVE BOTH IMPLEMENTED THE ACTIONS AND CHANGES
RECOMMENDED IN THE REPORT, WITH MODIFICATIONS IN SOME
INSTANCES TO BROADEN THEIR EFFECT, AND HAVE ALSO
IMPLEMENTED A NUMBER OF MY OWN POLICY AND PROCEDURAL
CHANGES.

FIRST, A BASIC CONCLUSION: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
GUIDELINES APPLICABLE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
INVESTIGATIONS WERE PRIMARILY DESIGNED TO GIVE GUIDANCE IN
FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS. THE
GUIDELINES DO NOT CONTAIN SUFFICIENT GUIDANCE AND
SUFFICIENT SPECIFICITY REGARDING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
INVESTIGATIONS OF GROUPS THAT ARE PRIMARILY COMPOSED OF
PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE GUIDELINES
DO NOT DESCRIBE THE EXTENT TO WHICH LEADERS AND RANK-AND-
FILE MEMBERS MAY BE INVESTIGATED DURING AN INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM INVESTIGATION OF A GROUP TO WHICH THEY BELONG.
NOR IS THERE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE REGARDING INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS OF FAIRLY BROADLY-BASED GROUPS
LIKE CISPES.

FOR THAT REASON, I HAVE ASKED THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
TO APPROVE THE FORMATION OF A DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE/FBI
JOINT WORKING GROUP TASKED WITH MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS TO
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON MODIFICATION OF THE GUIDELINES TO

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ADDRESS SPECIFICALLY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS
OF GROUPS. I HAVE ASKED THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO APPOINT
MARY LAWTON, COUNSEL TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR
INTELLIGENCE POLICY AND REVIEW—WITH WHOM YOU ARE ALL
FAMILIAR—TO CHAIR THIS GROUP. MY EXPECTATION IS THAT
THIS GROUP WILL DEVELOP FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
ADDITIONAL GUIDELINE PROVISIONS THAT WILL FURNISH THE
GUIDANCE NECESSARY FOR THESE TYPES OF INVESTIGATIONS.

IT WAS ALSO APPARENT THAT THE REVIEW AND APPROVAL
PROCESSES FOR THE CISPES INVESTIGATION WERE INSUFFICIENT
AND WERE CARRIED OUT AT TOO LOW A LEVEL, GIVEN THE
SENSITIVITY OF THIS TYPE OF INVESTIGATION. I HAVE
INSTITUTED A NUMBER OF CHANGES TO RECTIFY THIS PROBLEM.

PRINCIPALLY, ALL INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
INVESTIGATIONS WILL NOW HAVE TO BE APPROVED AT A HIGHER
LEVEL. I HAVE INSTRUCTED THAT THE APPROVAL LEVEL FOR
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS OF GROUPS BE AT THE
SECTION CHIEF LEVEL AT FBI HEADQUARTERS. (AT THE INCEPTION
OF THE CISPES INVESTIGATION, THE APPROVAL LEVEL RESTED AT A
LOWER LEVEL WITH THE OPERATIONAL SUPERVISOR.) THIS IS A
SIGNIFICANT ELEVATION OF THE APPROVAL LEVEL AND BRINGS EACH
OF THESE CASES TO THE ATTENTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NATIONWIDE MANAGEMENT OF THIS IMPORTANT
INVESTIGATIVE PROGRAM.

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IN ADDITION, I AM REQUIRING THAT THE SECTION CHIEF
REVIEW INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS OF GROUPS
EVERY SIX MONTHS AND THAT THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
HAVING OVERSIGHT OF THE TERRORISM PROGRAM REVIEW EACH OF
THESE CASES ANNUALLY. INCLUDED IN THIS REVIEW MUST NOW BE
SEVERAL SPECIFIC ASSESSMENTS THAT PREVIOUSLY WERE NOT
REQUIRED, WHICH I BELIEVE WAS A FLAW IN THE REVIEW PROCESS.
FOR EXAMPLE, THE REVIEWS MUST NOW INCLUDE AN ASSESSMENT OF
THE INVESTIGATIVE OBJECTIVES OF EACH CASE AND A
DETERMINATION OF WHETHER THE INVESTIGATION IS CONSISTENT
WITH AND HEADED TOWARD ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THESE OBJECTIVES.
THE MISSION MUST BE CRYSTAL CLEAR AND SHARPLY FOCUSED.

AS MENTIONED EARLIER, I CONCLUDED THAT THE
MECHANISM DESIGNED FOR REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
CASES, PARTICULARLY OF GROUPS (INCLUDING REVIEW BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE POLICY AND
REVIEW), DID NOT ALERT REVIEWING OFFICIALS TO THE FACT THAT
PARTICULARLY SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES WERE BEING
UNDERTAKEN AND DID NOT ALERT THEM TO THE FULL SCORE OF AN
INVESTIGATION. FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE CISPES INVESTIGATION
THERE WERE INSTANCES WHEN ACTIVITIES THAT WERE ESSENTIALLY
POLITICAL IN NATURE WERE SURVEILLED. I HAVE FURTHER
REFINED THE REVIEW AND APPROVAL PROCESS TO ENSURE THAT
HIGHER LEVEL OFFICIALS ARE AWARE OF SUCH SURVEILLANCES (AND

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OF OTHER SENSITIVE INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES) AND TO ENSURE
THAT IF THESE SURVEILLANCES AND ACTIVITIES DO TAKE
PLACE, THEY ARE FULLY JUSTIFIED.

BY WAY OF FURTHER EXAMPLE, AS MENTIONED BEFORE, MY
INSPECTORS CONCLUDED THAT THE OCTOBER, 1983, COMMUNICATION
TO ALL 59 FIELD OFFICES UNNECESSARILY BROADENED THE SCOPE
OF THE CISPES INVESTIGATION AND THAT IT WAS ORDERED WITHOUT
SUFFICIENT PRIOR REVIEW. ACCORDINGLY, I HAVE INSTRUCTED
THAT CLEAR AND CONCISE CRITERIA BE DEVELOPED FOR JUDGING
THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE SCOPE OF ALL INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS AND THAT THE SCOPE OF SUCH
INVESTIGATIONS BE REGULARLY REVIEWED.

I ALSO CONCLUDED THAT DURING THE CISPES
INVESTIGATION THERE WAS NO REQUIREMENT THAT HIGHER LEVEL
OFFICIALS BE ADVISED WHEN CERTAIN INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES
(THAT BY THEIR VERY NATURE MUST BE SCRUTINIZED CLOSELY)
WERE BEING USED. SUCH ACTIVITIES INCLUDE SURVEILLANCES AT
PUBLIC RALLIES, ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS, AND OTHER SIMILAR
INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES. ALTHOUGH I WILL DISCUSS THIS
TOPIC IN GREATER DETAIL IN A MOMENT, I WOULD LIKE TO
MENTION THAT EACH TIME A DOCUMENT IS PREPARED SEEKING
APPROVAL OR REVIEW OF THESE TYPES OF INVESTIGATIONS,
INCLUDING DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, I WILL NOW
REQUIRE INCLUSION OF A DESCRIPTION OF THE INVESTIGATIVE

147

ACTIVITIES THAT HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN TO DATE. IF
SENSITIVE TECHNIQUES ARE TO BE UTILIZED— AND OFTEN THEY
MUST BE UTILIZED— HIGHER-LEVEL OFFICIALS WILL BE ABLE TO
DETERMINE (AND REQUIRED TO DETERMINE) WHETHER A PARTICULAR
INVESTIGATION MERITS THE USE OF SUCH TECHNIQUES.

I BELIEVE THAT THESE AND OTHER CHANGES WILL ALLOW
HIGH-LEVEL BUREAU OFFICIALS, AS WELL AS THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, TO ASSESS AND EVALUATE THE FOCUS, THE BASIS, AND
THE SCOPE OF THESE INVESTIGATIONS. THESE AND OTHER CHANGES
WILL THEREBY HELP MAKE CERTAIN THAT DIRECTION AND GUIDANCE
ARE PROPER AND THAT ANY SENSITIVE TECHNIQUES BEING USED ARE
APPROPRIATE AND JUSTIFIED.

DURING THE CISPES INVESTIGATION THERE WERE
INSTANCES WHEN AGENTS IN THE FIELD OFFICES ASKED
HEADQUARTERS FOR GUIDANCE ON THE APPLICABILITY OF THE
GUIDELINES AND ON THE WISDOM OF CONTINUING CERTAIN ASPECTS
OF THE INVESTIGATION. IT IS VITAL THAT THESE TYPES OF
FIELD INQUIRIES COME TO THE ATTENTION OF HIGH-LEVEL BUREAU
OFFICIALS. FOR THAT REASON, I HAVE INSTRUCTED BOTH OF THE
FBI'S INVESTIGATIVE DIVISIONS TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT TRACKING
AND MONITORING SYSTEMS ARE IN PLACE TO ENSURE THAT THESE
REQUESTS— AND PARTICULARLY REQUESTS FOR GUIDANCE ON
JUSTIFICATION, FOCUS, AND THE USE OF SENSITIVE TECHNIQUES-
ARE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF HIGHER LEVEL BUREAU

148

OFFICIALS. I HAVE SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED THAT BUREAU
COMMUNICATIONS FORMS BE REDESIGNED TO MAKE IT EASY TO
DETERMINE WHETHER A RESPONSE (FOR EXAMPLE, GUIDANCE) IS
REQUIRED OR WHETHER A COMMUNICATION IS MERELY FOR
INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES. THIS WILL HELP MAKE SURE THAT
HEADQUARTERS PROVIDES TIMELY HIGH-LEVEL GUIDANCE WHEN IT IS
NECESSARY TO DO SO.

PROBABLY THE MOST CRITICAL AREA REQUIRING ATTENTION
WAS HOW TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS OF GROUPS WHERE
LEGITIMATE FIRST AMENDMENT ACTIVITIES WERE BEING UNDERTAKEN
BY THE RANK-AND-FILE MEMBERS. I FOUND THAT, IN THE CISPES
INVESTIGATION, GUIDANCE ON DEALING WITH ACTIVITIES
PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT WAS GIVEN TO THE FIELD
OFFICES IN MANY INSTANCES. IN SPITE OF THIS, HEADQUARTERS
RECEIVED REPORTS ON SUCH ACTIVITIES THAT FAILED TO SPECIFY
WHY THE REPORTS WERE NECESSARY.

WHAT THIS TELLS ME IS THAT SUFFICIENT TRAINING IN
THIS AREA IS NOT BEING PROVIDED TO OUR PERSONNEL. FOR
THAT REASON, I HAVE INSTRUCTED THAT ADDITIONAL TRAINING ON
HOW TO DEAL WITH ACTIVITIES PROTECTED BY THE FIRST
AMENDMENT BE GIVEN TO ALL AGENTS, NATIONWIDE. THIS WILL
INCLUDE TRAINING FOR NEW AGENTS, TRAINING FOR MANAGERS, AND
TRAINING FOR AGENTS WORKING THESE TYPES OF CASES. I WANT
TO DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO REMIND PERSONNEL AT ALL LEVELS

149

THAT INVESTIGATIONS MUST NOT UNREASONABLY INFRINGE ON
ACTIVITIES PROTECTED BY THE FIRST AMENDMENT.

CLOSELY COUPLED WITH THIS WILL BE THE DEVELOPMENT
OF WRITTEN GUIDANCE CONCERNING ACTIVITIES PROTECTED BY THE
FIRST AMENDMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF WRITTEN GUIDANCE
CONCERNING THE COLLECTION AND PRESERVATION OF PRINTED
PUBLIC SOURCE MATERIAL. FURTHER, I HAVE INSTRUCTED THAT
THE BUREAU'S LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PARTICIPATE FROM NOW ON
IN PROVIDING INSTRUCTIONS IN CASES WHERE THE POTENTIAL
EXISTS FOR CONFRONTING LEGITIMATE FIRST AMENDMENT
ACTIVITIES IN THE COURSE OF THE INVESTIGATION. AS I
MENTIONED BEFORE, IT IS CRITICAL THAT SENIOR MANAGERS AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE BE FULLY AWARE OF PRECISELY
WHICH INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN, IN ANY
PARTICULAR INVESTIGATION, WHEN THEY REVIEW AND/OR APPROVE
THAT INVESTIGATION. THE NEW REQUIREMENT, MENTIONED A
MOMENT AGO, THAT DESCRIPTIONS BE INCLUDED IN EVERY REVIEW
AND APPROVAL DOCUMENT WILL HASTEN THE SOLUTION OF THIS
PROBLEM.

MY INQUIRY CONCLUDED THAT A NUMBER OF DEFICIENCIES
IN THE HANDLING AND MANAGEMENT OF FRANK VARELLI RESULTED IN
A FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE VARELLI 'S BACKGROUND PROPERLY AND
RESULTED IN UNDUE RELIANCE BEING PLACED ON THE INFORMATION
HE PROVIDED. CONSEQUENTLY, I HAVE DONE THE FOLLOWING:

150

FIRST, I HAVE INSTRUCTED THAT THE INTELLIGENCE
DIVISION ESTABLISH A UNIT DEDICATED TO MANAGING ALL FOREIGN
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ASSETS IN A
MANNER SIMILAR TO THE WAY IN WHICH ALL CRIMINAL INFORMANTS
ARE NOW BEING MANAGED. I HAVE TAKEN THIS ACTION TO MAKE
CERTAIN THAT OUR ASSETS RECEIVE UNIFORM AND INDEPENDENT
OVERSIGHT, THEREBY VASTLY INCREASING THE LIKELIHOOD THAT
DEFICIENCIES OF THE TYPE REVEALED IN THE VARELLI CASE WILL
BE DETECTED BY HEADQUARTERS AND ACTED UPON PROMPTLY.

SECOND, I HAVE INSTRUCTED THAT A NUMBER OF
ADDITIONAL PROCEDURAL CHANGES BE INSTITUTED TO ENSURE THAT
UNDUE RELIANCE WILL NOT BE PLACED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED
BY ASSETS. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WERE NUMEROUS INSTANCES
WHERE VARELLI PROVIDED INFORMATION TO THE FBI THAT, UPON
REEXAMINATION, WAS DETERMINED NOT TO BE FIRSTHAND
INFORMATION BUT WAS IN FACT PUBLIC SOURCE INFORMATION.
ACCORDINGLY, I WILL NOW REQUIRE THAT INFORMATION RECEIVED
FROM ASSETS AND INFORMANTS BE SET FORTH IN A MANNER THAT
WILL SHOW, TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE, WHERE THE ASSET
OR INFORMANT OBTAINED THE INFORMATION. THUS, IF THERE IS
NO INDICATION IN A DOCUMENT AS TO THE ORIGINAL SOURCE OF AN
ASSET'S INFORMATION, THAT INFORMATION WILL NOW BE JUDGED
ACCORDINGLY.

151

THIRD, WHENEVER THE FBI BEGINS DEVELOPMENT AND
UTILIZATION OF AN ASSET, I HAVE INSTRUCTED THAT HIS BONA
FIDES BE SYSTEMATICALLY AND THOROUGHLY CHECKED AND THAT ANY
INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE ASSET BE SYSTEMATICALLY AND
THOROUGHLY ANALYZED. THIS MEANS THAT INFORMATION ABOUT AN
ASSET AND INFORMATION FROM AN ASSET WILL BE SUBJECTED TO
UNIFORM ANALYSIS BEFORE BEING CHARACTERIZED AS "RELIABLE."
THE CISPES INVESTIGATION SAW UNDUE RELIANCE PLACED ON
INFORMATION THAT HAD NOT BEEN SHOWN TO BE RELIABLE AND ON
CHARACTERIZATION OF AN ASSET AS BEING RELIABLE WHEN, IN
FACT, THAT HAD NOT YET BEEN ESTABLISHED. MY CHANGES OUGHT
TO HELP PREVENT THIS PROBLEM FROM HAPPENING AGAIN.

IT HAS ALSO BECOME CLEAR TO ME THAT INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS, BECAUSE OF THEIR POTENTIAL FOR
IMPACTING ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, WARRANT
CLOSER EXAMINATION DURING THE PERIODIC REVIEWS OF FIELD
OFFICE OPERATIONS BY THE BUREAU'S INSPECTION DIVISION.
THEREFORE, I HAVE INSTRUCTED THE BUREAU'S INSPECTION
DIVISION TO DEVELOP NEW AUDIT PROCEDURES AND TO PROVIDE
MORE IN-DEPTH REVIEW OF THE ASSET AND INFORMANT PROGRAMS,
INCLUDING REVIEW OF SUCH MATTERS AS THE BONA FIDES AND
RELIABILITY OF ASSETS AND COMPLIANCE W H RELEVANT RULES
AND REGULATIONS. I HAVE ALSO INSTRUCTED THAT, DURING EACH
FIELD AND HEADQUARTERS INSPECTION, ALL OPEN INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS OF GROUPS BE REVIEWED NOT ONLY FOR

152

COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE GUIDELINES, RULES AND
REGULATIONS, BUT ALSO TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SCOPE AND
FOCUS OF THESE INVESTIGATIONS ARE APPROPRIATE AND PROPERLY
DOCUMENTED. AS PART OF THIS PROCESS, THERE WILL BE
INCREASED TRAINING AND SPECIALIZATION FOR OUR INSPECTORS
AND THEIR STAFFS TO ENSURE THE ADEQUACY OF THESE REVIEWS.

IN ADDITION TO THE NEED I MENTIONED EARLIER FOR
SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED TRAINING IN REGARD TO FIRST
AMENDMENT ISSUES, IT ALSO BECAME APPARENT TO ME THAT
TRAINING IN OTHER AREAS MUST BE ENHANCED. FOR EXAMPLE,
DURING THE CISPES INVESTIGATION CERTAIN SUPERVISORS WHO
WERE ENTRUSTED WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISION OF
VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE INVESTIGATION CLEARLY DID NOT HAVE
SUFFICIENT FAMILIARITY WITH THE TERRORISM PROGRAM TO ENSURE
MEANINGFUL CASE SUPERVISION. FOR THAT REASON. I HAVE
INSTRUCTED THAT NEW FIELD SUPERVISORS (AND SUPERVISORS NEW
TO A PARTICULAR PROGRAM) RECEIVE A COMPREHENSIVE BRIEFING
ON ALL PROGRAMS UNDER THEIR RESPONSIBILITY. THIS WILL
INCLUDE MAKING CERTAIN THAT THEY ARE FAMILIAR WITH
PERTINENT GUIDELINES AND REFERENCE MATERIAL TO HELP THEM
DEAL WITH THE TYPES OF ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE CISPES
INVESTIGATION.

IN A RELATED MATTER, TO MAKE SURE THAT THE FBI
LEARNS FROM AND CONTINUES TO BENEFIT FROM THE LESSONS

153

LEARNED IN THE CISPES CASE, I HAVE INSTRUCTED THAT THE
FINDINGS OF MY INQUIRY BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF ALL
SENIOR MANAGERS IN THE FBI SO THAT THEY UNDERSTAND WHAT
PRECIPITATED THE NEED FOR THE CHANGES I HAVE INSTITUTED. I
INTEND TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE CISPES
INVESTIGATION AND IN THE OPERATION OF FRANK VARELLI ARE
INCLUDED IN RELEVANT TRAINING PROGRAMS.

I INDICATED EARLIER THAT NAMES OF PERSONS HAVING
NOTHING TO DO WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ENDED UP IN FBI
CASE FILES AS PART OF THE CISPES INVESTIGATION. I SHOULD
MENTION THAT MOST OF THOSE NAMES ARE NOT INDEXED IN THE
CENTRAL FILING SYSTEM AND ARE, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER,
IRRETRIEVABLE. NONETHELESS, ALTHOUGH WE ARE OBLIGATED TO
MAINTAIN SUCH FILES, THE BUREAU IS PERFECTLY WILLING TO
CONSIDER, ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, REQUESTS FROM
INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS WHO WISH TO HAVE THEIR NAMES
EXPUNGED.

THE PRIMARY CONCERN HERE IS NOT THE EXISTENCE OF
THOSE NAMES, BUT RATHER WHAT DISSEMINATION IS MADE .OF THOSE
NAMES. AS A GENERAL PROPOSITION, I BELIlVE THE FBI SHOULD
TAKE SPECIAL CARE IN DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT
PEOPLE WHOSE NAMES ENDED UP IN FILES MFRELY BECAUSE THEY
ATTENDED CISPES MEETINGS OR PARTICIPATED IN CISPES
ACTIVITIES. ONE ROUTINE DISSEMINATION OF FILE

154

INFORMATION COMES WHEN OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES REQUEST
FBI RECORD CHECKS IN CONNECTION WITH EMPLOYMENT MATTERS.
IT WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE INAPPROPRIATE, IN RESPONDING TO SUCH
A REQUEST, TO MAKE A DISCLOSURE THAT WOULD INDICATE,
DIRECTLY OR BY IMPLICATION, THAT SOMEONE WHO SIMPLY
ATTENDED A CISPES RALLY OR HAD CONTACT WITH THE GROUP IN
ANOTHER WAY WAS SOMEHOW SUPPORTING INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES. CONSEQUENTLY, I HAVE ORDERED SENIOR PERSONNEL
AT THE BUREAU TO DEVELOP CRITERIA FOR RESTRICTING
DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION IN CISPES FILES (EXCEPT IN
RESPONSE TO FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND PRIVACY ACT
REQUESTS, WHICH WILL NOT BE AFFECTED).

I HAVE ALSO INSTRUCTED THAT NUMEROUS OTHER POLICY
CHANGES BE MADE AND ACTIONS OF A LESS SIGNIFICANT NATURE BE
TAKEN TO ASSIST OUR MANAGERS IN THE DAY-TO-DAY OPERATION OF
THE BUREAU. THESE CHANGES RANGE FROM INCREASED
EXAMINATION OF INDEXING PROCESSES TO REEXAMINATION OF THE
USEFULNESS OF THE FBI FILE SOMETIMES REFERRED TO AS THE
"TERRORIST PHOTOGRAPH ALBUM."

FINALLY, AFTER CAREFUL CONSIDERATION, I HAVE
DECIDED TO IMPOSE DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS AGAINST SIX FBI
EMPLOYEES AT THE SUPERVISOR, UNIT CHIEF, AND SECTION CHIEF

158

unless there has been a very careful review and a very definite
reason requiring it to do so.

Mr. Conyers. I would like to first of all, thank you for that re-
sponse.

Do you think that that would satisfy the demands of the Center
for Constitutional Rights on this subject, allowing each person to
individually make this request? Does that accommodate the discus-
sion that is going on presently?

Mr. Sessions. I have not heard that discussion. It may not facili-
tate it precisely, but it will deal with those individuals or groups
who wish to have those matters expunged.

I am prepared to deal with those and take those requests, and I
think the bureau is bound to do that because it must try to fairly
deal with the circumstances where those names came into files,
where even though they were not indexed, they may still be con-
tained within those files. And, of course, you know a great deal of
it was public source information.

Mr. Conyers. Yes. Well, let's go the second question. I know we
will be on a time limit.

Mr. Sessions. Yes, sir.

Mr. Conyers. How do we get to the decision that the FMLN be-
comes a terrorist organization, while the contras are not a terrorist
organization. Both are rebel groups within their country.

Where is that decision made within the FBI?

Mr. Sessions. I think it is important for all of us to recognize
that there are, and I am sure you do, Congressman, a number of
investigations of the contra organization that are of a criminal
nature that relate to specific acts that were alleged to have been
criminal acts.

I wrote down for myself several points that I think differentiate
the contras from the CISPES, from an investigative point, because
I felt it would be of interest to you. So far as I know, the contras
have not directed activities against Americans and American inter-
ests. The FMLN, on the other hand, has directed bombings and as-
sassination plots against U.S. persons and U.S. interests.

And third, some of the activities in the United States in support
of the contras have been investigated when violations of United
States laws are suspected. And there are a number of those that
have continued.

I think we have an absolute obligation to investigate those al-
leged violations of the United States law, and it is done. I also
know that the American interests as reflected by the expressions of
the Congress or of the Executive Branch, have decided which coun-
tries are, in fact, recognized, and which governments are recog-
nized and, therefore, that is a part of the decision-making process
as to where the American interest lies.

Mr. Conyers. Well, I would like to continue on this discussion
with you, if not today, through correspondence, because I really
want to research this more than I have been able to, to satisfy
myself with these responses.

Finally, let me indicate that I am concerned about the adminis-
trative violations finding of the FBI agents that have been suspend-
ed. I need to know a lot more about this before I am prepared to
say that there was not a systemic problem, or that they were

157

Mr. Edwards. Well, thank you, very much, Mr. Director. And
again, I congratulate you on a very hard-hitting statement and the
work you did, and especially the work that Mr. Toohey and his
team performed. It was really outstanding.

Mr. Sessions. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Edwards. We will be operating pursuant to House Rules
under the five-minute rule.
I yield to the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The 18th Annual Congressional Black Caucus event is going on,
and we are having hearings in the Full Committee of the Judici-
ary, so I apologize, Director Sessions, for not being present for your
testimony. This is an incredibly important hearing.

Mr. Sessions. Yes, sir.

Mr. Conyers. I feel that it is a cumulation of a great deal of
work by other organizations, the CISPES and others. This subcom-
mittee and its staff, I understand there has been a great deal of
interaction and cooperation in going through files.

So I would like to just try to come to an understanding about the
disposition of the CISPES files that probably have a lot of names of
people in them, that have just come to your attention, without any
real reason for them to be under FBI investigation. And then I
would like to discuss how we determine what a terrorist group is,
and what seems to trigger the criminal standard versus the sup-
port for terrorism standard, which puts investigations on one track
or the other.

Mr. Sessions. Yes, sir.

Mr. Conyers. What is the current plan and what is the debate
and the disposition of these files?

Mr. Sessions. As you may be aware, Congressman Conyers, we
are, of course, governed by the Federal Records Act and by the Pri-
vacy Act, and we are also, of course, involved with the National Ar-
chives and Records Administration rules that require the mainte-
nance of the particular records that are involved.

I took the time, because I thought it would be of great interest to
the committee, to gain some information about those, and I find
that the importance of that to the historical record is significant.
The CISPES investigation, as you know, is a foreign counterintelli-
gence terrorism investigation.

It also, therefore, meets one of the narrow standards, that is the
National Archives and Records Administration standards for ex-
ceptional case files, since it was mentioned in FBI testimony before
a committee of Congress. I think it is likely for that reason, that
under the narrow — there are maybe some question about whether
they would approve a request that CISPES files be expunged.

I think that you may not have been in the room at the moment
that I read the part of my statement indicating that we recognize
that individuals may well want to pursue requests for expunge-
ment, and we are prepared to consider those very carefully.

I also believe that you may not have been present when I read it,
about the circumstance where individual's names might come up in
connection with other requests, that we have established a commit-
tee to very carefully, a working group, to very carefully devise
guidelines that will make sure that those names are not released

156

IN CONCLUSION, I BELIEVE THAT THE CHANGES I HAVE
SET FORTH FOR YOU TODAY REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT
OF FBI MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES AND POLICIES, AND I BELIEVE
THAT THESE CHANGES SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD
THAT FUTURE CISPES CASES WILL NOT OCCUR.

I WILL NOW BE HAPPY TO TRY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS
YOU MAY HAVE ON WHAT MY INQUIRY FOUND AND ON WHAT I HAVE
DONE. AS I KNOW YOU ARE AWARE, I CANNOT DISCUSS CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION IN OPEN SESSION, BUT I WILL OF COURSE BE HAPPY
TO ANSWER FOR THE CLASSIFIED RECORD ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY
HAVE PERTAINING TO SUCH INFORMATION.

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

155

LEVELS FOR THEIR PERFORMANCE DURING THE CISPES
INVESTIGATION. BOTH FIELD AND HEADQUAi "ERS PERSONNEL ARE
INVOLVED. IN THREE OF THESE CASES, THE INDIVIDUALS ARE
BEING FORMALLY CENSURED, A SANCTION OF CONSIDERABLE GRAVITY
WITHIN THE FBI. IN THE REMAINING THREE CASES, EACH OF
THOSE INVOLVED HAS BEEN CENSURED PLACED ON PROBATION, AND
SUSPENDED FROM DUTY FOR FOURTEEN CALENDAR DAYS. A SEVENTH
EMPLOYEE, WHOSE PERFORMANCE WOULD IN ALL LIKELIHOOD HAVE
MERITED DISMISSAL, HAS RESIGNED.

LET ME MAKE IT VERY CL .AR THAT I AM DISCIPLINING
THESE INDIVIDUALS SOLELY BECA ISE OF THE MANAGERIAL OR
SUPERVISORY INADEQUACIES DISPL YED BY THEM DURING THE
CISPES INVESTIGATION. I HAVE SEEN NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER
THAT THE CONDUCT IN QUESTION WAS EITHER ILLEGAL OR
MOTIVATED BY ANY IMPROPER PURPOSE.

AT THE SAME TIME. THE MISTAKES IN JUDGMENT THAT
TOOK PLACE DURING THE CISPES INVESTIGATION WERE SERIOUS
ONES, AND I CANNOT EMPHASIZE TOO STRONGLY MY FIRM
CONVICTION THAT THERE IS NO PLACE FOR SUCH MISTAKES IN THE
WORK OF THE FBI. THE SANCTIONS I AM IMPOSING ARE INTENDED
TO CONVEY THAT CONVICTION WITH CLARITY AND VIGOR.

159

acting under direction, because what we are doing, we are saying
this is an episodic situation. We are all sorry that it happened. It is
very grave.

But in the end, it is the way we dealt with Iran-Contra. There
were a few bad apples in the bunch, but there wasn't any systemic
problem going on here. And I think there is a relationship between
the way people analyze both those situations, and I would have felt
much better and far more supportive had you come back to tell me
that this was something more that just administrative mess up. Be-
cause that let's everybody off the hook except six or seven people,
and that is what bothers me about how we are wrapping up years
of debate about CISPES, and American citizens having their First
Amendment rights very seriously involved and interrupted.

Mr. Sessions. I quite agree with you that you have to make an
evaluation as to whether or not it is systemic or is an aberration. I
believe that it was an aberration, Congressman. And I believe that
there was negligence, if not great negligence involved at the levels
I identified.

For example, at the very beginning, the establishment of Mr.
Varelli as a reliable source, an asset, and the checking out of his
bona fides was not done. I think that is an aberration, I think that
does not happen on a regular basis. It does happen; true. And when
it does happen it needs to be dealt with appropriately.

I think the review of those requirements was not properly car-
ried out, and has to be. So I do believe that it is not systemic and it
is an aberration. But the volumes of material made available to the
committee, I hope will satisfy you of the review and the thorough-
ness of it.

Mr. Conyers. It seems to me that anyone could have determined
Varelli's reliability. I mean, I don't know what was an aberration
about that.

I think that somebody deliberately said, I mean, everybody
knows about him. I mean, he is nationally known for his unreliabi-
lity. So I don't know how we put that in the accident category.
That is what I am saying.

Mr. Sessions. I don't think we put it in an accident category
now. We might well have if we looked back at 1981 and 1982, recog-
nized that he should have been more carefully and thoroughly
checked out, and those things would have been discovered had it
been checked out. I quite agree with you.

Mr. Conyers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. Sensenbrenner. Director Sessions, in your testimony before
the Senate Intelligence Committee and this subcommittee, you said
that, quote, "absent the information provided by Frank Varelli,
there would not have been sufficient predication for an internation-
al terrorism investigation in CISPES," unquote.

In the Washington Times June 3, 1988 article, you reportedly
said at a luncheon meeting with editors and reporters at the
Times, quote, "I believe that when I am able to discuss it it will be
reflected there was a sufficient and proper predication for the in-
vestigation," end quote.

My question is, absent information from Varelli, was there credi-
ble information from other sources that could have provided a suf-

160

ficient predication for an international terrorism investigation of
CISPES?

Mr. Sessions. My belief is, Mr. Congressman, that there could
have been. There was not, and Mr. Toohey can discuss that more
with you. But there was, as I understand it, additional information
then available.

The conclusion was reached by Mr. Toohey and his group that
absent the Varelli information that there would not have been suf-
ficient predication even though you took into account that addi-
tional information. Now Mr. Toohey may be able to clarify it fur-
ther.

Mr. Sensenbrenner. How do you account for the difference in
your opinion between that which was reported in the Washington
Times on June 3rd and what you said here today?

Mr. Sessions. What I believe is that I would hope there would
have been sufficient predication and that, in fact, absent the Var-
elli testimony there would be other sufficient predication informa-
tion. I believe now that absent the Varelli information there would
not have been sufficient predication.

Mr. Sensenbrenner. The FBI has found that CISPES had no ter-
rorist links. In light of this, do you have any reason to doubt the
April 1985 testimony of then Director Webster before this subcom-
mittee that there were quote, "a wide range of individuals engaged
in CISPES, including some in whom we have a legitimate inde-
pendent foreign counter intelligence interest?"

Mr. Sessions. I have no reason to dispute that. I do not know
what information was available to him.

Certainly at that time he had not had the complete review be-
cause it had not been undertaken of the CISPES investigation.

Mr. Sensenbrenner. Assuming that there is a full international
terrorism investigation of a group, what activities of a terrorist
group would you choose not to surveil because they were essential-
ly political in nature?

Mr. Sessions. If you speak of CISPES, as opposed to a terrorist
group, and I presume you are speaking of CISPES, if there were, in
fact, circumstances which existed where the investigation had not
been broadened, we would not have been investigating out among
those 180 chapters, those processes that were essentially political
in nature.

We would have, in my view, been doing it in connection with the
National Chapter here and those other nine or ten cities where in-
vestigations focused on chapters in those cities that were more ac-
tively involved.

In those instances, I think we still would have been reviewing
those activities and surveying them to try to aid national leaders,
persons who were involved or might be involved in the furthering
of terrorists. Unfortunately, it was greatly broadened. That hap-
pened in October of 1983.

Mr. Sensenbrenner. Is there any evidence that anybody's consti-
tutional rights where violated in this investigation of CISPES?

Mr. Sessions. None whatsoever.

Congressman, let me take that back.

There was one instance where marginally it might be interpreted
that way. I don't think it was.

161

But there was a publication posted on a bulletin board in the
university or a college giving notice of a meeting. That brochure
was removed and taken, rather than the information noted by the
agent.

I guess that could come under the category of having deprived
that person of the right of free expression. But that is the only in-
stance that was reported to me from Mr. Toohey's investigation.

Mr. Sensenbrenner. That is interesting. Next time somebody
starts taking down my political yard signs, I wonder if my constitu-
tional rights would be violated here.

Come to Wisconsin, you will see it is done all the time.

In 1979, the FBI signed a settlement providing the Institute for
Policy Studies with immunity from past or present FBI monitoring,
and a blanket prohibition of any future intelligence gathering on
IPS by the FBI. Can you assure the subcommittee the FBI will not
enter into such settlement with CISPES?

Mr. Sessions. There is no forum in which that has been pursued.
That was as part of litigation. I am not totally familiar with it.
Was it a part of litigation, sir?

Mr. Sensenbrenner. Yes, it was.

Mr. Sessions. There is no litigation where that issue has been
raised in connection with CISPES matters. I cannot contemplate it
would happen.

Mr. Sensenbrenner. Because of the unfavorable publicity con-
cerning the CISPES probe, I am concerned that natural tendency
in the bureau will be to raise the standard of sufficient predication
for investigating CISPES or certain individuals in CISPES in the
future.

Can you assure the subcommittee the standards of predication
will not be raised, or CISPES-related individuals will not be treated
differently from other possible investigative subjects should infor-
mation warranting an investigation come to the attention of the
FBI in the future?

Mr. Sessions. If there is, in fact, information that warrants the
investigation, all groups will be treated similarly.

I believe you are aware and were present in the room when I
read that part of my testimony in my statement, which indicated I
have requested the Attorney General to form a working group be-
tween the Department of Justice and the FBI, and suggest it be
headed by Mary Lawton, to review guidelines as it relates to this
particular type of circumstance; that is, the relationship between
major groups and individuals who are members of that group so that
we will have better guidance in that form.

Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

So the record is complete, I would like to ask unanimous consent
that the Washington Times article, which I referred to in my ques-
tioning, be inserted in the record.

Mr. Edwards. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information follows:]

162

2 :

I -111;

f 1

163

Mr. Edwards. The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Kastenmeier.

Mr. Kastenmeier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to compliment Director Sessions on his statement on
the investigation that he commissioned with Mr. Toohey. Whether
or not it will satisfy everyone, it nonetheless, was important.

The conclusions and the recommendations of the director are im-
portant. For a new director to come in, the number of difficult situ-
ations confronting him, I think is not only, I would say the action
took place was courageous, because I do think it is extraordinarily
difficult to come to the conclusions and make the recommendations
he has made. I say that most sincerely.

Mr. Sessions. Thank you.

Mr. Kastenmeier. I really don't have more than one or two ques-
tions.

I think Mr. Conyers pursued the question of differentiation be-
tween political groups, or at least dissident groups, guerrilla groups
within one country or another, and what political distinction could
be made. I think what he was driving at there appears to be a dif-
ferentiation between groups the Administration would regard po-
litically as terrorists, and then those other groups operating in
other countries that are more consistent with the foreign policy po-
sition that the country is taking or the Administration is taking,
and therefore, puts the standards in a different category.

We do understand, of course, in the case of contra aid, they may
have been subject to certain criminal investigations, but they are
not in the same category as, quote, "terrorist," unquote, organiza-
tions. That will, I suppose, politically always be a question.

It is a question hardly of judgment. It is question of whether the
terrorism is, in fact, an appropriate category for various groups.
But I suspect we will continue to have that problem.

One of the things not really dealt with here, which is parentheti-
cal to this whole involvement, was the so-called break-ins within
the United States. There would be several theories for the break-
ins of churches, sanctuaries, others connected with in some form or
another, perhaps, a political sympathy with respect to individuals
or others relating to El Salvador.

There are theories connected to that. The theories, well, that
these are just ad hoc activists that juveniles or others get into, no
particular relationship to anything. Other theories were ranging
all the way to the fact that the bureaucracy itself might be in-
volved.

Personally, I don't believe either of those alternatives. But if nei-
ther of those alternatives is correct, then the question becomes,
could it be Salvadoran authorities operating here, or could it be po-
litical groups in the United States that disagree with the operation
or the activities of these sanctuaries?

Or conversely, could this have been carried out by others who
may have been assets to the bureaucracy?

When I say that, I mean these may be arm's length assets that
would be — the bureau gets information from police departments
who get information from certain local assets. Who else — I have to
ask myself who else would have an interest in rummaging through
a church sanctuary for names or lists or the like?

164

There really has to be some sort of answer for that. We just don't
have it. I would hope that notwithstanding the very commendatory
report that has been laid before us today, that that aspect might be
later gone into, Mr. Chairman, because that is still an insettling,
lurking question.

I am not going to ask the director this morning, unless he cares
to respond to that. But that is a tangential matter which I think is
still unresolved, and does affect, perhaps, civil liberties.

Mr. Edwards. Until recently they were continuing in different
parts of the country.

Mr. Kastenmeier. In part of my district, Madison. I am not
going to press that issue, because I think our focus this morning is
on what the bureau has done and what the director has recom-
mended in terms of procedural changes with respect to reviewing
investigations of a similar nature and what action was taken with
respect to the so-called CISPES investigations.

On that score, I do want to commend the director.

Mr. Sessions. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Chairman, I am very aware that the Chairman, among
others, has requested information concerning those break-ins, and I
think that is an entirely appropriate and meaningful inquiry. Our
response to your May 4 letter has not yet been completed.

But in doing that, I am very aware that it is important to under-
stand, from my point of view, the interest that you have and look
at each one of those and gain all the information that we can.

To this point, the review that I have been made aware of, there
are some of those now with the Department of Justice in connec-
tion with the civil rights investigation. There are in three of those,
lumped in some 40 of the 100 that had been referred to earlier in
your letter. But I expect to have a definitive reply for you shortly.

I do not resist at all any inquiry of that nature. It is important
that those be established what those were and what those were not.

I appreciate the opportunity to do that, sir.

Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Director. We appreciate that. We
are constantly getting inquiries, and our response is always that we
are confident the FBI is not involved.

However, a lot of people write us or phone us and make specific
or implied remarks to the effect that the FBI might be involved.
They are devastating and irritating to have gone on month after
month. And they are well over 100 now.

They all have this pattern to it. They are not real burglaries.
They are taunting burglaries.

Mr. Sessions. I think it is important the American public know
it is not the bureau. I look forward to those to be able to respond
and establish from investigation that it is not, and I hope that it
always is that way, and it must always be that way.

[A letter from the Director on the break-ins follow:]

165

U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Office of the Director

Washington. D.C. 20535

December 14, 1988

Honorable Don Edwards
Cha irman

Subcommittee on Civil

and Constitutional Rights
Committee on the Judiciary
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On May 4, 1988, pursuant to a request by my Congressional

Affairs Office (CAO), you forwarded a list of break-ins at the
homes, churches and offices of persons who you stated were opposed
to the Central American policy of the United States. As we under-
stand it, the list was compiled by the Subcommittee and included
incidents known to your staff, as well as incidents reported to
the staff by victims. You had previously expressed concern that
the break-ins presented a disturbing pattern of activity in which
agents of foreign governments or Federal or local law enforcement
officials may have been involved.

My CAO requested the list so that we could ensure that

all incidents identified by the Subcommittee would be included in
our complete review of this matter. These incidents, and the
perception by some members of the public that they represent a
pattern of harassment directed at critics of United States
foreign policy, concern me. I directed our Criminal Investigative
and Intelligence Divisions to examine all of the break-ins and to
determine what bases, if any, might exist for Federal jurisdiction
under the Civil Rights statutes, other applicable Federal criminal
laws or statutes and guidelines defining our foreign counter-
intelligence responsibilities.

We have completed an exhaustive review of this matter,
which encompassed 93 break-ins dating back to November, 1983.

166

Honorable Don Edwards

Many of these incidents were brought to our attention by the
Subcommittee. Others were identified through newspapers, police
records or information provided to us by other interested members
of Congress. We have attached a self-explanatory chart to this
letter which sets forth the results of our inquiry into each
incident .

In 31 of the 93 incidents, the information in our
possession was not sufficient to conduct a records check with
appropriate local law enforcement authorities. In the remaining
62 incidents we searched local law enforcement records for police
reports on the incidents. We found that police reports had been
filed on 49 occasions. In the remaining 13 incidents, although
the information in our possession was sufficient to make an
inquiry with the appropriate local law enforcement authorities, we
found that no police report had been filed.

Our review disclosed that 3 of the 49 incidents were
successfully solved with the arrest of a total of 4 individuals.
As shown in the attached chart, these were the September 16, 1985
incident at the office of Reverend David Meyers in Guadalupe,
Arizona; and the July 15 and August 3, 1986 incidents at the Old
Cambridge Baptist Church, Cambridge, Massachusetts. The police
reports that we analyzed on these incidents did not disclose any
connection between those arrested and either foreign powers or
Federal, state or local authorities. They appear to be common
burglaries .

A total of 15 incidents at the International Center for
Development Policy, the Central American Historical Institute and
the Old Cambridge Baptist Church formed the bases for three
preliminary Civil Rights inquiries by the FBI. These inquiries
were authorized by the Department of Justice (DOJ) consistent with
DOJ policy in regard to Civil Rights investigations. The results
of these inquiries have been referred to the Civil Rights Division
of the DOJ, where final decision is pending. All remaining cases
where police reports were filed were also submitted to the Civil
Rights Division of the DOJ, and are similarly under review. We
will inform you when the decision of the DOJ on these matters is
communicated to us.

Our analysis disclosed that in the 49 incidents wherein
police reports were filed, thefts occurred in 26 cases. In the
remaining 23 cases, either nothing was stolen, or the complainants
were unable to identify any property that was stolen. The

- 2 -

167

Honorable Don Edwards

complainants in seven incidents stated that their files or offices
were ransacked. In three of the incidents, the complainants
stated that they believed that the United States Government was
involved in the break-ins. The local law enforcement authorities
noted in their reports on these three incidents that no evidence
was discovered that lent credence to these beliefs.

In your letter of May 4, 1988, you expressed concern
that the jurisdictional elements of the Civil Rights statutes, as
interpreted by the Civil Rights Division of the DO J , may have
resulted in some victims of these incidents declining to be
interviewed by the FBI. While this is regrettable, an initial
inquiry regarding whether the victim had been petitioning the
Congress was mandatory to determine whether FBI jurisdiction
existed under Title 18, United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 241,
entitled Conspiracy Against Rights of Citizens. This guidance
regarding our jurisdiction was provided to us in writing by the
Civil Rights Division, DO J .

As to a broader jurisdictional basis, stemming from the
interference with First Amendment rights, regardless of how or
where they are exercised, we have been advised by the Civil Rights
Division, DOJ, that the FBI would have jurisdiction under Title
18, U.S.C., Section 242, only if there were some ground to believe
that the interference with the victims' First Amendment rights was
conducted "under color of law." As discussed above, our
investigation and analysis failed to disclose any ground to
conclude that Federal, state or local authorities may have been
involved in these incidents.

Our Criminal Investigative Division was unable to
identify any other bases for FBI jurisdiction under our criminal
law enforcement responsibilities. Subsequent to the analysis by
our Criminal Investigative Division, our Intelligence Division
reviewed the results of the inquiry, including the available
local law enforcement reports. This additional review and
analysis did not disclose any grounds to believe that the
incidents were conducted or organized by agents of hostile foreign
powers .

I understand and share your concern that some citizens
may believe that they are being harassed in their exercise of
First Amendment rights by Federal, state or local authorities. We
remain receptive to any requests by the Subcommittee that we

- 3 -

168

Honorable Don Edwards

examine a particular incident to determine whether it falls
within our jurisdiction under Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 241 or
242.

I look forward to working with you during the 101st

1 - Honorable David L. Boren - Enclosures (19)
Chairman

Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

1 - Honorable Louis Stokes - Enclosures (19)
Chairman

Permanent Select Committee

on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Congress.

Sincerely yours,

William S. Sessions

Enclosures (19)

- 4 -

169

Total Number Of Burglaries Examined: 93

Total Number Of Burglary Locations: 67

Total Number Of Burglaries Reported

To Police Departments: 49

Total Number Where Sufficient Information
Existed To Obtain Police Report But None
Was Filed: 13

Total Number Where Insufficient Information

Was Provided To Obtain Police Report: 31

Total Number Of Civil Rights Investigations: 3

Total Number Of Burglaries For Which

The Civil Rights Investigations Account: 15

Total Number Of Burglaries Where Perpetrators 3
Were Arrested:

Total Number Of Perpetrators Arrested: 4

170

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SUBJECTS | NOTES |
ARRESTED 1 1

! 1 1

L____. 1 1

METHOD OF |
ENTRY 1

Entry Rear
Door

Rear Window
On Third
Floor Off
Fire Escape

PROPERTY | POLICE REPORT |
DAMAGE 1 FILED 1

! 1 Yes

1 1

0)
0)
tx

ITEMS
TAKEN 1

Blood |
Pressure j
Cuff |
(Value
$49) |

Radio j
(Value
! $40) |

| Cassette |
Player j
(Value

l$100) 1

Copying j
Machine j

Type- |
writer j
(Value
$1000) 1

DATE OF | |
INCIDENT 1 LOCATION 1

January 6, 1987 j Reformed
j Christian
| Church, 5911
j New Hampshire
j Avenue , N.E. ,
jwashington, D.C.

1 1
January 10, | Apartment Of
1987 j Man Who Works
j With Chileans
j For Democracy , |
| Seattle,

1 Washington 1

January 10, | Brief case Of
1987 |D.C. Organizer
j Of Second
j Caravan Of
j Salvadorans
| For Peace And
j Justice,
|New York,
INew York 1

January 20, |Centro Presente, j
1987 | 10 Essex St. ,
| Cambridge ,
j Massachusetts

1 1
1 1
1 1

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188

Mr. Edwards. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. DeWine.

Mr. DeWine. Let me see if I can summarize your testimony. Ba-
sically, what you found at fault in the FBI was an internal problem
in two areas. One, reliability of an informant, and two, the narrow-
ness or the broadness of the scope of the investigation. Is that a
fair summary?

Those are problems that law enforcement agencies always have.
You did not find — you testified you did not find violations of consti-
tutional rights. But it is basically what I would classify as a law
enforcement problem?

Mr. Sessions. That would be essentially correct. I would add the
one painful aspect of it. That is that there was negligence in the
carrying out of responsibilities that those persons at their particu-
lar level had undertaken. That to me, the aligning of those series
of negative acts or failure to deal with those things they were
charged with doing as agents of the FBI, is extremely serious. It is
not a pleasant part, but it is a part of it.

Mr. DeWine. That relates to the other two. It is in those two
areas where they did not carry out their duties as they should
have?

Mr. Sessions. That is correct.

Mr. DeWine. Thank you.

Mr. Sessions. Thank you, sir.

Mr. DeWine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Edwards. Director Sessions, the FBI has been very forthcom-
ing. I must note the subcommittee began asking questions about
CISPES in 1985, and it has taken us over three years to get the full
story.

The Director states now that CISPES generated 180 spin-off
cases. In August 1986, we asked how many spin-offs there were,
and the FBI said it didn't understand the question.

We first asked to see the CISPES file in February 1987. We got
access to the file after the case hit the front page of the New York
Times in February 1988.

In April 1985, Director Webster testified that the FBI was not in-
terested in the members of CISPES per se. Now that proves to be
not so.

Another FBI official strongly denied in February 1987 that the
FBI was passing information to the National Guard in Salvador
through Varelli. It now appears pretty clear he did.

The FBI assured us it was not investigating the sanctuary move-
ment. It is now clear the FBI surveilled sanctuary churches and in-
vestigated some sanctuary activities.

I also must note your response to the question by Mr. Sensen-
brenner, no constitutional rights were violated. I think in much of
this investigation we are talking about certain rights of privacy, et
cetera, that can certainly be interpreted as constitutional rights.

I reluctantly, but must point out that the executive assistant di-
rector, in response to questions from the Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee, testified publicly on March 2, I believe, in the other body
regarding CISPES and violated a lot of constitutional rights, just
poured out file information, much of it never previously released,
and some of it declassified at the hearing.

189

I think the Director knows that I was very upset and talked to
him about it. I wouldn't have brought it up today had it not been
for the allegations that constitutional rights were not violated.

It is a violation of constitutional rights to release to the public in
defense of an FBI investigation a lot of file information uncorrobor-
ated that is not necessarily or not criminal or some that if true
could be criminal. And CISPES, whether or not is a good or a bad
organization, by this speech was really accused of 8 or 10 actions
and connections that were very, very derogatory.

I am not here defending the organization, but I remember one
time Judge Webster was testifying and he mentioned in response to
a question that two motor cycle gangs were terrorists and violent
criminals. He mentioned them by name. Then he caught himself.

He said, "You know, I shouldn't have said that." He understood
the FBI has such importance in our country, and I appreciate that,
that it has to be very careful about what it says.

Mr. Sessions. I trust the Chairman recognizes that I have been,
or tried to be — I am not trying to paint myself as pure in that
regard — but I have tried to respect the need for those careful delin-
eations of what we are dealing with. And I know it is extremely
important that those matters be discussed in a forum in a way that
properly reflects the information we do have.

I know at the time Mr. Revell testified that he did not have the
benefit of the full investigation, that I do now have the benefit of,
and all of us have the benefit of. I appreciate the Chairman's un-
derstanding of that.

Mr. Edwards. Mr. Director, the CISPES file makes many refer-
ences to support for terrorism — investigating the degree of CISPES'
support for terrorism. Yet, support is never defined. How do you
define support for terrorists?

Mr. Sessions. I struggled with that, Mr. Chairman, and I knew
that it was of interest to you. I undertook to try to refresh in my
own mind precisely how I should answer that question which you
have now placed.

If you will bear with me, there are some considerations that I
think are important in that regard.

First of all, a definition for the term "supporting terrorism"
may be substantially taken from the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act of 1978, wherein the term "agent of a foreign power" is
plain. The term "agent of a foreign power" is defined to any person
who on behalf of a foreign power knowingly engages in sabotage or
international terrorism or activities that are in preparation there-
for.

A person may also be considered to be in support of terrorism by
knowingly aiding or abetting in the support of terrorism or of any
conduct of those described activities. Therefore, a person who
knowingly provides succor to an international terrorist or interna-
tional organization in any logistical sense or otherwise knowingly
facilitates the execution of a terrorist objective may be considered
as supporting terrorism.

Yet, I, like I think maybe you, struggle with humanitarian aid or
aid that is in the form of weapons being exported or large amounts
of money being exported in violation of the criminal laws for fail-

190

ure to report it, or large amounts of money going that would know-
ingly be used by terrorist organizations for the gaining of arms.

I have to struggle with it. I do believe that the FISA statute
gives us pretty good support in that regard for the definition of
what is in support of terrorist activities. It is a very difficult prob-
lem.

Mr. Edwards. Now, can support include non-criminal activities
like demonstrations, grassroots rallying, or publishing newsletters?
Mr. Sessions. I would think not.

Mr. Edwards. Would it include civil disobedience at demonstra-
tions?

Mr. Sessions. I would think not.

Mr. Edwards. That would be a matter for the local authorities?
Mr. Sessions. I would think so.

I would say again if, in fact, we have an appropriate predicate
for an investigation, the monitoring of those activities, Mr. Chair-
man, might be totally appropriate.

If there was not a proper predicate for the investigation, then
there should not be.

Mr. Edwards. Let's take a hypothetical. Those are difficult, so I
won't hold you responsible too much.

An informant that reports that domestic group supports the
FMLN, do you think that is enough to predicate a case?

Mr. Sessions. If the organization itself simply says it supports
the FMLN, without saying how it supports it, whether politically
or in terrorist activities, it is a difficult statement, that is the state-
ment which was, in fact, contained at the start of the CISPES in-
vestigation, support of the FMLN.

Mr. Edwards. Do you think you ought to open a case on that?

Mr. Sessions. I would think not on that alone, no, sir.

Mr. Edwards. I will ask you the $50 question. The FBI has done
very well in combating domestic terrorism under the criminal
standard under the Levy guidelines as modified by Attorney Gener-
al Smith.

Why can't you live with criminal standard in fighting interna-
tional terrorism in this country?

Mr. Sessions. I believe that it is essential that we not be forced
in that position, Mr. Chairman. I think it refers to the statutes, the
FISA statutes specifically concerning the need for our own intelli-
gence gathering.

Under our responsibility under those statutes and the obvious, I
think the obvious intent of Congress that we should be responsible
for it makes that inconsistent with and incompatible with the high
criminal standard of there being criminal activity, or a reasonable
suspicion that there is criminal activity, or having information that
there is criminal activity afoot. I think it is inconsistent and should
not be pursued.

I would like to have the opportunity to answer that question in
writing to you because I know it is of great significance to the com-
mittee. It certainly is of great importance to the FBI.

I do not believe that the criminal standard should be applied
across the board.

Mr. Edwards. I certainly accept that answer with respect to — we
are considering a statute that would solely require the criminal

191

standard to be respected, and we will certainly communicate with
you on that.

I thank you for your offer to communicate in writing on the
issue.

Mr. Edwards. Time is up.
I do want a second round.
Mr. Kastenmeier.

Mr. Kastenmeier. I have no further questions.

Mr. Edwards. Mr. Sensenbrenner.

Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think this hearing today, as well as many of the preceding
hearings by this subcommittee, very evidently demonstrate the
poison that can be spread by one bad apple; in this case, Frank
Varelli.

I think a lot of people were taken in by the purported informa-
tion that Mr. Varelli gave. Not only was the Bureau taken in and
the Center for Constitutional Studies in New York City taken in,
but a good number of Members of this subcommittee and its staff
were taken in by Mr. Varelli's cockamamie stories.

So giving Varelli credibility initially was not a monopoly of the
Bureau or of the subcommittee or of the Center for Constitutional
Studies in New York, but the damage that he has caused has really
been extremely extensive and expensive in terms of staff time that
was spent, the time of the subcommittee that was spent.

That is why I salute you in setting up some guidelines so that
future Varellis are placed on notice that their credibility will be
checked out before they get put on somebody's payroll.

Here the placing of Mr. Varelli on the FBI payroll has had a
domino effect where a lot of faces were red. Hopefully that will not
occur again.

Thank you.

Mr. Edwards. Mr. DeWine.

Mr. DeWine. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Edwards. Mr. Director, I want to ask you a few questions
about the contact with the National Guard. I think it ought to be
made a matter of record because there is quite a lot of concern
about Varelli's connection with the National Guard in El Salvador.

Isn't it possible that the National Guard learned the identities of
persons of investigative interest to the FBI through Varelli?

Mr. Sessions. I won't speculate, but it is possible. I do not know
what he actually gave to the El Salvador National Guard. We have
no way of establishing that.

You know, Mr. Chairman, that there were circumstances where
there were communications, and we do not know the content of it.

Mr. Edwards. We have one fairly, clearly documented case
where Varelli gave the National Guard the names of 13 Salvador-
ans here in the United States who were facing deportation. Varelli
actually gave us a copy of the list of 13 names, so I am sure you
would say that it is possible he had access to the names of other
aliens facing deportation?

Mr. Sessions. It is quite possible. I think the Chairman is aware
of the action we took in connection with those particular names to
be assured that those people were in fact informed of the nature of
that information.

192

Mr. Edwards. I think we can assume that the National Guard
was interested in, not just a one-way flow of the information; they
just weren't supplying information to Varelli. They must have sus-
pected something in return. That gets me to the questions asked by
Mr. Kastenmeier.

It is possible that the Salvadoran government has operatives,
good friends, shall we say, in the United States and that the Na-
tional Guard would have contact with them? You would assume
they would?

Mr. Sessions. I would assume that is possible, but the Bureau
has no information to substantiate that.

Mr. Edwards. It has always been the belief of the Chairman that
it is very possible that these break-ins could have been triggered in
that particular way, with information coming from the National
Guard which has no conscience about any act, apparently, and that
these connections in the United States with the National Guard
could have resulted in some of these break-ins. And I hope that you
will look at that.

Mr. Sessions. That is possible. And if we ever find that connec-
tion, you can be assured that it will be revealed to the committee.

Mr. Edwards. Thank you.

Director Sessions, I believe you said in your testimony that in
the future, higher level officials will be aware of surveillances of
demonstrations to ensure that if these surveillances and activities
do take place, they are fully justified. When will they be fully justi-
fied? When will the FBI feel justified in taking pictures or keeping
a march or a demonstration under scrutiny?

Mr. Sessions. If there is a proper predicate for an authorized in-
vestigation, that is a proper technique, and it may be done. But the
predication has to be there. And otherwise it must not be done.

Mr. Edwards. Can you describe for us an appropriate predica-
tion?

Mr. Sessions. Yes. If in fact the predication had been truly here
in connection with the CISPES investigation undertaken. It was a
totally proper and approved technique.

Mr. Edwards. Let's say that the FBI monitors a demonstration
to identify leaders, and then the leaders change. The leaders might
be present at the first demonstration, but does that mean that all
the subsequent demonstrations are going to be monitored?

Mr. Sessions. It does not necessarily mean that, but it could
mean that. If the predication is proper, then the technique, I be-
lieve, is proper. If the predication is not substantiated and is faulty,
then the procedure should not be used.

Mr. Edwards. How about the FBI monitoring demonstrations in
Federal buildings or protesting the appearances of Federal officials,
whatever they do? Do you just automatically monitor a demonstra-
tion at a Federal building?

Mr. Sessions. No. If there is a proper predicate and a reason for
that, if there is, for instance, in a non-CISPES matter, if there were
indications and information dealing with criminal acts or proposed
violence in connection with that particular Federal priority, yes, it
would be proper to use that technique, I believe.

Mr. Edwards. You are sticking pretty close to the criminal
standard.

193

Mr. Sessions. That is a criminal standard in those regards. When
you are dealing generally with domestic terrorism, you are talking
about a criminal standard and going under a criminal guideline.
That is correct. If you are talking about foreign counterintelli-
gence, international terrorism, then you are not. That is correct.

Mr. Edwards. Judge Webster received regular informational
notes — those are his words — on planned demonstrations. Do you re-
ceive regular informational notes on planned demonstrations?

Mr. Sessions. The ability to receive it is there. I have not during
my tenure in office received it. I presume if I had been the Director
of the FBI back in those days where there were demonstrations
that might well have been investigated under a criminal standard,
that I would have received the information. Much of that is dis-
seminated so if there are demonstrations against a particular facili-
ty or circumstance, those people have the information.

Mr. Edwards. That is a very important First Amendment right.

Mr. Sessions. I quite agree with you.

Mr. Edwards. Is this one of those things that you are asking the
Department of Justice to provide you better guidelines on?

Mr. Sessions. What I am asking the Department of Justice to do
is in connection with the investigation of major groups, to clarify
the way we can deal with individuals when those major groups are
in fact investigated.

Mr. Edwards. I congratulate you on making that request to the
Department of Justice.

Mr. Sessions. I think it is important.

Mr. Edwards. Have you talked to the new Attorney General
about this?

Mr. Sessions. I have informed him that I am testifying — the
schedule of testimony. I have not discussed with him in detail any-
thing except my request of him concerning the formation of an
FBI-Department of Justice working group in connection with guide-
lines.

He has taken that under advisement, and I presume I will hear
in the next few days what he has done. I will be pleased to inform
the committee.

Mr. Edwards. We would like to know of the timetable.

Mr. Sessions. The minute I hear from him that in fact he has
done it, then I will inform the subcommittee.

Mr. Edwards. I think you will have success with the Attorney
General. I understand from the newspapers that he is a card-carry-
ing member of the ACLU, at least formerly.

Mr. Sessions. I have no idea about that. I do know he is an old
friend. I have known him for many years, and have seen him per-
form in his offices, and he has acted very well.

Mr. Edwards. He is an old friend of the committee, too. We have
always had fine relationships with the Attorney General.

Mr. Kastenmeier. Mr. Chairman, I think this has been a very
useful hearing. Certainly the testimony justifies the early interest
of the committee on this subject. I want to compliment the Chair-
man.

Mr. Edwards. Mr. DeWine, do you have anything further?
Mr. DeWine. Nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

194

Mr. Edwards. Thank you. This has been really a great experi-
ence for us. We held hearings for many, many years on the FBI
and our mutual problems and on our obligations under the Consti-
tution.

I say without any reservation that your statement, and the writ-
ten statement that I am sure Mr. Toohey was involved in, and your
testimony was very comforting. Thank you.

Mr. Sessions. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that.

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to recon-
vene subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIXES

Appendix 1. — Letter Dated July 15, 1988, From Chairman Don
Edwards to Director William S. Sessions

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July 15, 1988

The Honorable William S. Sessions
Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
Washington, DC 20535

Dear Director Sessions:

As you know, the Subcommittee is eager to receive as soon
as possible your testimony on the results of your review of the
CISPES matter. The most appropriate time would be the second
week in August, since the House recesses on August 12 until
September .

I have been very impressed with the depth and seriousness
of the review undertaken by the Inspections Division and with
the strength of the findings in the report presented to you and
made available to us. Based on the Subcommittee's review of the
case and our study over many years of the terrorism issue, I
believe that the following measures should be among the steps
undertaken in response to the CISPES matter:

(1) Eliminate the distinction between international terror-
ism and domestic terrorism, treating all terrorism cases under a
single criminal standard. The opening memorandum in each case
should specify the criminal code sections that are involved, and
the case should focus on proving or disproving those violations
until others emerge. Investigations should not be predicated on
mere aiding or abetting an international terrorist group, unless
the aiding or abetting is carried out by means that otherwise
constitute criminal activity on the part of the subjects. Given
the desirability of a focus on criminal conduct, international
terrorism cases should continue to be handled by the Criminal
Investigative Division.

(195)

196

The Honorable William S. Sessions
July 15, 1988
Page Two

(2) Institute higher levels of review and more frequent
reviews within the Bureau for initiating and continuing terror-
ism cases: institute more frequent 01 PR reviews, particularly
of investigations of groups.

(3) Establish higher standards for initiating investiga-
tions of groups engaged in First Amendment activities. One of
the major problems in the CISPES case is that it encompassed an
entire group with numerous chapters, as to most of which there
was no reason to believe they were engaged in criminal activity.
The CISPES case would have generated little concern — because
it would have been conducted very differently — if it had
focused on individuals. The decision to investigate an entire
First Amendment group should be based on a higher standard than
the investigation of individuals who happen to be members of the
group. The "enterprise" for purposes of an investigation should
not be co-extensive with the First Amendment group unless all or
most of the members of the group are involved in the criminal
activity. If, as in the CISPES case, it is believed that many or
most of the members of the group are not involved, then the group
should not be the target of the investigation. The focus of the
case should be on the individuals as to whom there are criminal
allegations.

(4) Institute strict limits on the monitoring of political
activity. This is one area in the CISPES case where the field
offices expressed confusion. It is our strong feeling that
demonstrations, marches and public meetings should not be mon-
itored unless there is reason to believe that criminal activity
will occur or will be discussed.

As I said, we look forward to your report.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely,

Don Edwards
Chairman

Subcommittee on Civil and

Constitutional Rights

DE : jdd

197

Appendix 2. — Letter Dated October 4, 1988, From Chairman Don
Edwards to Director William S. Sessions

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October 4, 1988

The Honorable William S. Sessions
Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
Washington, DC 20535

Dear Dire<^&jJe^essions :

Again, I want to commend you for the manner in which you
have responded to the CISPES matter. Your testimony before the
Subcommittee was greatly reassuring and the actions you have
taken have significant potential for improving the FBI's
international counterterrorism efforts.

Among the few important issues that remain to be resolved is
the disposition of the records generated as a result of the
CISPES case and the spin-off investigations. Most of these
records have no legitimate law enforcement value, and their
maintenance may well violate section (e) (7) of the Privacy Act.
Steps should be taken to segregate these records and ensure that
they cannot be disseminated inside or outside the Bureau except
in response to legal process or requests under the Freedom of
Information and Privacy Acts (FOI/PA) .

In the absence of a court order governing dissemination, the
only effective way to protect against future use of the records
is to accelerate their transfer to the National Archives and
Records Administration, where they can be preserved for
historical purposes and eventual declassification.

The Archives can handle individual requests for expungement
and FOI/PA requests. If it is decided that the Bureau rather
than the Archives should handle FOI/PA requests, the only copies
retained by the FBI should be those necessary for processing such
requests, and the recoids should be used only far FOI/PA
purposes.

Disposition arrangements should cover Headquarters and field
office files as well as the documents disseminated to other
agencies, such as INSCOM, Secret Service, and others.

198

The Honorable William S. Sessions
October 4, 1988
Pag* Two

This is a complex issue, and the Subcommittee would like to
work with you on developing suitable procedures for handling
these records. Subcommittee staff will be contacting the Bureau
to pursue the details of this matter further.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely,

Don Edwards
Chairman

Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights

DE: jdd

199

Appendix 3. — Letter Dated September 16, J 988, From Russell B.
Christensen, Staff Attorney, Ayuda, Inc.

September 1G, 1938

Represent ative Don Edwards
U.S. House of Represent a tives
!. ! a3tiiii;jton, D . C .

Re: Oversight FBI practices relative to I'.V.i

(Co-operative efforts - Varolii affidavit)

Dear Cor.,; r e ssnr. n Edwards,

I wrote you once on July 2 7, 1 9 0 8 . riven before I wrote you,
I wrote Re]> rose rit ative Fiodino who is on the Immigration
sub- e onir: i 1 1 ee and he never responded to my letter.

In tall: in,; with '.'r . Ji:, Denpsey
became clear to me that some formal

raised in the Frank Varelli a f f i c. ;

o f y o u r

ersi:;ht

staff it

request

a to be

:.i a d e for

i 1 1 e e s

clarify

an issue

t .

The issue is confirmed as real and of it. tense importance to
a class of people now livin^ here in the U.S. - approximately
600,000 El Salvadoran refugees.

As a practicing asylun lawyer I have attended to
500 of these folks needs over the last four years.

: e 1 1 over

One of the Most common concerns these refugees have is the
concern for confidentiality of their asylun process here in the
United States. Host want assurances that their requests do not
become known to El Salvadoran officials, as many fear reprisals
to their family, if their requests becona known in 31 Salvador.

'.."henever I have interviewed these refugees, I have always
met these concerns with statements to the effect that they are
in the United States now and we -wouldn't cei.p r orii so our Judicial
systeu by any process of reporting on them for seeking asylum in
this country.

The Varelli affidavit, and then the Guevara
(786 F2d12i)2 - 5th circuit) makes clear that my
not the case.

Ayuda, Inc.

Legal Aid/Consumer Protection

1736 Columbia Rood, N.W.
Washington, DC. 20009
Telephone: 202-387-4848

'lores case (see
supposition i3

A United Way Member Agency

200

Ayudo, Inc

What all practicing immigration attornies need to l:now is
the extent to which these two sister agencies of the U.S.
Justice Department, in co-operating together> have c orop rorai sed
our judicial process in this country. This seems to be
something no one wants to enquire into. In writing
Representative Rodino, he didn't answer my letter; and ay carbon
letter to the ABA President merely produced a polite letter of
thanks. Ho one wants to open this can of worms.

As a practicing attorney who represents hundreds of El
Salvadorans, I know no other response now than to advise lay
clients that yes, indeed there is a chance that information they
supply in their asylum process; and information that they have
applied for asylum here in the United States may well get back
to authorities in their country. I would think that all AILA
attorneys should likewise be advising their clients this
information, until this point is clarified.

I am going to again send carbons of this letter to the ABA,
AILA, Hodino and others.

We know from many independent human rights organizations,
(Amnesty International, American Watch, Tutela Legal, etc.) that
the security forces that our FBI reports to, are highly involved
in death squad activity. Thus our government would seen to be
participating in a process we have long condemned.

I would like this letter to be part of the official record
of your oversight committee. I would also like your committee
to take up this issue and clarify it.

P.S. We may even need to advise our clients to insist on
another forum - one before the OAS or the UN. The U.S.
government is so highly involved in this civil war, that they
seem willing to destroy our legal process, that protects
individual rights, in order to advance their agenda in Central
America .

cc AILA
ABA

Rodino
NY Times

Bangor Daily News
FBI

Chief Judge Robie
Guild

ecu

Russell D. Christensen
Staff Attorney

201

Appendix 4.— Selected FBI Documents Released Under the Fre&

dom of Information Act

)

■ ^3no/iT]^nJ ni l S m i routine

. *rZ57IRR(£fi »L HO LA Ml MO NY SA SF SJplFME Hfl HU257 |

vsat 3usnz(nAi ^ .

rn director; r«

TO FBI CHICAGO ROUTINE
TBI DALLAS ROUTINE
FBI HOUSTON ROUTINE
FBI LOS ANGELES ROUTINE
FBI MAM ROUTINE
FBI NEW ORLEANS ROUTINE
FBI NEW YORK ROUTINE
FBI SAN ANTONIO ROUTINE
FBI SAN FRANCISCO ROUTINE
FBI SAN JUAN ROUTINE
FBI WASHINGTON flELft
LEGAL ATTACHE HEXICO CITY
LEGAL ATTACHE PAN AH A CITY

6-1 SECTION 1 OF 2

IU IWMttHIWUIUiWi

HurtiM is 'jtclissiiud

202

203

N MKT HINT Of 1 USTlCll
COMMUNtOtT OM MI H Mil PQflM

CONTINUATION SHEtT

_ PAGE THRIf H Hi 02s3Vl.i_5- C

PUBLICATIONS'! "THE SALVASORAN PEOPLE EXPRESS THEIR IRREBIATC f

NEEDS AMI HISTORIC INTEREST THROUGH THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY

,1 FRONT <FDR>, NHICH ZS THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION EXPRESSING
THE UNIFICATION OF ALL FORCES OPPOSING THE JUNTA FROft EVERY
; SECTOR OF SALVADORAH SOCIETY, AN1 THROUGH THE FARABUND9 HARTZ
FRONT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION tFflLNJ- THE ttlLITARY ORGANIZATION
RESSIN6 THE SAKE UNIFIES OPPOSITIONS -™ /^j(>lj

"CISPES PROVIDES INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE OPPOSITION
HOVE PIE NT IN EL SALVADOR, FORflED IN OCTOBER, 1180 . IT IS A
JR0A1 COALITION Of GROUPS AN> INDIVIDUALS OPPOSES TO
i, -UNITES STATES INTERVENTION IN EL SALVADOR. THE COALITION

INCLUDES CHURCH GROUPS-. TRASE UNIONS* STUDENTS-. PROFESSORS, AN1
ESTHER SEGflENTS OF SOCIETY- CISPES ATTEHPTS TO EDUCATE THE U-S-
PUBLIC REGARDING THE SITUATION IN EL SALVASOR- PARTICULARLY THE
LEGITIMACY OF THE BROAI OPPOSITION ROVE RENT REPRESENTED BY THE

7SR.-(A?f7

204

4-730 (IW».4-l7-t»

) i ngagp

FEOUUL NIEM Or imSTlUTMk
FOIM DUETO MM ■POMUTWI »UT

^ Pagt<e> wUhfcala eatirety a rata location ia tba Ala. " •" lianh.

indicalea. aaplaia lata oatetJoa.

&^&**m& undar exca«>ttoaU> ^ /

. irilk no aearoaaMa)

material »TailabU far raUaea Is yoa.
CI loJbimwtloa pertaiaad oaly Is a land party with ao naanaea to 70a or thm aabjact of roar ruiaiiat,

□ Inforaatioa pertained oatjr Is a land part/. Yoar aaaa ia lieted ia tba ttOa oal*.

□ Document] orifinited »itli loothcr Gomnmcat ifeac^ia). ThcatdocaaKatiwtn referred to that
igrocr(iei) for rrriew and direct r tip o fin to job.

Paget contain lafonaatioa r ata b b ad by another Gnniaiiaat igintjOea). Yoa win be advised by tba FBI aa
to the releasabUHy 0/ ttita urfbrmatk* foOowtag oar coauhatioa with the other agencjKiea).

Pagete) withheld tor tba followiag raaaoauO:

□ Foryoar

[Z^^fbUowtacaaateUtobaaaaatenlBM

205

♦raSfllRR^Cfi »L HO LA nil NO NY SA SP SJ UF»E H0 riOZSA •rfj
VSM 302351Z HAR 63 Tf**") - _

rn mrector_/m

TO FBI .CHICAGO ROUTINE

FBI DALLAS ROUTINE

FBI HOUSTON ROUTINE

FBI LOS ANGELES ROUTINE

FBI tllAHI ROUTINE
| FBI NEW ORLEANS ROUTINE
, FBI NEW YORK ROUTINE

FBI SAN ANTONIO ROUTINE

FBI SAN FRANCISCO ROUTINE

FBI SAN JUAN ROUTINE

FBI WASHINGTON FIELi ROUTINE

LEGAL ATTACHE HEXICO CITY ROUTINE

LEGA L ATTACHE PANAIW CITY ROUTINE (_

S^l W ■ * SECTION Z

COnnlTTEE III SUPPORT Of THE* PEOPLE Of EL SALVADOR <CISPES>-.

206

4-JSC(fc».4.|T4» S*\\

fioual niiM of ravunuTiM

F0IM OIL ITU FAU MFOMATHM MIIT

j3L PaapU) irllniill trtiiriy 1 thia location la the BU. One of worn of tha following iUi
indicate*, explain this deletion.

B^Ddeted under exesptiovla) _ with no

■atonal araiUbia far mlaaaa to yoa.

□ tnfefnrtioa pertained oidy tea tkiid party wio^

□ Information pertained only to a third party. Your nan* ia liatod ia tfaa titla only.

Q Documents originated with another Government ifeacrtfei). These document! were iiftnul to that
agcncjf(ies) for review and direct response to yoa.

Pi go contain information ftirniihcd by another Gortrament agcncyfles). Yoa win be advised by tht FBI ■

to the rdeaubiltty of this information following our consultation with the other ageacyOa).

Ptfete) withheld for the following raaaoad):

□ ForyontintoniaHoa-

The following maber la to be uaad far lefarouco regarding tbeae pagan:

207

- * *

TRANSMIT VIA:
O Ttletyjw
rj Picjiiiiila

P£] ftlRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

D Ptiwitj
Q Rotiiae

E T
FBI

D.le-:

CLASSIFICATION:
O TOP SECRET

□ SECRET

□ CONFIDENTIAL
O UNCLAS E F T 0
D UNCLAS

n . to 5/23/81

FBI
ION: SSA

TO: IHRECTOR,

Iffrinti'iOK

FJCM: SAC, DALLA^|7l99-79S^ "&>)
SU&JECT: CCWOTTEE TW SOLUM rTY_wrmjTOF

JLL ISTWtm - iUH COltTAIlUD

het.ii:) is v ::/.:£msD
Othsruisi ■ — ■ J

0O:rsUlAS

Entire ocutentfl of this communication classified

DAI R

™— u * cccrdlng to their »terial t available to the general public,
CISPES has offices at 4906 Bonnie vipjjplla,, Te*aa, telephone 2U£n$- ^gfa J

Ota— *«

J. M'

yfj Bil l CAW)

...

SECRET

I '7

Approved :

209

San Antonio
In

CGM1XTTEE rN SOLIDARITY WITH
ft^PEOPU or EL SALVADOR (CI6PJM) f
L>CI-KL SALVADOR-TE RRORI ShJkg i

ihi« ccmunication ia ciaaiTriad
lt« antlraty.fc

Attach*!! talatypa ooncama tha plannad
latratlooa otganiaad by tha "M Boc CsnittM
Cor a July 2 Knargancy Mobilisation. ■ Thay had
plannad to rlaaruatrata at m location Whara
Frasidant Raagan would ba attandingj howaver,
Pra aidant Baagac will b*Aa California during
tha "aa.ta.iifl of July 4. *

210

211

SA00C7 19923331
HQ Ba CE NT V

R Hf333Z £{JL w(M

/ft sak ahtowio Tt 1 9j- «8> <p>

TO DIRECTOR ./FBI ROUTINE J

BaLTI'-'ORS ROUTINE
CK r 'FLOTTE ROUTINE
Kty YORK ROUTINE
j-."0 POfTIKE

etJ^J
mrrt

"TEE IS SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLE OF EL SaLVaCOR '(CISP.ES)
FCi-sL SALVADOR -TERRORISE.

THIS CO' ;:i'«ICfiTIOH IS CLASSIFIED

IK ITS ENTIR

FE VFO TELETYPE TO BuREaU* ET aL, DaTED JUNE 29, 1 98 J
FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU AND RECEIVING OFFICES, TvO
ARTICLES APPEAR 1M IN "THE VaLLEY STa*". A HaRUNGEN, TEXaS NEvS-
PfPES, ONE IK JULY 8, 19B3 EDITION CAPTIONED, "AMERICANS, NICaRaGUANS
JOIK TOGETHER IN PEACE VIGIL" AND ANOTHER IN JULY it* 1983 EDITION .

212

— -- — * m ._-» ~* ^

----- L

P^GE TVC i^l99-768J W L Jl WT * .

CAFTIONiD, "GROU? PROTESTS FUNDING OF N I CAR AG U AN REBELS" , AND BOTH
wF. ITTEN BY SCOTT LINO , WHOSE IDENTITY IS KNOWN TO BUREAU i RELATE TO
TRIP BY "INTERFaITH GROUP" MNTIONED IN PARAGRAPH TwO , PAGE THREE
Of REFERENCED TELETYPE. feuXf

SCOTT LIND ACCOMPANIED GROuP TO HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA TO COVER
GROUP'S FFCTEST OF I'NITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NICARAGUA AND ITS AID
TO f . TI-iANDINISTA REBELS. THE JULY 9, 1983 ARTICLE DEALS WITH
PROTEST IN JALftPA • KONDuRa^ AND THE JULY Jjt 1983 ARTICLE DEALS WITH
PROTEST IN FRONT OF CLOSED GATES OF UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN MANAGUA f
NICARAGUA. GROUP LEADER N'A' ED AS PROTESTANT CHAPLAIN WILLIAM SLOaN

cc.'Mt', Pastor at riverside church, new york. coffin was severe

CTITIC OF fNITED ITaTES INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM WAR WHILE SERVING AS
CX.«PLa1N AT VALE UNIVERSITY DURING 19SCS. % W

T'.:E JULY M, l9i3 ARTICLE INDICATES JIK MC LEOD, ORDAINED
FFt?EYTERlAN MINISTER FRO v RIO GRANDE VALLEY, TEXAS STATED AMERICAN
RE: IGIOl'S AND PEACE GROUPS ARE PLANNING A "PERMANENT VIGIL" OF
A v E?ICaNS IN NICARAGUA TO REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF MORE DEATHS IN
Tr.z SI' ALL CENTRAL AMERICAN NATION". MC LEOD EXPLAINED THESE
AMERICAN CITIZENS wOl'LD RESIDE IN aREaS SuCH AS JALAPA, HONDURAS AND
T-aT, "THIS PRESENCE WILL BE A PERMANENT yITNESS BY AMERICAN RELIGION Jf^lJ

213

LIND HAS REPORTED NO IKjL'RT or DEATH of demonstrators, however,
GROUP'S PlflNHIHG OF "FERTaKEN'T VIGIL" IN UNSAFE AREAS HakES PROBA-
BILITY OF INJURY OR DErTH OF TKESE AMERICANS HIGH. ELABE ON UNITED
PTfTEi fiNC UNITED ETflTES BACKED GROUPS, IF INJURY OR DEATH OCCuRS
ALSO rIGHLY FROBABLE. wfu,)

r ft e.TT URL. ukWh

214

SXCR1T KrP

ATTVt NOT1

COMKXTTU IN -fbLIDARITY WITH THE
ft, PEOPLE OF IL SALVADOR (CIS PES) J a)
gel - XL SALVADOR - TERRO RISM
"CTh {San Antonio^

This conraunication la classified iimt In
it* entirety.

By attached teletype, WTO advised that a
demonstration is being planned by captioned
organisation for Monday, 3/22/83, at the
entrance to rt. Leslie J. Mcffalr, F Street,

W. between Third and Fourth Street* ,
Washington, D.C. Thia demonstration is to take
place in the form of a blockade) beginning at
8 a.m. , and organizers for that blocked* are
calling _for civil disobedience. In additi on to
CISPESJ ■■■■Hi ■■■the PJ

follovlHg^rganXzations arealic^aKIngpert la
the blockade with thai purpose being to "atop thai
war in Central America:" U.S. Grenada Friendship
Socle ty-D.C. Chapter; People's Anti-Mar Hobiliia
tlom Washington Cooaaittee Against Registration
in the Drafti Case El Salvador i Washington Peace
Cantert and the Progressive Student Network
(PSN) . It is unknown at this tine whether the
demonstration planned by CISPES is in any way . /
connected with the explosion of an improvised «JJ6 /

- Mr. o, B. Re veil

- Mr. J. b. Hot is

- Mr. W. R. Gilbert

1 - Nr. F. X* Clarke

1 - Mr. 8. Kle in

1
1

" ' "sffiffiTa

215

explosive device (IED) which occurred at the
Naval Ragional Data Automation Center (NAROAC) ,
Building 196, Washington Navy Yard, Washington,
D.C., on 8/18/83. VjfU.)

WFO is plannrng to provide coverage of the
demonstration in order to identify potential
CISPES organisers and other individuals /
potentially involved in civil disobedience JeMTV 1

216

D-JE m„. 1-2 3. 181

TRANSMIT VIA;
QTt.ii.lyp"
□ Fictimile
[3 _lii£eJ —

PRECEDENCE:

□ lanadiitc

□ Prictitjr
l~l Routine

FBI

I ''fi

DALLAS(J199-795)

CLASSIFICATION:

□ TOP SECRET -

□ SECRET
O CONFIDENTIAL
O UNCLAS E F T 0
O UNCLAS

OKLAHOMA CITY [(199-963) (PJ

- * * J

: ^COMMITTEE IN SOLIDARITY WITH

THE PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR (CISPES/
ECI-EL SALVADOR-TERRORISM
£00 : DallajQ u.

■ Otfttfl

Dtclaw'rty or OAN

The entire content* of thi« comnunication are
classified Mvet.fi*"}

Re Dallas airtel to Bureau, 7/25/83. /u.) aWUI UIMCUn tma
1 / EtcEPi mtau shou n

On B/S/B3, a telephone call placed to 583-4028
resulted in a recording indicating that the telephone at that
number had been disconnected.

On 8/8/83, observation of 12B East Jasper, revealed
it to be a single residence in an older residential neighborhood
A sign on the fron t of the residence read "Slaters of Benedict".
2 - [Dallas \, , tk afAjM ■arf'

Oklahoma Cit^Jf^ P e etB S i i ^j aV-eCTr .

-m

Appimed:

Tnr.naltlcd ; — -j-e^/J ^ % y O

217

A white, male, residing in the residence immediately to the
west of 128 East Jasper advised that Sisters of Benedict had
moved to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on the first of the month.
He advised that there had been nuns living in the house and
doing community services. This community service indluded -
work at the Oklahoma State Department of Corrections, Horace
Mann Sre-Release Center. |£(Ia)

A review of the Oklahoma City files concerning the
Committee in Solidarity with the People of El-Salvado reveals
an article in the Daily Oklahoman, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma,
on 6/23/81, indicating that a forum on American involvement
in El-Salvador was to be held that coming Saturday at the
Corpus Christi Catholic Church in Oklahoma City. The forum
was sponsored by the Norman Chapter of the Committee in

218

i^raoM! ' [sac.san discc] (199-sii) (c>

Committe r finr.Tr>m T Ty

WITH THE nw " caryanne

(CISPES)

JT -CENTRAL AMERICA
[00 1 San Antgnio"]

:ca tltt/vi cju/! U Ik, eft uanwwii

mtaiunot chtiiid

UKUDlfla*

ALL MARKINGS. NOTATIONS AMD ITEMS OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED IN THIS COMMUNICATION ARB CLASSIFIED ' WW UNLESS
OTHERWISE NOTED. (u.J ■ . ' .

>*>* J*.

Re Washington Field Office (WFOJ teletype to Bureau
dated 9/14/83, captioned above .^J

em a il a a."

219

f. -

.-V "' " Information to data indicates that tha organisation V'
ia involved with inforaation campaigns, fund raising , function* 1 , V
and promotion of peaceful deaonatrationa againat United. Statne-*-

policy in_Bl Salvador, pfO^ j_ '. ■ , 5 L.; ^ - m H^E,|"

DACB, no further invaatigation ia being conducted'
by San Diego.

220

AIRTU.

Cissi'ified by i

■a

Cissiinea py fn — j

QHMITTEE IH SOLIDARITJ WITH THE
PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR (CI 6 PES) I —
fpTt NATIONAL TERRORISM - EL SALVADOR! Ai/

This eoswuni cation la claaalfiad h«rft H^ffiT'fcfctortgf . fuj

Re San Diego elite 1 dated 10/7/83, captions a 'CIEPEEj
IT-Cantrel America i OOt San Antonio," and Bouaton teletype dated
i '10/18/83, captioned "CISPES (CIEPEB-HouetOn) | IT - Central Americat
00 1 Bou»tOn.' « ^

Enclosed foe recipient* la one copy of Butel dated 3/30/ 83
regarding captioned Batter, which baa already been received by nu
office*. £ X. < .

(cloaura

1< N0\' 8 1933

See ROTE Page *

gap

221

222

224

225

Kt Boulder, Colorado i

Conduct Investigation re individuals Hated in accordance
with Bureau in at ruction a.

At Colorado Spring* , Colorado i

Conduct investigation to identify leadership and ■amber*
of Colorado Springe Chapter.

SEATTLE DIVISION

At Seattle, Washington!

226

TO VB/ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

Y1/5IRECTOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
via/ U.S. SECRET SERVICE

V^V SECRETARY OF STATE

I wfe J}) m

VMSIRR VZ ¥tO niWI H0105 J13Q15SIVSIR 0A11HI.Z|N0V 1^7^

FH DIRECTOR FBI

, CRIMINAL DIVISION

nana oovfitwu 3

CP Ife

OMHITTEE IN SOLIDARITY KITH THE PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR ICISPEsJ
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - EL SALVADOR.

THIS COfllHIMICATION IS CLASSIFIED tHMt IN ITS ENTIRETY
THE FOLLOWING INF OR HAT ION HAS OBTAINED FROM THE ASSETS OF
SEVERAL OF OUR FIELD OFFICES. THE INFORMATION PERTAINS TO THE
PEACE HARCK SCHEDULED FOR NOVEHBER Ui 1183, IN HASHING
D-d AND OTHER MAJOR CITIES IN THE UNITED STATES.

THE CHICAGO CHAPTER OF CISPES PLANS TO BE HELL ftEPxfsENTED
AT THE MARCH* ACCORDING TO CISP/
ORGANIZATION HAS A GOAL OF SEN1

NX TO THE

itFKtsENTE
DiNG/TEN BUSfcT HHH PEOPLE FKewl A

227

pi*-")

-4

MUATICM SHOT

CISPCS AMI OTHE R CROUPS. THE SCATS ON THE BUSES HILL COST EACH
N>IVX»UAL M TOR THE ROUNB TRIP. OVER SIXTY ORGANIZATIONS AN9
wlfROniNENT INBXVXBUALS HAVE SICNE» ON TO HELP HAKE THE flARCH THE

J.AR6EST EVER ON CENTRAL AMERICA. THE BUSES ARE SCHEBULEB TO
l«t>EPART CHICAGO ON NOVEMBER 11. 11831, AT 5:310 P.M. ANB ARRIVE AT

.WASHINGTON, B-C-i ON NOVEHBER 12, 11S3, AT fl:30 A.M.
UL THE LOS ANGELES CHAPTER OF CISPES EXPECTS 150,000

DEMONSTRATORS TO BE PRESENT AT THE ABOVE flARCH IN WASHINGTON,
ijLb.O, ANB APPROXIflATELY 15,000 PEOPLE TO flARCH IN A BEHONSTRA-

JTON IN LOS ANGELES, BOTH TO BE HELB ON NOVEMBER IS, 1163. THE
10 .DEMONSTRATION IN LOS ANGELES IS TO BE HELB AT HAC ARTHUR PARK •

JHE MARCHES HILL BE NOT ONLY TO BEMONSTRATE AGAINST U.S.
8 INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA, BUT ALSO THE U.S. INVASION OF
URENABA

6L. THE BETR01T AREA SUPPORTERS HAVE BUSES AVAILABLE AT A COST
-OF ♦MS EACH

THE STATE OP MICHIGAN IS HOPING FOR EIGHT BUSES ANB SOME

VANS FROM BETROITi ANN ARBOR, LANSING, ANB KALAMAZOO
JL. ALL REPORTS INDICATE PLANS FOR A PEACEFUL MARCH.
ADDI T I O NAL I MFflRH A T I O M M IL L BE P RO UI BEB A S RECEI V ES- /

DO NOT TYH MBSAOf WOW TMB UM

228

229

li Abo** forvazdad to adviia racipianta of tha oaaapoait*
of currant Information available ragardlng tha plannag
daKmatxatioa/aarcn In Washington, D.C. , on 11/13/13. CISPM
la only ona of tha organliationa aponaorlug thla naxsh. It la If.
'that th« flo nra of lBg.000 oaoola participating ooana froaf
lltaratura.

mrthar info:
that a racipianta

aa racalvad, will ba forvardad to

- *

230

BANKINGS , NOTATIONS, A» ALL ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED
I? THIS CCMf!U«IC*TIOI» CLASSIFIED %MKt' UUFSS OTKOWISE
BOTTD. |M

231

WW ORLEASS IS OF THE OPIKIOK THAT DFPA3TK WIS Of JUST ICE
A» STATE SH0U.D EE CONSULTED TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF
D E PORT I W! THESE INDIVIDUALS OR AT BEST DEMYI8S THEIR RE -EHIHT
OKCE THEY LEAVE.

232

SUBSET

□ i

luimaanwcNHiiBQ uncus

C LAB HFKATIOM :

□ nraan

(~ | CGKPXENTUL
O UNCLAI IFTO

Harking* , notation* and othar 1 tOT^oT" reformat IbTJ — -
contained in tnil^conmi cation ax« claaaif iad •ssoXfct* unlea

. tha following in
tney could locata no r a cord 1b tha files of thair _
agenciea idantif labia with tha Tucson Cmlttea for Susan Rights i

233

9C-422

On 10/3/83, nmpipti article, regarding the Tuceoa
Ccavelttee For hum Right* in Latin America published in tha
Ariaona Daily Star and tha Tucaon Cltiian, both daily newspaper a
of ganaral circulation in tha Tucaon area, war* reviewed in tha
library of the Tucaon Citi lan . Thau articlaa indicated the
Tucaon Cossaittee For Bumen Right! in Latin America ha a been in
existence for approximately aavan years. Tha ganaral baais for
tha existence of this organisation la that conditions in Latin
American countries f ran a human righta standpoint are not what
tha government of the United States says they are. The organisation
ia against military aid to El Salvador and also protests 0.8.
invoivement with anti-Sandlnista rebels In Nicaragua. Moreover,
tha organisation ia against tha U.S. military role in Latin America
and supports sny legislation banning military aid to El Salvador^
Further, tha group protests the treatment of Chilean citixene. ft til

The newspaper articlaa indicated that tha unofficial
spokesmen for tha Tucson Committee For Human Rights In Latin
America was Mr. Jon B. Ki laa , a self earployed landa caper residing
at 3644 B . Lundy Avenue, Tucaon, Arixcna . Over tha past six
years, the organisation has sponsored various peaceful act It! ties
in tha Tucaon area to inform tha public about continued violations
of human rights ia Latin America. JflttJ I

On 10/24/83, Mr. Jon B. Hi laa, spokesman for the Tucaon
Committee For Ekssan Rights in Latin America, furnished the following
information t

Human

Tha Tucaon Cosseittee For Buatan Rights ia Latin America
has bean in existence in tha Tucson, Ariaona area since l§7e°
and utiliies Post Off lea Box 42461, Tucaon, Arisona 15733.
objectives of tha organlsatloo are as follows i Ufui

to create
right* in

sss, in this
.«.am.rio. ^

try, of the etate of

234

0 SE«ET 3

si..»-fe---

»tC-422

and multinationals in the suppreaaion of Latin American peopla

- to point out tha rola playad by tha 6.8. govarnmant, military M f . ■

- to generate support for tha atruggla againat repraaaiva regimaa
in Latin America through education and, when approved, through
concrete aid )HUJ

- to extend our aolidarity to peoplea of Latin American origin
living in tha 0.8. , regardlaaa of cltlsenehlp fflUj

- to cooperate with other organisations sharing similar interests
especially on tha local level JHULJ

Miles adviaed the Tucson Committee For Human Rights
in Latin America haa alwaya been a non-violent organization,
which haa been utilised aa a forum in the Tucson, Arizona area
for dissemination of information regarding Latin American matters

In view of the above, it doea not appear that further
investigation regarding the Tucson Committee For Human Rights
in Latin America ia warranted. Thia caae ia therefore being
closed.

235

=3. 4 l

1 clraetor, VU/l J

TCHR

Qdj ncMmlutlea la eloalfUa 'N ii rt ' la !*• Wtltaty.

era-

taclOMd for CallMt Houaton ana San tatosio la «a« copy
of iwfazwacarf Jhoani* airtal.(Jt|

M Buraao ecacnnlcatiwia a*riaad that CIEPES pf Hc«.
wan often contain** in, or opor.tad froo, effiejw i^*. 7

typi ScganlaaUoM or front »fftc*a. Baa.a OB thj Infarction. /,
SSLlLcd la rafarenoad rho.nl* alrfc.l, rho.nl,

poatlblUty that tha Tocaea Co^alttaa forijjynruc^ka^ * _
h« a front organ! ««fcloa for tha CICTEB.M '

l— *

Bafora eloalag thla lnveitir Jtl<

boanix viil e\4>*it

ntonlol

l l l aOa aairn ta tiw

^lirtrf -pill**
^ PW t \Eouaton'

Iff

236

-■f,

O Taajfrpa

□ TOPI
□
□

□ UNCLMIFTO

□ UNCIAL

dm* {y*—*>T a

TO I

DIRECTOR, FBI \ll»f-«4t) - *U .»M*IWS. a4,™-:j f.P.l lift

room Juc, uwieviu4 m»c-lso> m ^mF^m&^^'S.ii9.

SUBJECT)

OF P. SAL VADOR (CISTES
IHTESnTlUUXT TEJtltUXISH * EL SAL'
[OSl DA1.LAS|(W^

Ra Bureau airtal to all SAC'a, datad Octobax 28,

tlty with tba Paople of «15*lvador (CISFBS)
activity it Loulrrilla, XantucXy , via artractad frott varloua

B la aa ifijM hi ■ |
L" B ailuaaA qui " M gH \ ■ ■ -

LouiavillijVj. ^Ttr . _T — — — -ja-J'

l j»9

■ HI

. * « — — .».

237

238

On July I, 1983, during a peaceful protest
d emon stration in front of the Fadaral Building at Louisville,
Kentucky, litaratura waa distributed to tha public by
"Loulavllla CISPXS (Committee in Solidarity with tha Faopla
of II Salvador) P.O. Box 2005, Loulavllla, Xantucky 40201*
urging U.S. citisena to vxlta thair respective
congressmen to express thair concarna over incraaaing U.S.
involvaatant in II Salvador, while asking them to aaak
a peaceful solution to tha Central American situation. CISFBS
literature assarted that while President Ronald Reagan
certifies to Congress that the human rights situation is
improving in II Salvador, tha United States is being
dragged into a bloody conflict in Central America. CISPSS
cited the following indications ■ 1) over $100 Billion
requested for new military aidi 2) 100 new military adviaara
and a new U.S. base to train Salvadoran troops in Honduras —
and more to comei 3) CIA organised raids from Honduras into
Nicaragua, an apparent attempt to provoke a war between
these two countries j and 4) Pro-administration members of
Congress and the military think D.S. combat troops will be
needed. CISPXS concluded that all of the above waa
being Implemented by the U.S. Government to "prop up a
government that rules by terror, a government that in three
yeare has carried out or approved the killing of over
37,000 civilians, created nearly 500,000 refugees, and
stifled all legal channels of dissent". Above demonstration
was to coincide with tha July 1913, certification to Congress '
that the Salvadoran government ia making significant progreaa
toward eliminating human rights abuses. (LS 199-133-3) c / .

(Literature distributed
publicly at Louisville
Kentucky, July a, 1983)

" On October 21, 1983, demonstration protesting
recent U.S. "lnvaaion* of Grenada was held in front of
U.S. Post Office and Courthouse, Louisville, Kentucky,
and aceor4Ua« to m adia reports approximately SO persons;
partioipaftarin asms. Leaflets ca l ling for cessation of U.S.
intervention ia Central America and tha Caribbean, as well
as nuclear and co n ve n tional arms escalation, were distributed
■Louisville Committee in Solidarity with the People of _
_ . Stone 458-5477" which was identified, i

a ■Louisville ComeJ
Salvador. Svdell
■local contact 1 for

Washington. O.C.. Bovembex 12,

1983, organised by •Xovember 12 Coalition, P.O. Bos 50131, 'ff^J ■

:i_UsT^

239

Washington, D.C., 20004, 202-347-5516*. (LH 157-0-180) -j^^

f( Literature distribute jfv
publicly at Louisville, ]i
Kentucky, October 28, 1983)

On Movember 12, 1983, approximately sixty (60)
Louisville, Kentucky area residents were to participate
in a mass demonstration at Washington, D.C.. , protesting
U.S. involvement in El Salvador, Hicaragua and Grenada.
Among the main Louisville, Kentucky groups identified as
being involved in organising the Washington, D.C. trip
was CISPBS. jf^j

(( Courier-Journal .
daily newspaper of
general circulation published •
at Louisville, Kentucky, ( '
Jtovenber 12, 1983)

It is noted that foregoing information has been
included herein to provide background data concerning local
origin of captioned organisation only and should not be
construed as an effort to investigate the exercise of
First Ammendment rights of individual CISPBS members who
politically oppose U.S. policy in Bl Salvador and Central
America. Said data does serve, however, as a data base
to begin the process which is i n tended to ultimately
ferret oat the identities and activities of those CISPBS
members who are knowingly supporting Salvadoran guerrillas
in the United States and Central America and furnishing
financial and material support to the guerrillas. KuUj

In am effort to determine location, leadership
and activities of CISPBS chapter within the Louisville
Division, the following lava stigatiom was conducted conce r ning'

CISPBS, Louisville, Kentucky, which is the only known CI
chapter operating in Kentucky i jf^ij

240

241

On 10T«t»t 10, 1983, review of r»cord» at
Jaf farson County County Public Protection and laynlatlon
Cabinet, Department of l~nai»i— 11 Protect-too, $27 Mast
Jefferson Street, Louisville, Kentucky , rm«l*J issuance
of permit for solicitation of donations to "Louisville cispks
Ccenittee in Solidarity with tfaa People of SI Salvador, P.O.
Box 2005, Louisville, Kentucky 40201" on Octobar 17, 1983,
permitting CISPKS to aolicit money frca October 22, 19*3 -
December 17, 1983' door to door". Mmd applying; for Mid
permit on Octobar 13, 19S3, imcy S. Harrla, 1183 But
Broadway, Louisville, Kentucky 40204 (584-3210) llatad bar
own telephone an org"*"**" telephone, noting that
Louiavi 11a" CISPKS waa organised Itejil enlioi 1180. Purpose
of solicitation wan llatad "to raise m o n ey to boy boa eigne
which state "Central a— i Ina - Smother Vietnam war* -
to alert people to tha Impending mMnSKM of an eacal sting war
In Cantral Snarl na pins to kanp oar organisation going —
coat of newsletter, phone calla, apaakara ate. Solicitation
datae warn listatf aa Octobar 22, 1983 - Oacanbar 17, 1983,
during which t Ina CISPKS would aolicit money and support.
CISPKS hopad to raiaa 8808 to ba diaparsad aa follows i
108 national CISPKS i lot Local Chaptar to defray coat of
canvass i 80* Soy bos signs, coot of solicitation waa
estimated at 8130.00. no aoo ay baa prarionaly baan raiaad
by CISPKS as result of public solicitation. Officers of
CISPKS ant parsons in charge of solicitation were listed aa

242

•Storing Coaadttaa* Lucy Itirli, 11B3 I. Broadway,
<«04 (514-3210), Dong Nagaa, 113» 1. Broadway, 40204
(584-0349), Up Nackay, Bpaad ATanu* (454-5587) t Frad
Hick. , «622 Wut Broadway (77I-7444) . Attachad to abova
daacribad application waa copy of CZ8PBS laaflat
indicating that "thouaanda of aambara and frlanda of CISPKij"
ara going "door-to-door all ovar tha country* in «
national Naighhorhood Protaat Caapaign Agalnat C.S.
Zntarvaotlon is Cantral Aaarlc*". Contaiaad la said
laaflat ma tha atataaant **a hop* you'll balp ona of our

■ora than 300 coamittaaa nationwide aaka a ganarooa

contribution plaaaa aaka chacka payabla to your local

CISPBS affillata*. Laaflat waa to ba diatrlbuted locally
by ■Loulavllla CISPZS, P.O. Box 2005, Loulavilla, Kantucky
40201, 584-3210".

243

' KentucJcy ,

pre, Loulev&l*,

Court T7-

f, 1113, —

reported tlwt Mariano Barahona (•op
Juatio* and bead of lUtrigw mar Aaacclatlon)
Obregon |M—fi*r of ■ioeregua Court of Appeal*) war* ia
Louiavilla, Kentucky, aa past of a oat low id* tour to
build public under ■tending and support fox their revolutionary
imwwint. Public leoturee were sponaored by National
Lawyer* Guild and Looiarllle exsns

D*taun, 4 door

7, lfS3, vehicle deacrlbed aa 197<
hairing Kentucky Vehicle tag OM-4M,
a ticker "Of on or SL MLVhDOR* we* jewel
parked in front of Univeraity of Loui*«llle, School of
Law at 12:20 p.m., at ufaicfa I lei licareguen judge* Mariano
Barahona and Konharto obregon were apeaking on Jaa
and the legal Syataa in
anaored In

Juatioe

on* "Lucy Karri*
nailaeot of 1112
liated ea Pri

of 1M3 LoniBTllle City Directory refleote

502-5**-;

*****

Loa lev ilia, Kentucky,
Jr. , Coordinator, Louiavili*

' 1— Tjoio of forego log data Indicate* that aa of
K Uij, CIKVn, Loeierille, Kentucky, 11

ocgaaieeti n*a 1 tela

244

246

□
□
□
□
□

UNCOS C F T 0

IMS

[199-8848)

ILLI}{1B9C-1S0) (P) ttPSBI
WI TH TOT
- EL SALVADOR

_ SOLIDARITY-..!.
OF EL SALVADOR (CISPES
NTXRNATI05JAL TERRORISM

1963

Re Louisville alrtal to Bureau, dated November 28,

Referenced cocmunlc*tion Nt forth pertinent data
concerning- Louisville, Kentucky, chapter of Cocnnlttee in

People of El Salvador (CISPES) including

au V

Deetn

»lJiW>j 8-9 DEC 19

- Dallas I »™

- WO (lafo.) IfvJ Bee 1
fc LoaiOTim

tVi' Jlj

247

Id further support of above, following Invest 1 gat loa
tu conducted m nn Mini 12, 1983, at Louisville, Kentucky

OB /

4f^J

Transit Authority River City (TARC) passenger bos
#130, bearing Kentucky 11 ceo* LH3972, m observed displaying
paid billboard type idnrtlMMBt which read as follows :
"Central America. . .Another Vistula? CISPB8 384-3210; 8. Stone
Treasurer, P.O. Box 2005, Louisville, Kentucky; Day 837-1422;
Night 584-3210" Bevlew of 1983 Criss Cross Directory revealed
telephone 837-1422 listed to Allison and Associates (W. H.
Allison) (1. Garber) (Paul Soreff) 1328 South 3rd Street,
Louisville, Kentucky (previously stent ioned in referenced
communication). «Uj

Review of Louisville Defend er, weekly news pi per
with limited circulation, published at Louisville, Kentucky,
revealed that December 8, 1983, Issue thereof contained
snnouncsaent conce rn log "Benefit Dance" sponsored by Louisville
Chapter of CISPES sad Klcaregua In format loa Committee to
raise funds "to help send George Buchanan, Jr., and Lucy
Harris oaj a fries dshlp and Information gathering tour of
Nicaragua la Dseesdwr". %(u)^

1983 , *

248

It is notad that Lucy B. Harris, 1183 Zut Broadway ,
Loula»llle, lentucky (584-3310) pu| bean preTloualy identified
aa CISPES local apoke a parson ,

Louisville Division indicea and f Ilea negative
concaral nf George Buchanan , Jr., Lucy H. Harts aad Lucy
Fairbanks Harris and bo actlva investigation being
instituted at this tin*. £$t/J

spot* information balng provided FBI HQ

aa auppl«Dental data which tenda to corroborate the adailni
/5M-32104"

I la located in rail
[y advert laad on litaratura and rotary
trenalt billboards aa tba CISPES telephone, and aa auch. should
be con aide red tha CISPES organisational te I a phone la Louisville .
Kentucky. Accordingly. Bureau la requeated

aa auppieawntai am wmu
deterglDatlm^h»^02/584

^^SjfeBperaon^anapu^Hc^

249

rVTA:

□ Teletype

□ Facsknle

Priority

seAet

BIKSCTOR, FBy<199-8848)
5AC, HOBILE/l99C-96) (P). .>■ "

TTCT Tfl ROT TnaPTTY WTTq

.CLASanCATION: % -

□ TOP SECRET
O SECRET ■

□ CONFIDENTIAL
O UNCLA8EFTO TV'

□ UNCLA8
Pets £ /A/Ri

r?..

vk;'

SUBJECTl ^ gdWMITTB ,g 'f| "»» - 1 i n _ . - / , ■

^ THE rgdPLE OF BL SALVADOR (CISPEST/W,/

CjlNTidKNATlONAI. TERRORISM - EL SALVADOR
OOt DALLASj^y* J

entirety.

This commun 1 cation
Ra Bureau airtel

^3^11 SACsdaJ^d 10^

1 Investigation disclosRE-1S8ity6n/ll/297
radio stx^on, WKRG, ran a two-hour program featuring on*
_Dr. Steve^fech aef fer. a profesaor_of Pharaacolo^y,^Univer«Jjty
"of' South Alaba ma Me dical S cho ol .^MobiTej &J.a. ~ who spoVo on
"BeTial'f oi~CISPES. Dr. Schaeffer advised that hia wife waa from
El Salvador and that he had resided there for several years. Be
advised that CISPBS was against the United States knowingly
supporting the right wing death squads of the El Salvadorian
Government, who were responsible for allegedly 30,000 deaths since
1979. He advised that CIS PES was knowingly supporting the
Salvadorian guerrillas and that their group was trying to put
the message out to the American people regarding the insensitivity
of the Reagan Administration in their continual financial support
to the El Salvadorian Government. Be advised that his group is
fighting against the oppression and that CISPES is backed by thai
Catholic Church and other groups. Be advised that it is his
contention that President Reagan in ;he 0.. S. foreign policy is
supporting the wrong side. Ha cited the main reason for this
was the trauma of the O. S. fpreign uolicy during the Jimmy Carter
iffer contended the Salvadorian v ay is losing thai

• i

• \

250

.wax and that with at> many Governmental troupa being casualties,
eventually, the 0. S. Government will have to recognize the .'
guerrilla movement and do a complete turnabout insofar a* recog- 1
nixing this element. Schaeffer stated that the guerrillas have /--"'-
killed over 800 individuals during the paat two months and that
there haws been lot of the Salvadorian army of 25,000 men recently
killed. Xi^

Schaeffer advised that CISPBS is an international organ
whose purpose is to acquire a just peace in El Salvador. He
advised that it should be CISPBS to give input as to who should
decide how events should unravel whenever the guerrillas overtake
the Salvadorian army. He advised the guerrillas want negotiations
with the United States and that they are tired of the current
oppression. He advised that they are just another liberated
group and movement who want their freedom and that they, CISPES,
have nothing to do' nor want anything to do with Communism. He
advised that the CISPES group does desire land reform and wants
to be used as a tool so that the United States can save face and
open up negotiations with the El Salvadorian guerrillas. During
this presentation there was no mention of the size, location or
future plana of CISPES, and the telephone number given to the
public at large, 460-6288, was the office of Dr^ Schaeffer at the
University of South Alabama, Mobile, Alabama. 4yH,l

A review of the current directory for professors at
the University of South Alabama indicates that one Steven W.
Schaeffer was Assistant Professor of Pharmacology, University
of South Alabama Medical School. This directory indicates that
Schaeffer has a Ph.D. from 'the University of Minnesota in 1981 J..\
and reaides at 6416 Gaslight Lane South, Mobile, Alabama 36608.yfl u /

Mobile Division will continue attempts to develop

additional information aa to location, leadership, and activities

of above group. J^^Lj

251

252

253

4-1M0tor.4-IT.ai »-■=-. -

- ~ FUEUL nUAU OP IMVECnaATHW

1— FOIM OELFTEO MSB OIFOMAHOI SHUT

Pafa<a> wilhfaU aatbaty at Ma location ta ft* flla. On* or aura at tha following AlMk, aha
J imGeiki aiplaia Bala oaMka.

witt ao aefrafabt*

matarial availabla Sir wlaaaa lo jroa.

O bdbrmitioa pit* la art only lo a thirl party with bo wfta a ue a to you or tfaa aubjact of your nanaaC

O Inthrmtim partaJaad only lo a thin! party. Yoar aaaa ia llatad la tha titla> oaljr.

O Document! oriftnatad with another Government afencyOea}. Thcae document! were tlJum l to that
agenesia) for uiWa and direct response to job.

Paget contain information furniihed by aDOtbcr Government afencyOca}. You wiD be advised by the FBI I
to the rrletiiMBtj of tha tnronnatioa following oar conturUnoa with the other ajencyOeei.

Patsta) withheld fa taa foUowini raaaceiUh

D For toot

[H^^rWlc^rtMaaaJiarl

Tharblloirtaf aaaJiar la to aa aaa< fcr lara r aaca t aaa trllu t

254

AMERICA AND IN SOLIDARITY WITH THE FfU.lt- FDR , THE LEQITMATE REPRESti*-

TATIVE OF THE SAL V AM RAM PEOPLE. CISPES ACTIVITIES INCLUDE FU» -

255

6 0 o

«Yi . T|jS§9-s3i ^ut i . ^

RAISINS AND LEGISLATIVE CAMPAIGNS, EDUCATIONAL AND OUTREACH PROGRAMS, f'^*.'
AND MASS MOBILIZATIONS, CONDUCTED ON NATIONAL, RES IONAL AND LOCAL* ~ J'*..
QRASS ROOTS LEVELS. THE FOLLOW I NO IS A LIST OF CISPES REGIONAL
CENTER Si CISPES NATIONAL OFFICE, P.O. BOX 90139, VASHINQTON, D.C.,
20004, TELEPHONE 202/887-9019} CISPES NORTHWEST REGION, 3410 19TH
-STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, 94110, TELEPHONE 419/431-2113}
CISPES SOUTHWEST REGION, P.O. BOX 97337, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA,
90097, TELEPHONE 213/484- 1044} CISPES ROCKY MOUNTAIN/PLAINS RE

GION,

r.:3 SOUTH 42 ND STREET, BOULDER, COLORADO, B0303, TELEPHONE 303/499-
8633} CISPES MID-WEST REGION, 3411 WEST DIVERSEY AVE. > ROOM I,
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, 60647, TELEPHONE 312/227-2720} CISPES NEW
ENGLAND REGION, 124 SOUTH STREET, NORTH HAMPTON, MARYLAND 01060,
TELEPHONE 413/586-3471} CISPES MID-ATLANTIC REGION, 19 WEST 21 ST
STREET, NEW YORK, NEW YORK, 10010, TELEPHONE 212/242-1040} CISPES
SOUTHEAST REGION, P.O. BOX 56262,' NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, 70156,
TELEPHONE 904/923-3775.

THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY FRONT HAS ESTABLISHED AN INFOR-
MATION OFFICE IN NEW YORK CITY IN ORDER TO PROVIDE NEWS AND
INFORMATION DIRECTLY TO THE PEOPLE OF THE U.S. THE OFFICE PUBLISHES
THE FDR SOLIDARITY BULLETIN BI-WEEKLY. ADDRESS! FDR SOLIDARITY

256

O O Tt

A3E SI»V • TPflSJ-SSf »E 8-N if

INFORMATION OFFICE, BOX 2TJ3, MEW TORI, NEW YORK, 101C3.'

CENTRAL ANERICAR SOLIDARITY NEIWORKSl* THE GROWTH or THE " • f >

CENTRAL AMERICA SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT HAS PRODUCED THREE- " = ^ -

• • » - MAJOR NET-

WORK S I r <

CISPES, THE NATIONAL NETWORK IN SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLE

OF GUATEMALA (NISOUA), AND THE NATIONAL NETWORK IN SOLIDARITY WITH.
THE NICARAQUAN PEOPLE <NNSNP) , THE WORK OF EACH NETWORK IS PRIMARILY

FOCUSED ON A SINGLE COUNTRY, WHILE ALL SUPPORT ALL THE PEOPLES

MOVEMENTS OF CENTRAL AMERICA AND OPPOSE U.S. INTERVENTION ANYWHERE
IN THE REG ION. MANY LOCAL COMMITTEES ARE AFFILIATED WITH ALL THREE,
FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT IKE ADDRESSES BELOW i

NISQUA, 938 F STREET ».W. , WASHINGTON, D.C., 22084, TELEPHONE
202/4 83-0050} NNSNP, 2025 I STREET N.V., WASHINGTON, D.C., 2000C,
TELEPHONE 202/223-2528.

257

4-TSO (tat. 4-17-19

■'(

FED UAL BUREAU OF MVE111QATIM
FOIM DELETES PA8E HFOMATION MEET

Plawd) witfchaU aatirarj at tkU localioc la fee Ala. 0— o» man of tha foUowtoj arataawata, itw
IndkaJaiL aiplaia thla dalatiaa.

■aterlal availahla for nlitM to yam.

□

Infbaatioa pertamad only to a third party with no reference to yoa or tha lubjact of you raquea t .

□

WbruUoa purhiinurl only to • third parly. Your

la I Ulad la tha tide only.

O Documcati originated wtth another GotcinnKnt *ggncy{lea). Theee document! acre referred to that
igencyOet) lor mkw ud direct respoue to job.

— Pi gel contain hdbnparlon furnished by another Government ageocyPea). You will be advised by the FBI aa
to the releatablUty of thb Information following oar coniuhatkm with the other tgenqKiei).

Pifsta) withheld far tha following reaaooUfc

□ ForytjarlaJoaaaiioa:

Tba foDowtag aaabar ia to ha oaad lor r af erea c e reptrdinj tfaaaa paaaa:

258

i PAGE E»KT

IKE FOLLOW I HB IS ONE EXAMPLE OF A CI SPSS SOCIAL ACTION PROJECT I
THE SIXTY ACTIVE. MEMBERS OF SAM FRANCISCO CISPES INTRODUCED A

LOCAL BALLOT INITIATIVE OFPOSIW O.S. INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL
AMERICA CALLED PROPOSITION M. TO BUILD A POPULAR BASE, CISPES
LAUNCHED THE EL SALVADOR INITIATIVE CAHPAISN (ESIC), A LOOSE

group ins that included chapter members as well as a far larger
number of non-cispes activists, neighborhood committees were *
ESTABLISHED IK SIX DISTRICTS OF THE CITY, AND LABOR AMD LESBIAN
SAT USE FORCVVOt SET DP. ESIC 8 REV TO !■• MEMBERS AND OVER f,i

259

Y*OE MIfl TF|

199-630

PEOPLE WORKED ON SOME ASPECT OF THE CAMPAIGN.' ESIC DISTRIBUTED *" . 7?
NEARLY 300,000 PIECES OF CAMPAIGN LITERATURE THROUGH CANVASSING* i. '
CABLIN3 AND STRATEGIC PLACEMENT. REGIONAL VORX WAS ALSO STRENGTHENED.
MAYOR DIANE FEINS

TEIN, ALL THE LOCAL CONGRESS PEOPLE, THREE QUARTERS

."OF THE CITY'S SUPERVISORS AND OTHER LOCAL OFFICIALS ENDORSED THE

'INITIATIVE, AS DID THE CENTRAL LABOR COUNCIL AND MANY LOCAL UNIONS.

CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS, DEMOCRATIC CLUBS, WOHENS GAY AND.

LES-
BIAN AND THIRD WORLD ORGANIZATIONS ALL BACKED THE CAMPAIGN. THE

BIGGEST BOOST FOR PROPOSITION N CAME FROM ARCHBISHOP JOHN QUINN,
WHO ISSUED A PASTORAL LETTER. SENT TO 300,000 LOCAL CATHOLICS, IT
CONDEMNED U.S. INTERVENTION IN EL SALVADOR AND CALLED FOR A "YES"
VOTE ON PROPOSITION N. EASILY QUALIFYING FOR THE BALLOT WITH OVER
TWICE THE 9,000 SIGNATURES REQUIRED, PROPOSITION N PASSED BY A
MARGIN OF S3 PERCENT.

THIS FALL, BALLOT INITIATIVES AND TOWN RESOLUTIONS OPPOSING
U.S. INTERVENTION IN CENTRAL AMERICA PASSED IN SAN FRANCISCO, CAL-
IFORNIA! SEATTLE, WASHINGTON! BOULDgR, COLORADO) AND ITHICA, NEW
YORK.

CISPES OVERTLY TAKES A POLITICAL STANCE OPPOSINB U.S. GOVERNMENT*
POLICY IN EL SALVADOR AND CENTRAL AMERICA, AND COLLECTS FUNDS AND

260

U 0

<r .; J - , I*) ;v .Jr.. . ... . - c-

\PAGE TEH ' tpJ" IM-CM U^tl^.V

MATERIAL OSTE "" . . - • ' • *'

■ NS1BLY FOR EL SALVADOR AN REFUGEES AND ALIENS IH CENTRAL

AMERICA AND THE U.S. 'THE OVERT GOALS OF CI5FES PARALLELS THOSE
AIMS OF HOST RELIGIOUS SOCIAL ACTION GROUPS, ISOLATIONISTS, WORLD
i PEACE MOVEMENT LEADERS. MOT TO MENTION NUMEROUS CONTROVERSIAL'
: CELEBRITIES. IF CISPES LEADERSHIP COVERTLY ENGAGES IN ILLICIT-
ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE BOUNDARIES OF ITS OVERT OBJECTIVES AND
PURPORTED AIMS, THEN IN ALL PROBABILITY THIS ACTIVITY IS HIGHLY
SINGULAR AND CONFIDENTIAL IH NATURE. THE BROAD BASE

OF U.S. SUPPORT

FOR CIS

PES CONES FROM PUBLICIZING IIS "LEGITIMATE" GOALS FOR PEACE,
JUSTICE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS IN EL SALVADOR. I HE CISPES
MOVEMENT IS EXTREMELY DESIRABLE TO SOVIET OBJECTIVES. CISPES
LEADERSHIP AND AFFILIATES ARE THEREFORE TEMPT INS TARGETS FOR SOVIET,
CUBAN AND NICARAGUA* "ACTIVE MEASURES" CAMPAIGNS. EXTREMIST LEFT
Vim LEADERSHIP WITHIN ClSPES WOULD ALSO HELP PROMOTE THE TYPE OF
' COVERT ACTIVITIES AND DIRECT MATERIAL SUPPORT OF REBEL FORCES IN
EL SALVADOR ALLEGED TO BE TAXING PLACE BY SOME SOURCES.

262

263

y ^QI TWO PI PI ■BB^ICWB (<D^(§»C-7S3)] Si

^ . sum mm a* community in Washington, d.c, is concur at ed in mtf

-* ' ■ • . ■ •- '-" • • •-• '- - r

AREA OF I8TH AND COLUMBIA. THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 40,001

SALVADOR A US RESIDINS IN AND AROUND WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA. MANY
HAVE OPENED BUSINESSES IN THIS AREA OF TOWN, SOME LEGITIMATE,
OTHERS USED FOR DRUB OPERATIONS AND POSSIBLY SELLING FIREARMS.
THEY ARE ALSO IDEAL LOCATIONS FOR PROVIGING REFUGE FOR THE
NUMEROUS ILLEGAL SALVADOR ANS. SOME OF THE BUSINESSES IN THE
AREA WHO ARE IN SUPPORT OF THE LEFTIST MOVEMENT ARE; REVOLUTION
BOOKS, WREI QITH NW,| EL TAZUMAL, VRYU QITH NW, AL CASA DEL
PUEBLO, QITH, AND ADAM'S MILL J EDITORIAL EL MUNDO, QITH AND
COLltlPlA! ZODIAC, COLUMBIA AND ONTARIO; GUATEMALA HOUSE, VICINITY
1STH AND COLUMBIA} CASA LIBRATO, ONTARIO AND COLUMBIA} AMONG
OTHERS. jftx)

IT WAS DETERMINED THAT MOST ILLEGAL EL SALVADOR ANS IN
THE WASHINGTON, D.C. AREA RECEIVE SANTUARY AT TWO LOCATIONS.
THE NATIONAL CITY CHRISTIAN CHURCH LOCATED ON MASSACHUSETTS
AVENUE BETWEEN MTH AND |5TH STREETS AND THE MT. PLEASANT CATHOLIC
CHURCH CENTER, LOCATION UNKNOWN AT THIS TIKE. FALSE IDENTITY
IS PROVIDED AT THESE LOCATIONS, AS WELL AS PROTECTION FROM J^U^

264

265

vmnm.n-nm

. . - - I >

HIM ff ■VKtnMTIM

nn uum rut areauTiM mm

PaaaarialMBMaBlMyatanaleeatkalaiafila. Oaa at ion of fta feUovaw al
ii II i hi. aaalaai ftla daiattoa.

hi, hm\ hie, 67A, kfe^ -i»

•aaUaalateiataaaato

□ litwattn a aartajaaa oaly a> a tMri party iritt 10 i i ta a uL a to yea or o» »abr»cl of year

□ lil.aillua aarariaaa oaly to i tana party. Yoar aaaa ia UaM ia laa tttto oaly.

L_J DocuHsti orififMted wttb Asotaaw Gomnmt ■gimjOM)- Tlwst docunmti ws refund to tiutf
if« ».) (»«) for rrrifw tad arret mpoiM. to jam.

PifW ooatiia tarormiboa fnndsh«d by another Government ■jencrtleO. You win be adSrlaad by tat FBI ■
to the ralaannUHy of tab) nrfarnudoii foUowiof our conairUtioa with tha other nencrlha).

Paaato) illaaiH fettaa fettartai raaaoaUfc

266

267

DLOO027 PQQFTVTZ
£j?R HI VFO
DC DL^*|

R 1201 12Z (Tan S4l

Cni FBI DALLATt»9C-793>
1X0 DIRECTOR FB 13(199-884 8) ROUTINE
ATTHj f ^tOON 4239)

^FBI WFoJ< 199- 1397) ROUTINE

attn t mr. vatter, asac
Section three of thre£J(Yv|

(fijmillttee in solidarity with the people of el salvador (cispes)j(*"j

IT -EL SALVADOR; foot DALLAsQ^U.}

WEATHER UNDERGROUND, RNA, BLA, HAY 19TH COALITION, AND OTHER
SUCH ORGANIZATIONS. (DOCUMENTS LINKING THESE ORGANIZATIONS
WITH EL SALVADOR AN LEFTIST GROUPS WILL BE EXPLAINED LATTER
PART OF THIS COMMUNICATION.) .

ON THE CORNER OF COLUMBIA AND CHAM PLAIN STREET, WASHINGTON^
D.C., IS LOCATION Of A CHURCH CALLED FIRST CHRISTIAN SCIENCT^L^^
CHURCH. rgPRONT Of THIS CHURCH WERE A GROUP Of SALVADOR A»*^*^_
VEARINf A PA&R ON THE LEFT SLEEVE OF THEIR JACKETS THAr SAIV^- '
FMLN. ■ • "-- -

268

~ moMiintMtPMvimMiMi

MM MUTtl 'Mi ■FtMttlM tUXX

l/uu^iaMaU A3, A 7g^ Lf^ wift.

□ htiwi>lui>wtilirfMy>»«>Wp«rt|r'H»«ew*fe«>»r»»«fc»»«t>»ctflf yagwawt
a IiI.bIIib , nlih 1 1 calf Id ■ Mrf ptrty. Vo» mm to ll***! h tfc» tttto only.

O Dm ■mrti nfcl—M iW MottrOmniiiwI HTfl"). Tb*ndaeupali«ainfendtDtfa^

Pif CTUh tote— ttu i h i ■ Mm J by nothrt G a uimi l lycrOn). Yoa wlD bs adrbad by the FBI I
to th« it h u MB ly of oM» hfa—llu a Mkwriag op wtt t H c wWi Urn other hcbctOm).

Ptftvta) rttkfcsU fcr ft* Mloafa« noli):

269

^aqe tfwes. de dl aeE7j-9rerer (Tdi^^ssc-tsQ

IS APPROACHED BY FBI. j££tj

THE FOLLOWING DENOTES POSSIBLE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN HAY 19
COALITION AND EL SALVADOR AN LEFTIST MOVEMENT IN THE U.S. THE BELOW
ARE OPINIONS OF DALLAS SA COMPILED FROM INTERVIEWS IN WASHINGTON,
D.C., AREA DOCUMENTS OBTAINED, AMD VARIOUS SOURCE INFORMATION! J^lJi)

IN 1978, THE WEATHER UNDERGROUND ORGANIZATION (WUO)
REORGANIZED. THE NEW YORK PRAIRIE FIRE ORGANIZING COMMITTEE (PFOC)
CHAPTER WAS TRANSFORMED INTO THE WUO'S COMMUNIST PARTY AND WAS
RENAMED THE MAY 19TH COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION CH-19 CO) TO COMMEMORATE
THE BIRTHDAYS OF HO CHI MINH AND MALCOLM X., AND USE MAILING
ADDRESS OF BOX Sl3, VAN BRUNT STATION, BROOKLYN, NEW YORK, 11213.
THE H-19 CO PRINCIPLES OF UNITY CLEARLY ALIGN THE WHITE REVOLUTION-
ARIES WITH THE BLACK LIBERATION ARMY CBLA) AND THE REPUBLIC OF
NEW AFRICA, j^t)

THE M-19 CO PROGRAM OF ACTION WAS DEFINED IN ITS FOUNDING
STATEMENT AS III SOLIDARITY WITH THE WORLDWIDE BLACK LIBERATION
STRUGGLE, EXPOSURE AND ATTACK ON GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM,
TO FIGHT FOR THE FREEDOM OF PUERTO RICAN REVOLUTIONARIES AND '"^Jf
TERRORIST*^ ETC. THIS INCLUDES ANY MOVEMENTS TO FREE CENTRAL ^{l^

270

V;ffllf

AMERICA FROM U.S.. INTERVENTION* J^JW -V '

A RALLY ENTITLED, "A PROGRAM OF UNITY AGAINST REPRESSIONS A
CALL TO RESIST" WAS HELD ON NOVEMBER 13, 1981, 11TH STREET AND
6TH AVENUE, HALF A BLOCK FROM THE SITE OF THE MARCH, 1970 TOWNHOUSE

SPONSORED BY NUMEROUS GROUPS INCLUDING M-19 CO AND MOVIMIENTO DE
LIBER ACION NACIONAL (MLN) OF NEW YORK CITY. A SPEECH GIVEN BY
JCSE LOPEZ, NATIONAL COORDINATOR OF THE MLN WAS A CALL IN SUPPORT
OF TERRORISM. INTERNATIONALLY, HE LINKED THE MLN TO TOTAL SUPPORT
OF REVOLUTIONARY TURKEY, EL SALVADOR, AND PALESTINE. FOR IDEOLO-
GICAL SUPPORT OF TERRORISM HOPEY CITED WRITINGS BY MARIO ROBERTO
SANTUCHO, FOUNDER OF PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) OF ARGENTINA.
THE ERP OF ARGENTINA IS CONNECTED WITH THE ERP OF EL SALVADOR, AND -
IS ONE OF THE FIVE MAIN ORGANIZATIONS OF THE FMLN, THE MILITARY ARM
OF EL SALVADOR 'S LEFTIST MOVEMENTS. HOPEY ALSO STATES, "WE SUPPORT,
APPLAUD ALL CLANDESTINE FORCES THAT WORK FOR ALL.. ..HURRAY FOR WHAT

EXPLOSION WHICH KILLED THREE WUO BOMB MAKERS. THE RALLY WAS.

HAPPENED AT NYACK,

271

4 b

OK DL #082 Ti

A DEMONSTRAT ION WAS HELD 01 APR It £2, QOIWI AT IB U.N., N.Y.C.

IN SlPPORT OF THE SOVIET- BACKED TERRORIST SOUTH VEST AFRICA J
PEOPLE * S ORGANIZATION CSWAPQ). AMONG THE ENDORSERS OF THE RALLY
WERE 14-19 CO AND CASA a SALVADOR, J^Uj

IH DALLAS * OPINION, THE KEY WORD IS SOLIDARITY, ALL OF
THESE GROUPS M-19 00, FALN, FMLN, ETC. ARE CONNECTED, EXTENT
DEPENDING ON THE GROUPS THEMSELVES, III REGARDS TO

CISPES, ONE MUST REMEMBER THAT 80 OF THEIR MEMBERSHIP ARE ANGLO
MIDDLE CLASS INDIVIDUALS, MANY VERY WELL EDUCATED, THE SAME
PROFILE AS WUO MEMBERS IN THE 1968* S. THERE IS ALSO EVIDENCE
THAT MEMBERS OF M-I9 CO IH AUSTIN, TEXAS, HAVE CONTACTED CISPES
CHAPTER IN DALLAS, TEXAS. THIS WILL BE DEVELOPED FURTHER, AND
RESULTS SUBMITTED,

PERTINENT INFORMATION WILL Bt SUBMITTED 01
^^^^^^^^ «l 1 1 1

NNNN

272

BEC^ET

□ TOP SECRET

□ SECRET

□ CONFDENTML

□ UNOASEFTO

□ UNCLA8

TOt DIRECTOR, FBI

rXOMl SAC, PITTSBURGH (199C-635) (P)

S OBJECT l CENTRAL AMERICAN MOBILIZATION COALITION (CANC)
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
EL SALVADOR!
(OOl PITTSBURGH)

■v (OOSPiTTSBUKGHI , r- ^ I r- l, . ,

This coansunication i» classified '

in ita

entirety.

Ra Pittsburgh airtel to Bureau dated 12/21/83,
and captionad aa abova.

In rafarancad communication, Pittsburgh reported
that two persona of Hispanic appearance claiming the names
"Gabriel and Marie Elfero" are giving public political 'talks'*
to small groups in the Pittsburgh area in which .they claim to

by 0-3
on OADR

DMbtttnVl

OAM

wa-

nt* m

se\n%t
ClassiMed
Declassify

Bureau

(2 - 199-8841)
(2 - CAHC)
2 - Washington Field
4 - Dallas

(2 - CISFES)

, i 2 ~. CAMC ! i«aMAR21B84Haawis
2 - San Antonio (CAHC) BCPt niw

10 - Pittsburgh .

(2 - 199C-623) 0 ,,f,,v , M - -
(2 - McDonald) C. i-L I \, JftfffflW''' 1 ' r
(2 - Gabriel Elfero) i in ■ " LJLM"

NOT RECORDNtt lj t ; v ., r ...

uvcuuu im>

(2 - Kazia Elfero)
japselx

[

COI TAIM

* nttPB UlQflC ~> 1_,

273

be Salvadorans who have surreptitiously crossed th« Mexicsn

border into the United States and art now hiding in the

United States from "death squads" of the Salvadoran government.

Pittsburgh has recieved additional information distributed

by the Thomas Her ton Center, 1111 Eait Carson Street, Pittsburgh,

PA, that these persons are currently residing in the basement

of the residence of Harold and Christine Menger on or near

Thomas Boulevard, Pittsburgh, PA. The first floor of this

residence allegedly functions as the meeting place of the

Pittsburgh Hennonite Church, of which Harold Henger is allegedly

■pastoral leader.* %MA

Pittsburgh also reported in referenced communication,
that Art McDonald, who stated that he is a member of the
CAMC, is actively seeking to expand the number of churches
in the Pittsburgh area that are willing to give "sanctuary"
to Salvadoran refugees. Pittsburgh iilao reported that McDonald
is translating for the Salvadorans, who claim to speak no
English.it these public political "talks" given to small
groups. Pittsburgh has now received information publicly
distributed by the Thomas Her ton Center, that McDonald has
recently attended a "conference" held in Washington, D.C.,
concerning possible future United Stntes actions in El Salvador
and Nicaragua. McDonald is also actively engaged in obtaining
"pledges" froa members of the public to engage in a demonstration
to protest a aignificant rise In United States military
involvement In Central America, to b«i held at the Pittsburgh
Federal Building, the day after a rise in involvementi such
protest possibly to include "a non-violent civil disobedience."
Additionally, McDonald is now seeking work in the Pittsburgh
area for the Salvadorans. jCfui

The following are' the details of the Pittsburgh
investigation conducted to date, since the date of the referenced
communication!

_ Oct 1/6/14, an agent frost the Federal Boreas of—
Investqbtloa (FBI) , Pittsburgh, obtained from tb« Tbomaf*'
Mer tost Caster, 1111 last Car son Streak, Pittsburgh , FA, °
15203, a copy of the newspaper Three Elvers network . Decemb«F~
1913, Volume 1, lumber C, a newspapex disseminated freely

and without charge by the Thomas Mar torn Center to the general

274

J~ublle. On the. first page of the paper appeared an article ' 5
n (Ball caption entitled, "First in a Serlesi The Ktnnonites,'
and in large caption, "Churches and the Peace Movement."
The article contains a brief description of the history
of the Mennonlte Chruch. Then, speaking/ of the Pittsburgh
Mennonlte Church, the article states t

lnej of

The congregstlon began in 1969, on Keade
Street in north Point Breeze as a voluntary
service for urban outreach. It now numbers
40 adult attendees and their children and
aeets In a former fw/eral home on nearby
Thomas Boulevard. Myv

The article than briefly describes the history
of the meeting house and states that the first floor of
the meeting house is a worship room. The article then
continues! <MU|

Harold and Christine Henger, pastoral leaders,
and their three children live on the second
■ floor. Another member family rents the third

floor. In the basement live two refugees, a married
couple from El Salvador. KfMj)

The article then discusses some activities of
the church In the peace movement. It then stateat ttHCl

Although members differ on whether or not
to participate In war tax protests, all agreed
recently to provide sanctuary In the meeting house
for refugees from El Salvador and Guatemale.
The decision came after much agonising, as
members weighed personal risk's and possible
legal consequences against their desire to reach
out and help. AtHlaes.tbe discussions were
heated and produced tears. When a consensus was
finally reached, the congregation and other support^**
groups quickly pitched in to convert a basement
Sunday School room Into an apartment.

a basemei

275

9C-635

3 *»

Th* arc** of chill pepper • and apleea waft*
trow th* op*a doorway of th* Salvador an refugoaa*
apertnant aa cm antara tba baeeaent. Mac la, .. .
• till learning Engl i ah, nlUl a* w* paaa. She
la working a lu»p of tortilla dough in bar
hand*. On bar tibia la a glaas jar with Chicory
and Quaan Anna' a lac* picked by a protestor at
Battlp Atonic Power Laboratory. Ma wondar If
her teeing the children with aa bring* pang a of
lonelinaaa for her fany laf t behind In the
ear* of relativea. JDU,)

Thm granting of sanctuary la ona way In which
congregation teaches peace to lta children

the

The Hanger* Maintain three Hating a in .the Greater
Pittebargh white Pag* a, which read aa foil owe t jfU.)

*Weng*r, Christina, 7211 Thoaaa Blvd. 247-7574" |
Hangar, Howard, 7211 Thoaaa Blvd., 247-7574*1 and
"w anger, Howard, Pastor, 7211 Thoaaa Blvd., 242-31 67

a cosy of "Tba New People, Th* Thoaaa
Nerton Canter* January 1914, Voliaee 13, Ho. 1, a
and

On 1/6/84,

Voliaee 13, Mo, 1, a nawalattar
d istr ibu ted freely and without charge to th* general public
by th* Thoaaa Mar ton Center, contained an article entitled ,
"Jobs Wanted*, it atated i Mml

Oar Interfeitb Sanctuary Movement baa
decided to aaak aajsloysant I: or one two refugee a
froa U. "-evador, Cabrlal and Maria. Maria can
do sawing and la looking to do repair work. She
la also willing to do houaa cleaning. Cabrlal
will do any kind of odd Job* that at* available,
. !*•• cleaning benaaa, aiaor repeira aroond tba

boa a*, clerical taaka, ate. Pi a a a* abaro this

" information with poor fe lands, your dbarob os
i local neighborhood groat*. W* ooaaldar this
• a*r loas sos* at tha seawtnt. Call Art at th
canter aa Jaff at 362-20*3. Pal la Bavidad y

276

Also appearing in this newsletter was an article
entitled, "Central Acer lea t Peace witness*. lmmcd lately
below the caption appears, the nam Art McDonald. The article
outlines latest development! In the "Witness for Peece Action*
In Nicaragua, a plan to prevent an invasion of the country
by U. S. forces by asaembling on that country's border
with El Salvador, a human chain of civilian volunteers frost
the Dotted States. It reports that the first group lsft
the United States to go to Nicaragua on 12/2/83, and that
at leaat eight people from Pittsburgh are also prepared to
go to Nicaragua. The article then states*

Very recently, I attended a conference In
Washington, t>. C, which aadt clear connections
between the arms race and intervention In third
world countries. An expert on Latin America, Janet
Schenk, suggested that She thought it no re likely
that the United .state* would attenpt to intervene
wore directly in II Salvador than in Nicaragua
at the present tine. Why? Because the wllltary
in El Salvador is doing very badly and there is
real fear that the insurgent* are winning the
conflict. Hence, our opposition to Onited States
aid to that ruthless regime needs to continue.
Especially since V(e aidant Reagan has just recently
vetoed congressional Insistence that continued
kid to the Salvadoran governwent be tied to "progre

on ha

right.*

277

Tha ait Id* than raoueated "pledge*" to participate ,
In a pro teat to ba atagad at tba Federal Building la Pittaburgh;
to taka placa fro* 4- 6PM on tha firat working day following
an Invaelon or aerloua eacaiatlon of a 111 tar y action on
tha pact of tha. United Statea. Tha ait Id a than atataai

TO data, wa haaa over 140 aignad pledgee
and a coamitmeat On tba part of 26 people to partlclpte
In • non-viol ant civil dlaobedlence. JCwil

Uao appearing In tba above nentlonad laana of
"Three Rivera Network" waa an, art id* entitled, "Ko Mora
Vlatnaaa", which reported* tfulj

Over 100 Pittaburgbere joined with aa many
as 25,000 othai Aaerlcana In Washington, on
Nov em bar 12, 1903, to pro teat O. 0. ailitary inter -
vantlon In Central Aaarlca and tha Caribbaan rag Ion. .
rallying around a call for "Mo Mora Vlatnaa Ware.* .awl

278

Th« Buraau la raquaitad to provida Pittaburgh with any
information It may ha va concerning a racant CI SPSS maating

279

WABBmGTOW FIELD

AT WASHIHGTOH. DISTRICT CP COLPMBI ft >
Sum Raqusat of th« Buttasi.

DALLAS

AT DALLAS. TEXAS t

Sum as Request of th« Burtaui.

SAW AN TOOT 0 -

AT SAW AWTOWIO. CALIPORNIAl
Sam* as Rsquaat of the Bumau .

LKAP»

280

uLimnuiTHreefft
KDmatiUKUisif:
ncsnmu

F is* £5*

1 J

>7EI ALEXAffiRIft FEIOKIIYj

FBI ATL*AKTAfcl$9C-M9) FRIOr.ITY
FBI SALTIF:0F.e\(199C-85O PRIORITY

FBI BIRNINGKAt\U9»0155> PRIORITY
Ft I PCSTOK A 1SSC-B13) KUORITY
FBI EUFFAL0yiS9C-361) FKIQP.IIY
FBI CKAELOTTE PS 10
FBI CHICAGO ftl9 9 C-SM) PRIORITY
F3I CIKCIKKAII PR
FBI CLE VELA MO PRICK II
.FBI DENVER f» 90-323) PRIORI
l?"LS3?4963lC»S02576) Pf.IC:

£_0 FEB 7 Sg^O

281

{RAGE T^b DE DL 1! U. E 1

/FBI ELfPAS0l<199G-2£9> PRIORITY

FBI H0USI0n(n99C-771) PRIORITY . ..

FBI HONOLULU PRIORITY

FBI JACKSONVILLE PRIORITY ]

FBI KANSAS CITY PRIORITY

FBI KHOXVILLE PRIORITY

FBI LAS VEGAS PRIORITY

FBI LITTLE ROCK [uSSC-1 68) FRICIRTY

F2I LOS ANGELES K199C-331) PRIORITY

fbi louisvillea issc-isa) priority

FBI KEP,P.HIsf7lS9C-e5£) PF.IOI~;ITY

FBI riIANl(Tl9SC-5 65) Ff.IORITY

FBI MILVAUXEe\ (199C-385) PRIORITY

FBI MINNEAPOLIS^ 199C-553) PRIORITY

FBI r.OBILE f C199 C-96) PRIORITY

FBI NEWARK PF.IOF.I

FBI NEW KAVEi:((199C-443) PRIORITY

FBI NEW ORLEANS K199C-382) PRIORITY

199-195)

ill j TIH Hi i^i ■ - -

282

J^S* THREE DE.OL #6bA^ it i llH jcL]l99-795^
FBI' NEW &RKf C199C-297Q PRIORITY - .- .

,0L #ee

199C-257S) PRIORITY
FBI -N0RFXXH199C-I79) PRIORITY
FBI 0N.AH0MA CITv( ( 199-963) PRIORITY
FBI OMAHA PRIORITY

fbi Philadelphia/: 199C-612) priority

FBI PH0ENI^(199C-41S) PRIORITY

FBI PITTSBURGH PRIORITY)
FBI ST. LOUIS PRI ORITY^
FBI SAN ANTONIO [(1990768) PRIORITY
FBI SAN DIEGO PRIOR IT Yl
FBI SAN FANCISCC /( 1SSC-1 1S5) FEIORITY
FBI SAN JUAi:/(199C-14 6) PRIORITY
FBI SAVANKAKf(199C-99) PRIORITY
FBI IAKPAfTl99C-6Ja) PRIORITY
FBI WFg/(199C-1397> PRIORITY

y, n c

SECTION ONE OF SIX SECTICKsJ^y

»E01

DALLAS^V

ENTIRE COlftlf S OF THIS COKMJNICATION CLASSIFIED " fi S BflET .

itte;

(CISPE

TTEE IN SOLIDARITY WIT H
e^Jit a. SALVADCa;(ooT

THE PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR

283

(pAsT TOUR DE DL Mi^St WHU ^^(sS-7S5rj^

DALLAS DIVISION HAS RECEIVED NUMEROUS REO-tSTS FROM OTHER v. V*^ ■»
FIELD OFFICES FOR INDICES CHECKS, SOURCE CONTACTS, AND ;^
INFORMATION RELATING TO A SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP..
DUE TO THE \OLUME, DALLAS WILL ON A MLfiTHLY BASIS, SUBMIT
INFORMATION REQUEST □) OF A POSITIVE NATURE. TO SAVE TIME, .
AND ALLOW MINIMUM NUMBER OF COMMUNICATIONS, EACH MONTHLY . .
TELETYPE WILL INCLUDE FIELD OFFICE REQUESTS AND INFORMATION
OBTAINED UNDER SEPARATE OFFICES CAPTI )S. :

284

1-1749

FIBUAL MUM IF MVUnMTKM

raiM mrm pam hfobuum «ut

Paarfa) HI li ■■tbaij at &ia kxatioa k tfaa Ola. OM or ana of tba fcUowtaf i

. with bo Mgwffhl*

■atorial avaJkUa fcr nlaaaa to j

i partial oaly to a fluid party with bo rafcnaca to yoa or tfaa labiaet of jroar mqoaat
□ tatoaaMua partaiaaa paly to a Burd party. Yoor aaaa la liatad ia tfaa title oaly.
LJ OocBsnte otigaaUtad with f*M*fcf* GovcrBnat aagcscyOoi). Hmm docmiatPt> were icfcrrcd to tint

aafCOC^laW) fef ICTaW ftStl daTOCt HUpPUM tO JOU.

Paget cootaia taformettoB Ainrithed by mother Goveraraeot tfenqKfes). You will be tdrbed by the FBI is

to the frlmiMHly of this Uifcn nation following oar c o Multi ttoB with the other afencyflts).

Paaata) wttiailil tot tfaa iaUoajag waaoaUh

285

VLOBeZ 03J2042£
^PP HQ AL AC AX AT BA BH BS BU CE CQ CI CV I)H DE
EP HO RK JK KC KX LV LR LA LS ME MM MI MP HO NX NH NO
HY UT^OC OM PH PX PQ SL SA SD SF SJ SV TP WFO
DE DlJOk) .:' ~ ■ ; -/
P 312042Z£FaN 3<J0ij ■
FM FBI DALLAs\l99C-793) CP)

TO DIRECTOR FBIJ U 99-8848) PRIORITY *
ATTENTION! SSAJ
/'FBI ALBANY PRIOR IT YA^C]
FBI ALBUQUERQUE/^ 199C-308) PRIORITY
FBI ALEXANDRIA PRIORITY)
FBI AIL ANT A/ ( iSSC-35 9) FRIOHITY
FBI 3ALTIK0RE\U99C-856) PRIORITY
FBI EIRMIKGXA f A(19SC-l55> FT.IORITY
FBI BOSTON K199C-&15) PRIORITY
FBI BUFFALo\ci99C-361) PRIORITY
FBI CHARLOTTE^ PRIORITY
FBI CHICAGO |( 199C-C14) PRIORITY
FBI CINCINNATI^ PRIORITY
FBI CLEVELAND/ PRIORITY
FBI DENVER fU99C-S£5) PRIORITY
FBI DETROITI ( 199C-2C76) PRIORITY
FBI EL PAS0l<199C-229) PRIOTIRY
i FBI HOUSTON |(U9C- 771) PRIORITY
|FEI KOKO^ULU^tlMC- ) PRIORITY

)

286

. ■ga ^ unci (?dl|

(£MI TV* DE DL
[FBI JRCKSONVIU.I PRIORITY
FBI KANSAS CITY PRIORITY

199C-79I0

FBI XNOXVILLE PRIORITY
FBI LAS VEGAS PRIORITY
FBI LITTLE ROCK 1^1990-168) PRIORITY
FBI LOS ANGELESIC199C-831) PRIORITY
FBI L0UISVILLE/U99C-15B) PRIORITY
FBI MEMPHIS /l99C-258> PRIORITY
FBI MIAMI (fl99C-565> PRIORITY
FBI MILWAUKEE^ 199C-385) PRIORITY
FBI KINKEAP0LISVl99C-553) FP.IORITY
FBI MOBILE j fl99C- 96) PRIORITY
FBI NEVJARK PRIORI!^
FBI NEW HAVEN |<199C-443> PRIORITY
FBI NEW ORLEANS^ 1990382) FRTORITY
FBI NEW YDRx/ci99C-2576> PRIORITY
FBI NORFOLK K19SC-179) PRIORITY
FBI CN.AHOKA CITYl < 199-963) PRIORITY
FBI OMAHA PRIORITY
FBI PHILADELPHIA f( 199C-612) PRIORITY

287

90-793)

(PAGE m» DE DL BMa ffi UHT |fp^ IS
*hj fW3EMIx \l99C-4l5) P RIORITY :

FBI PITT SBIJRQH PRIORITYjL^ j . . • '

FBI ST. LOUIS PRI ORITY

FBI SAN ANrONIo/U99C-768> PRIORITY

FBI SAN DIEGO PRI0RIj7

FBI SAN FRANCISCCf (J99C-U9S) PRIORITY.

FBI SAN JUAN ((199C-UO PRIORITY '

FBI SAVABNAh|u990-99> PRIORITY

FBI TAKPa/i99C-63B) PRIORITY

FBI yF0/Tl990-1397) PRIORITY

a -e-o w e-r

CsECTION XYO OF SIX SECTICKSj^t) .
(cCfiMTTEE IN SOLIDARITY LIT H THE FiOPLE OF EL SALVADOR
IT - EL SALVADOR} (OQl DALLAsJj^A.)

ENTIRE CONTENTS OF THIS* COMMUNICATION CLASSIFIED

(CISP

288

MOtaiMMa - - — _ - — - - - -~

I tf ■VUTMATM

nm Mum mm ■rtaunt* am

P*aWa> wkftfciM «M> at kx^tka h ft* fll*. Om or Bon of** faUowfe

T^^rrtiliilMil illmfil

withw

t wU»M> tor »!«■ to yom.

□ u b prtii— ' oaty to ■ tknd parly witfc bo latonao* to too or Hm aabjcct of yon nqaast

□ lilinHiB pttd— d dy to ■ pro/. Yot — » to ltotod hi tfao titU only.

LJ DocuMiti ottohMtod wMfc avjolkcr GovcnBxst s(BBcj(in). Than op ca iii mti vr ivfciiad to tnct
tfi mrjjim) !>■ mli» ■■ddhtt wpo— t to job.

Pif re—ih iaftn —Una fknmhcd by «artWr Gomrontat i«CTcy<ic»). Yoa win be tdvbed by the FBI i
to the rdcsnbGBtj of thb htffof itfat* fofawivg oar coaattatioa with the other ifcncy(ict).

Pajpts) witkaeU far ft* feUowbf mmto):

289

WMpaGE'TTW'dE DL »i U 1 I (^btl 199-79?)

« 82

is tic united nats.

TlCW HAVEN DIVISION - RE NEW HAVEN AIRTEL TO BUREAU, ET
AL, DATED NOVEMBER 14, 1983. " /J' ■ ~

ON SEPT EPS ED 29, 1983. DR. MIGUEL ANGB/TARADA W AS A - - A

GUEST IN A PROGRAM CALLEdT«UNDO LATINO THAT IS TRANSMITTED III
SPANISH FROM LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA . THROUGH THE SPANISH
INDEPENDANT NETWORK. HE WAS ASKED, AKONG OTHER THINGS,
TWO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS. FIRST I HIS OPINION ON THE PROBLEM OF
EL SAL VAPOR r AND SECOfJDl THE PURPOSE OF HIS TRIP TO THE U.S.

HE STATED THAT IN HIS OPINION THE PROBLEM OF EL SALVADOR
WAS THE RESULT OF 50 YEARS OF WLITARY OPPRESSION, WHICH HAD
BROUGHT TO THE COUNTRY, POVERTY, MALNUTRITION, ILLITERACY,
UKE6UAL DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY A WD WEALTH. HE CONTINUED
BY STATING THAT THE PRESENT SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES
TO EL SALVADOR LOULD ONLY BEING MORE REPRESSION AND MORE
VIOLATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE SALVADOR AN PEOPLE. HE
GAVE AS AN EXAKPLE THE CLOSING OF THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
CArPUS ON THE 16 OF JUNE 1S8S BY THE SECURITY FORCES AS ONE
OF T HE MOST OUTRAGEOUS VIOLATIONS OF THE HUHAN RIGHTS OF
OPPORTUNITY TO RECEIVE EDUCATION. HE SAID, THAT HE HAS
DEMANDED THE REOPENING OF THE CAMPUS EECAUSE THEY ARE HAVING

290

fcPAGg <UL.DE DL »eg0E f!> [ L I, t 1 [[byi 99-79?)
TO TEACH IN OLD WAREHOUSES WITH GREAT INCONVENIENCES. 10

THE SECOND QUESTION HE ANSWERED THAT THE PURPOSE OF HIS TRIP.

VAS TO Visn SEVERAL' UNIVERSITIES IN THE U.S. WHERE HE HAS

BEEN INVITED TO SPEAK OK THE SUBJECT OF "THE SALVADORAN

CRISIS", "

THE OBSTACLES FACING THE EDUCATION SYSTEM IN VIEW

OF THE CIVIL WAR", "THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT

IN EL SALVADOR", ETC., AND TO SEEK "SOLIDARITY" AMONG THE

STUDENT COMMUNITY OF THIS COUNTRY IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SUPPORT

FOR THE £AL VAEORANS "STRUGGLE". HE SAID THAT HE WILL BE

VISITING SAN FRAKCISCO, BERKLEY, DETHOIT MCKIGAH, NEW YORK

AND OTHER CITIES THAT HE COULD NOT RECALL AT THE TIPS. XI HIIT'IHH |H |JU

HIS TOUR WAS BEING CALLED "OPERACION AKIGOS" - "[FRIENDS [^Jj!^^ . jj^ -

OPERATIOtr, BECAUSE OF THE SPONSORING COMMITTEE.

IT WAS MORE OF AN ORGANIZTAT IONAL AND COORDINATING TRIP
FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES WITH THE SOLIDARITY GROUPS IN THE UNITED
STATES WITH THE LEFT WING GROUPS OF EL SALVADOR (FDR-FM.N).
EVERY PERSON THAT THIS MAN WAS IK CONTACT WITH, IS POTENTIAL
LINK BETWEEN THE PCS SALVADORAN COKHJNIST PARTY AND THE CPUSA.

ifcf i ggiru sv i 7a«i i rTn.' . fTTY -n tu i -ir . : - *

291

DL'OeaS 6312B42Z- v

£PP iBf*. AO AX AT M BS BH BU CE CQ CI CV DN DE

EP HO-HN JK KC KX LV LR LA LS HE MM HI MP MO NK NH HO
MY Uf OC OH PH PX Pfl SL SA 6D SF SJ SV TP WFO ,

P 3 12M2Z £jAN 84] ^K«j

SM FBI DALLAS Vl9 9- 793) <P>
TO DIRECTOR FB^<199-8848> PRIORITY

(ATTN* ssA^m^m^^b^

f FBI ALBANY PRIORITY)
FBI ALBU6UER«UEf(199C-3B3) PRIORITY

FBI ALEXAKDRIA PRIORITY j
FBI ATLANTA^7sSC-35S) PRIORITY
FSI EALTIWOF.l\<199C-S5S) PRIORITY
F2I SIRf:IKGHAt\ciS9C-155> PRIORITY
FBI B0ST0Kfu99C-515> PRIORITY
FBI EUFFALo \(lS9C -36» PRIORITY
FBI CHARLOTTE PR1

FBI CHICAGO (CIS 9C-8U) PRIORITY

FBI CINCINNATI/PRIORITY

FBI CLEVELANDpRIORITY

FBI DEKVO=/<lS9C-825) FRIORIT Y

FBI CETROIT\<19SC-2e76) PRIORITY

I '3

292

QkOtrw de Di?)»eeg{ffi i t .-. c 9 {ZpC$i

FBI fi. PASO |( 199C-229) PRIORITY
FBI HOUSTON |C199C- 771) PRIORITY
1 FBI HONOLULUjPRIORITY
FBI JACKSONVILLE PRIORITY
FBI KANSAS CIT y PRIORI! Y
FBI KNOXVILLE ^PRIORITY
FBI LAS VEGAS [FRIORITY
FBI LITTLE ROCm 199C- 168) PRIORITY
FBI LOS ANGELES K199C-831) PRIORITY
FBI L0UI3VILLz/(IS9C-15C> FRIOF.ITY
FBI nEKPKIsXlS9C-25S> PRIORITY
FBI KIAMI I IS9C-5 65) PRIORITY
FBI KILWAUKEE\(199C-3o5) PRIORITY
FBI MINNEAPOLISV 199C-553) PRIORITY
FBI P".03ILE/7l99C-96) PRIORITY
FBI NEWARK PRIORI
FBI NEW HAVE (A (199C-443) PRIORITY
FBI NEW 0RLEAN|)<lS9C-332) PRIORITY
FBI NEU Y0Rk/c1SSC-25 76J ffilOKITY
FBI CORF0LKK199C-179) PRIORITY

9-795)

293

gSf JVl * J. (199-795)

(PAGE SMfflTDE DL #B0Z3>

''FBI OB.AKOMA CIT Y\U9S-963> PRIORITY

.FBI OMAHA PRIORITY/

FBI PHILADELPHIf/u99C-612> PRIORITY

FBI PHOENIX(U99C-415) ffilOHITY

FBI PITT SBURGH PR I OR IT 1

FBI ST. LOUIS PRIORITY^

FBI SAN ANT0KI0/Tl99C-768) PRIORITY

FBI SAN DIEGO Ff.IOfi]

FBI SAN FRANCISCOl C 1S9C-11S5) PRIORITY

F2I SAN JUAt/ C 1SSC-H6) PRIORITY

FBI SAVANNAH) C 199C-9S) FRIORITY

F3I TAnFA/(199C-«S) PRIORITY

FBI t'FcA I99C-1397) PRIORITY'
BT

[SECTION THREE OF SIX SECTION

3(S)

294

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF EL SALVADOR
SHOWS THE COKHUKIST INVOLVEMENT fKAT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN THEIR
CARPUS. SINCE 1921 IT HAS BEER USED AS A SAKCTUARY FOR TERRORIST
OF KAR XI 3LT E KD EH CI ES . KARIQ ZAPATA AND ALFONSO LUNA BOTH £

295

(page -wwoe DL #eeeJ*-s-c-ire-r (pij 199-795)

FOUNDERS OF THE PCS STUDIES THERE. THE CO ft PUN I ST UPRISING ~"
OF 1942 VAS COORDINATED FROM THE UNIVERSITY.

THROUGH THE YEARS THEY CAME TO IMPOSE, AS A REQUIREMENT
FOR FIRST YEAR STUDENTS, A COURSE NAMED "GENERAL SOCIOLOGY" .
THAT UAS NOTHING MORE THAN A COURSE OF INDOCTRINATION OF
MARXIST -LENINIST DOCTRIN.

THEY CREATED THE "AUTOMATIC PROMOTION SYSTEM" INTENDED
TO KELP THOSE STUDENTS THAT WERE DEDICATED IN A FULL TIKE
BASIS TO COMMUNIST ACTIVISM.

THEY SELECTED SPECIAL STUDENTS TO GO STUDY IK EUROPE WHEN
ACTUALLY THEY WERE ATTENDING TEF.nOHIST TRAINING CAMPS IN
BULGARIA, EAST GERMANY, HUNGARY, AND MOSCOW. LATER, THEY
SENT STUDENTS TO NCHTH KOREA, FLO CAITPS, AND RED CHINA.

THE AGEUS (GENERAL UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ASSOCIATION OF
EL SALVADOR) ELECTED TO THE POSITIONS OF LEADERSHIP, WERE
MARXISTS THAT THEY COULD CONTROL AND THEREFORE, CONTROL THE
ENTIRE STUDENT 30DY. THE STUDENT CONGr.ESS, THE SUPREME
COUNCIL OF THE ENTIRE UNIVERSITY STUDENTS, HAS HAD CONTROL
FOR THE PAST 5B YEARS BY MARXIST » LENINIST. THE "OPINION
ST ID I A NT IL" C STUDENT NEWSPAPER) VAS ACTUALLY THE OFFICIAL

&GE^»*»DE DL teiu J^L U-H fD1^199-793> -- *^

VOICE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF EL SALVADOR AND OF ALL ITS ' ! v-' 1 ; >

" FRONTS. THE POPULAR ORGANIZATIONS LIKE THE BPR, LP- 28, FAPU, ; r '•
AtlZS, HERS, UDN, NLP, AND THE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS •
Fa, ERP, RN-FARN, FAL, FUR-30, UR-19 WERE ALL CREATED IN THE . ; i
UNIVERSITY. THE FACULTIES OF LAW, POLITICAL SCIENCE, til r'ntlTT Tr~ i.ijj
WERE THE VANGUARD OF THE COMMUNIST KCVEKENT AT THE UNIVERSITY '"' ' ' " ■--
WITH AROUND 30,000 STUDEIITS. WHEN THE SECURITY FORCES WENT IN
ON JUNE 26, 19E0 THEY MET ARKED RESISTANCE, FINDING THE FOLLOWING I
A BOMB FACTORY, A CCMPLE-PRUTIKG PRESS, AN INDOOR FIRING
RAivGE, AN UNDERGROUND HOSPITAL TO TREAT THE WOUNDED TERRORIST,
THOUSANDS OF ROUNDS OF AMMUNITION FOR MORTARS, M-16, GALIL,
GARAND, Ml CARABINE, HANDGUNS, HAND GRENADES, MQLOTOV
COCKTAILS, AID CLAYKORE NINES. THOUSANDS OF BOOKS, PAMPHLETS,
POSTERS, AUDIO ESUIPKEKT A11D VIDEO TAPES WERE CONFISCATED.
MANY OF THE FILMS WERE SIMILAR TO THOSE SHOWN BY CISPES. FAKE
FASSPORTS, DRIVERS LICENSES, NATIONAL ID CARDS, INTELLIGENCE
FILES All THREE BODIES IN THEIR GASKETS IN THE AUDITORIUM OF THE
FACULTY OF LAW VEflE ALSO FOUND*

aabuii'iiu in — to 09 . — ncaft'.'i.FY fin o.wni(*<j

NKfiK

297

DL0C04 0312042Z l» -

£fP HSIAL A A AX AT BA BH^S BU CE CQ CI CV ON DE

EP HO KN JK'KC KX LV LR LA LS HE KM MI MP MO NK NH HO

NY NF OC Oil PH PX PQ SL SA SO SF SJ SV TP WFO •

P 3l2e42z(jAN sT]^^

, r*FM FBI D ALL A?\( 199-795} (P)
^Mto DIRECTOR FB^ (199-8848) PRIORITY

(ATT Hi SSA^^^^^^^P 1>/C/

FBI ALBANY PRIORITY/ (U.)
FEI ALEUGUERGUrf(l99C-363) PRIOIRTY
FBI ALEXANDRIA/PRIORITY
FBI ATLACTA((199C-35S) PRIORITY
FBI BALTIK0F.n(l99C-C56) PRIORITY
FBI BInMIt:GKAll99C-l55) PRIORITY
FBI 6CST0Nf(199C-615) PRIORITY
FEI BUFFALo\(19SC-361) PRIORITY
FBI CHARLOTTa PRIORITY
FBI CHICAGO /l9SC-8 14) PRIORITY
FBI CIKCIHKATlj PRIORITY
FBI CLEVELAND/PRIORITY 1
FBI DENVER /X 19 9C- 825) PRIORITY
1 FBI DETROIT! (lSSC-2ki76) PRIORITY

298

lPA6EtT**»DE DL f geM-fr D C- T i E 1 {(DlJ 199-793)

FBI EL ' PA SO I ( 199C-2291 .- -..
FBI H0USI0Nl(199C-77I) PRIORITY
FBI HONOLULlApRIORITY
FBI JACKSONVILLE} PRIORITY
FBI KANSAS CITY/PRIORITY
FBI KNOXVILLE /PRIORITY

H B. tst J tase-.

FBI LAS VEGASlPRIORITY
FBI LITTLE ROCk\( 199C-168) PRIORITY
FBI LOS ANGELES |( 19 9 C- S3 1) PRIORITY
FEI LCUISVILLEj{lS9C-152> 3UCP.ITY
FBI EtMFHIS /U99C-258> PT.IOFITY
FBI MIAKI (U99C-565) PRIORITY
FBI KILVAUKEE\l99C-3S5> PRIORITY
FBI MINNEAPOLIs\(lS9C-553> PRIORITY
FBI MOEILE/U99C-96) PRIORITY
FBI NEWARkW.IORITY
FBI NEW KAVENV199C-443) PRIORITY
FBI NEW OFXEANsV 199C-382) PRIORITY
FBI NEW Y0RK/U99C-237*) PRIORITY
FBI NORFOLK /(199C-179) PRIORITY

299

JpAGEiM

be ol tesu

jW* Jo

795)

FBI OKLAHOMA CnVM 199-963) PRIORITY
FBI OMAHA FRIORITYJ

FBI PHILADELPHIA/X199C-612) PRIORITY
FBI PHOENIX^ 1990-415) PRIORITY
FBI PITT SBUMjji PRIORITY
FBI ST. LOUISlPRI0RITY
FBI SAN ANT0HI(N<199C-76o) PRIORITY
FBI SAN DIEGC/'Pf, IORITY

FBI SAK FF.AKCIS00S(199C-1195) PRICF.ITY Mt!M3Q
FBI SAK JUAK iflS9C-U6) PRIORITY
FBI SAVAKKAhl(19SC-99) PRIORITY
FBI TAMPa/(199C-636) FRIORITY
FBI WFo/<lS9C-1397) PRIORITY

1 I L i. L »
^SECTION FOUR OF SIX SECTI0K£^{^

2 (

300

- ••" '° «' ' ° " " •iter

fpAGE>W» DE 0L ttoZA^i i 9 r, S T |Tdl/i?9-79» , . .^^T"

EpMMITTEE IN SOLIDARITY KITH THE PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR (CISPES^H^Pi- -.- .
•IT-EL SALVADOR; (gOl DALLAs]|t)

ENTIRE CONTENTS' OF THIS COMMUNICATION CLASSIFIED "crrr-T- £{J
DR. MIGUEL ANGEL PAR AD A HAS BEEN AN ACTIVE PARTICIPANT
A tO MASTERMIH) OF THE LEFTIST MOVE KENT, AND NOW THROUGH THE
SOLIDARITY THAT CISPES IS GIVING TO THE GROUPS. .
BUFFALO DIVISION - RE BUFFALO AIRTEL TO BUREAU, ET AL,

DATED NOVEM BER 3C, 1S83. fig W HHyill — «T—

PHI LIB^WHEgTONr iS AK cP1SC0B<(l1AR'PT!IEST WHO HEADS tfcP 0
CALLED EPICA. .WHICH PHOMOTES THE "LIBERATION THEOLOGY" IN
LATIN AMERICA AND IN THE UNITED STATES. EPICA GETS SIS, £00
A YEAR FROM THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES AND WHEATON ACTS AS
AN ADVISER ON LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. REVEREND ED ROBB,
A METHODIST MINISTER WHO KNOWS WHEATON WELL, DESCRIBES THE
HEAD OF EPICA AS A "REVOLUTIONARY." WHEATON, WHEN INVITED
BY THE DALLAS CHAPTER OF CISFES TO SPEAK AT THE SID IKTER-
CULT URAL CENTER, WAS DESCRIBED BY REPORTER TOM STYIER FROM
CKAKtvEL A (C3S> DALLAS, AS A "RADICAL MARXIST-LENINIST".
WHEATON RUNS A PROGRAM WITH THE METHODIST CHURCH IN WHICH
STUDENTS ARE BROUGHT TO THE WASHINGTON DC AREA TO RECEIVE - * *

301

(PAflqmS DE DL fMlfl m AlfffJ 199*799} ' .
INSTRUCTION 01 CENTRAL AMERICA! ISSUES. THEY RECEIVE .THEIR
"LIBER AT ION THEOLOBY," ANTI-AKRICAN RETHORIC', AND A COMPLETE
DISTORTED VIEH OF THE ROLE 'OF THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD
AFFAIR S ( IN HIS WRITINGS YOU CAN SEE A MIC TOTALLY SOLD TO
THE KARXISI-L ENIHIST PHIL OSOPHY . (^COM/^ . ..

302

(pagO**T>e dl #m

Qpl7JS9-793)

OKLAHOMA CITY DIVISIOH - RE OKLAHOMA CITY AIRTEL TO
BUREAU, DATED DECEMBER M," 1983.

THE SOLIDARITY hOVZKENT WITH THE PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR
IN OKLAHOMA IS USING A VARIETY OF SISTER ASSOCIATIONS TO
CARRY ON THE WORK OF ORGANIZATION, PROPAGANDA AND MOBILIZATION.
IT IS NOT CLEAR AT THE PRESENT WHERE THESE ORGANIZATIONS ARE '
OPERATING FROM BECAUSE OF THEIR NEti STRUCTURE. CISPES, NETWORK,
SAKE, COALITION, INTER -RELIGIOUS TASK FORCE, NARMIC, FCNL,
NACIA, IPS, WPC, USPC, NISGUA AND KKSHP, AFSC ARE VERY ACTIVE
IN THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA.

NEW ORLEANS DIVISION - RE NEW ORLEANS AIRTEL DATED
NCVEK3ER 30, 1983.

NORFOLK DIVISION"
DATED OCTOBER 2 7, 1983.

NORFOLK AIRTEL TO BUREAU,

303

lORITY

£}p HQ AL AQ AX AT BA BH BS BU CE C8 CI CV DN DE EP HO KN JK KC ^KX
LV £S lA LS HE m HI KP BO >K NH NO HY NF OC ON PH PX PSjfl. SA SD

£de olJ(.W V -

P 312044Z JjAN 84^(1*-)

Cn fbi Dallas! (199-795) (P)

|to director J-pbT^pri

(ATTN: SSA
FBI ALBANY FF.IORIT

FBI ALBU6UERCUt/(199C-3e8) PRIORITY
FBI ALEXAhrDF.I A/PRIORITY
FBI ATLANTAK1SSC-359) PRIORITY
FBI BALTIM0RE\(199C-856) PRIORITY
FBI BIRt;iNGHA[J(lS9C-155) FHIOr.ITY
FBI BOSTOtl V. 19SC-S15) PRIORITY
FBI BuFFALol (199C-361) PRIORITY
FBI CHAFLOTrS PRIORITY
FBI CHICAGO K 199C-3M) PRIORITY
FBI CINCIKtiATrtFRIOaiTY
FBI O.EVELAKd/fRI0RITY

VFBI DEKVEf^(199C-323) PF.ICRITY
FBI DETF.OIT\ (199C-2376) ■

SD SF SjJ

S3.

304

(page rat de Dl'#a6e

Fi3I EL PAS0j(l9»C-825) PRIORITY
FBI HDIISTONK 1990-771) PRIORITY
FBI HONOLULlXpRIORITY

fbi jacksonvilleVriority

FBI KANSAS CIT Y/flIORITY
FBI KKOXVIU. ^PRIORITY
FBI LAS VEGASjPRIORITY
FBI LITTLE ROCKy ISSC-168) PRIORITY
FBI LOS AKGaE£l(lS9C-S31) PRIORITY
FBI L0UISVILLE/C199C-15B) PRIORITY
FBI IEKPHI^(lSSC-£58) PSICRITY
FBI rlA(-l/l9SC-565) PRIORITY
FBI KILWAUKEeK 199C-385) PRIORITY
FBI MIKKEAPOLISV 199C-553) PRIORITY
FBI K02ILE/fl99C-96) PRIORITY
FBI NE'. ARK /PRIORITY
FEI NEW HAVEI?S<199C-443) PRIORITY
FBI KEV ORLEANS* U99C-382) PRIORITY
FBI KEV H0RK/U99C-257S) PRIORITY
FBI K0RF0LKK199C-179) PRIORITY

99-795)

305

'bhi ere t )cd1I i s

|PASC ><«"T ::f. 01 *aee;H-s-«-f-t -MiCDUlM-

[FBI OH. A HO Hi CIT T|< 199-9&) FflioRTTY-
f FE I OMAHA

FBI PHILADELPHIA/! J99C-SI2> PRIORITY
FBI FhC KI<"ilS9C-415) PRIORITY

FBI Pittsburgh) priority '..
FBI ST. LOUIS [PRIORITY
FBI SAN AKrOHlXc 1SSC-76B) PRIORITY,
FBI SAN DIEGO ^PRIORITY
FBI SAN FRANC1SC^<199C-11S5) FR I Of 1 1
FEI SAN JUA!»/<lSSt>M6] PRIORITY
FBI SAVAW:ahIc19SC-99> PRIORITY
FEI TAWA/fl99C-S3a> PRIORITY
FBI VF0A199C-1397J PHIORITlf
It

*- a t frg T

^SECTION FIVE OF SIX SECTIoi!s](U J

^fOPIWTTEE IN SOLIDARITY IWTH THE PEIPLE OF EL SALVADOR tCISPEs£J|^j
IT - EL SALVADOR) [Sit DALLAs/^tj

*LL INFORMATION REGARD I

I HAS BEE! PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED TO NORFOLK.

306

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FOOUL HUM H OTISTIMTIM

fmm KLim mm voauTm hut

PN»W iM*iH iiIIiiIj «t to IocHm h *» BW. Ow«mrftiMla>k|i

m<L— . A/, ATA

■■twill wiUbhfcei

□ htnnMw pataaad oaljr Is ■ tfcnd party witk bo ii w iwh to jxm or tha (abject of yoar nqsssL

□ titor—Hc. pKalMd o*)y to » (tod pty. Yow ii listed m la* title only.

LJ DocnncBts oilgliuted wMi limine i GovtfflneBt iftscyfjee). Hun rtnnmmti were nfcmd to did
■fCSCjOtt) fee minr ftsd dlnct mpOBvr to job*

Pfcfe* oootala tnrbrmitkxi farakhed by another Government ifencydei). Yoo vifl be edriied by the FBI l
to the rcleasabtKty of thk Information following oar conmltatJan with the other ifencrfies).

P *(*(•) wttWaki lor tfca foUawiig Matil:

a Par rev ixlnatiom:

ravaw

307

DLO Hf7 B3I213R '. C^'V

Qf> M AL AZ AX AT BA BH BS gU CE CG CI CV DN DE EP HO KS JK KC K^^^X

'LV LIT LA LS ME MM MI MP MO NK NH NO NY NF OC OM PH PX PQ SL SA SD Sf SJ
SV TP VF0j(yJ}

P 3J2J44Z

fFK FEI DALLAS|C199-795> (P>
(TO DIRECTOR, FBlj^IORITY
(ATTN: SS

/fbi albaky priority,

fbi albuquo!&ue/tl99c-3£8> priority

fbi alexancriajft.iority

fbi atlanta f( 199c-359) priority

fbi baltikorevc 199c-£5 6j priority

FBI BIRr!IHGHAlA(199C-155) PRIORITY
FBI E0STCH/fl99C-815> PRIORITY-
FBI SUFFALO\( 1S9C-3S1) PRIORITY
FBI CHAF.LOTTEJ PRIORITY

fbi Chicago/ J99C-8U) friority

FBI CISCIKKATl) PRIORITY
FBI CLEVZLAKOy PRIORITY
FBI DEKVER/U99C-825) PRIORITY
FEI DETROrl C191C-2076) FSIOF.ITY

308

1 DC dl taez

8j i 1 B HD » [<pl/

FBI EL PASOlC 1990-229) PRIORITY
FBI HMJST0N|<199C-771> PRIORITY
FBI *BNOLU.U\PRIORITY
FBI JACKSOKVILL^PRIORITY
FBI KAKSAS CIT Y/Pf.IORITY
FBI KNOXVILLe/pRIORITY
FBI LAS VEGAslpRIORITY
FEI LITTLE ROCkVc 199C-16S) PRIORITY
FBI LOS AKGELES/(199C-831) PRIORITY
FBI LOUISVILLe/< 1990-153) FRIORITY
FBI KEKPKIS'''u9SC-253) PR I OH IT Y
FBI MAM /US 90-5 65) PRIORITY
FBI r.ILWAUiX?\<lS9C-oS5> FftlOSITY
FBI KINNEAP0LlS)<199C-553> PRIORITY
F3I KCSILE/T1S9C-S6) PRIORITY
FBI KEWARKlFMORITY
FBI KEW KAVEbv(19SC-443) PRIORITY
FBI NEW 0RLEA!.k<199C-382) FRIORITY
FEI NEW Y0RKy<l99C-2576) FRIORITY
199C-179) PRIORITY

FEI NORFOLK

199-795)

Kutsztsm.

(page

DC DL /B8B7

T^E C R E T

199-795)

r3 I OKLAHOMA CITY \C199C-S65) PRIORITY
FBI Of: AHA PRIORITY]
FBI PHILADaPKlyU99C-6121 PRIORITY

fbi ph0ekix((199c-415> priority
fbi Pittsburgh} priority
fbi st. louis priority
fbi sah aftokiol c is9c-763) priof.ity
fbi sak diegoariorit y

FEI SAK Fi-:ftf;cl5C^U99C-llS5) PF.IOSIIY
FBI SAls JL*Ar/U9SC-M6> PRIORITY

FBI savau;;ah\(!S9c-99> priority
FBI TA; PA/( ISSC-SJ8) priority
FBI kr: X19SC-1397) PRIORITY
BT

r-ii -a,7T.

SECTION SIX OF SIX SECT IONsJ^IaJ

^otrnnTEE u slidarity with the People of el Salvador <ciSPEs)j£^

IT - EL SALVADOR; {OCt DALLAS^IaJ

ENTIRE CONTENTS OF THIS COWWRICAIIOK CLASSIFIED r.Lr_i .

310

- 4-TJW»r*fT«r-

PnOULHUMtrimtTWATIM

row* •aim mm ■pomahn mur

jSU^ >ttW mttnij at tkia loeatioa ia the Me. 0— or Mow of fl» faUowtoa; ititiaiaU. afceee

lull III. lajlihtoililiiloa,

JBf^ThUMi —Jar li— FllnaJl) . wilaeo npipHi

utatal available fa leieaM to »«■.

□ iafcsMtioa pertaiaed oaljr k> a third part? vita do reraraoca to yo« or the euhr*ct of yoar requaet

□ Iafeaatfoapaitaiaaaealy toalhjidpaily. Yoor oaaa ia lietad ia the title only.

□ Put ain e uU originated with eaother Government agencyQeri. Tlieat docameoti were referred to that
ageacyOrj) hr review aad direct rcspowje to yoa.

Pagas reartahi uifmiuetioQ raraUMd by aa mlw Government afency(lcs)- Yon will be edviaul by the FBI ai
tn the releaiabllrtj of ttth mtbrmatkxi following oor consult* tioa with the other ageacyOa).

Pagwte) withheld (or the following laaaaa(a):

□ For yoar iafaMttoK

following aaabar ia to be aaad fa lafaian regarding tbeee pagan:

311

(page «Cf DE dl * seel

199-793)

* " FDR THOSE OFFICES JUST BEGINNING INVESTIGAT ION OF CISPES
CHAPTERS, DALLAS SUBMITS THE FOLLOWING WHICH COULD EE USEFUL
IN DETERMINING THEIR ACTIVITIES^
' 1.

2. CISPES OFTEN ADVERTIZES SOCIAL EVENTS SUCK AS DANCES,

BAR-B-SUES, BAKE SALES ETC., TO RAISE FUNDS. THESE EVENTS
CAN BE ATTENDED WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.

3. CISPES CLOSELY ALIGNS ITSELF WITH CHURCH GROUPS.
IN FACT, MOST CISPES OFFICES HAVE SET UP SANCTUARYS IN
CHURCHES, AND HAVE PUBLICALLY BOASTED THE FACT THAT THEY
CAN PROTECT ILLEGAL SALVADORAHS WITHOUT INTERFERENCE OF
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

312

nMUL HUM tF MVUTIMTNR

fwm mrrn mm ■fobutmm but

Pssspte) wilMi aatMj at aria tocarioa la Cfca Ala. Op. or —» of the tollowtat ttHlalill, wa—
Ig / 'pal«to» —hi ■■aaytiuad)

with ma aepaphia

aaferU arailabla fa hImm to jot

□ laJbraarka parti joed oaly k> ■ third party with no lataaae* Id too or the lubjact of roar nojBMt.

□ IxJbrmatioa partakwd mlj to a third party. Yoor aaae La lLetad km tha titla only.

□ Dec u M i nli cf sf hsa tri with ea nrh i i Gorerameat atencjtQes). These documents were referred to that
ageacjOra) for mho aad dbact ropoMt to jma.

Pages contain infbnpjtioo f arahh ed by Mother Gwtmment ttencrdei). You will be ad^hed by the FBI ai
to the refeasabilitY of this information foUoving our consultation with the other agettcyfiei).

Pajote) witkhsU fa the fctlowimf nanonU):

□ For,

ttf^TtotoUoirimf aiiitoioWaiaafaiafisMLate^iaiiuTt

_NODUPUCAnOM PB _

liiiiiummim

313

TRAN8MrrW*'

□
□

AIRTKL

Routes

... O ;

CLA88FT At ;

□ TOP SecAcT

□ SECflET

□ CONFIDENTIAL

□ UNCtASEFTO

3EC,

£t>0: DALLA5j^j

DIRECTOR. FB 1^199-8848)
CITyY

SAC, KANSAS

<199C-635)(Sq 4 - WRA)(P)

IB TH iSnTiIfURTTT WITH

PEOPLE OF fit- aAi.vaprw (CISPES
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - EL

k *vADOH

All markings, notations and Items of Information.,
contained In this communication Is classified fcum t unl ess
otherwlss noted, ^Ja^ Jf"^ 1

Re Bureau alrtel to all field offices, fcnptlcVped as
above, 10/28/83. fa J V* J

Enclosed for the Bureau and Dallas Is one copy each of
a "flyer" obtained at Wichita State University (WSU), 11/17/83.

For Info of the Bureau and Dallas , a canvassing of all
major campuses In the Kansas City Division re captioned group
proved negative, with the exception of WSU. Wichita/ Kana

On 1L/ 17/83, the writer obtained a flyer 4f|ptloned
"Stop tJ. S. InfceVventlon Is Central America and the Caribbean."
This flyer wasXdffeplayed on a bulletin board In the Liberal Arts
Building, Wichita! Stats University (WSU), Wichita, Kansas.

Enc.

r-3A)

alias (Eno
[Kansas City

^wJdkU):

snu:

Approved:

Besfeaftr*

i Tinrc c ro;

ncmmin

torn

'-568 0119

314

At the bottom of the flyer was typed

Sponsored by the Committee in Solidarity with
the People of El Salvador, 2330 N. Oliver, #216-683-9750.
Tbe flyer listed numerous dates, ranging from 1823-1983,
when the United States had/ varying degrees of Involvement
in the" Caribbean area. fefe*/

On 11/28/83 the mail box for apartment 216 at
2330 N. Oliver (Shadow Lake Apartments) was observed and It
had displayed thereon the names Otto and Gentry , J^tdtj

Public directories for Wichita indicate that a
Cam/Camillia Gentry resides at 2330 N. Oliver, Apartment 216,
and that she subscribes to telephone #683-9750., Tbe same
directories contain no reference to an Otto, fete)

The 1983-84 1SU Student /Faculty /Staff Directory
indicates Camlllia A. Gentry Is a library staff librarian,
and resides at the above address. Tbe same KStl Directory
indicates Steven J. Otto also resides at 2330 N. Oliver,

Apartment 216 , and 1b a senior In the college of Liberal Arts.,

Kansas City indices negative re Gentry and Otto

315

316

317

SKT U.S. CVTERW JN IN CENTRAL
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

iB23i none* Docnm sod. u.s. claims utu
tfniCA Ai its *trma or xmusra."

IBJ31 U.S. troop* latarvmas U tlcarafba

1635< O.S. troops Lnunm LA Poru

1852 1 U.I. MailAas Lnvadt ArfastLaa

1651*1 U.I. dastroja Saa Ju& dsl ■art*, ■lcaracua

to *voag« so insult to th* U.S. alalstar
I855i U.S. troops Latairaao la Uruguay
l656i U.S. loradao Paaaaa
lft5fli U.I. troop* latarrwM La Uzufua/
186 J 1 U.S. troops LAt«r**Bo la Paaaaa
16661 U.S. troops LatarvsM Lb Uruguay

1066 1 U.S. troops latorraas la Columbia

l673i U.I. troops latorrsM la CoJusbia

16651 U.I. troops latarvmaa Lb Paaaaa

16661 0.3. troops latamoa 1a Haiti

I89I1 U.S. troops UrUrrmtia La CM Is

18^*i U.S. troops UUnw ia llearacua

IP951 U.S. troops LatarrsM Coliaitla

I6961 U.S. HarUss Lavads Honduras

I&961 U.S. troops Latarvsa* La Ilcararoa

10961 U.S. troops LBtsrvma* La llearacua

IB9S1 U.S. troops lAtsrnsa La Cuba, initiating

ths Spanlab-Aaarleaa War
I8961 U.S. troops LATsdo Pusrta Uco to

'libs rata 1 It fro» Spain
1899 1 O.S. troops latsrwas la Ucarafua
190li U.S. troops Latarraas la Coluabia
1902i U.S. troops tAtarvaas 1a Coluabia
903' U.S. troops Latarvaa* la Honduras
:90)t U.S. troops latarra&s la Doaialcan ■•public
1903i U.S. troops lAtsrwat La Panama
190(*i U.S. troops latamaa ia Domini can *• public
190»i U.S. troops latsmas 10 Paaaaa
1907i U.S. troops Latsrroo la Honduras
1910i U.S. troops Intarvaos la llcarafua
1911i U.S. troops lAtsron* Ia Honduras
19 Ui U.S. troops latorrsas Ia Cuba
1913' U.S. troops Latarvans La Haxlea
191^* U.S. troops LAtsrroas Ia Haiti
1915i U.S. KaxLass lavads Haiti, ramaia 20 jttn
19l6i U.S. troops Lntsrama ia Dominican *« public

for 4th tlM. thoy rsaalA for 6 nan
I919i U.S. troops latamos Ia Honduras
1920i U.S. troops Lntsrrmna La Cuatoaala
192J*! U.S. troops lAtarrws La Honduras
1925i U.S. troops latarrsM Ia Honduras
1925* U.S. troop* Lntarrma* La Paaaaa
1926i 3000 U.S. Xaxlass Utsmos 1b llcarafua,

aad ruin for ? t*at%
1926i 1000 aanana ■oxfcan klUsd U Celtabla

for atrlklat afaiavt Ucltad fruit Co.
1933i 3 U.S. van hips deck La U Salvador, boob

aftar JO, 000 psaaanta an aaaaanrad
19 5** • KlssahoMOr, tha C.X.A.. aad U.S. military

wsrthrov tb* constitutional aad

daaocratjloallj dieted Axbsss govszaaaot

la Cuatsmala. Tbsy iaatall a Bilitarj

dictatorship
1956» Paaaaa dselans "otats of saifs" aftar

6 an klUad U aeU-O.I. dots
1959i Cuba soeoasi first Latin Anorlcaa aatioa

to mln LBdspsadaaes from tea U.S. "sphan

of influaoca"
19*1 1 CI. A. acdar Isoaady Lnvadaa Cuba, but ia

dafsatad at aaj of >i«s
1962* U.S. Sary bafins Its bloeaads of Cuba
196**i U.S. troops kill studaot protsitsrs Ia tha

Paaaaa Cacal Zoos

Sponcsrod 07 tha Coanltto* in Solidarity with
2330 It SJXnr. i 216 €63-9750 •

19*5' 20.000 U.S. MarJjMs iarads Domini cm Sap.

I9691 Thoroufh oonald«ntlon b* glvmn to Mm
elimination of fldal Caatre.*

— Jobs Postar Dullos

1973i Elsalacsx, tha C.I. A., and Um U.S.

aiiltaxy aponaor a coup La Cm la ablch
ovarthrowa tba cautitutional and
dmmscrmticaily al^t«d (OTmaasat.
Pnaidaot JOlaads aad 50,000 otAtr
an aurdarsd

1975> ^ studaata an klllsd at tba UaiTmraltj of
SI Salvador mhlla daaonatratinc acainat
U.S. latsrv*Qtiaa

1979 ■ Slcarmfua bnomi tha 2ad latin AaarieaB
aatles to via l&dspaadoDC* froa tAa U.S.
"sphsrs of Lnflusacs"

19S3i Concrtaa approvss S80 alllioo la covsrt
U.S. amjr agalnat Ucarafua

1963> 6,000 U J. troops at*c« "sock" alockada of
Mlcarmfua. 1*aj salt thars ao« for aa
axeua* to lotsrvsos la Hlcaracua, .
or CI Salvador which li attsa;tlns to
baeaaio tha third Latin iasricaa oatioa
to win tha It iadopaadancs from tha
U.S. *a?h*n of influsoes"

tn« Poopla of Zl 5slrsder

318

TRANSMIT VIA:

Teletype
□ Facsimile

3 ftJxlcJ

PRECEDENCE:

□ Immediate

□ Priority
D Routine

Director, FBI IU99-8B48)
SAC, Jackaonvill

. -. f
CLASSIFICATION:

□ TOP SECRET

□ SECRET

□ CONFIDENTIAL

□ UNCLAS E F T 0

□ UNCLAS,
Ma

U99C-407)

out

OMMITTEE IN SOLIDARITY wtth
TITE^PEqT/LE 6f EL SALVADOR (CISPES

T - EL s'ALVAD6r~TT
00: DALLAS]

its

This communication
er.t irety

is classified

-5 rs UNtLissi7in> Re Bureau airtel to all off flees, 1 07 2 8 / 83. flU

Information contained in this communication
obtained from public aourees:

t DC£P7 IVKLRX MCWI

■'TJtERWiJX

SUP

CISPES was first noted to be in Tallahassee
Florida, when this none appeared on an advertisement
as a co- sponsor for Mario Velasquez, Representative t
'he U.S. from the Revolutionary Democratic front.
Velasquex spoke on campus at Florida, Stat* University (FGU>
on 4/21/81, on "The Struggle for Independence in El
Salvadore". t*5 > *f^'~'

On 10/12/12, an article appeared in the FlKi'i
Flambeau, campus newspaper, FSU, entitled, "CISPES Is
Not a 'Commie Front*", written by Felix Kasud.

Approve

319

article stated in part, "We support the Democratic Revolutionary
Front and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front...".
At the end of the article, Masud was described as the local
"coordinator" for. CISPES. £(Llj -

Masud, a FSU student, first came to be noted in
an article in the Florida Flambeau on 4/14/(10, when he
furnished an opinion concerning the incident when 10,000
Cuban people stormed the Peruvian Embassy seeking asylum
in other countries. Masud stated that Castro used this.,. ;• .
opportunity to rid Cuba of counter-revolutionaries. - •
Masud admitted to travelling to Cuba in 1 979 , on a trip
sponsored by the Antonio Maceo Brigade.

1979, .

Masud has been the only person referred to in a
possible leadership role. Other persons making statements
in behalf of CISPES are always referred to a a member or
spokesperson and all appear to be students i: FSU.*^[(^y

The Tallahassee chapter of CISPES admits to being
the first chapter in. Florida which consists of students and
professors at FSU. VAXj

The local chapter has no known local office but
takes advantage pf being students to obtain use of FSU campus
facilities. £ «*J

The fall, 1983, isaue for the Center for Participants
Education (CPE) lists a non-credit course entitled, "No

Viet Nam War in Central America (CISPES)", which meets on
the first and third Wednesday of each month at 7:30 p.m.,
in a building on campus at FSU. The instructor is listed
as "The Group". j^vUi

CPE emerged on campus at FSU about thirteen years

ago for the purpose of "addressing more relevant and timely
issues and providing opportunities to learn more practical
skills". Consequently, you have a hodge-podge of non-credit
classes running the gambit from Chinese Calligraphy to Food
and Nutrition. However, it should be noted the program is
funded by the FSU student government. k^A.J

320

JK[/19 9C-<0

FS'J

t'"!- On the, staff of CPE is Moni Basu,
student and admitted member of CISPES

Coord ina tor, r

In the "collective
CISPES, Geoff Smith (law stu
student, and Felix Masud.

CPE are admitted members
and Paul Kamolnick, FSU

It should be noted CPE was the other co-sppnsor
for the appearance of Mario Velasquei, supra. Ji(jJ

The 1982 FSU Student/Faculty Directory lists
Felix Roberto Masud, FSU Box 6442, Tallahassee, Florida,

telephone 90i/575-9343. It is noted Masud is a graduate
student in" the College of Arts and Sciences.

321

stration

Building

Theater

El Salva

combined

local pe

possibil

CISPES is known to have conducted protest demon-
s at the U.S. Army Recruiting Office, Federal '

in Tallahassee, Florida, and conducted a Guerilla
to dramatize the killing of the foreign nuns in
dore. Tallahassee CISPES orgar. ization is also
with the Tallahassee Peace Coalition, a group of
rsons and ministers who apeak out on the increasing
ities of nuclear war.

who fipea

CISPES i
local of
campus

Overall, it appears the Tallahassee chapter Of
s composed of students at FSU and has no known
fice. It is believed to conduct its^ ijeetings on
nd uses the facilities of the CPE.

Bureau authority i* also requested to allow Buagents
to conduct surveillances on campus at FSU pertaining to'
students and faculty members of CISPES. jfluj ' .

Leads

Miami Division

At Hiami, Florida

322

323

TRANSMTTVIA: V - PRECEDENCE

O Teletype v , 4 □ Immediate .

□ Facakrde <v^rv- :v' O Prtorty

n ATRTBfc —— — □ Routine

FiScnc

•••• ">

-ASSIFICifnON:

' a top secret '

a SECRET

□ CONFIDENTIAL ' ;

□ UNCLAS EFTO

□

/":.

• DIRECTOR, FBI J

FROM I '

SAC, PITTSBORGHj(199C-623) (p)

SUBJECTj JCiDERCOVERPROPOSAL

or.

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - ** 0 UUJ IU.

EL SALVADOR i"l>
£TOO, DALLAS} ^)

«9i

entire

This communication is classified ••

in its!

SEd

2-{>alla. /
2-£ittsburgtJ{KJ

ttaburg

£2 FEB 16 B 2j0<-)

(Numbaf) (Tkna)

324

9C-C33

- - ■ ... - "Tftaete's^

Tin vr t/uiujt j j | y/ i BMK'-sgJgg* - ."TJ^^^^^'ai^'" i ^

The coemlttee In Soliflarltj With the People of ■''■•> '

El Salvador (CISPES) Is a national organization involved lo^^^^Ti_
activities supporting Comunllt insurgents tn Bl S al v ado r . -J 5^ -
CISPES overtly takes a political stance opposing 3. Government"; 'V — ~
pollcr in Bl Salvador and Central Amertce, and collects funds and -.j.... .-,
■atari all ostensibly for Salvador an refugees and all ana 1m; — j,fy » /sf?j *--*j
Central Aaserlca and the U. 8. The CISPES leadership covertly . - ■ s.v_V'
furnishes the above funds and Materials to the guerrillas In ' ':_~'Z~"l.':
El Salvador! assists In the maintenance of camp* in the United
Statea for the rehabilitation and reindoctrinatlon of Salvador an _V
guerrillaa and Salvadoran guerrilla sympath tiers either to be
returned to the fighting In Bl Salvador or to rema in In
to establish guerilla cells In the United Stat

SPEa has many chapters - ana
throughout the United states which often utilise front nanea
rather than cispes such as. In the San Antonio area. Pro j tec to
Liber tad (PL), Project© Ho spit all dad EPE>, and Latin American
Assistance (laa), JmU/J

Investigation at Pittsburgh has disclosed an ~
organisation in the Pittsburgh area calling itself the Central _ * -.
American Mobilisation Coalition (CAMC). This group .haa been •'—
identified as the regional cispes chapter. This group la also ■
active in assisting and advancing CISPES sponsored activities . jfl UJ

Investigation at' Pittsburgh has disclosed that the CAMC - -
Is actively engaged in fund raising activities in the Pittsburgh
area. Bureau haa provided Pittsburgh additional information that ■ f
the CAMC was one of two groups arranging programming la the -
united States for Alejandro Molina Lava, Organising Secretary of
the national Federation of Salvadoran Workers (FKRASTRAS) and

325

member of the United Popular Action Front (UPAF) . This
information indicated that Molina was in the U. S. actively
seeking contributions for the Central American Solidarity
Comm ittee. (CASC) . which is largely Influence d and directed by the

\\ upAj-^^HBM|pBBHlHlBBHBHF^' ddi tionall y ' the

CAMC lsTwolveTinTo^ia^onliccuon with, a group or
organization that has created an underground for smuggling
Salvadoran illegal aliens from Mexico into and across the D. S.
Two Salvadoran illegal aliens are now being sheltered in the
Pittsburgh area. Their known activities include the attendance
of meetings of political and church organizations and the giving
of political speeches describing the "oppressiveness" and
"brutality" of the Salvadoran government and the justness of the
guerrilla cause. They describe themselves .as. having been labeled
"guerrillas" by the Salvadoran government. 'xSS^j

The CAMC also has connections, of an unknown extent,
with a program called the "Witness for Peace Action," which
involves the travel of chosen individuals from the Pittsburgh
area to Nicaragua for a period of one or two weeks (apparently
depending upon the travelers choice). The program's advertised
purpose is to line the borders of Nicaragua with U. S. citizenB
in an attempt to prevent the invasion of that country by D. S.
forces. Fifteen people from the Pittsburgh area are involved
with this trip, and will leave for Nicaragua 3/16/84, to return
3/26/B4. '

The specific target of this operation is those members
and affiliates "of the CAMC and CISPES who are knowingl y
supporting the Salvadoran guerrillas in the U. S. and Central
America and furnishing to them financial and material support. A
membe r_"'- affji< »te of the CAMC has described the membership of
the CAMC as a hard core of former Socialist Jjcj ker Varfcy tsWPl
jnempers. most of them In their mid-thirties or early forties, who
were once active in the anti-Vietnam War movement and who are
" more inclined toward violent demonstrations " than to peaceful
demonstrations. ^i^Ll

326

99C-623

S^^T

OPERATIONAL SCENARIO

The membership of the CAMC and Its affiliated groups
appears generally to be of two type groups: the 'core" membership
and the " affilia te" membership. The " core " ■ember ship consists
of individuals with strong Comm uni st or Socialist beliefs who
have a history of being auLlve In LujUIumst or socialist
political organizations, some since the Vietnam war era. The
"affiliate" membership, on the other hand, consists in large part
of local college students relatively new to the political scene.
It has at least one female high school student member. Some of
these younger "affiliate" members appear to be politically
unsophisticated in that they know little of international current
events save what they read or hear at their political meetings.
Pittsburgh has noted at least two of these members or affiliates
both were young females. Another group of "affiliate" members
consists of older college students . orp erhaPS graduate students ,
who appear to have a nigh uegree of political awareness in that"
they are knowledgeable of world events and are aware of the
Communist and 0. S. Interpretation of these events. These
members or affiliates are often members of other groups, such as
the Young Socialist, or The Thomas Her ton Center. _&ffa\

327

328

involved in, and the purpose behind the violation* oC federal la*
of smuggling and sheltering illegal aliens in the Pittsburgh area
2 ) the potential for violent demonstrations in the Pittsburgh area
and; 3) the extent that these and otherj clandestine activities are
Intended to aid foreign terrorists. SRiAJ

JUSTIFICATION OF DSE OF UNDERCOVER (UC) TECHNIQUE I

329

4-7S0(Rc» 4-n tS)

xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

Pagets) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where
indicated, explain this deletion.

L^^Dele ted under exemption* s) with no segregable

material available for release lo you.

Q Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to you or the subject of your request.

Q Information pertained only lo a third party. Your name is listed in the tide only.

n Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that
agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as
to the releasability of this information follouing our consultation with the other agency(ies).

Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s):

n For your information:

following number is lo be used for reference regarding these pages:

xxxxxx
xxxxxx

xxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx

DELETED PAGE(S) X
NO DUPLICATION FEE 0
FOR THIS PAGE X

xxxxxxxxxxvxxxxxxxx

330

The Privacy Act of 1974 ammended Title 5, United States /
Code (USC) , Section 552o(e> to include the following provision: <wU/

■(e) Agency Requirements - Each agency that maintains a
system of records shall - jfelU J

(7) maintain no record describing how any individual
exercises rights guaranteed by the Pirst Amendment unless
expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom
the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and, within the
scope of an authorized law enforcement activity)

and wi

S^^ET

331

Title 26, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) , Section
16.56 promulgated under the authority of the Attorney General
applicable to All FBI employees provides that employees shall

■(SJNelther collect, maintain, use not
disseminate information concerning
an Individual's religious or political
beliefs or activities or his membership
In associations or organizations, unless
(1) the individual has volunteered such
information for his own benefit] (2) the
information is expressly authorized by
statute to be collected, maintained,
used or disseminated, or (3) the activities
involved are pertinent to and within the
scope of an author la
adjudication or con

and

lent to ana witnin tne
Lied investigation, *f , I
:rectional activity. jH^V

Both membership in a political organization and
speaking out in public against particular actions or policies o
the U.S. Government are generally within the protective
restrictions of subsection (e)(7) of the Privacy Act (herein

332

after referred to as (e)(7) data). However, the collection and

maintenance of such information ia justified if it is pertinent to,
and within the a cope of an authorized law enforcement activity. {/^

The DCA whose background has been att forth la acutely
aware of and sensitive to First Amendment considerations. He has
been and will continue to be briefed by the PLA regarding First
Amendment issues as they arise. The ultimate goal being the
elimination of irrelevant and unwarranted collection and
maintenance of information concerning one's practice of his
Constitutional rights of freedom of religion, press, assembly,
speech and petition. The key words her* at* irrelevant and
unwarranted! ireelevant to the stated objective of thia
investigation, and unwarranted in the absence of appropriate
authority for the collection of Such information.

Accordingly, within the Halts herein set forth, and .
with adequate controls to insure what starts out On course
remains on course, the undercover proposal merits approval. The
legal issue la recognized and minimization principles will be
applied and supervisory oversight insured. Km/

14. RISK OF VIOLENCE TO PEOPLE OR PROPERTY

No risk of violence to people or property Is
anticipated in this scenario. -

333

18 CARRYING OF FIREARMS BY DCA r - ,.- ^O-- -^SS^^t""
?- -.-■::« r-^sp^ - . . .• "" .. '^"■ 'V^' '■'■r' ■ **

It i» anticipated that no firearm* will bo carried b%.^}^;.'z:~
OCA while participating in inatant scenario. . " \-">_.

. 19. SPECIAL TRAINING - :. ' •.. • •-..£•» .." - * ' ; --Sr':.'"' •-• --"V
— - No special training is anticipated for UCA. ..^ ^ >.• -

- 20. NATORE AND EXTENT OF TRAVEL OCTSIDB FIELD DIVISION "*T

None anticipated. f."*
21. SAC RECOMMEND AT I OH t

I have reviewed this proposal in its entirety. It is a
worthwhile venture which I believe deserves consideration.
Accordingly, I reconmend this DC proposal be approved. . _ - .. ._' _ .

334

335

THAT MEMBERS OF CftSC ARE KNOWINBLY INVOLVED II COVERT ACTIVITIES
; Of CISPESV HOWEVER, MILWAUKEE DIVISIM CAM ROT STATE' WITH *W
DEGREE Or CERTAINTY THAT THIS 13 THE CASE. jg^J ", : ; . .-

AS FAR AS INTERVIEWS OF MEMBERS ARE CONCERNED, THE INTERVIEWIN8 \
AGENTS HAVE EXPLAINED THE FBI'S LEGITIMATE INVESTIGATIVE OBJECTIVES
PRIOR TO ANY INTERVIEW WHEN THE PERSON INTERVIEWED PERMITTED SuCH. J^Qj

ALTHOUGH FBIHq HAS MADE CLEAR THE OBJECTIVES OF THIS INVESTIGATION,
MILWAUKEE DIVISION DOES NOT HAVE ANY SPECIFIC DETAILS CONCERNINB
SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES OF CISPES, I.E. TERRORIST AND COVERT ACTIVITIES. J$

IN INTERIM,

ATTEMPT TO ANALYSE CASC IIFORHaTIDI II ORDER TO MEET INVESTIGATIVE
OBJECTIVES. * j

B bt n'3) oc e Li oil 8 n B m

ytlt

■3W

336

4 *

TRANSMIT VIA;

□
□

II Ulrl-wl

. \

FBI

PRECEDENCE:

LI MnrnMnn

□ Priority

□ Routine

^ V

■2A10N: \
s TOP SECRET \^

SEcJ^T

40.

□ 8ECRET

□ CONFIDENTIAL

□ UNCLAS

□ UNCI

UNCLAS E F T (Mfl VUt

.fell »4C/DIRECTOR, pbi/ „_„

»£^tteNtioni "SSA flJH|^^|M^ £«JC/

^ROmAAI^C, PHILADELPHIA^ (199-612) (SQ12) (P)

SUBJECT: fcO«?ITTEB IH SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLE
-OP-EL ..SALVADOR (CISPEsMjk fc. ...L '

IT-EL SALVADOR -l^J
[DO: DALLAS]^

This communication classified "new in its entirety .^4,

^ iV _ Re Bureau teletype dated 12/22/83 and Dallas teletype
to the Bureau dated 1/31/84. fc) *^

, f 0 ?, 1 "* Information of the Bureau and Dallas, investigati
at Philadelphia has determined that a chapter of CISPES along
with the below listed organizations and/or groups are actively
involved in demonstrations! seminars; marches, etc., regarding n iJ.
the O.S. intervention in Central America, the Caribbean and El ([IP-
Salvador. The various groups involved in these matters are VY^T/
as follows i

^ot El^Salvadof (CISPES) - 215-386-9250

99-8148) (RM)

3. jfintral American Working gr °np (CKWG^^ rt5-j87- ffip 6
SECwET

SEC

IS lf MB 111 -
I SS 1PW 81 1

IRK)

.612) (S012)

£E-2l6/> ,

♦a

D uliui j uu. CAM —

(Nunfcer) (Time)

337

338

4-730(1*.. 4- 17-tS

FEDERAL MM EM OF fflVESTIUHOI
t , ., FOIM OELETEO PAGE UFOMATIOH SHEET

Pajx<s) withheld entirely st this location la the file, "in nr mail if Itn fnllnr lin ililiwuli. ihw
jp^l^t— < explais this 4

with do •egrefnbla

material available for release to yoa.

□ Information pertained only to a third party with do reference to yoa or the subject of your request,

□ tnfcraatioB pertained only to a third party. Your nana la listed in the till* only.

□ Documents originated with another Government sgencyOes). That documents v/trt referred to that
egencyfles) for review and direct response to yoa*

Fsges contain laformatlon furnished by another Govern ntentagencyOes). You win be advised by the FBI 1

to the releasablHty of this Information following our consultation with the other agencyOes).

P *!*<•) withheld for the following maoafah

I 1 For joer Inwuiether

The following saaabar is to be used for reference regarding thee*

HQ 199* SMI- 233 yegg. 3

339

340

anuria* nt anon tens ms

a< aLVJUm (dsn ,V It

nmMIW l» ■■ ^ I _ wr nmrnW ✓ *\ ' ' "

I fedmftJK-MM

Tha antlra oontanta of this n— i nil ■! lm dual f lad •atemV,
Of f la of Orlglni Dallas

fata Bwaatlgatlva Stawaxy Fraparadi Itercti 28, 19M

Mil fat Investigation

CaMlttM In Solidarity with tha Faofda at EL Salvador psn) , a

provide international attract to th* laftlat tommlt In EL Salvador, idnl s f

in 1980. It la a broad eoHltion at groqpa and individual* ojnoaad to Oil tad fcj >V

Stataa Lntarvsntlon In EL Salvador, and attaapta to aducata tha felted Stataa e

psjlic of tha lagltiaaey of tha oapoiltlai ttmm nt capri—itad by tha
Daaoczatlc Maelutlonarj Front ORB) , tha r" 1 **'"* 1 an of tha U
Laftlat Hwaaarrt.

mformtion aas fncnlahad to tha Fadaral mraaa of Inv—tigaUcn,
Dallas Division, ghat OSHB la an organisation that oonsist* of gro^m-}^

TMs ana— nt qontalna nalttaa raariaanoatloaa nor cmclfuarj"

It la tha proparty of tha IK and la
ara not to ba diatr lbutad

idantltlas ara

341

4.7J0 (»r». 4.17-tS)

YYYYYT

FEOUUL Ml RE All OF WVESTIUT1M
FOIM DELETED PAQE MFOMATIOI MEET

I Pagete)

indicate

CB^Ddeted under exemptionU) ^ /

Pagete) wteWaetd entirely at tfaia location in lbs MI*. Out or aiore of the following |U
indicated, eiplaia tail deletion.

Deleted under exessptiaoU) _ *Q f with no segregnnle

materiel available for releeee to yon.

0 Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to you or toe subject of your requeeL

1 1 Information pertained only to a third party. Your name ia Hated in the title only.

□ Documents originated with another Government agenesia). These documents were referred to that
agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency()es). You will be advised by the FBI as

to the rcleasability of this information following our consultation with the other agencyties).

Page(e) withheld for the following reason* il:

Q For yoar letweurrina-

following aaausef ia so he Mad far reference regarding these pegao:

342

Ml Salvador and to

" thi», asm

in 1980 to ogfom Chi tod Stotot lntorvantion In
ths struggls of Silndorw paaplt. To acccoriliih
tto FOt-fKN, and ton lssusd to* following

■CI9n> provide intomitlonal support far tot apposition
— t In El Salvador and raoognltt tto fM MM aa tto only political
party In H Salvador'.

That tto Salvsobran paopls tijiai ttoix last ill all naads and
Miter ie lntoraato through tto ITJt Nhlch Is tto political organisation
i it—at iij tto tnlf icatlon of all Caress opposing tto junta f raa tvtry aactar of
Salvador an sodsty and through tto nut. tha Military organisation
•xprtasing tto usat unified oppoaitions*.ay^/

"ftoy bring- to ton pa n p ln nC tto Dbltod Statoa a truthful pcrteaysl
or ton RB)Mr.l«[(|/

"Tto raiat fund* for tto ptxpoaa of providing housing, food and
to ntugaas-^oj

bona «ho think tto Salvadoran Amy can vin an daludlng
lias. In to* past taw aontto, tat Salvadorsn Aaay has launcfasd nan

tto positions of tto !KJ. Hot only tos tto ntJI^^ .

343

344

4-TSHSWV.4-17.aS)

C"\ ') xxxxxx

FEOUUL Hllig OF IIVEST1UTI0I
FMM DO-tTEll tkU INFO MATH) II MEET

Pafwta) wtiahiH entirely at Ilia location in the file. One or more of the following stai
indicated, asgdaia this ddetksa.

ewejptioa(s)

. with no segregahle

material available for release to you. ~

□ Infccaatioa pertained only to • third party with no reference to you or the subject of your request

□ Information pertained only to t third party. Your nests ia listed in the title only.

O Doc um ents originated with another G wi.iiiun.ii t sgencrOes). These documents were referred to that
agency! lea) for review and direct response to you.

Pages contain information furnished by another Government sgencyOes). You will be advised by the FBI as

to the reteasability of this information following our consultation with the other agencyOes).

Petals) withheld for the following raaecerla):

□ For yoor in&natkm:

E'^Tne following essabar ia to he need for reference re carding theaa pagee:

Vadaral Bissau of Investigation laafly lai ■. (reiBQ) alil—l In
Mgr, 1983, • bo* «o>lodea at Ha 0. S. iw Rational ttar Collage, Part
(Uttlr, Washington, D,C M inldentlfled Individual contacted a local radio
station In tfcehlngton, D.Ctto days aftar ths bcablre and advised that
"mb are in Solidarity with tha People of KL Salvador, and rinilaaslr and have
taken action because people ara trained at tba NC, M the tiaa of ths
tatting, rep rese ntatives of ths Coasittee in Solidarity jrith tba People of El
Salvador (CISFB9) vara aaetlng in Weehlnjton, D. C.'

346

in Jim, 1383, tn jim Division advlaad tha asets latter In ;
Jon la Jem Kwlga) Oolon B an La n a , an attorn*?. Bt la toon to trmt

I^S^^LS? ?0¥?* n 111 P™*1«> of awaaarrts ajainat tha ywint
of El Salv»ta.Q|Y

347

FED HAL HUM OF IIIVCIrlUTHHI
F01H DEL IT HO -AGE I1F0MATKII SHEET

Paaatet I IM l l l Mtiralj at tkm tocjt™ >a the file. Oh or «. of tt» followiaf .U
i Ifck MttVta

D
□

*0 jam.

nut* w ed only Id a thirt party with do reft™™ to yoa oe (be •ubjed of your
oaljr to a tkiid party, Yow um la IjaUd ia tba title only.

with BsofhcrGQ*erBnefltatencyt,fei). These document *ere iefenc4 to that
atcacyfapj) for rrriew aad direct nspddse to yoa*

Paflet contain information fumtihed by another Coveminent ifeDcyfira), You will be etfrianl by the FBI t
to the Kfeeubinty of thk tnforma two following on r cooiulta two with the other agencyf asK

Paajeta) witbbaU for tba following naaoafa):

□ Forjwt

ITf^Tlia full mail —till 111 >1 til mil f II llfllin

348

In July, 1963, Iter folk Dlviiion d»t*rmln«d ■Uhm 1b Mwcrt
Vlrglnti, which Is a llbrary/bookatora uaad by CXBB, ana also Is
utiliMd by ttw nun Socialist AUianca, and etntc such ma. Bocfcjbcca
cortjimd po«t«ri ana othar 11 tar Mm In sopport of Blsak tasc. and Black

MlitiKy.MSi)

349

350

) »

FOtML HUM t» millMIIM

ran larra mm anauiwi but

tU. P*B)U> aUafctH mOmij at AU kxatfcm is 0a> Ma. Ga* or an* of 0» foiloaiac ataai
iwlli »M. aajlaai Hill llllttna

(Ef'Mrtrtafcr aetata) «^ witfcao

aalartsl atailaMa tor lalaaaa Is job.

□ tafa(Mtl<» patafa*d cab to • IWal party . Yaar aaa* ia IM ■ oa> Ufa «aly.

O Poc»i»jabcr|gla»a«lwnaaaolaarG aaajal ajaaj(aU Haw i>« mill am nftiml tottat

■ t iiiij<aa)ft» wfaa lid ilaa I h ipiaw layoa.

Pajq cclrtthi lu>ji»tiltuii ftinrirted by Mother C»i»»i»ui»uI ipinqrtaiX Too win ba adMaK] bj Haj FBI ■

In llM ajhmliHitj nflhli lnfonailaTa fnllmiaj we cnai.tutic iHa taj mftjr iai«r)tai>

PajaU) wUaaaU fm ta* fcUovia*

□ rn-awt

atacaaabar ia tote ■

352

FtBOUL HUM OF MYUT1SAT1M

fmm ULrm put anauTWi am

PaawttntananU entire^ ntftiekicarion Berlin. Om or mam at Bat foUowinf

hi witk on

material available Cor rlnn to ran.

□ Information pertained only to • third party with oo reference to yon or the •ubject of your reaunaL

□ lofomation u at Ulu ad only to • thiri party. Yaar aaaa ia liatad in the tide cady.

□ Document! originated with another G wumeu i aeencyfaaX, Then documenti were referred to that
aeencY(ia) for review and direct response to job.

PifO contain lufui uultua rui pithed by another Corel aiueal ayncrtiei). Ton win be adrised by the FBI •
to the rekaiabitrrr of thn inform* boa following oar consultation with the other agenesia).

Pnaefa) withheld for (he fallowing meaorfah

□ For toot initiation

fH^-ri- r~n — c f . i„i. t ,v.-ji « 1 — 'ini tin [lanea

w~~. lmouHJCAvtm

353

354

355

Motiving offloat should not* tiilm 1
lnforattian rtgarding CXSRB dssonstrstlant, pldwfc Him, prot— ts, boyco tt a.
titilsx actlvltlt '

GC Othsr

In tat hundrada,

In reviewing tht mi mil— cf ODB Inwtstlgstion, Dalits
tubnltstht following two ssctlons. First 1b ■ list of grois?*, tlttaor la
of CUM or ga wwW with CHI9 la mm ftshlon. tt» ssoond la * list of
chapters and I atom tfaara pravldaS. Tbrnm lists an by no aaana aUr
lacluslvs. (*V Uj

list of grasps, organisations oonotcted wits CISRS Or
to sslstlon to CISRl astl-ltlas^ [ u)

»_ MiaiBta £n SjaUdarlt* with Qrtrajt M!a a? CttlBoSsn

krlcan working
aV Oir istisns Owornafl About 11 Sal<

riot Solidarity <koix> (CMS}, miT«:slt» of

UK), rhUsdtlfCds,

fit Hot ikl

KBf)

356

(mens a acunmnr wrra rm pbom or el salvmor j^)

T7 Ptli mwvmy GDadtta* In Solidarity with tha Paopla of El Salvador

(DVCSPB)

8. Tha Philadelphia Later Coarittaa In Stfpcrt of Daaocraey ana Biaan
Sights in SL Salvador (PLCSCBFEB)

9. fl» Hospital Mbrkara Onion (BO)

10. 3t» Afro-Mac lean Coalition for a Ft** Granada (MCPB)

11. The International Markers Party (IMP). Fhilafleljhia, Pennsylvania

12. Urn Nicaragua Solidarity Ctaalttee at ottroit

13. The Birmingham Caeittee in Solidarity with Central Mar lea

14. The United Gaapuaae Against nuclear Mar

15. lhe NDveaher 12th Onelltlon

16. The OiataaaTa Solidarity Cbmittae OCflGDA)

17. The San*

18. Faaoa Link*

19. Non-intervention in 81 Salvador Ccaadttee

20. The Central Man lean Solidarity Cnalltlon (CMC)

21. Tha People'a Cnalltlon for Paaba

22. National Netnork In Solidarity with tha alcaraguan Paopla

23. Tha Network Solidarity of tha Faople oC mataaala

24. Ttm Cantral Mas lean Solidarity ^aUtlm

29. ttm Cantral Mart ran Mnhllliatlon Cnalltlon (CWft)
26. rtm tL Salvador Coseltta*

357

34. The Tart Fore* "

33. The Blralnghea Cbmlttee In Solidarity with Central Aoerlca

36. The Neto<ort In Solidarity with the People off Hint— iTa QOSGa)

37. The People* e Alternative to the Kiosingae Oxmlaaion

38. Th* Association In Solidarity with Guateaaln (ASQGOft)

39. National Association of Wtraen's Religion

40. Washington Area Labor Ooanittea an Central America and the Caribbean

41. Case n Salvador

42. Central Ann lean Rtfugee Canlttee {GBBBBK)
U. O. 8. Antl-XBiwlallst League {tSAXL)

44. People's AntMfcr Itabillsatian (PMO

45. Qacax Baser* Cralltlnn

46. Oilan of OBocratlc ihUllptnav OOP)

47. Teatxo Nuestro

48. The OUtad rtaate front fOT)

49.

SL, Join

52. The

NDbUiaetion CballtkB {CMC}

CnMCk

858

M. Tit TMrrlJt TTttirw ni mnirt filia [TITIJ
$5. Or6Uiw tntar faith DMA ftm» an antral *mhm
SC. tt» mm Kii i bH In swawity with th» wm> Hem

«7.

S7. Itm OalaMfl

». f» «■> irin— » in annuity with th» —act tuaaucn

60. f!» Aob8 Bjalfttnoi Qdt

«1. «• O. fi.-Mttloo Borta OteiStma la ScOtferley with t)» IUU fa»

359

1 amirva nt wmioH wra tbe hcm or g. SMAfrPOR i '
76. Frairla Fir* Organizing CaaaittM RTQC)
77- A* Alliance for Survival

78. The Southern Christian Leadership Oonf«r«not

79. ACW

80. Tht Southern California Intarfaith TSs* Faro* on Central Anerica

81. Cua El Salvador

82. Caaa Nicaragua

83. Cal Stat* IA Latin taarlcan Society

84. Coalition Against the ttoroaa Dictator aMp;

85. Ctxnltta* In Solidarity with Central Marie*

86. Conmlttaa in Solidarity with the Palestinian Feopla

87. CcnnlttM to Resist the Draft

88. Gasanist Wcxkare Party

89. Danccratic Socialists of asbxIcb

90. Faaaratlon for Progress

91. El Rascata

92. Fanastras

93. Friends of the adversity of ZL Salvador

94. GuataeaJa Inforaatlcn
99. Barter Area Paac
98. Mdical ait flat A 8alv
97. Hxlaa) ftnAntia soriatgp
98* Maw Jevias MQsn0a>

360

WITH

vm wm or a, anaaoKi

100. Nicaragua lMk flare*

101. Revolutionary Socialist League

102. Socialist Party OB*

103. U. S. Out of Oantral Mario* (DBCCA)

104. U. 8. Anti-Xaperlalist Laagoe

105. U. 8. Vlatnaa Friendship Association

106. \fencereaas Brigade

107. National Alliance Jigainat Racist and Political Repression

108. Ctmnittaa of Central Aaarican Refugees (OCA)

109. nui
uo. m

111. Friends of the Nicaragua) Cultura

112. P GA i m lce Bcratr ft»iHn

113. Federation car Pragreas-Ssnaatras

114. a. 9. Catholic Oanreranot

115. El Salvador Oaaaittaa

116. Taak Pares en Si Salvador and Central naai lie

117. Oargy and Laity CDncamaS
116. mry RnoU Bletera

119. 8Ister* of Benedict

120. Ttm Mm Orleans Mcaraguan Solidarity Orgmlattlon 0OSO)

121. Aaneety TMwiai l.ml

122. I B sM ii ju j etaadttae Agalaat Registration to tfaa Craft

123. Frogreeeiva Student ■ktaork

361

Or B.

124. Prograaate Stuteit tteticrft ~

123. OcndttM In Solidarity of Puarto Rioo

126. Cdban Xnatitut* of Frlandahip

127. EPIC*.

128. FEB Solidarity Inflcmtlan Omt*x

129. HM3A

130. 8. ft. H. D. coalition for Bkawt Rights in Latin Anerlc*

131. filadl Liberation Axmy

132. SocUlUt ttxkara Party

133. Amrican Padaratlan at Taachars

134. American Rulstanca Oanitta*
139. Bro«n Biapanlei Oaawnity
136J. National Hard Tim* Oanfaranc* (HOC)
137. All Bacpla's Oo ng taaa
US. Xntarfaltb GWqp

Albany Odcnmn
Albugutrojua;

362

(X MOTBB IB ftXXBMtPHf WHB tBs" MMOf B. BHJIKUt
Baltiaara

Boston

Buffalo
Butts
Char lot ta
Chicago

Cincinnati
Clavaland
Colunbia, 8.C.

Bixadnghas Ccaadttaa In Solidarity with
Oantral
900 6th

205-786-4101

CXSRB - NX Region
124 S. Straet

North Hajptniy Msaschusetts
413-586-8471

CZSRBB - R.B. Mgfon

P. O. Box S2S .

Astor Station

Bos ten, ttaaaacbusetts

617-493-8699

OhknoMi

Oiknom

CZSRS — Central Rag ion
3411 «. Divcraity, Boos Ll
Chicago, Illinois
312-227-2720

Stav* rtuarstain

Ohknoan

4910 Bctnls Vlav
Dallas, Taos

214-375-3715 .

« Sistss Patricia Bldglay

363

ciimm w paMBTt wg thb ipm or tt am.vmo>

$25 S. 42nd StTWt
303-499-8GB

CXSFB - OrtnraUb SCtSogt
315 N. Ttjon

Colo r ado Springs, Qalnrada
479-7949

LMte • OataaJo Santa
P.O. Bos 2239
Bauldar, crilrwflo

Detroit CXSPBB

1920 25th Strwt
Detroit, Michigan
313-841-9200

EX PUB GSRS - Kl Pa*>

015-532-6133

CI Paso Solidafllf OBBltttf
P.O. Boa 9039
El pud* «na»

CXSPB9 - Sauall
808-942-0437

caps <■? florida SUt* QtSv«rcitf
Wl ahum, Florida
904-575-9343

iMtei falix Kteto Naat*
IffJ^JIT

364

CCWgTgg g l».imBT»wr Mm tg MM OF g. SUMMOC

city

Knesvllla

Littla Rack
Um Angelas

lailavUI*

Ma**!*

' - w.s.o.

2330 H. 011 vk
216-683-9750

t Cadllia Ositiy

\, Jr.

P.O. Boot 8597
adversity of
Bntvillt,
(EERMS)

KMflftTi Arthur

(HtnoMi

Oikton

A. CXSPEB - Bdho Put Chapter
1467 Echo Park Avenua
660-4587

B. GCSPBB LJU - Soft} Mil Raglan
P.O. Box 57337

la Angelas, California

213-484-1044

213-623-7176

pjO, BD

Louisville, Eantutty

502-584-3210

502-637-1423

t J. Phillip GTlffin

P.O. Bat 249123
Ooral Gahlas, ritxUk

rice Solidarity Coalition
1016 ■. 9th ftXMt
t, WlauiwUB

365

cmui'm n> sjuoam una vm, hom of g. flami

P. 0. BOB 1457*

£12-375-0105

ftobila

tlaaaxki

tta* Bran

Qifcmn
Q9B

2714 artta stratt or

916 St. Andnw Straat

8m CrLaan. Ioiiaim

504-523-5775

822-8884

482-7115

TwTif i Jdki LlndtC

New Tcrfe

19 w. 2Ut Stcaat

Haw Dock, Naw York

212-242-1040

mrm nmm naglan

853 Broadway ABU

NMf Yock# Nov VqebX

212-473-4848

NBcSalft

P.O. BOB 3070

HaapUm, Virginia

Po— ihla Laadart

3916 shall Boa*

Ttaajtnn. Virginia

aOMtamatf

CMMi - imiali— i

2937 B.W. 17th

OkUDOMCltr
405 949 1928

iMtei mm ft land

366

B iMtl

at aajDMoiY wrm vx fboflb cr a. aw

Philadelphia
Phoenix

Pitt«but9h

Portland
BlchnonS
Siaanto
St. Louis
Salt Lata City

122 Bortfa 40 Straat, #3

402-551-5678

teaderat Kan Jallnala
Jana Faabartan

CXSPES
215-386-9250

A. CISPBS - Phoenix
59 Daartrall

Phoenix, Arizona pondcroaa P»r*
Praaoott, Arizona
602-445-8954

Bm CISPSS - A.S.O.
Vanpa, Arizona

Leaders*

Michaal Steward
Prancie Lactones;

Central Anerlcan Mobilization Q&Utlcfl

P.O. Box 7234

X. Caraon Straat

Pittsburgh, Cexiaylvanla:

381-14»

Ohknowi
QhknoMi
Unknown

Oantral American Solidarity OnaHtlon
P.O. Bo> 511153
Salt Late City, Utah
801-533-9185

Leaders* Diana Potts
Diana Bynea

367

SBdBBV

omri'ia in auLiDMary with tsk aottg or bl salvxdcr

Son Diago

San Francisco

San Juan

Savannah
Seattlat

SprlngfiaU, IU.

VAahington, D.C

OS» - Baglanal Otfioa
P.O. Bo* 8407
Ohlvarsity c£
Austin, Tans

&oadars Brnesto Cordova

as»
714-692-947«

Laadarst Susan Norwood
Darudd Cohan
Norasn Sullivan

3410 19th Stiaat

San Francisco, California

115-861-0423

415-431-2113

t3nkno»«

Leaders Joan Birique Colan-Santana
Onknoan

dsns - Seattle
206-323-5698

asm

mi vanity c< Southern Florida

Cian - National Off las
930 F. Street
Docs) 720

Washington, O. C
202-W7-501*
202-887-5020
202-687-3023.
887-5021
202-»3-f43*
202-393-8437

can:-..-..

368

\ cawmg nt actnaum «b thb varus ct a s^lvadorI

« O. C. cent, i

WO Chapter

1322 18th Strwt, B.W.

Washington, 0. C.

202-822-9712

bufart h«W1 Travtr*

369

370

Lbla far

In «A r*gion aalaot <x» raglanal
A regional lMduiMp bcdy up

of the nolana! l
tha aub-reglnna *
facilitates th* iWlOHMBfe Of regional strategies. Soae regions hava rsglonai
off lost or eantare MhlcA Mm aa mom Intonation o an t a r a foe local
organizing. These cantata dletributs lltssatnxs, fllaa, all* i
with regional and local CXSHS, im, organising lto, and updates on
situations In H Salvador. There la also a national administrative
which la aada up of tha regional coordinators and designated" sasbari
national off lea staff .

are charged with tha following dutlaat

oC tha

a. To present qualified mDiin, allda thews, fllaa etc., fa
churches, local unions and ooemwiity gather Inge.

b. To organise dMcnatraticns, to keep constant
official! and alert ooaauUtlaa about continued Military
escalation.

on pfrltc

c. To e d u c at e tha public concerning tha altuatlcn In El Salvador
and praaantlng tha Ordtad Stataa aa tha

<3. To ralaa acney Cot what CtspSB says la refugee aide and to
support fHwi™ in tha nuVRR controlled sense In SI

Salvage*.

•. To participate In tha growing KX>
to Salvsdorans In tha Pfcltad Stataa.

investigation has detarsined that <
tilth tha tttitad stataa Catholic Church.
CXSFU ghlloaophy, ham i
illegal Salvadorans la tha Onitad Stataa.

to paBj$0p

la vary closely i

with:

las to ha used to !

372

TRANSMIT VIA:
O Teletype

□ Facsimile

□ man.

FBI

PRECEDENCE:

□ Immediate

□ Priority

□ Routine

CLASSIFICATION:
O TOP SECRET

□ SECRET

O CONFIDENTIAL

□ UNCLASEFTO

□ UNCL
Date

313

DIRECTOR, rBim99-88«8)

SAC. CIHCIKHATU (199C-SO0) (P)

COMIITTXE JN-SOLIDAHITY WITH THE

iT-tL-SALVSTjOR '
KOO: DALLAS!*.

This cotnnujilestloii it claidfled

entirety.

Sit HVEP5E

smi ras

t" in ttt

1 1 t | ft"M i t i f^iBn

ttecUufy on: OADft

Dallas
Detrol
Louisville"'
£ incinnat
(2 - 199C

99C-79S)
99C-2076) (SQ. Ct-1)
""9C-1SD)

1*9

1U IFTOSHTIO* tO!

rpi iotta» RjDwa
'i a . 1

toe

373

XXXXXX

xxxxxx

F JUL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA DELETED PACE INFORMATION SHEET

Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the Tile. One or more of the following statements, where
indicated, explain this deletion.

E^^beie ted under exemptions) _ with no segregable

material available for release to you.

D Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to you or the subject of your request.

D (n form a boo pertained only to a third party. Your name is listed in the title only.

D Document! originated with another Government agenry(ies). These document* were referred to thai
agency(iet) for review and direct response to you.

Pages contain information furnished by another Government agencv(ies). You mill be advised by the FBI as
to the rclcaubilit) of this information follow ing our consultation with the other agency(ies).

Paget e) withheld for the following reason^):

[ I For your information:

following number is to he used for reference regarding these pages:

xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

X DELETED PAGE(S) }}
V NO DUPLICATION FEE 0
X FOR THIS PAGE X
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

374

19K-S0D

Information which

Cinc innati hfa no
identical vlct^H

Cincinnati ha a only once bof ore heard references Co
the Central American Taek Force which waa the aponaor fox aa
advertisement la the Cincinnati Enmilrer Newt paper, p. C-8.
Tuesday, 3/24/81. At that time It waa~callad "The Cincinnati
Central American Teak Force" and lamed late It under that heading
waa carried the neaa "STEPHANIE LINDSEY, Slater a of Charity.
Mount St. Joaaph, Ohio 45051 <513) 244-4896". The article) mmm
entitled, Oat the People of El Salvador Decide I -

BEQUEST Of THE BUREAU ■ t

The Bureau la requested to furnish Cincinnati with
guideline! regarding Investigation of captioned matte*,
vla-a-via rellglo m organlia clone - epeclficallT the -

ch.

DETROIT omsiOS

At DETROIT . ttlCHIGAB

cimcpmati nmsicw

375

376

Irte) tc DalHs

E. Committee In Solidarity with . ,

the People of El Salvador (CISrES)K*J

t; - El Salvador) ^/g,) '
O: DbIIbb^,^^

NOTE. Above matter regarding surveillance was coordinated' trJth
Intelligence Division.

377

(Committee im soltdaritt wtTP

TUB PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR (ClBPE3j)fet.l - ft- '

IT - EL SALVADOR KStKl jM***-" tA -

This eomaunkHoa fa claaalflsd «ww f tn Its entirety.

Enclosed for rsclplent* It one copy of ■ B/1S/M letter to the Director from
Hike Boos, Progrsn Director for the Young America' ■ Foundation , end enclosures
to that tetter.

The enclosure la furnished for the Information of recipient* . (y^j

For the tnlbrnutloi) of Washington Field . a letter 1» being forwards to
Mr. Booa advising him to contact Washington Field should he hare further Inform stl<«Ji
which ha better ca may b* pertinent to the FBI's iireeatlgsjfvs responsibilities.

Enclosure)

1 - Alexandria (Enc.
I * Baltimore (Enc.)
I * Blnnlnghaaa (Eos

| - Boston (Ear.)

- Charlotte (Era.)

- Chicago (Ene.)

- Columbia (Boo.)

- Dallas (Enc.)

- Denver (Eno.)
I - Detroit (Ens.)
t - O Paso (Sao.)
9 - Houston (Ene.)
I - JscksccrrlDs (Bus
1 - Kansas City (Enc.
t - las Angelas (Kb*.

MB L. JjJ BWaal

Miami (Ene.)
Milwaukee (EM.)
Minneapolis (Ene.)
t - Hew Orleans (Ene.)
t - New Tor* City (Enc. '
1 - Norfolk (Ens.)
1 - FhQsdelphls (Ens.)
Phoenix (Eno.)
Portland (Ene.)
SI. Louis (Enc .)
San Antonio (Eno.)
Sen Dlrfo (Ene
San Francisco
nan Joan CEne . y
Tsasps (Ene.)
Washington

378

^YOUNG A .lERK^VS

FOUNDATION

SUITE 812. 11800 SUNRISE VALLEY DRIVE
" REST ONi.XIRCilNttJJOSf ^ (703) M0-J17iT"

Es^r

Btwrd of CKmtort
Prcudrm

RON ROBINSON
Ret i on. Virginia
KENNETH CRIBB. ES
Spartiruburg. South Carolina
FRANK, J. DONATELLL ESQ.
Washington, D.C
JAMES V LACY. ESQ
Withingion. D.C
RONALD PEARSON
Akundrta, Virginia

james b. Taylor

Cucutit* Director

MICHAEL BOOS

Program Director

NrioraJ Ad^borj Caaaac*

(Pin t>1 Luting)

HON. JAMES L BUCKLEY

Radio Free Europa

OR. GEORGE W. CAREY

Georgetown Uniwiity

RONALD F DOCtSAJ

Washington. D.C

HON JOHN P EAST

United Siatci Stnatt

JACK W. CULLAHORN. ESQ

Roan and GulLahom

DR. JAMES GWARTNEY

Florida Slate University

PROF. JEFFREY HART

Dan mouth College

HON HENRY J. HYDE

U S. Repreientaina)

JEFFREY D. KANE. ESQ

Portland. Main*

OR RUSSELL KIRI

Amhot

J. ALAN MAC I AY. ESQ

June 25, 1984

Mr. Edward J. O'Malley
Assistant Director of Intelligence
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building

Washington, D.f. 20003 , „ - CfM& l* *

Dear Mr. O"

HON. DANIAL A. MANIOM
Souk Bend. Indam

Forrest McDonald

Uaraemjr of AUbua
OS. CHARLES A. MOSCB
Tfct Gcoryr Washington Un
MR. THOMAS L PHILUPl
ftukfc i * . Phillipi PuNahinj Co.
MR. JAMES C ROBERTS
Thf While Home Frilowriapt
OR. CEORCE C. ROCHI IO
Pleader*. Hillidile Coifcaa
OA. DAVID NELSON ROW!
Viofcaor EMfW Ykk Ua
MR. WILLIAM A RUSHER
Pabbher. Mario**' Rnm
OK. ALAN NED SABROSKT
Oner far Stmept and

Enclosed please find a copy of an article
that I have written on DC CISPES and the supporting
documentation for the article.

This article, which exposes a DC^rf5££S_ project
designed to provide direct military assistance to
the terrorist FMLN/FDR in El Salvador, will appear
in n soon to be published issue of The American
Sentinel .

I obtained this Information and the supporting
documents by attending the 9 June meeting of CISPES.

If you would llk« more Information on this
meeting please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,

Mik&^Boos V
Program Director —

Enclosure

HON. WILLIAM L. SCOTT

Somar UJ. Seaaagv

MR. 1AM SLOM

ftnk of Haaaa

HON. FLOYD SPMCS

tl-S. R tpiumlMm

HON. STEVE STUMS

WMIaaSMi

DR. WAYN1 JL THOjrftjRN . -\
FREDERICK WlLHr\MJEM

379

FOR THE AMERICAN SENTINEL

GROUP IN NATION'S CAPITOL TO AID LETT-NING TERRORISTS

BY MICHAFL BOOS
25 June 1984

380

GROUP IN NATION'S CAPITOL TO AID LEFT-WING TERRORISTS

Documents obtained from a recent meeting of the Washington,
D.C. chapter of the Committee in Solidarity with the People Ci" ~
El Salvador (CISPES) reveal that the group will soon launch
a fundraising campaign to provide direct military assistance
to the Soviet supported Marxist terrorists seeking to overthrow
the recently elected government of El Salvador.

During its meeting of 19 June, the D.C. CISPES chapter
announced a plan to raise nearly $17,000 over the next six
months for a project dubbed "DC CISPES Material Aid Campaign."*
Funds from this campaign will be used to build a "shoe factory"
in the town of Tequeque, El Salvador. CISPES claims that this
shoe factory will be used to make and repair shoes for the
605 local residents of Tequeque and two small neighboring towns.
However, upon close examination of the DC CISPES documents
it becomes apparent that this project will Qo much more +h, art
provide shoes to the local residents. ^ •

The DC CISPES Haterlal Aid Campaign la actually part of
a comprehensive material aid project being jointly sponsored bv
San Francisco CISPES and a group calling Itself new El Salvador
Today INEST) . The SF CISPES/NEST project is designed to provide
nearly $45,000 in direct material aid to the "local popular
governments" of Tequeque, Los Albertos and Los Dubon. These are
three small towns located in El Slavador's Chalatenango province
All three towns are presently occupied by the Soviet supported
Marxist terrorists of the FMLN/FDB.

381

According to the DC CISPES documents, the goals of the
SF CISPES/NEST project are to "develop new values" in the

p * i

three small communities throuth "collective work," provide
food to the local population and the "popular army" (FMLN/FDR) ,
provide medicine tp the medical clinic, and to build a "small
shoe factory."

The DC CISPES chapter has agreed to raise the money to
build the shoe factory. This factory when completed wilj. be
able to make and repair over 6,000 pair of shoes per year. Since
the total population of Tequeque and its neighboring towns is
only 605, the project would appear to be designed to provide
every man, women and child living in the area with at least 10
pair of shoes. However this is not the case beo
are not being made and repaired for the exclusiv
local residents.

In reality the overwhelming majority of the
made and repaired by the Tequeque shoe factory will be used
by the FMLN/FDR. The documents from the DC CISPES meeting
acknowledge that the terrorists of the FMLN/FDR will be living
in the three occupied towns. These documents list the terrorist
FMLN/FDR as an advisory group to the "pupular junta" of the
"local popular government." And they state that food to be
grown in the area will be used to feed these terrorists.

Additionally, the DC CISPES documents state that the three
small towns targeted for the CISPES/NEST aid project are only
accessible by dirt roads that are "barely passable." Thus the

382

possibility that the surplus shoes will be used to trade with
other communities is quite remote. f

Furthermore, the "1984 CISPES National Administrative
Committee Strategy Proposal," an internal document published
by the CISPES National Office, states that one of the primary
functions of CISPES is to "provide material support for the
FMLN-FDR in El Salvador." " " ' ' ------ •-- --

Taking into consideration all of these facts, and the
fact that intelligence sources inside El Salvador report that
the FMLN/FDR relies upon the civilian population of occupied
areas for logistical support, there is only one possible
conclusion regarding the DC CISPES Material Aid Campaign. The
conclusion is that the primary beneficiaries of the Tenueque shoe
-factory will be the Soviet supported Marxist terrorists of the
FMLN/FDR. And the aid that the FMLN/FDR will receive from
CISPES will come in the form of combat boots, a\ype of direct
military assistance. — — "

*At the conclusion of the 9 June meeting of DC CISPES,
members were asked to volunteer to assist the chapter
in generating news media coverage for the Material Aid
Campaign. The first meeting for these volunteers was
to be held at 11:00 AM on 10 June at the national office
of the Institute for Policy Studies.

383

Eugene "Guv" Newport,

Mtyor oi flr'*e'ey. California
Barbara Chmtian. PhD
&r. Jose Onu
Margarita Studrmeisler
Tracey Schear, Kuionit Coordinator

EL SALVADOR
CENTRAL AMERICA

Project for Agriculture, Health and a Shoe Factory
for the Local Popular Government of Tequegue , Los
Albertos and Los Dubon, Chalatenango Province

StaH D**t Cr«rn«. Carnpi-f" Coo'dinaio' Sandra Seroai. Stun Cn*j Coccimaior Caih. Conit.

384

TABLE OF CONTENTS'

I. Geographical Location
II. Population Distribution
III. Political Situation
IV. Social Organization

V. Project Objectives
VI. Community Contribution
VII. Project Descriptions

A. Agriculture

B. Health

C. Shoe Factory

D. Total Project Budget
VIII. Project Follow-up and Control

385

Outline

Location of Project: The hamlets of Tequeque, Los Albertos and

Los Dubon, Chalatenango province. El Salvador.
Central America.

Duration of Project: 6 months
Population Affected: 605
Assistance per person: $75.00
Subtotals:

Agriculture

$21, 280

Health

6,563

Shoe factory

15,121

Total Cost:

$44,964

386

Project for Agriculture, Health and Shoe Factory for the Local Popular
Government (Poder Popular Local - PPL) of the hamlets of Tequeque, Los
Albertos, and Los Dubon.

3 . Geographical Local and Description of Project Site

The hamlets of Tequeque, Los Albertos and Los Dubon are found in the
municipality of Arcatao, Chalatenango. The most remote, Los Dubon, is
6 kilometers south of Arcatao. It is an area with small ravines. He
travel to Arcatao by dirt roads that are barely passable in the summer.

The soil is rocky and sandy and not very fertile, which limits
production to the winter, from May to October or November. Our hamlets
are humble ones with dirt roads that are dusty in the summer and muddy in
the winter. The houses, those left after such a prolonged war, are made
of adobe, clay bricks with straw, dried in the sun. The houses normally
only have one room plus a partially opened kitchen. There are also fruit
trees such as mango, lemon ,jocote , avocado, etc. There are dogs, chickens,
etc. although today there are fewer than before because many have been
killed during invasions and bombings.

II. Distribution of Population

We are a population of 605 persons (as of July, 19S3). A large part
of this is children. The population is distributed as follows:

Los Dubon Tequeque Los Albertos Total

men 45 51 84 180

women 36 47 96 179

children 46 79 121 246

total 127 177 301 605

We must admit that turn-over is relatively high due to the conditions
of war in which we live, which obliges us to evacuat je oca sslonally .

III. Political Situation

On September 25, 1983, in the northern province of Chalatenango, an
unprecedented event took place: the formation of the first sub-regional
government in the insurgent history of El Salvador. This constitutes
another step in the consolidation of the PPLs, permitting a greater dev-
elopment of collective work: production, health, education, self-defense,
etc. and increases the capacity to confront the the daily problems that
the war imposes.

The consolidation of the PPL has been made possible as a result of
the greater military control that the revolutionary forces exercise in
this province. Of the 3 3 municipalities In Chalatenango, 27 have been
virtually liberated from the Salvadorean government army by the FMLN.
90% of the province is controlled by the revolutionary forces.

Nevertheless, the army is constantly attempting Invasions, which forces
us to always be prepared and on the alert, taking the necessary measures
to defend our population. The last Invasions were in May of this year,
but we didn't suffer great losses.

387

IV. Social Organization

Our hamlets are organized within a PPL, the bases of the new
government. The PFL is the highest organism of popular leadership that
has been created in the zones under revolutionary control. Its principle
function is to organize the social and economic life of the population,
to consolidate the liberated territories and defend what we have won.

We have broken all the repressive patterns of the Alvaro Magana
regime, clearing the way for new forms of coexistence and work among
peoples. Within this framework, the PPLs are developing agriculture
and cattle raising, fishing, workshops, education and health care and
all types of political-cultural activities.

Our PPL is organized in the following manner:

President - Eliazar
Vice President - Alfredo
Committee Chairpeople

Production and Education - Narciso

Public Works - Marcos

Self-Defense - Carlos

We are conscious that only by working collectively will we be able to
consolidate the PPL and with it the zones of control and the revolutionary
movement. These are the most important factors to achieve our true
liberation.

V. Project Objectives

We have stated as our first objective, to
push collective work as the way to develop
new values in our community.

To secure basic nutrition for the population
producing enough to feed 605 people for one year.

To contribute to the nutrition of the companeros
of the popular army.

d. To provide the Tegueque clinic with basic medicines
for 6 months.

e. To establish a small shoe factory that would, in
6 months, take care of the most urgent need for
new shoes and repair those shoes that are still
useable .

VI . Contribution of the Community

- We have land available on which to plant the crops.

- We have some tools, such as machetes and sickles,
but we don't have all that is needed.

- There is a small clinic in Tegueque and we have
6 health care workers who can administer first aid.

388

treat the wounded, remove schrapnel, perform minor
surgery, and remove molars.

- We contribute our daily work not only in the area of
production, but also defending the crops, the workshops
and our people.

VII . Description of the Projects

A. Agriculture

1. We x plan to plant corn, sorghum, beans and vegtables,

attempting to cover the minimum necessities of the population
and to contribute to feeding the companeros of the popular
army, \floreover, we have io take into consideration, as a
consequence of the war, the fact that our crops could be
destroyed by the bombings of the Salvadorean Air Force.
We estimate that it will be necessary to plant 135 manzanas
of land distributed in the following manner:

corn \ sorghum beans vegtables

Los Dubon

8 manzanas

11 manzanas

5 manzanas

Tecrjecue

Los Albertos

26 ' "

11 "

Total

22 "

one manzana

equals 1.7

acres

We will plant primarily sorghum and corn, since the land is
not the best quality, and these crops give the greatest yield.
In regard to the vegtables, we will try to increase production
since we use them to feed the sick in the clinic. They are
also used to prepare popular medicines.

2 . Necessary Items

To plant the crops we have estimated the following requirement*

Corn 35 manzanas, per manzana ■= $173.00

Item Unit Price Total Cost

18qq of seed 33 5600.

fertilizers:

77 qq of formula

35 qq of sulfate
herbicides
insecticides

plus 10% administration

Total Cost 56,050

qq - quintal (1 quintal

100 pounds)

389

First Aid Kit

The overall necessities are calculated as follows

Analgesics
Antibiotics

Treatment supplies (gauze,
cotton, dissenf ectant,
bandages, etc.)

Plus 10% Administration

$117
667

667

$1,451
145

$1,596

Total Proposal for Health Project

Parasite Treatment

Anti-malaria

Vitamin Treatment

Anti-diarrhea

Skin disease

First Aid Kit

Total Health Project

4 , 686
829
455
586
. 411
1,596

$8, 563

■^.C. Shoe Workshop

y Given the huge need, we want to establish a shoe workshop

that would, in part, provide new shoes and repair used ones.
Six companeros will be able to produce 100 pairs of shoes
per month and repair 430 per month.

Equipment and Tools

2 .sewing machines

$2,000

15 shoe

375

3 metal feet

18 shoe maker's knives

120

7 hammers

7 tongs or forceps

$2,591

Plus 10% Administration

259

Total

$2,650

390

2. Materials for Production for € months

92 leather sheets

92 sole sheets

138 neolite sole sheets

184 undersoles

18 boxes of machine needles

138 cones of thread

138 sponge sole sheets

92 boxes of eyelet holes

27 gallons of glue

230 dozen heels

46 boxes of 1 inch nails

55 boxes of >j inch tacks

73 boxes of buckles

Plus 10 % Administration
Total

3 . Total Cost of Project

Tool 3
Materials

D . Total Cost of Proposal
Agriculture
Health

Shoe Factory
Total proposal

$1,360
920
2,070
1,127
150
276
1,840
491
252
1,840
46
55
608

11,155
1,116

12,271

2,650
12,271

$ 15,121

$ 21,280
6,563
15,121

$ 44,964

VIII. Follow-up and Control -

Our government junta will respond to the donor regarding the
use of funds and the development of the projects. With the
execution of these projects the Production and Economy and
Social Affairs Committees will be assisted in beginning the
projects through their respective production and health
collectives. .

We seek your urgent approval of the solicited funds, which
totals $44,964, to meet the needs of the population
satisfactory. We thank you in anticipation of your assistance
and solidarity to strengthen the case of the Salvadorean
people .

PPL of Tegueque, Los Albertos and
Los Dubon

391

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392

A Commiutt of Sin FrantiM-o CISfES

UIJj WIHM.'l

CANVASS TO SAVE ^
LIVES IN EL SALVADOR

Door to Door Campaign to Raise JQinds for
Health and Agricultural Supplies:

The Tequeque
Project

Ub PrM» CartliCcm*
Ttqwcqv** EJ Stlwbdw id Up

i by raumi fudi for halik

Harry Brill Urges Vour Support

On Mir t"ih our t e*l it »
mw fundi IMrA Ik* m.OTJG

•td ato » tdVou buiwl;«lf of

kClWll Art-erttA

Mir by jflinnj ui m Lht feu
anrii* TC* J» T«-

Inside:

• EJ Salvador ttenioni uced
to tup up niliury nd

• Thoutuds tonufid vuj
killed in EJ £ih idor duj-
bif Duirw'i Lui pr&ica-

• 14,000 U.S. miliury
Utxipi vtrt iovCkirtd id
nuliiiry nrrcitci in Of
DC*J Clflllll Amend.

• U.S. rejecu FMLN puot
prepouJ

« Bcfutm fornd to nk>
aie for mlimynt icl**

J j tlivu <d b* PlWM

c 1 1 pLt " cjt -h^t > r " " -|

p»sfJf If Io^j [I ly. niter ad

■ BB v^iil tar 7 S I

• HI hi bay 1 M «< ha

» 110 ■mil buj JQCC •»

Ma to «Hf Hint f-f m B ffttUttix f J™*"

"^1

VOLUNTEERS NEEDED:

SUNDAY, MAY Z0(h: Training & Speakers: 1 :3C-2:30pm Canvass: 3 :00-7 :00
MEET AT HOLY REDEEMER SCHOOL, 11*7 Diamond Si«et at 18th, SE

393

DC CISPES Material Aid Campaign
"tentative Income Breakdown

July - August:

Social/Cultural Event (early Aug.)
5 House Meetings
1 House Party

Street work (tabling i canvassing)

$ 600
$ 1000
$ 500
$ 500
S 2600

September:

Reception and Mass Event with PPL rep
2 House meetings
Street work

S 4000
$ 400
$ 200
$ 4600

October:

Street work
Mass Mailing
Yard Sale
3 House Meetings
1 House Party

$ 200
S 1500
$ 1000
$ 600
$ 500
3900

November :

Concert

2 House meetings

$ 3000
$ 400
S 3400

December :

Benefit

3 House mettings

$ 1500
$ 600
2"IO0

Total July - December

$16600

394

J >31 i 3 ; C

ft p, 1 o. 10 J M

FtOflU IUIIAU Of INVIITIGATON
COftUHUMCAION MIltAGI fOtm

9* J-**-

to-

ROUTINE

• F131IBR B*-BH-B * - Ct IL IV DL EN E E EP HO J kTC L* - l t.n n ni
BP- fi e NM li lffl W ' f N r PC PG PP 50 5P S r 8 J T P W fJ^

DIRECTOR FB I*]

'"jO FBI ALBUaUERUUE' ROUTINE
FBI BALTiriORE ROUTINE '
FBI BIRMINGHAn ROUTINE
FBI BOSTON ROUTINE
FBI CHARLOTTE ROUTINE
FBI CHICAGO ROUTINE
-|_FBI CLEVELAND ROUTINE
FBI DALLAS ROUTINE
FBI DENVER ROUTINE
.FBI DETROIT ROUTINE
.FBI EL PASO ROUTINE
JBI HOUSTON ROUTINE
_TBI JACKSONVILLE ROUTINE
.FBI KANSAS CITY ROUTINE
LFBI LOS ANGELES ROUTINE

FBI_10UI$VILLE. —ROUTINE

CUlyfied b,^£i^^^
DedmW, ok OUR

HI H>F."X«ATK<li CO«TAIKD
IICiPT *f.iml SHOW

fct v

3*)

395

DtPAITVENI Of JUSTICE
FEDERAl BUIEAU Ot INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FOIM

CONTINUATION SHEET

i PAG E TUQ-JE Hfl 01311 > C e R E
FBI HIAni ROUTINE

FBI MILliiAUKEE ROUTINE

FBI MINNEAPOLIS ROUTINE

FBI MOBILE ROUTINE

FBI NEW HAVEN ROUTINE

FBI NEU ORLEANS ROUTINE

^_FBI NEU YORK ROUTINE

_FBI NORFOLK ROUTINE

_FBI OKLAHOMA CITY ROUTINE

_FBI PITTSBURGH ROUTINE

FBI PORTLAND ROUTINE

j_FBI SAN ANTONIO ROUTINE

i FBI SAN DIEGO ROUTINE

[fbI SAN FRANCISCO ROUTINE

,[_FBI SAN JUAN ROUTINE

j_FBI TAMPA ROUTINE

: FBI WASHINGTON FIELD ROUTINE

-L C « L-T SECTION 1 OF E

, f C OMM I TTEE IN SOL IDA R I T Y UITH THE PEO PLE OF EL SALVAD O R UISPE S > :

| DO NOT TYfE MESSAGE SEiO.V THIS LINE " _

396

397

;iriii-mc»iuilo

8*1 tD OH THE ABOVE. THERE XX SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR THIS

4 JHVESTI6ATI0H- XT I1UST BE NOTE*. HOWEVER, THAT TUNY OF THE

PEOPLE AND CROUPS INVOLVED WITH CISPES CO SO FOR POLITICAL.

i_CnOTIONAL. OR SOCIOLOGICAL REASONS AND ARC HOT AWAKE OF OR

THVflLVm TM THE CISPES COVERT AtTTVlTtfS EHUHE RATEB A BOVI
DO NOT IT?l MIMAGI MkOW lHIt UN*

398

PAGE FIVE BE Hfl 0131

JATiO?! 5>iriT

■Li

THEREFORE- IT IS ITERATIVE THAT THESE INVESTIGATIONS ARE

-JCUSCLY SUPERVISED AND. HONITOREt TO ENSURE OUR INVESTIGATIONS
, 3 JO NOT INFRINGE UPON THE RIGHTS OF THESE INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS

PROTECTED BY THE CONSTITUTION.
, 4 _ SOT1E OFFICES HAVE REPORTED INFORMATION RECENTLY REGARDING
POLITICAL STATEMENTS AND POLITICAL LOBBYING BY CISPCS OR CISPES
AFFILIATES - SUPERVISORS IN RECIPIENT OFFICES MUST CAREFULLY
MONITOR THIS AND RELATED INVESTIGATIONS AND ASSET OPERATIONS
_NITHIW YOUR RESPECTIVE DIVISIONS TO ENSURE APPROPRIATE
DIRECTION- TARGETING- AND REPORTING •

409

XXX XXX

xxxxxx
xxxxxx

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA OELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

Pafre(s) withheld entirely at this location in the Tile. One or more of the following statement*, where
indicated, explain this deletion.

SJ^Deli

eted under exemplion(s)

with no segregable

material available for release to you.

ZD Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to you or the subject of your request.

lZ3 Information pertained only to a third party. Your name is listed in the title only.

mi Document! originated with another Government agencv(ies). These document* *ere referred to that
agency(ies) for review and direct response to you.

Pages contain information furnished by another Government agencv(ies). You * ill be advised b\ the FBI at
in the releasability of this information following nur consultation with the other agcncv(irs).

Page<s) withheld for the following reason(s>:

O For your infomiatiofi:

Uowing number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

xxxxxx
xxxxxx
xxxxxx

xxxxxx xxxxxxxxxxxxx

X DELETED PACElSl X
8 SO DUPLICATION FEE 5
X FOR THIS PAGE S

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

418

7 « 1 . '

10/17/AhJCM

it ; » w

FH DIRECTOR FBI
TO FBI ALBUdUERdUE ROUTINE

FBI BALTItlORE ROUTINE

FBI BIRMINGHAM ROUTINE

FBI BOSTON ROUTINE

FBI CHARLOTTE ROUTINE

FBI CHICAGO ROUTINE

_FBI CLEVELAND ROUTINE

FSI DALLAS ROUTINE

FBI DENVER ROUTINE

FBI EL PASO ROUTINE

FBI HOUSTON ROUTINE

_FBI JACKSONVILLE ROUTINE

_F9I KANSAS CITY ROUTINE

FBI LOS ANGELES ROUTINE

.FBI LOUSIVILLE ROUTINE

FBI niAni ROUTINE

Fit*. 1 msm JE-

JO MOT TYPt MEiiiSI Si LOW Irtll .INI

|io/i7/aH ^r

•OCX

419

'AGE TWO DE HU 018

FBI MILUAUKEE_ ROUTINE
FBI MINNEAPOLIS ROUTINE
FBI MOBILE ROUTINE
FBI NEV HAVEN ROUTINE
FBI NEV ORLEANS ROUTINE
FBI NEW YORK ROUTINE
FBI NORFOLK ROUTINE
FBI OKLAHOtH CITY ROUTINE
FBI PITTSBURGH ROUTINE
FBI PORTLAND ROUTINE
FBI SAN ANTONIO ROUTINE
FBI SAN DIEGO ROUTINE
FBI SAN JUAN ROUTINE
FBI TAMPA ROUTINE
FBI WASHINGTON FIELD ROUTINE
BT~"

.. _ . SECTION TUO OP TU<Q£.J

^OHMITTE IN SOLIDARITY UITH THE PEOPLE Or EL SALVADOR tCISPES^f^
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM - EL SALVADOR

[si

CO NOT ITPI MESSAGE 3E10W THIS UNI

420

XXXXXX

xxxxxx
xxxxxx

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA OELETEO PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

Pafe(a) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statement*,
indicated, explain this deletioB.

[^Ddeted under exemptioo<e)

Deleted under exemptioata) with no sepegabto

material available for release to yotu

O Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to you or the subject of your request.

□ Information pertained only to a third party. Your name is listed in the title only.

O Documents originated with another Government agencyftes). These documents were referred to that
•gcncyfies) for review and direct response to yow.

Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency<ies). You will be advised by the FBI I

to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agcncyfies).

Page<a> withheld for the following reason* a >:

□ For your iiiibmaboat:

QJ^Tte following ■xaafear is to be used far iafai— ls » regard lag these paaajr

xxxxxx

X DEUCnB PMM 2

(no duplication re t

421

DO NOT TYM MISSAGI StlGW THIS UNI

422

PMM #n«.*s

. TRANSMIT JTA:

□ F«3|p IMTERULAIIMI1§

CLASHFICATION:

□ TOPSCCfleT

□ 86CHET

□ OONFCeiTUL

□ UNCLAS EFTO

0 sr v^u i

■3!S> (IMC-517) (»> («0 3)

nlcation art

SUBJECT! ~ mm pBMBMMI WTTil.

■ JBBgnQa B. g»f,vnfg° (cispes

Jtr-n SALVADOR j ~—

(?°' ^JfrO

The entire contents of tblt
classified ' MOMf Ag

** Atlanta teletype to Director, 2/2 5/8 5. (vj

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original an
four copies of an LHM titled aa above. Inclosed for
each receiving office are two coplaa of the LHM.

Mo specific leads ara being aat forth for receiving
office*. Atlanta baa no specific information that any of the
v eh idee whose license plates are shown oa the enclosed
lhm were occupied by conference participant*.

Y* *T" T.l

' A it ■■ ■ m*--

-1I4I) (Inc. Hlf£r^*

(be. 2}
ColuAla/TCne. 2)

Dellaa£qiac-7t5) {Hoc. 2> Htfat^W
Jacksonville} (inc.

Mew OrleeHSj (lM<?-3tl7 fine, a)
(2 - lttC-3V

^BET MATFTW. ATTAOltP °*

nisaeUl

423

UJ.1

Federal Burnt. A Inratigitkm

(Atlanta, G«org i*//, i

UKicp *. wis J(Kf

CcCMIITTBI IX SOLIDARITY WITH THE

PEOPLE OP EL SALVADOR fCISPESfJ Q\. I

Markings, notation*, and other Itema of information

1985, obtained a flyer and a prog ranAegiiitmt Ion for» for
the cispes conference to be held at toe Little Five Points
Coaaunity Center, 1013 Auetin Avenue, North** at, Atlanta,
Georgia, February 23 <eind 24, 1)1! r-wfej «tSKe r.taoB

424

Committee in solidarity with the
people of el salvador (cispesjjj^j

SE^^T

Observation of the Little Five Points Community
Center the evening of February 22, 1985, determined there
were only. about a dozen vehicles in the parking lot, and
that a dance program was scheduled at the facility that
evening.

On February 23, 1985, the following license plates
were observed on vehicles parked at the Little Five Points
Community Center:

North Carolina

PAB 337
SHX 887

Alabama

1C 67349
IF 88875
2A 99046
2C 67498
1C 22998

Ohio

LGV 374

South Carolina

WNE 263

Tennessee -

8C6S31
737H91

Flor ida

RPK 495
AIP 039

airs 5

425

^COMMITTEE IN SOLIDARITY WITH THE
PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR (CISPESyjj^Jj

Loui siana

IN 406

Georgia

BFN 347
CIK 283
CZE 395
JBE 723
GEW 782
HGR 871
GMD 307
F2X 398
GCC 843
APC 522
HAA 4 28
CDN 607
EMN 553
AME 6 39
HGO 24 6
BKW 763
GDY 608
RG 1983
DA J 490
ANY 863
RE 6228
ATE 755
DDK 4 37
HKE 784
QB 3396
EWN 914

A copy of the flyer and program/registration form are
attached as part of this communication.

426

428

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•4

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k k 0 <
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k~4^ckc8~4-«3'a).2ka mm * •
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5 *. m C n k tt ** m c *a - _ -

-« k • • 3 « O ■ a k 3 O O

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4 *> K) 4 « b. C *-» * 4 « 0 k X

t.-4C.O.C a a c x a *> o a
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- ■ - --OC^«« - * ' ~

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£ C O k 3

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«*4>«£« a k * *> * «k«

w c *> ** c a*««B3<>tkoia

kS-4 « -£«£C l. *> C ^

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fdkoa •ooiii
a**-^^-a*>**-^5aa-^ m
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a»»e a ■— • • ^ -4 u £ c *j
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aokaj*>a«waa tea

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a o k ♦* _

a £ k O T» -« 4 »

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3 a £ k o x» -« a » a >ku
_ _ >*>*»*.T>eak<-«0*«3-4

cf>o>oo**«<ua«**ca^«-*cvc c *- caaA*> w .c o «-> *>

• a U4C«-« •« 4>»o 3440^a0a*4£ c tj g

^•w^k^ai^ ao c ** o ** a- Sa o • c t» a

oowgkakO-o M »akk«* > * -* a k c 1 > a k

*4-^co*4-^abc M *- k a 4 a c -4*££cak>o- ' -4 a o « o

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429

TRANSMIT VIA: PRECEDENCE: CLASStPCATtON:

□ Teletype □ Immediate □ TOP SECRET

D FiealmHe □ Priority', ■ ' * □ SECRET

C AIRTEL □ RouW * " ' ' • □ CONFIDENTIAL

□ UNC LAS E F T O

□ UNCLAS

TO: SAC, DALLAS (199C-795)

FROM: SAC, BOSTON (199C-950I (C)

TITLE : COMMITTEE IN SOLIDARITY
WITH THE PEOPLE OF
EL SALVADOR (CI5PES)
IT-EL SALVADOR
(OOs DL)

This comnunicati.cn la class:, tie: "WCMV" in its entirety.
Re BS airtel to FBI HQ, 2/22/84.

;!ouilm^inayretwo (2) copies of an LHM, captioned

A review of captioned matter indicated that the enclosed a
LHM had not been disseminated to Dallas, office of origin in the
CISPES matter.

has never been

For information of Dallas
observed, contacted or confronted by

Additionally, Dallas should be made aware that the New
Institute of Central America, an organisation located 1151 Mass-
achusetts Ave., Cambridge, Mass. was broken into during the period
of 4/20-2 1/B5 . This address houses most of the CISPES related
organixationa in the Boston area. Allegedly, these offices were
burglarized in Nov. and Dec., 1384 and a spokesperson for the group
stated, "We don't know who did it, but it fits the pattern of
attempting to silence opponents of U.S.

(z>- Dalles U99C-79S)

2 - Boston (1-199C-B15)
, (1-199C-950)

policy*

/T/- if*- SK3

0 1 I I ml N ■ i T T i ll ff ' ~*

*4t

Approved:

Transmitted

(Number)

(Trne)

430

TRAMBMT VIA:
□
□

□ TOP

□ CONFBENT1AL,

□ UNCLMIFTO

□ UNCUS

•74/H

HMITTE8 III SOLIDARITY **»
THE PEO P LB~~gP BL S*LV KVQK I CI S PBS
IT - BI. SALVADOR
(00 1 DALLAS)

lis entire comaunli

Enclosed tor Dallas, Now Orleans, and San Antonio, an
ona hundred four (104) photographs each of a march conduct ad In
Houston, Texas on April 30, ISIS by tha Tans April Mobilisation
for Peace, Justice, and Jobs.

For information of receiving offices, on April 20. 1915,
the Texas April Kohl Illation for Peace , Justice, and Jobe at aged a
danonatration and rally In downtown Bouaton, Texas. A aurvailluc

Dallas fine*. 104)
San Antonio (toes. 104
Albuquerque
Haw Orleans (toes. 10 4)
Phoanix

REVIEWED fW™|^^=

431

gf the demonstration determined there war* « pproxiMteiy four .
Jundred (400) participant* in tha demonstration. Because of
torrential rains, tha demonstration and march vara short-lived.

In Coram t ion received from ral labia a a Bat a at tha Houston
Off ica determined there ware individuals participating in the
above -described demonstration who war a f ran the San Antonio and
Austin, Texas araaa, aa well aa new Orleans > Louisiana, and Dallas,
Texas.

The following la a liat of
during this surveillance!

LICEH31
358GPH

XIU191

owra

HERTZ CORPORATION

38 37 11-73731 Airport Blvd.

Austin, Texas

if*

of tha licenses noted

A wan parked at the site of
the demonstration into which
a number of marchers and
participant* an tar ad and
exited.

This vehicle is a reddish
brown Toyota which was observed
following the marchers and
parking, at tha ait* of tha
s j J) sequent rally. Tha license
frame stated that the car wan
purchased in Saa Antonio and
was being driven by a whit*
female.

432

REQUEST Of KEC1IVIIW OITICBS . t C . .

Racaiving officaa ara raqttaatad to check off lea indie* ■ on
tha abova-naaad IndiTiduele whoa* vehicle* vara obeerved Id tha abova-
dascribad demonstration. Any further action taken concerning the a*
individual* ia being laft to taa respective of fic*a.

Delia* i Raw Or lean*, and San Antonio are r aqua a tad to advlaa
Houaton if any Of tna Individuala depleted in tha ancloaad photograph*
an identified.

433

* .

TRANSMIT VIA:

Tabtjpa
□ Facsimile

FBI

AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

□ ImiiIIiIi

□ PtkrMj

SEl

i^R^T

CLASSIFICATION:

□ TOP SECRET

□ SECRET

□ CONFIDENTIAL
CD UNCLAB E F T 0
CDUNCLA8

n... 3/6/84

TO:

FROM:
SUBJECT:

DIRECTOR, FBI

(ATTN: CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

SAC,
BXLVJ

PITTSBURGH '

tLVADORAN LEFTIST ACTIVITIES

TW tut; united STAT ES

BUDED: 3/9/84

•ntircty .

jr "*f tut

C^-ati'ty,— ;^ -rr.'

Dc:'.:-jtj»*jr AS

nrr ^ /r-/»ff

This communication is cl«*^rfl*d "S^p^et* in Its

Re Bureau teletype to Pittsburgh, dated 2/16/84, cap-
tioned as above.

Pittsburgh has identified a chapter of the Committee In
Solidarity With the People of El Salvador (CISPIS^ that is active
in its division. This chapter calls itself the Central American
Mobil iiati o n Coalition (CAWC) .

MEMBERSHIP

groups,

The Membership of the CAKC Bay be divided into two
the 'core* membership that consists of those members

SEl
Classff

Declassi^fy,

By G-3
OADR

1- Bur«au

(VBoston (For Info.)

2- Los Angeles (For Info.)
4-Pittsbur gh

(11. ^

Cft*ov*d:

Trtuaittad

r Mnmi tnts

434

SUPPORT GROPES -

According to CAMC literature, on December 3, 1983,
Central American Solidarity Committee* from throughout
New England Anet in Boaton for • regional conference and estab-
lished the Bew England Central American network (NBCAN)..
This was the first attempt to coordinate at the regional level
the work of three national networks: CISPIS, the Wetwork
in Solidarity with the Guatemala n People (NISGUA) . and the
./ national Network j n Sol' foaritv Wi' th Nica ragran People (NNSNP) .

On December 10, 1983, 150 solidarity activists from
the Northwestern region of CISPIS met in Oakland, California.
Eighteen chapters took part in this.

v ' Locally, the CAMC receives substantial support from
The Thomas Mqr ton Cei^er (TMC 1 . a *store front* type organiza-
tion. The TMC is located at 1111 E. Carson Street, Pitts-
burgh, Pennsylvania, 1S203, describes itself as a "Ministry
for Peace and Justice" and is actively involved in many
political issues including nuclear disarmament, 'war resis-
tance," and human rights. The TMC appears to act as the head-
quarters for the CAMC. Also supporting the CAMC is the Mili-
tant Book Store, Socialist Workers Party (SWP) , Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania, a propaganda outlet for the SWP which occasionally
operates as a mailing address for the CAMC. Frequently attending
CAMC activities and making financial contributions to the CAMC
are members of the Young Socialist Alliance of Pittsburgh •
(YSAP) and the Young Lawyers Guild (YLG) . Pittsburgh notes
that the connection between theae above-listed groups with
the CMAC la as much personal as it Is political. Several mem-
bers of the TMC who are primarily active in other areas,
such as nuclear disarmament, have worked closely with CAMC
core members in other political causes in the late
sixties and early seventies. Many CAMC members are ex-SWP and
YSAP members.

SEPTET

435

■)"ANSMTT VIA:
U Teletype
□ Facsimile
3 Airrg]

PRECEDENCE:

□ Immediate

□ Prtodty

□ Boutins

ALL t«F"BM.T«» eWTM«D

CLASSIFtCATlON:

□ TOP SECRET

□ SECRET

□ CONFIDENTIAL

□ UNCLASEFTO
O UNCLAS

Date . 1/Z5/B6

DIRECTOR,
(ATTENTION:

FBI

CID/IT-GU, SSA fj

E T

FROM:

. NICARAGUA^ TERRORIST MATTERS J
IT-NICARAGUA"

SAC, j= £^ICAGO (l^C-l«99y C)

This communication is classified "SESTET
its entirety.

1986.

Re Chicago teletype to Director, dated February 13,

On April 11, 1986, JOHN D. REIF, Physical Security
Specialist, Federal Protective Service (FPS), District 1
staff, 536 South Clark Street, Chicago, Illinois, furnished
information regarding the individuals who were arrested
February 12, 19B6, by the FPS for "Creating a Disturbance"
and "Conformity With Signs and Direction" in connection
with an activity sponsored by the Pledge of Resistance
protesting United States involvement in Central America.

Listed below are the individuals who were arrested

February 13, 1986

1 . Name :

CVBureau
^Chicago

7 earn

a cl as s i f y en OftDIV / j v

Approved:

Transmftted

139 OCT lO^®

i (Number)

(Time)

i' f ' * ti'^-i^SL

436

199C-1499

Name :
Address

Name ::
Address:

Telephone:

Race :
^"'Sexi^r,*,

_DO&i

height:

Weight:

"»"•

9 . Name :

Address:

Telephone:
Race:
'Sex: -
- -TOB: .'
' Height :
Height :

10.

11.

Name :
Address:

Race:

Sex:
DOB :
Height:
Weight:
-SSAN:

Name;
Address :

Race :

— Sex :*"'_"

12.

Name :
Address:

Telephone :
Race :

Sex:

' DOB:

Height:

5tns IMfJ-ffilHS

SHtoT

SECRET

Chicago, . Illinois, £065?

White

' Pema'le_~
September -. ^

437

CG 199C-1499

REIF, FPS, advised that on the morning of April 14, 1986,
the Pledge of Resistance held a demonstration in the Federa
Plaza, Chicago, Illinois, which was attended by about 250-3
people. KROK advised that approximately 75-100 people
entered the Post Office adjacent to the Plaza and about
half of that group spread themselves on the floor. Another
group stayed outside the building and pounded on the glass
windows. KROK advised the Post Office was unable to conduct
business and access to the building was controlled for
30-45 minutes. The CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT assisted
in removing the people from the Post Office. KROK advised
the event appeared to be well orchestrated. He advised
there was no violence and no arrests were made. —

The above is for information of the Bureau,
is conducting no investigation in this matter.

Chicago

438

CG 199C-1499 „

Hair:
Length;
Eyes:

Nane:
Address:

Telephone
R ace:

-DOB: ■

"Height:
Height
Hair :

Facial hair:

On March 19, 1986, five individuals, including
the above three, were issued citations by the FPS for disorderly
conduct and preservation of property. The other two Individuals
are described below:

Address:

Ra ce :
_gei:" —
_DQB;

Height:

Weight:

Hair:

Harae :
Address:

Telephone :

Age:

On March 20, 1966, five individuals were cited
panphlets on Fede ral proper ty tho se cited w ere:

who was one o
19SE,

the individuals arrested on February
On April 1*, 19B6, DONALD J. KROK and JOHN D .

439

FORMS. TEXT HAS 1 DOCUMENT

»-* « * '

ihsox.20 loose)

TEXT :

SAO0B3 3 4 2 2 1 ^ S z
RR HQ JK NH til WFO
DE 5A
/ W B92165Z DEC 86

^/''fM SAJ ANTONIO (1»UA-8EH) (ROC)

PLoA

to director, fbi routine
-Jacksonville routine
new haven routine
nek york routine

wfo ROUTINE

^L.umMAT.DNMKTWHEtt
EXC£P- SHIM SHO*H

y c c i e t

PLEDGE OF RESISTANCE; DS/T; ^Oj)hew YORK.

fed

mtfy en: OftDlr ^

440

441

RMS. TEXT HAS 1 DOCUMENT
I1JEOX.2 (19547)

'JUIaqbco 34411!

, R¥„?e vun KM

I5SZ

RR HQ JK NH HY HF
DE SA

» 10H55Z DEC EG
FM SAM AI.'TONIO (100A-NEWJ (RUC)
TO D1RTCTOR, FBI iOUTl:JE

JACKSONVILLE ROUTINE
(JEW HAVEN BOUT I HE
NEW l'ORK ROUT ItJE
WFO F.OUTIHE
2T

iUIHfORMATIOK CONTAIMtO

EXMnV.'HIRl SHOWN
OTHERWISE

. '

'4 ..

6— B P 1

"PLEDGE OF RESISTANCE; O S/T: OO: NEW *ORK

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET

Declasftfy on: OflDR V

ITS EKTIRLTY.

(Raw

442

MFAKTMHT OF JDSTICI

II AI1TIL

DATE; 2/17/g?

TO: DIRECTOR, Pit

F«OM:^^^IAC, HEW HAVER (100A-22M3) (»UC)

SOlJECTcl ^FLEDGE OF RESISTANCE
I DS/I
OD: HEW YORK

•t ■ f

DEC
OH

Tt -'- aa '■

-n minimi jiim' i .-At.

12/J/B6.

RE: Ecu Antonio tilttjpr to Bureau and Hew Haven,

(t)- IUREAD

HEW TORE

#WEU HAVEN (100A-224SI)

■ 81ml Mil] If U J > ~
■ llIHIIIJ Ul UH»t>

4 tfT-

443

444

MESSAQE RELAY VIA TELETYPE n - >
(RESTRICTED USE), |

Dais: ' lO ' 86 PRECEDENCE: □ IMMEDIATE □ PRIORITY ROWlNE

FM: DIRECTOR, FBI "^'i^f^CO

T0 7 // ALL INFORW'IOM C3NTAIHI*

JJ • ■ HEREIN IS USt'.rESintO

/ 'i.Lf' • . EXCEPT Wi'.EP.E SHOWN '

^ n i

□ While HOUM/VVH/

□ Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Frearms/BATF/
^ Central hteeaence Agency/CIA/

□ CIA DCD/DCD/

□ Dept ol Energy HQ&'DOEHQ/

□ Dept. ol Energy Germentown DfV/DOE/
^ Dept ol JueUce/DOJ/
^ Dept ol StBlefDOS/

Dept ol the Army/DA/

□ Depl ol TreeauryfDOT/

□ Defense tnleligenca Agency/DvV _

^A^^s4^y- c f ,

Declassify on: OADR ' r.r.'l. "" ' U - ' '

Classification: _

D Dlreclof National Security Agency/NSA/
X Dlrectof Navel irvasligatfce Servfce/DRNAVINSERV/

□ Drug Enforcement Admln./DEA/

□ FAA Weehfngton HO/FAA/
J( HO AFOSI Boeing AFBDC/AFOSIV

INSCOM Ft. MeedeflNSCOM/

□ Nuclear Regulatory Commlaalon/NRC/

□ U.S. Cuatoma Servte/UCS/

□ U.S. Immigration a Naturabatton Servfce/MS/
ft U.S. Secrel SeryteAJSSS/

^Other: tA. <. Al/^^HA L. SCP-VlCe,

AddrMt** Internal Distribution

For

00 NOT FU WrfHOUT^yMUNICATIONS STAMP

10 8 SEP 2 ss?

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